April 17, 2024

HRNK Advisory Opinion to His Excellency Tomoya Obokata

Submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, regarding contemporary forms of slavery affecting currently and formerly incarcerated people

April 12, 2024

Over ten years ago, in February 2014, the UN Commission of Inquiry (UN COI) reported that the DPRK was responsible for crimes against humanity. The gravity, scale, and nature of the DPRK’s violations of human rights reveal a state that has no parallel in the contemporary world. The DPRK’s systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations are thoroughly documented, including its imposition of arbitrary detention, arbitrary death penalties, political prison camps, slave labor, the absolute monopoly of information released to the public, and total control of all organized social life under the hierarchical system of songbun. Under Kim Jong-un’s rule, the scale and scope of these violations have continued to worsen and intensify.

Contemporary forms of slavery in North Korean detention facilities represent a grave and systematic violation of human rights. In these facilities, detainees, including political prisoners, are subjected to forced labor.


Please provide the details of labor programme(s) implemented in your country for incarcerated individuals, including:

Types of work performed.

Detainees work in mining, under dangerous conditions. Detainees are forced to work in agriculture involving strenuous labor, regardless of the detainee's physical condition or age. Detainees work in logging, typically in harsh weather conditions without adequate clothing or safety equipment. Detainees work in textile production, producing goods that may enter international markets despite sanctions.[i]

Detention facilities often assign harsh conditions to detainees without considering their age, gender, or health condition, leading to injuries, illnesses, and deaths.[ii] Political detainees may be subjected to even harsher treatment. Hundreds of thousands of individuals are held in a network of camps. Many of them are subjected to forced labor.[iii]

Further evidence on forced labor from escapee testimonies can be found in the HRNK and No Chain report “An Investigation into the Human Rights Situation in North Korea’s Political Prison Camps: Testimonies of Detainee Families”.[iv]

c) Working environment/conditions, including wages and any deduction for incarceration costs, working hours, and provisions for health & safety.

The working environment in North Korean detention facilities is harsh and dangerous, lacking basic health and safety measures.[v]

Detainees are often unpaid for their labor, with nominal wages often deducted to cover incarceration costs.[vi] Detainees work for 10-12 hours per day, seven days a week, with minimal rest.[vii] This, combined with insufficient nutrition and rest, negatively impacts their physical and mental health.[viii] Health and safety provisions are non-existent, and injuries or illnesses often go untreated, leading to numerous deaths.[ix]

Is there evidence of labour practices which may amount to exploitation? If so, please provide details.

Some of the abuses include excessive working hours. Another type of abuse includes no or extremely low pay. In addition, detainees work in an unhealthy or dangerous working environment. Conditions in North Korean detention facilities are unsanitary and hazardous. Detainees work in dangerous environments, leading to injuries and health complications. Furthermore, they face discriminatory treatments where certain groups of individuals, such as political prisoners and all those deemed to be disloyal to the regime, are subjected to even harsher treatment and forced labor practices. Finally, there is a lack of access to medical facilities.[x]

Is there evidence of sexual exploitation among incarcerated individuals? If so, please provide details.

Many camp orders are conducted in secret.[xi] Despite stringent information control, escapee testimonies, reports by human rights organizations, and investigations conducted by international bodies have provided insight into the grim reality faced by inmates, which involves modern forms of slavery, including sexual exploitation (sometimes referred to as sexual slavery).[xii]

Sexual exploitation and abuse in North Korean detention facilities, particularly targeting female prisoners, is widespread. Escapees report rape, forced abortion, and sexual assault, often used as torture and control methods.[xiii] Male guards and officials abuse their power, targeting political prisoners, women suspected of having illegally crossed the border, and those detained for petty crimes.[xiv]

Are victims of labor and sexual exploitation able to seek justice and remedies? Please provide details, including legislative frameworks and complaint mechanisms.

On paper, DPRK laws prohibit forced labor. The DPRK Constitution includes articles on the dignity and rights of citizens, and the country is a signatory to several international human rights treaties. However, in practice, the government does not uphold these laws, especially within detention facilities. The legal system is opaque and subordinated to the dictates of the ruling Korean Workers' Party.

There is virtually no avenue for victims to seek justice or remedies within the DPRK. The judicial system lacks independence, and there is no mechanism for detainees to file complaints or challenge abuses.[xv]

Victims of labor and sexual exploitation in North Korean detention facilities are caught in a grim situation with no available mechanisms for seeking justice or remedies. The international community continues to struggle with effective strategies to address these human rights abuses, given the geopolitical complexities and the DPRK's self-imposed isolation.

What are the main challenges in eliminating labour and sexual exploitation among incarcerated individuals, and what recommendations would you make to address them effectively?

Despite the veil of secrecy surrounding the country's penal system, escapee testimonies and satellite imagery have provided the international community with glimpses into the dire conditions faced by incarcerated individuals. The DPRK executes a deliberate policy of human rights denial.

The international community should increase pressure through targeted sanctions and hold the government accountable. Supporting North Korean escapees and running advocacy campaigns can help mitigate abusive government control and encourage reform. Educating North Koreans about their rights and the outside world can also help create and enhance awareness of international human rights standards.

Does your government provide tailored support to formerly incarcerated individuals which effectively meets their needs? Please provide details particularly in relation to access to temporary/long term accommodation, education/training, decent work, finance and pension, and other essential services.

The United States provides assistance to refugees and asylum-seekers including North Koreans, to rebuild their lives.[xvi] However, the effectiveness of this support can vary based on resources, individual circumstances, and local community capacity. Challenges including cultural adjustment and language barriers can also impact resettlement experiences.

What is the role of other stakeholders, including educational institutions, jobs/training centres, housing providers, businesses/employers’ organisations, financial institutions, trade unions and civil society organisations, in providing support to formally incarcerated individuals? Does your government actively coordinate or cooperate with them?

Individuals who escape from the DPRK, including former detainees, face challenges ranging from psychological trauma to the need for basic necessities and integration into a new society.

Educational institutions, job centers, housing providers, businesses, financial institutions, trade unions, and CSOs are all crucial. Educational programs, language training, vocational training, housing solutions, inclusive workplace environments, financial literacy programs, and legal assistance are essential in ensuring the rights and fair treatment of North Korean escapees.

CSOs including HRNK[xvii] and various other stakeholders often provide direct support and advocacy work to help individuals and raise awareness about human rights abuses in the DPRK.

What are ongoing challenges in promoting successful economic and social reintegration to formally incarcerated individuals in your country, which may include discrimination (including intersecting forms based on age, gender identity/sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, indigenous, migration, socio-economic and other status), corruption, lack of opportunities and support?

After escaping from the country, former North Korean detainees face challenges including lack of opportunity and inadequate support systems as well as age and socio-economic status discrimination.

What recommendations would you make to overcome the existing obstacles and prevent formally incarcerated individuals from being subjected to labour and sexual exploitation?

The situation of detainees in North Korean detention facilities remains deeply concerning, drawing attention from international human rights organizations and governments worldwide. The available reports indicate severe conditions, including forced labor, torture, inadequate food, and medical neglect, leading to high mortality rates.[xviii]

To address these issues and protect both current and former detainees from exploitation, we respectfully put forth the following recommendations:

  1. International Pressure and Sanctions: Continue and intensify international pressure on the North Korean government to adhere to international human rights standards, using targeted sanctions against individuals and entities responsible for human rights abuses.
  2. Engagement and Dialogue: Encourage diplomatic dialogue that includes human rights as a core component, alongside denuclearization and security concerns. Leverage diplomatic channels to press for the closure of camps and the release of political prisoners.
  3. Support for Escapees: Enhance support for North Korean escapees who can provide firsthand accounts of the conditions within detention facilities. Support should include protection, rehabilitation services, and platforms to share their experiences on the global stage.
  4. Use of Technology: Increase the use of satellite imagery analysis and other means to monitor detention centers and gather evidence of human rights abuses.
  5. Humanitarian Aid: Ensure that humanitarian aid, when possible, is conditioned on improvements in human rights, prioritizes vulnerable groups including people in detention, and is not diverted by the regime. Aid should be designed to minimize the risk of bolstering the capacities of the regime to continue its repressive practices. Access and transparency are of the essence.
  6. Awareness and Advocacy: Support international and regional human rights organizations in their efforts to raise awareness about the conditions in North Korean detention facilities. Promote campaigns that advocate for the rights of current and former detainees.
  7. Legal Mechanisms: Explore legal avenues to hold North Korean leaders accountable for crimes against humanity, including labor and sexual exploitation, through international courts, tribunals, or other accountability mechanisms.

The challenges in addressing the human rights abuses in North Korean detention facilities are significant, particularly given the closed and authoritarian nature of the regime. However, sustained international focus, combined with a strategic mix of pressure and engagement, can create conditions for change and provide some level of protection for those who have suffered in these facilities.

Thank you very much for your kind consideration.


[i] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Greg Scarlatoiu and Raymond Ha, “North Korea’s Political Prison Camp, Kwan-li-so No. 25, Update 4” and European Parliament, Parliamentary Question, “Forced Labor in North Korea,” April 2, Parliamentary question | Forced labour in North Korea | E-004134/2014 | European Parliament (europa.eu).

[ii] The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) & the International Bar Association (IBA), “Report: Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers,” March 2022, https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Report%20Findings%20Inquiry%20on%20Crimes%20Against%20Humanity.pd.f and European Parliament, Parliamentary Question, “Forced Labor in North Korea”.

[iii] Amnesty International, “Images Reveal the Scale of North Korea Political Prison Camps,” May 2011, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2011/05/images-reveal-scale-north-korean-political-prison-camps/.

[iv] The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) and No Chain, “An Investigation into the Human Rights Situation in North Korea’s Political Prison Camps: Testimonies of Detainee Families,” 2018, https://www.hrnk.org/publications/hrnk-publications.php?page=3.

[v] U.S. Department of State, “2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: North Korea”.

[vi] HRNK & IBA, “Report: Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers.”

[vii] Ibid.

[viii]  HRNK & IBA, “Report: Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers.”

[ix] Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2024: North Korea, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/north-korea.

[x] HRNK & IBA, “Report: Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers.”

[xi] The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) and No Chain, “An Investigation into the Human Rights Situation in North Korea’s Political Prison Camps: Testimonies of Detainee Families”.

[xii] HRNK & IBA, “Report: Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers.”f and Anti-Slavery International, “Forced Labor in North Korean Prison Camps,” December 2007, https://www.antislavery.org/reports/forced-labour-in-north-korean-prison-camps/.

[xiii] The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) and No Chain, “An Investigation into the Human Rights Situation in North Korea’s Political Prison Camps: Testimonies of Detainee Families”.

[xiv] HRNK & IBA, “Report: Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers.”

[xv] Ibid.

[xvi] The Bush Institute, “U.S.-Based North Korean Refugees,” https://gwbcenter.imgix.net/Resources/gwb_north_korea_executive_summary_r4.pdf.

[xvii] See HRNK’s policy recommendations to the U.S. government: https://www.hrnk.org/publications/policy-recommendations.php.

[xviii] The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) and No Chain, “An Investigation into the Human Rights Situation in North Korea’s Political Prison Camps: Testimonies of Detainee Families”.

April 10, 2024

South Korea’s 22nd National Assembly Elections and the Likely Effect on North Korean Human Rights

By Greg Scarlatoiu, Raymond Ha, Colleen Burns, and Gayeong Lee

April 10, 2024

Today was South Korea’s turn in this global year of elections. Close to 30 million voters (approx. 67% turnout) went to the polls to elect the 300 members of the Republic of Korea’s 22nd National Assembly—254 from single-member districts, and 46 from a nationwide party list proportional vote.

While the votes are still being counted, the opposition parties are on course to win a resounding victory. The Democratic Party of Korea (DP) is set to win a decisive majority, with some exit polls indicating that the liberal bloc could win over 200 seats.

Inter-Korean relations may not have been at the forefront of voters’ concerns, just as Taiwan’s January 13 election was “mostly about Taiwan, not China.” However, the outcome of today’s election will have important implications for North Korean human rights.

The Yoon administration's emphasis on North Korean human rights is unlikely to be immediately affected by this result. The opposition's victory, however, lowers the likelihood that there will be movement on establishing the North Korean Human Rights Foundation (NKHRF) pursuant to South Korea's North Korean Human Rights Act.

Regrettably, bipartisan consensus over the NKHRF and North Korean human rights in general remains unlikely. As incomprehensible as it may be to outside observers, North Korean human rights will continue to be a political football in a South Korea ever-teetering on the brink of an ideological civil war.

The Role of the National Assembly

The National Assembly can pass laws that shape inter-Korean relations, as it did with the so-called “anti-leaflet ban” in 2020. (South Korea’s Constitutional Court ultimately struck down the law last September.) The National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee can draw attention to relevant issues, as it did when the Committee adopted a resolution last November urging China to halt the forcible repatriation of North Korean escapees.

The National Assembly can also use its power of the purse to influence policy implementation at relevant agencies, including the Ministry of Unification. (In a recent example, the opposition reportedly reduced the budget for the North Korean Human Rights Center, citing possible redundancies with existing institutions.) Moreover, representatives can highlight or criticize policy initiatives during the annual audit of state affairs.

Parliamentary associations such as IPCNKR can exchange views with their legislative counterparts, including the APPG on North Korea in the United Kingdom. Finally, North Korean escapees who are elected to the National Assembly can not only represent the interests of the 34,000 escapees who have resettled in South Korea, but also advocate for the human rights of the North Korean people.

Overall Impact on North Korean Human Rights Policy

The Yoon Suk-yeol administration has adopted a proactive approach to North Korean human rights issues. For the first time, the Ministry of Unification released a public report on the human rights situation in North Korea, as well as an analysis of socioeconomic trends under Kim Jong-un based on escapee surveys. Minister of Unification Kim Yung-ho has stressed the importance of raising awareness on North Korean human rights at home and abroad

Furthermore, the Yoon administration appointed Lee Shin-wha as the Ambassador for International Cooperation on North Korean Human Rights, filling a position that had been vacant for nearly five years. South Korea’s diplomats have spoken out on behalf of North Korean human rights at the United Nations in New York and Geneva. At the Camp David trilateral summit last August, President Yoon, President Biden, and Prime Minister Kishida “commit[ted] to strengthening cooperation on the issue,” especially with regards to “the issues of abductees, detainees, and unrepatriated prisoners of war.”

These policy initiatives are unlikely to be immediately affected by today’s election results, and the Yoon administration appears poised to maintain its focus on North Korean human rights issues going forward. Parliamentary exchanges and discussions on North Korean human rights issues will depend on whether individual representatives decide to draw attention to these matters.

The North Korean Human Rights Foundation

A key issue in which the National Assembly plays a central role is the continued delay in establishing the North Korean Human Rights Foundation (NKHRF) pursuant to South Korea’s North Korean Human Rights Act. The National Assembly adopted this law in a bipartisan vote in March 2016. Article 10 of the Act calls for the establishment of a government-funded foundation to “report on the state of North Korea’s human rights situation, inter-Korean human rights dialogue, humanitarian assistance,” and other related issues.

Article 12 further specifies that the NKHRF shall have twelve board members—two chosen by the Ministry of Unification, five by the ruling party, and five by the opposition parties. This provision does not depend on the prevailing balance of power in the National Assembly. The DP has not chosen any board members since the Act entered into force in September 2016, and the NKHRF has not been established. In its place, the Yoon administration has formed a Committee for the Promotion of North Korean Human Rights under the Ministry of Unification.

Since the early days of the Yoon administration, the PPP called on the DP to appoint its share of NKHRF board members in return for appointing a special inspector to investigate corruption among the president’s family and high-level officials. In early February, however, there were reports that the PPP was considering dropping its demand about the NKHRF. There have been no notable public discussions of the NKHRF since.

Despite the Ministry of Unification’s roadmap for launching the NKHRF, it appears unlikely that the issue will gain traction in the 22nd National Assembly.

Escapee Representation in the National Assembly

Two North Korean escapees have served in the 21st National Assembly. Thae Yong-ho, a former North Korean diplomat, was elected to represent the Gangnam-A district. Ji Seong-ho, a human rights activist, was elected from the proportional party list.

For this general election, the PPP selected Thae to run against Youn Gun-young, a former high-level official in the Moon Jae-in administration, in the Guro-B district in southwestern Seoul. Ji applied as a candidate for the Seocho-B district, but he was not chosen as the PPP candidate. In addition, the PPP nominated Park Choong-kwon, a 38-year old escapee who was once a missile engineer in North Korea, to the second position on its proportional party list.[1]

Park is all but certain to win a seat in the National Assembly. He has said that he wishes to "play a role in inter-Korean relations," and he can be expected to speak out on North Korea-related issues, including human rights concerns. Thae Yong-ho, however, appears to have failed in his bid for a second term in the National Assembly.

[1] Park was formally nominated by the People's Future Party, a satellite party associated with the PPP. See Jinwan Park, "Understanding Satellite Parties in South Korea and Their Dangers to Democracy," The Diplomat, February 28, 2024.

October 27, 2023

North Korean Forced Labor in the U.S. Seafood Supply Chain

By Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director

October 27, 2023

Note: On October 24, 2023, HRNK Executive Director Greg Scarlatoiu was invited to testify before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) for a hearing on the subject of forced labor in the U.S. seafood supply chain. The following text reflects his remarks during the hearing, as prepared for delivery. The full text of his written submission to the CECC can be viewed at this link.

Chairman Smith, Chairman Merkley, distinguished Commissioners, I wish to begin by thanking you for inviting me to testify today. The official dispatch of North Korean workers to China’s seafood processing plants is a breach of applicable UN Security Council Sanctions, international human rights instruments, and most importantly of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).

Mindful of CAATSA provisions relating to Sanctions for Forced Labor and Slavery Overseas of North Koreans, HRNK has made a preliminary determination as to whether the working conditions these workers face are subject to Section 302(b) of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9241 (b)). We further endeavored to identify Chinese entities that employ North Korean laborers, with the aim of determining if such entities and individuals in charge meet the criteria under Section 111 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7108). 
Until their repatriation began on August 23 or August 29, there were thousands of North Korean workers officially dispatched to Chinese seafood processing factories. In many cases, these workers processed seafood imported from North Korea. The importation of seafood processed by North Korean workers in China, seafood exported from North Korea to China, or a combination of both, into the United States would constitute a blatant violation of CAATSA.
Three major seafood processing companies have historically employed North Korean labor and have exported their products to the United States.[1] Witnesses mentioned the presence of at least three seafood processing factories that employ North Korean workers in Donggang (東港), Dandong City.
Have Chinese Factories Processed Seafood Imported from North Korea?
North Korean seafood exported to China from Najin Port is primarily transported overland by vehicles, through Chinese customs.[2] It is then distributed and sold in China's Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, Liaoning Province, or flown to inland cities including Beijing. Seafood processed in Hunchun is exported as frozen or dried seafood to the United States, Europe, Japan, and other countries.[3] The main North Korean seafood products transported inland in this manner include various species of squid, croaker, snow crab, hair crab, and blue crab.[4] 
North Korean workers process fish caught seasonally, such as cod and pollock as well as clam during clam season. They also process octopus and shellfish, packaged as Chinese export products. There are reported instances of processed seafood marked “Made in China” being shipped out to Vladivostok, where labels are switched to “Made in Russia” and exported to third countries.
North Korean Workers in Chinese Seafood Processing Plants: 
International Legal Implications
The employment of North Korean workers in Chinese seafood processing plants and labor standards violations may contravene the ILO’s Forced Labor Convention (No. 29) and the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention (No. 105), other ILO conventions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (also known as the Palermo Protocol).
The North Korean seafood processing workers face:
1.  Inhumane Working Conditions: Long working hours, denial of proper rest and breaks, harsh treatment, and minimal safety measures, posing a risk to their physical and mental well-being.
2.  Lack of Freedom and Communication: They are often isolated, facing limited contact with the outside world and their families. They are unable to exercise their right to freedom of movement and communication. 
3.  Absence of Labor Rights: Such rights, including the right to unionize and engage in collective bargaining, are nonexistent.
Living and Working Conditions for North Korean Overseas Workers
North Korean workers covet overseas positions, as the average monthly remittance of $70 (500 Chinese yuan) is dramatically higher than the $3-dollar average monthly industrial wage in North Korea.[5] The average bribe paid to be dispatched overseas is $2,000 - $3,000. The workers must borrow the funds from money lenders and pay it back with interest.[6] The workers are lured with false promises and subsequently entrapped under abysmal working conditions.
Wage violations through compulsory “contributions” extracted by the North Korean authorities, unpaid overtime, precarious safety, and health conditions are widespread. 
The workers must moonlight for other companies to pay back their loans, with the approval of three site supervisors (party, security agency, technical manager), who must also be bribed. Including moonlighting, a North Korean seafood processing worker in China may make up to about $210 a month. (1,500 Chinese yuan).
The North Korean workers' monthly wages are paid upon their repatriation, in North Korean currency, at the official exchange rate. 
During the COVID-19 quarantine, the workers received no wages, and the interest on loans increased, reportedly leading to about thirty suicides, most of them women.
The Chinese companies pay the North Korean regime mostly based on production volume. The payment is made in Chinese currency. 
Men mainly carry frozen fish blocks, and women sit down and peel fish or squid or sort clams and crabs by size. Most of the North Koreans work the whole day in cold storage. Additionally, the pungent smell inside is unbearable. 
North Korean workers at the Chinese seafood processing plants usually work about 10 hours a day. If production targets are not met, the workday can extend to over 12 hours. 
The witness respectfully recommends the following:

Continue to encourage civil society groups with relevant networks to continue investigating conditions of work at Chinese seafood processing factories and whether products processed by North Koreans may end up on the U.S. market.

Propose that new findings on violations affecting North Koreans at such factories be included in the Annual Report on Trafficking in Persons, required under Section 110(B) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 707(B)).

Seek to determine whether the government of China has made any serious and sustained efforts to eliminate severe forms of trafficking in persons, as they relate to the official dispatching of North Korean workers to Chinese seafood processing plants.

Seek to confirm whether seafood exported from China to the United States contains North Korean seafood products, and whether North Korean workers officially dispatched to China processed seafood exported from China to the United States. If confirmed, such products would have to be denied entry at any of the U.S. ports, pursuant to a prohibition under Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307).

The witness wishes to thank HRNK team members Ingyu Choe, Mohona Ganguly, Doohyun (Jake) Kim, and Damian Reddy, as well as Jung Gwang-il, Ko Young-hwan, Lee Hyun-seung and Ri Jong-ho for their invaluable contributions to research, translation, direct testimony, and securing testimony by key witnesses in China and North Korea.

[1] Tim Sullivan, Martha Mendoza, and Hyung-Jin Kim, “NKorean Workers Prep Seafood Going to US Stores, Restaurants,” AP News, August 21, 2021. https://apnews.com/article/sports-middle-east-canada-europe-global-trade-8b493b7df6e147e98d19f3abb5ca090a.
[2] Baek Seong-ho, “North Korea’s Seafood Production and Exports” [in Korean], KITA Inter-Korean Trade Report vol. 7 (2020). https://www.kita.net/cmmrcInfo/internationalTradeStudies/researchReport/northKoreaTradeReportDetail.do?pageIndex=1&no=13&classification=19&searchReqType=detail&pcRadio=19&searchClassification=19&searchStartDate=&searchEndDate=&searchCondition=CONTENT&searchKeyword=&continent_nm=&continent_cd=&country_nm=&country_cd=&sector_nm=&sector_cd=&itemCd_nm=&itemCd_cd=&searchOpenYn=.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Interview with North Korean escapee, October 8, 2023.
[6] Interview with North Korean escapee, October 9, 2023.