Assessment of North Korea’s Nuclear Situation in the First Half of 2026 and Outlook for the Second Half of the Year
August 3, 2026
Kim Dong-sik
International Advisory Council Member, HRNK
Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK President and CEO
Executive Summary
This report assesses developments surrounding North Korea's nuclear program during the first half of 2026 and provides an outlook for the remainder of the year. This report argues that recent U.S. actions toward Venezuela and Iran, together with increasingly assertive statements by President Trump and senior U.S. officials indicate a more forceful U.S. approach toward nuclear proliferation and North Korea.
The report argues that these developments have significantly influenced North Korea's strategic calculations. It contends that Kim Jong-un has responded by further emphasizing the regime's status as a nuclear weapons state, expanding nuclear capabilities, strengthening military preparedness, and deepening strategic ties with China, Russia, and other “fraternal” states.
Looking ahead, the report anticipates that North Korea will continue to reject denuclearization, further strengthen its nuclear deterrent, and prioritize regime survival. It also argues that the United States may increasingly combine diplomatic engagement with military pressure, resulting in a more confrontational security environment on the Korean Peninsula during the second half of 2026.
1. Introduction
On January 3, President Trump ordered the deployment of U.S. special operations forces in an operation that resulted in the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. At the end of February, the United States, together with Israel, conducted strikes that reportedly killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other hardline Islamist leaders by launching military strikes against Iran, preventing its nuclear development efforts.
Against this backdrop, Kim Jong-un held a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping, who visited Pyongyang on June 8 to 9. During the meeting, the two leaders pledged to strengthen comprehensive cooperation in such areas as diplomacy, law enforcement, and military affairs. However, the North Korean nuclear issue was omitted from the official announcement, which had been a major concern of the international community.
This omission effectively contradicted Xi Jinping’s commitment made during his summit with President Trump in Beijing in mid-May to pursue the shared goal of the denuclearization of North Korea. While Xi may have discussed denuclearization privately with Kim Jong-un, failing to disclose any such discussion publicly is effectively equivalent to not having addressed the issue at all.
After the news emerged that denuclearization had not been included in the official announcement of the North Korea-China summit, a spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State stated on June 8 (Washington D.C. time) that, during the U.S.-China summit held from May 14 to 16, ‘President Donald Trump and President Xi Jinping reaffirmed their shared goal of the denuclearization of North Korea’.1
Meanwhile, immediately after signing a memorandum of understanding (MOU) declaring an end to the conflict with Iran, on June 12, President Trump posted on social media a photograph of himself with Kim Jong-un from their previous summit meeting without providing any explanation.
At the same time, Kim Jong-un convened the Second Plenary Meeting of the Ninth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea in Pyongyang from June 20 to 22. During the meeting, he emphasized that North Korea would continue to expand and strengthen its nuclear forces and assert its status as a nuclear-armed state in response to the evolving geopolitical crisis.
In practical terms, Kim’s declaration that North Korea would “fully exercise its status as a nuclear armed state” suggests that the regime intends to use nuclear weapons if attacked by the United States.
1 Unless otherwise noted, dates relating to the United States refer to the U.S. local time.
These developments demonstrate that the United States and North Korea, China, Russia, and other relevant countries are engaged in an ongoing strategic competition over the North Korean nuclear issue, each pursuing its own national interests.
The purpose of this report is to examine the interests, and policy moves of North Korea, the United States, China, Russia, and other relevant actors regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, which is the key variable shaping the security environment on the Korean Peninsula. Also, based on this analysis, it is to assess the likely future direction of U.S. policy towards North Korea and the corresponding policy responses that North Korea is expected to adopt.
2. U.S. Foreign Policy and Developments Concerning the North Korean Nuclear Issue
1) The Trump Administration's Foreign Policy Orientation and Recent Developments
The Trump administration currently pursues an "America First" foreign policy that places the political, economic, and security interests of the United States above all else across every area of national governance, including diplomacy, national security, and trade.
This foreign policy departs from multilateral cooperation and the existing international order. Instead, it is characterized by a strong emphasis on national interest, including protectionism, high tariffs, maintaining peace through strength, restructuring the global order, and imposing strict border controls and immigration restrictions.
President Trump has sought to transform the Western Hemisphere into what he considers America's strategic sphere of influence under what he calls the "Donroe Doctrine," aiming to safeguard U.S. national security. Acting on this doctrine, the administration arrested Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro at the beginning of the year and supported the establishment of pro-American conservative governments throughout Latin America.
The most representative example of this approach would be the operation on January 3, in which U.S. carrier strike groups and special operations forces were deployed to capture Maduro.
At the end of February, the United States and Israel jointly launched military strikes against Iran, which had continued pursuing its nuclear program; the attacks disabled Iran's uranium enrichment facilities and eliminated Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei along with other hardline Islamist leaders. Following these operations, the United States reportedly identified Cuba as its next potential target, which is an anti-American communist state located near U.S. territory.
2) U.S. Developments Regarding North Korea and Its Nuclear Program
Since the beginning of 2026, statements by U.S. government officials and President Donald Trump concerning North Korea and its nuclear program have increased noticeably in both frequency and intensity.
A chronological summary is as follows. On February 22, Bonnie Jenkins, who had been nominated to serve as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, stated during a discussion hosted by the Korea Society that a North Korean nuclear attack against the United States or any of its allies would bring about the end of the Kim Jong-un regime. Any such attack would be met with a swift, overwhelming, and decisive response.
On March 4, Elbridge A. Colby, who had been nominated to serve as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, remarked that “we have spoken about North Korea before. We are fully aware of that issue,” referring to the North Korean nuclear problem.
On the same day, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth appeared to make an indirect reference to North Korea, stating that “the same principle applies to other countries; and although this question is not directly related to Iran, we will address Iran's nuclear ambitions, and in doing so, we will send a sufficiently strong signal.”
On March 18, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that “North Korea's intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are already capable of reaching the U.S. homeland, and the regime remains committed to expanding its nuclear arsenal.”
On March 25, Gabbard further testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee that “North Korea is prepared to conduct another nuclear test at any time and will continue testing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).” She assessed that these actions were intended to strengthen North Korea's strategic position, defend the regime, and ultimately secure at least implicit recognition as a nuclear weapons state.
On April 16, Lieutenant General James Adams, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), testified before the House Armed Services Committee's Intelligence and Special Operations Subcommittee that “North Korea continues to advance its nuclear forces and missile capabilities, and its new solid-fuel ICBMs are specifically designed to threaten the U.S. homeland.”
On April 30, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated before the Senate Armed Services Committee that “North Korea's strategy is to deter challenges through conventional missile capabilities before gradually advancing toward a nuclear force.” He further argued that Iran had attempted to benchmark North Korea's strategy for acquiring nuclear weapons.
On May 17, the White House released a fact sheet summarizing the summit between President Trump and President Xi Jinping, held from May 14 to 16, stating that the two leaders had reaffirmed their shared objective of achieving the denuclearization of North Korea.
On June 8, after media reports indicated that the North Korean nuclear issue had not been discussed during the North Korea–China summit, a spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State reiterated that “President Donald Trump and President Xi Jinping confirmed their shared goal of the denuclearization of North Korea.”
On June 13, after announcing on social media that he would sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) ending the conflict with Iran, President Trump posted a photograph of himself walking alongside Kim Jong-un from one of their previous summit meetings without providing any explanation.
On June 17, the leaders of the Group of Seven (G7) adopted a joint statement reaffirming their commitment to the denuclearization of North Korea.
On June 18, William Ezell, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, emphasized that “Denuclearization remains a priority for the Trump administration. President Trump is prepared to engage in dialogue with Kim Jong-un once again, but until then, the administration will continue to pursue peace through strength.”
On June 19, President Trump reportedly told South Korean President Lee Jae-myung that “it is time to pay attention to the North Korea issue.”
On June 20, President Trump posted on social media that negotiations aimed at disarming North Korea would be resumed and suggested that Kim Jong-un could be removed and replaced by a new supreme leader.
Meanwhile, on June 22, the White House announced through the Federal Register that it would extend for another year the executive order declaring North Korea's nuclear and missile programs a national emergency.
3) Assessment and Outlook
Taken together, the statements made by President Trump and senior U.S. officials throughout 2026, along with the policies and actions of the U.S. government—including the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the White House—suggest several noteworthy observations.
First, President Trump and the U.S. government appear to believe that North Korea, like Iran, should not be allowed to possess nuclear weapons.
Second, although President Trump publicly identified Venezuela, Iran, and Cuba as successive targets of U.S. pressure or military action, he did not explicitly mention North Korea. Nevertheless, the report argues that North Korea is likely being considered as the next target after Cuba.
Third, by effectively replacing the Venezuelan government through military action and preventing Iran's nuclear development, the United States has demonstrated that it is prepared to resolve nuclear proliferation issues through military means. According to this interpretation, the North Korean nuclear issue could likewise be addressed through military action.
Fourth, compared with previous years, the statements made by President Trump and senior U.S. officials regarding North Korea throughout 2026 have been considerably more assertive and confident.
At the same time, if President Trump ultimately decides to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, he is expected to depart from the previous strategy of relying primarily on negotiations. Instead, the report anticipates that the United States would adopt a more aggressive two-track approach, combining diplomacy with military options—including, potentially, regime change through the removal of Kim Jong-un.
3. The Kim Jong-un Regime’s Response and Assessment Regarding Nuclear Issues
1) Emphasis on the Willingness to Use Nuclear Weapons and Focus on Strengthening National Defense Capabilities
The U.S. operation on January 3, 2026, to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is likely to have had a significant impact on Kim Jong-un. This can be observed, first, from the fact that Kim Jong un postponed the Workers' Party Congress, which had originally been expected to take place early in the year, by more than one month.2
Second, Kim Jong-un’s repeated declarations that North Korea would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons if the United States attacked North Korea highlight his concerns and anxiety regarding the situation. Several examples illustrate this point.
At the 9th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea (February 19–25), held for the first time in five years, Kim Jong Un criticized the United States and Western countries, stating that:
“The United States and Western forces pursue unilateral hegemony based on the logic that power itself constitutes justice, ruthlessly destroying the existing international order and established norms while aggravating instability and chaos.”
He further claimed that:
“Under the banner of America First, the United States disregards the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security interests of other countries, advocates peace through strength solely to satisfy its hegemonic ambitions and does not hesitate to commit aggression and use military force against sovereign states.”
Kim also assessed that:
“The current international order and structure of international relations are undergoing significant changes due to U.S. hegemonic policies, prompting a reassessment of standards of justice and the value of power.”
Based on this assessment, Kim Jong Un expressed his firm determination to further expand and strengthen nuclear forces and make full use of North Korea’s status as a nuclear weapon state. He emphasized that North Korea would "not hesitate to use nuclear weapons" if attacked by the United States.3
2 North Korea held the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea from January 5–12, 2021. Therefore, based on previous patterns, the 9th Congress was expected to be held in January 2026, or at the latest in early February, as preparations had been completed by December 2025. However, the fact that it was delayed until February 19–25, more than one month later than expected, appears to reflect external circumstances such as the U.S. operation against Maduro.
Kim Jong Un reaffirmed his willingness to use nuclear weapons during his policy speech at the First Session of the 15th Supreme People’s Assembly (March 23).4
3 Kim Jong-un also stated that North Korea would improve supplementary strike capabilities to increase the military effectiveness of various nuclear weapons, update operational support systems, make nuclear combat capabilities practical through exercises, maintain readiness so that the nuclear shield could be rapidly and accurately activated under any circumstances, and continuously modernize naval operational capabilities centered on nuclear armament of surface and underwater forces.
4 Kim Jong-un stated that North Korea would further develop its self-defense nuclear deterrent, maintain a rapid and precise nuclear response posture, firmly manage strategic threats to national and regional security, permanently consolidate its status as a nuclear weapons state, and conduct an offensive struggle against hostile forces.
Furthermore, on the final day of the U.S.–China summit (May 17), Kim convened a meeting of North Korean military division commanders and brigade commanders. During the meeting, he stated that North Korea would:
“Strengthen frontline units defending the southern border, transform the border area into an impregnable fortress, and reorganize military structures to thoroughly deter war.”
On May 28, through a statement issued by a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, North Korea responded to the joint statement by the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)—comprising the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—which reaffirmed their commitment to the denuclearization of North Korea.
North Korea declared:
"We make it absolutely clear once again that the denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will never, under any circumstances, occur."
Four days before Xi Jinping visited Pyongyang, on June 4, Kim Jong Un visited a newly operational nuclear material production facility (uranium enrichment facility). During the visit, he claimed that:
“Through the implementation of the nuclear force enhancement policy over the past five years, North Korea’s production capacity for weapons-grade nuclear materials has reached more than twice its previous level.”
He further emphasized that North Korea must:
“Continuously, quantitatively, and rapidly expand its nuclear war deterrence capabilities.”
One day before Xi Jinping’s visit, on June 7, Kim Yo-jong issued a statement declaring that:
“The policy of strengthening self-defensive nuclear war deterrence capabilities is an irreversible conclusion that must be implemented without exception,
and that:
Our status as a nuclear weapons state is an absolute red line that can never be abandoned.” 5
In short, North Korea’s position is that it cannot and will not abandon its nuclear weapons.
On June 13, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticized the joint South Korea–EU statement, stating that refusing to recognize North Korea’s status as a nuclear weapons state constituted a clear violation of sovereignty and a serious hostile act.
On June 14, North Korea criticized the outcomes of the South Korea–U.S.–Japan Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) meeting and extended deterrence dialogue, arguing that the denuclearization of North Korea is an issue that has been permanently and irreversibly concluded.
Regarding the adoption of a G7 joint statement calling for North Korea’s denuclearization, Kim Yo-jong, the leader’s sister stated on June 18:
"Possessing nuclear weapons is our core national interest that must be firmly maintained, and denuclearization is an irreversible red line that can never be crossed."
At the Second Plenary Meeting of the Ninth Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (June 20–22), Kim Jong-un again emphasized:
“Continuously expanding and strengthening nuclear forces and fully exercising the status of a nuclear weapons state is the most accurate and only path to responding to the unpredictable international military and political situation.”
In his June 23 speech at the commissioning ceremony of the destroyer Choe Hyon, Kim Jong-un stated that "the nuclear armament of the navy is proceeding according to plan," describing it as “an important strategic process for securing the initiative in military operations aimed at maritime defense and war deterrence.”
5 Statements issued under Kim Yo-jong’s name are generally considered to represent Kim Jong-un’s own views. In other words, Kim Jong-un often communicates his own position through statements issued in his sister’s name. Kim Yo-jong criticized the U.S. State Department’s explanation that Trump and Xi Jinping had agreed on the principle of North Korea’s complete denuclearization, calling it "a typical U.S. deception campaign." She also criticized the U.S. Trade Representative’s statement that the two leaders had agreed to maintain the goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, describing it as "a complete fabrication and absurd false information." Kim Yo-jong stated that "We possess the most accurate information regarding whether such facts exist," suggesting that North Korea may have received relevant information directly from China.
2) Strengthening Relations with China, Russia, and Other Countries
Since the beginning of 2026, Kim Jong-un has assessed that President Trump and the U.S. government have adopted an increasingly hardline approach toward anti-American states and are willing to back their policies with concrete military action. Against this backdrop, Kim appears to believe that the United States could likewise launch military action against North Korea.
This assessment is reflected in North Korea’s intensified efforts to strengthen relations not only with its treaty allies, China and Russia, but also with Vietnam and other countries that maintain anti-American orientations.
Above all, Kim Jong-un has focused on deepening North Korea’s traditional alliance and friendly cooperative relationship with China.
Following his re-election as General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea on February 25 and his reappointment as President of the State Affairs Commission on March 22, Kim exchanged congratulatory messages with Chinese President Xi Jinping. He subsequently invited China’s foreign minister to Pyongyang on April 10 to discuss preparations for a North Korea–China summit.
Most notably, after the U.S.–China summit, Kim invited Xi Jinping to Pyongyang for a summit meeting on June 8–9, during which he succeeded in ensuring that the North Korean nuclear issue was not included in the official agenda.
To commemorate the 65th anniversary of the signing of the North Korea–China Treaty, Kim also dispatched the North Korean premier—effectively the country’s second highest-ranking official—to China as a special envoy. In addition, Jo Yong-won, Secretary for the Organization of the Workers’ Party of Korea and one of the regime’s most influential figures, attended a reception hosted by the Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang.
Kim has also devoted considerable effort to strengthening North Korea’s alliance with Russia. North Korea has emphasized its deployment of troops to assist Russia in an apparent effort to secure continued Russian political, military, and economic support. Evidence of this effort includes the invitation extended to Russian parliamentary, military, and economic delegations to attend the opening ceremony of the Memorial Hall for Overseas Military Operations, inaugurated in Pyongyang on April 25 to commemorate the first anniversary of the liberation of Kursk.
Likewise, on the second anniversary of the North Korea–Russia treaty (June 19), Kim exchanged congratulatory messages with Russian President Vladimir Putin and dispatched
Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui to Russia, moves that appear intended to strengthen bilateral ties and secure continued Russian assistance.
North Korea also sought to deepen relations with Vietnam through the visit of the Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary and State President’s special envoy (the foreign minister) from May 12 to 16, followed by the visit of Vietnam’s Minister of Public Security to Pyongyang from June 13 to 16.
Meanwhile, Kim invited Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko to Pyongyang on March 25–26, strengthening ties with Belarus, Russia’s closest ally. North Korea has likewise continued efforts to expand relations with other countries that advocate anti-imperialist and independent foreign policies.
3) Analysis and Assessment
As reflected in Kim Jong-un’s remarks at the Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea, he views the current international environment as one in which the United States, under its America First policy and its doctrine of peace through strength, does not hesitate to invade sovereign states and use military force.
Against this backdrop, Kim Jong-un’s domestic and foreign policy actions during the first half of 2026 have been characterized by an overriding emphasis on preserving North Korea’s status as a nuclear weapons state and ensuring regime survival. Accordingly, he has consistently stressed that North Korea cannot abandon its nuclear weapons and would not hesitate to use them, if necessary, while simultaneously strengthening the country’s military capabilities.
This report argues that U.S. policies and actions have had a direct influence on Kim Jong-un’s decisions and North Korea’s domestic political schedule; one example cited is the postponement of the Ninth Party Congress.
Unlike the Eighth Congress, which convened in early January 2021, the Ninth Congress was delayed until mid-February 2026. According to the report, this delay reflected Kim's apparent reassessment caused by the U.S. operation to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and Kim’s need to reassess North Korea’s overall strategic direction.
A second example is the apparent synchronization of North Korea’s political activities with developments involving President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping regarding the North Korean nuclear issue.
Holding the conference of North Korean division and brigade commanders on the final day of the U.S. China summit (May 17), visiting a uranium enrichment facility immediately before Xi Jinping visited Pyongyang, and emphasizing that North Korea’s status as a nuclear weapons state constituted ‘an irreversible red line’ are all interpreted as direct responses to evolving U.S. policy.
Taken together, these actions suggest that Kim Jong-un and the North Korean leadership have been deeply unsettled by the U.S. operation against Maduro and the U.S.–Israeli military campaign against Iran. The report argues that these developments have heightened the regime’s anxiety and uncertainty.
Considering these circumstances, the report concludes that Kim likely believes North Korea could become the next target of U.S. military action and that he himself may be the ultimate target for removal.
Furthermore, it argues that Kim recognizes the possibility that the Trump administration may no longer rely exclusively on diplomatic negotiations to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue but instead pursue military options alongside diplomacy. Accordingly, Kim is portrayed as increasingly concerned that the possibility of a U.S. operation aimed at removing him is drawing closer and is therefore actively preparing countermeasures.
4. North Korea’s Future Policy Direction
1) Domestic and Foreign Policy
At present, Kim Jong-un and the North Korean leadership are expected to focus primarily on how to respond to anticipated U.S. actions aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, including increasing military pressure and the possibility of military attack.
Domestically, Kim is expected to strengthen ideological education and political control to reinforce anti-American sentiment among the population and foster wartime unity. At the same time, North Korea is likely to prioritize completing fortification projects along the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in preparation for a possible U.S. ground offensive.
Militarily, in the name of "completing preparations for war against the United States," North Korea is expected to expand the production of nuclear materials and nuclear warheads, diversify its nuclear delivery systems, increase the production of missiles, conventional weapons, and ammunition, and intensify military training.
In the diplomatic arena, North Korea is expected to further reinforce its alliances with China and Russia while simultaneously expanding relations with Vietnam and other socialist or anti-American states.
While closely monitoring U.S. policy and developments concerning North Korea’s nuclear program, Pyongyang is expected to concentrate its diplomacy on securing international support—especially from China and Russia—for its position that denuclearization is unacceptable, while seeking assistance in the event of U.S. military action. According to the report, North Korea’s foreign policy will remain focused on preserving its status as a nuclear weapons state and ensuring the survival of the Kim Jong-un regime.
2) Future Direction of North Korea’s Nuclear Policy
As experience has demonstrated, no matter how strongly the United States and the international community urge Kim Jong-un to abandon nuclear weapons, he will neither relinquish them nor be able to do so. In short, verbal persuasion alone will never lead North Korea to abandon its nuclear arsenal.
The report argues that the reason is straightforward: Kim Jong-un equates nuclear weapons with his own survival. In other words, he believes that losing or abandoning North Korea’s nuclear weapons would mean the end of his own life and his regime.
Kim frequently reminds his inner circle that Iraq and Libya were attacked by the United States because they lacked nuclear weapons, resulting in the deaths of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi. These examples are presented as evidence supporting his conviction.
Accordingly, Kim is expected not only to retain North Korea’s nuclear arsenal but also to continue expanding and strengthening its nuclear forces while fully exercising the country's status as a nuclear weapons state.
Specifically, the report anticipates that North Korea will continue to advance its nuclear capabilities, diversify its nuclear delivery systems, and maintain a policy under which it will not hesitate to employ nuclear weapons if it perceives a serious threat from the United States.
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