Control of the Kim Regime’s Political Prison Camps

By Robert Collins 

Following the July 6, 2016 release of the U.S. State Department’s “Report on Human Rights Abuses and Censorship in North Korea,”[1] the U.S. Department of Treasury commendably followed up on July 7, 2016 by naming several North Korean organizations and individuals to the Specially Designated Nationals List, which correlates to sanctions on those entities.[2]

Most of the North Korean organizations and individuals named[3] have a direct impact on the Kim Regime’s political prison camps, which incarcerate up to 120,000 individuals and their families. Control of these camps is frequently presumed to be a function of the North Korean state—the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)—but that would be a narrow understanding of how and why the camps operate the way they do, and more pointedly, why they exist in the first place.

These political prison camps started with the early Kim Il-sung regime’s concept of banishment of those deemed enemies of the party and state—religious persons, landowners, businessmen, those that cooperated with the Japanese colonial government in Korea, and even those deemed too popular locally—to North Korea’s mountainous northeast. These banishments developed into the current form of actual political prisons[4] concurrently with the development of the Ten Principles of Monolithic Ideology (TPMI).[5]

Loyalty to the supreme leader, Kim Jong-un, is the supreme principle of the TPMI. Developed in the late 1960s and promulgated for instruction to all in the early 1970s, every North Korean must demonstrate his or her loyalty based on TPMI principles. Violation of these principles is the number one justification for the regime to incarcerate individuals in these camps. Not only does the TPMI serve as the guidebook for all party members, security services, government leaders, and action personnel with regards to violations of loyalty and political ideology, it is also used as a standard to which every leader, manager, and department director is held in the performance of their respective duties. This applies as well to those who run the political prison camps and who provide administrative and/or logistical support to those camps.

Within the Kim Regime, chains of political control are far more important than chains of command, regardless of organization type, and the internal security services are no different. The following line and block chart lays out how North Korea’s supreme leader of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) politically controls the political prison camps (and all other prisons) through the party apparatus.

Chart 1: Political Control of the Kim Regime’s Political Prison Camps[6]

At the center of the control process is the organization that is responsible for ensuring the TPMI is followed statewide to the proverbial letter—the party’s Organization and Guidance Department (OGD). The OGD is the “party within the party.”[7] Its mission is to guarantee the continuity of the supreme leader and the KWP. The OGD Party Life Guidance Section evaluates every leader of every organization, regardless of societal role, as to their performance on loyalty to the supreme leader and obeisance of the TPMI. The OGD Cadre Section employs these evaluations to manage leadership careers.[8]

As in every other organization within North Korea, each political prison camp has its own party committee embedded into the camp structure and this committee takes its orders from the KWP OGD. It is the prison’s embedded KWP committee from which the prison takes its overall direction. The orders and direction provided by the camp KWP committee that direct the treatment of prisoners and these orders and directives must ultimately conform to the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee. The most critical position in this camp KWP Committee is the Organizational Secretary. He or she oversees the efficacy of camp management in accordance with OGD orders and directives, as well as its continuity with the TPMI. The orders and directives of the KWP Central Committee are the responsibility of the KWP OGD.

Thus, the actions and tasks of every leadership position within the political prison camp structure are sanctioned politically by the KWP OGD, which reports directly to the supreme leader. Each of those camp leaders, whether shift supervisors, section chiefs, or camp managers, must comply with the spirit of the TPMI and is responsible for the treatment they deliver to punish the camp residents. Sympathy and latitude toward the political prisoners is counter to the TPMI and punishable under the same standards that lead to the imprisonment of the camp prisoners. It is imperative for these personnel to punish political prisoners in accordance with the intent of the TPMI. Not do to so would result in the denial of food security, adequate housing, opportunity for professional advancement and, most importantly, family survival.

Understanding political prison camp leadership behavior is embedded in understanding the TPMI and the control of the KWP OGD over the internal security services. Administrative analysis is totally inadequate in understanding a regime that derives its power from enforcement of a political ideology that controls the regime’s agencies of political power enforcement.

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[1] See U.S. Department of State, “Report on Human Rights Abuses and Censorship in North Korea,” July 6, 2016. URL: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/259366.htm.

[2] See U.S. Department of Treasury Resource Center, Office of Foreign Assets Control, “North Korea Designations,” July 6, 2016. URL: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20160706.aspx.

[3] Not named are numerous North Korean elites who are responsible for supporting the operation of these camps politically, administratively and logistically.

[4] For an understanding of political prison camp development, see Robert Collins, Marked For Life: Songbun – North Korea’s Social Classification System, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012, pp.22-24; for details on the camps themselves see several related reports at hrnk.org/publications; also see several prison camp publications published by the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea at hrnk.org/publications.

[5] For a detailed translation of the Ten Principles of Monolithic Ideology, see Joanna Hosaniak, Prisoners of Their Own Country: North Korea in the Eyes of Witnesses (Seoul: Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, 2004), 39-44.

[6] Authors rendition.Derived from numerous sources.

[7] National Intelligence Service “Bukhan Nodongdangui haeksim Buseo (North Korea’s Korean Workers’ Party Core Department),”2006. URL: http:// www.nis.go.kr/app/board/view?sc_param=,M03180 000&midArr=M03180000&fieldArr=&keyWord=&page =1&startDate=&endDate=&dataNo=23452&hcode= 39077402012879299424981&viewNo=201.

[8] Michael Madden, “Basic Party Organizations,” North Korea Leadership Watch, May 10, 2016. URL:

https://nkleadershipwatch.wordpress.com/the-party/basic-party-organizations/; see also Michael Madden, “’City and County Party Committees,” North Korea Leadership Watch, May 10, 2016. URL:

https://nkleadershipwatch.wordpress.com/the-party/city-municipal-and-county-party-committees/; see also Micheal Madden, “KWP Central Committee Organization and Guidance Department,” NKLeadershipWatch, October 2009.   URL: http://nkleadershipwatch.files.wordpress.com/2009/10/kwpcentralcommitteeorganizationandguidancedepartment.pdf; see also Ri Myong-hun, “노동당 내부사업 실상과 조직지도부 65과 (Status of Korean Workers’ Party Internal Affairs and the Organization and Guidance Department’s Section 65),” Pukhan, August 2014, pp.85-91; see also “Pukhan Chongchiron: Choson Nodongdang Chungangwiwonhoi Chojik Chidobu (North Korean Political Theory: Korea Workers’ Party’s Central Committee’s Organization and Guidance Department),” Report Shop, Augugst 7, 2010. URL: http://www.reportshop.co.kr/dview/455102/9062471347817998.

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Categories: DPRK, HRNK, humanrights, Kim Il Sung, KimJongUn, Korea, KWP, North Korea, OGD, Political Prison Camps, Ten Principles of Monolithic Ideology, TPMI

The Challenge of Giving Thanks in North Korea

By Robert Collins

Recently, Melanie Kirkpatrick wrote an outstanding book on the history of Thanksgiving in America that examines our country’s Thanksgiving experience over the last four centuries. Thanksgiving: The Holiday at the Heart of the American Experience reminds us that those of us in the United States give thanks this holiday for the many things that make our country one of unparalleled freedom, bountiful opportunity, and relative comfort despite challenges all along the way. To enjoy these same blessings that most of us take for granted, about a million people continue to immigrate to America each year with many more waiting in line. In that vein, possession of well-protected human rights is not one of those blessings that we normally acknowledge with any specificity at the Thanksgiving table. However, for many in the world, there is a longing desire to be in a position where they could give thanks. Nowhere is that more true than in North Korea.

Both sides of the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) celebrate Thanksgiving where thanks are given in autumn for a bountiful harvest and blessings possessed. For South Koreans, they celebrated the Korean Thanksgiving called “Chuseok,” on September 15th in 2016. The holiday is always on the 15th day of the 8th month of the lunar calendar. Therefore, it slightly differs each year from the Gregorian (international standard) calendar. The holiday goes back to the Silla dynasty more than 1200 years ago. Originally called “hangawi” or “the great middle of autumn,” the holiday celebrates the autumn harvest, which is parallel to the American Thanksgiving celebrating harvest. A central tradition of “Chuseok” is the “charye,” where Koreans prepare a table of traditional foods and honor previous generations of their ancestors, frequently visiting their graves. These days, South Koreans increasingly observe a morning celebration in their homes, where traditional foods are laid out as symbolic representation of thanks to their ancestors.

Image of the "Chuseok" table. 
Photo Credit: Namwon030 (Own work) [CC BY-SA 3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons.

Above the DMZ, North Koreans celebrate Korean Thanksgiving in a very different manner and give thanks for blessings possessed in a vastly different dynamic than their South Korean counterparts. In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, North Koreans officially celebrate “Chuseok” by praising and memorializing the Kim Family—Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un, as well as Kim Il-sung’s parents and grandparents. In reality, North Koreans have little for which they can be thankful.

South Koreans have many things for which to count their blessings: being the world’s 15th largest economy and the observance of their civil rights, including freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom to elect one’s representatives, and freedom to protest peacefully. South Korea has fully developed democratic institutions that enable celebrations to be as the people wish. In sharp contrast, the 25 million North Koreans’ GDP per capita is ranked 197th at the bottom on the world scale. The national economy is deliberately designed by the Kim regime to not focus on food security for the people, but rather, focus on nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, the military in general, and, most importantly, anything that supports regime survival. On top of that, the Kim Regime prioritizes the nearly 3 million citizens of Pyongyang over all other North Korean population sectors in terms of food security and a host of other privileges. This leaves the remaining 22 million citizens to fend for themselves in an economy where personal food security efforts for all but the ruling class are based in limited, but sanctioned individual market booths, small 10m by 10m agricultural plots, and black market activity. 

Photo Credit: Associated Press/Wong Maye-E

The Kim regime’s highly politicized focus on cult-like worship of the Kim Family leaves little for the North Korean to celebrate. The deliberate denial of Korean traditions accentuates the Kim Regime’s complete denial of human rights. Brutality and Thanksgiving are two words that are normally not associated with each other. Unfortunately, in the case of North Korea and its human rights record, these two words are both regrettably appropriate. North Koreans cannot count sufficient food, competent healthcare, or adequate housing among their blessings. They cannot be thankful for protection under the law, comfort in religion, or freedom of choice. Their lives are filled with restrictions, limitations, and political terror. They can expect nothing from their government or leaders and instead, only rely upon themselves and, on occasion, their families—if the Party-state hasn’t invaded that as well. The attempt by the internal security services to subvert family relations for the sake of ensuring political reliability through reporting is deplorable.

Photo Credit: KCNA

The Kim regime’s oppressive rule and brutal treatment of its own people is unparalleled today. The North Korean regime’s policy of human rights denial suppresses even the freedom to give proper thanks on Chuseok/Thanksgiving. For us and our friends, allies, and partners in South Korea, this is one additional reason to give thanks to our forebears for being blessed to live in a democracy, and for the freedom to vote, assemble, debate, and demonstrate to ensure that our democracies remain vibrant and resilient. Perhaps most importantly, the holiday gives us pause to appreciate family and bountiful sustenance, two of the essential elements of thanks on this holiday.

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Categories: Chuseok, Democracy, DPRK, hrnkus, Human Rights, KimJongUn, North Korea, RobertCollins, ROK, South Korea, Thanksgiving

North Korean Mothers Fight to Be Reunited with Stateless Children Left Behind in China

By Christine Chung

Perhaps you’ve read William Styron’s novel Sophie’s Choice, or maybe you’ve seen Meryl Streep win the best actress Oscar for her role in the movie adaptation. The story is about a woman who chooses under extreme duress which of her two young children will be allowed to live. We like to think imposing these types of sadistic choices was part of a distant Nazi past. But the Tongil Moms were forced to make heart-wrenching decisions not that long ago.

These North Korean women chose to leave young children behind to make precarious journeys to escape the dangers of residing illegally in China and find asylum in South Korea, either because they couldn’t endure their forced marriages any longer or because every day they risked being captured by Chinese authorities and repatriated to North Korea where they were certain to face beatings, starvation and worse in prison camps. Because in North Korea it’s a crime to leave without permission, even if there’s no food to be found inside the country or you have to go to over the border to find goods to trade in the markets to survive. And asking for permission to leave is tantamount to a crime because it would reveal a lack of faith in the North Korean leadership.

Tongil Mom Delegation and HRNK at the Heritage Foundation on November 2, 2016.
From left to right: Lee Young-hee (Tongil Mom Member), Kim Jeong-ah (Tongil Mom Founder and Executive Director), Rosa Park (HRNK Director of Programs and Editor), and Hwang Hyun-jeong (Tongil Mom Member).

This week, three members of the Tongil Moms, an advocacy group of North Korean women who seek reunification with their children whom they left behind in China, participated at a forum on human trafficking in China at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C. Three North Korean women (sometimes referred to as “defectors”) who now reside in South Korea are activists demanding their fundamental human rights to family life and privacy. Executive Director of Tongil Moms Kim Jeong-ah said, “Two [other mothers] have been included in this delegation, but the participants have changed multiple times because they could not face the trauma of having to retell their stories.” The two other members were Hwang Hyun-jeong and Lee Young-hee.

Around 30,000 North Koreans have resettled in South Korea, the vast majority of them women. Assessing how many of them were victims of human trafficking is difficult as is estimating the number of North Korean women who remain trafficked in China or languish in prisons back in North Korea after forced repatriation. Kim estimates 60 percent of North Korean women in South Korea were abused in China. She said, “Naturally, women only share their stories with friends they are very close with and trust. This is because women defectors feel shameful about their experiences. It is extremely difficult for me when I share what I have been through. I was sold for 19,000 Chinese yuan (about USD 2,800). Moreover, I have to confess the fact that I abandoned my child, whether it was against my will or not.”

Kim explains that the Chinese government's policy of forced repatriation of North Korean refugees leads to mothers having to abandon their children. Under international law, China is prohibited from returning North Korean refugees to North Korea where they face torture and other reprisals. Instead, China is obliged to offer them protection under several international treaties, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention against Torture, as well as customary international law which prohibits forced repatriation (also called refoulement). But the Chinese government doesn’t comply with its international legal obligations and declares North Koreans who flee the country not to be genuine refugees but illegal immigrants coming to China for economic reasons.

“Because of the constant threat of being forcibly repatriated to North Korea, I was never able to sleep for more than one hour at a time; I would lay awake every night,” Kim said. “Mothers cannot stay in China and must abandon their children, thinking that they will go back to get them someday, but there is no way to influence what the children are taught. The [Chinese] fathers tell them: “Your mother’s abandoned you.’ They don’t think about the kind of pain that causes a child.”

The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in October 2013 urged China to “cease the arrest and repatriation of citizens of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [North Korea], especially children, and women who have children with Chinese men, and ensure that children of mothers from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have access to fundamental rights, including the right to identity and education.” The CRC made similar recommendations in previous years, as have many other UN committees and human rights bodies like the Working Group on discrimination against women in law and practice.

Kim said, “The last time I spoke with my daughter in 2013, she said, ‘Mom, you’ve left me haven’t you. You hate me don’t you?’ When a child says that, her mother will be devastated, don’t you think? Have you ever said that to your mother? I bet not. This is not the kind of thing that should be said between a mother and her child. Even so, the daughter I have not seen since she was five years old repeated this to me endlessly. It seemed like my world was collapsing around me.” The Tongil Moms make three demands: that children born to North Korean mothers and Chinese fathers be given proper identity documents that would entitle them to education and health care—some 20,000 to 30,000 such children are believed to be stateless, that mothers have access to their children and other parental rights, and that these children be given a choice to reunite with their mothers.

“If we continue to ignore these problems, it will continue to be a huge obstacle for these women to adjust to South Korean society. They will pretend as if nothing happened or hide what happened. They will look ‘normal’ during the day, but will then cry at home alone, sobbing because they miss their children in China. However, it is different when their suffering is shared with other people.” 

The Tongil Moms decided they needed to share their stories. “I felt that we needed to come together and tell the world about the situation of these children left behind in China…to raise awareness, generate interest and get your help to work on this situation together,” Lee Young-hee told students at an event at the University of Virginia (UVA).

“Obviously, the Chinese government is not going to stop its policy of repatriation overnight,” Kim told UVA student newspaper The Cavalier Daily. “But I believe if we approach the people with a [conscience], the people who believe in human rights in China and if we approach this using social media then we can definitely try to make a change regarding the situation.”

Kim said, “If I do not share my story, I will be in pain and cannot hold my head up in front of my child one day. I could say nothing if my child asked me that what kind of efforts I made in order to find her.”

The author is grateful to Rosa Park, HRNK Director of Programs and Editor, who conducted the interview with Kim Jeong-ah in Korean and provided translation. The author also wishes to thank HRNK’s Christopher Buchman, Soohyun Chang, and Amanda Won, who helped with the translation. HRNK thanks Henry Song (No Chain) and Bruce Klingner (Heritage Foundation) for facilitating the interview.

Christine Chung is a Senior Advisor to the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the former Political Advisor to the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. As a human rights officer for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, she managed the Office's technical cooperation program with China, supported the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, and served desk functions for Northeast and Southeast Asia. Before joining the UN, Ms. Chung established and headed the China field office for the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.

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Categories: hrnkus, human trafficking, humanrights, North Korea, Tongil Mom, UN, UNCOI, women, women's rights