HRNK Letter to His Excellency Tomás Ojea Quintana

January 10, 2021

His Excellency Tomás Ojea Quintana
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)


Dear Mr. Quintana,

Thank you for your invitation to answer two questions on progress in accountability for human rights violations in the DPRK, aimed to inform your upcoming March 2021 report to the 46th Human Rights Council session.

The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) is the leading US-based bipartisan, non-governmental organization in the field of North Korean human rights research and advocacy. Since our inception in 2001, HRNK has published 47 reports, investigating the DPRK’s vast system of imprisonment, including political prison camps as well as vulnerable groups, especially women, children, and people in detention. HRNK has held UN consultative status since April 2018. Ever since, we have been proactively representing civil society in the UN process. By participating in the Universal Periodic Review, by organizing online and in-person international conferences and seminars and meetings with Permanent Missions, UN agencies and offices in Geneva, New York City, and Seoul, HRNK has been disseminating the findings and recommendations put forth in our reports.

All HRNK reports and report summaries are available on our website: https://hrnk.org/publications/hrnk-publications.php.

We are honored to share our views relating to the two questions you pose to stakeholders.

 

1. What progress and limitations do you see on accountability issues in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea seven years after the COI report, and how do you envisage the way forward?

On Progress:

The establishment of the OHCHR Office in Seoul, in June 2015 was the direct result of a recommendation made by the COI. For five and a half years, the Seoul Office has played an important role in the documentation process aimed to inform future accountability processes. While executing its mission, the Seoul Office has extensively interacted with CSOs based in the Republic of Korea and other countries, including HRNK.

Since the February 2014 UN COI report, annual resolutions on the human rights situation in the DPRK of both HRC and UNGA have included language condemning the “long-standing

and ongoing systematic, widespread and gross violations of human rights” committed in the DPRK, including those violations that, according to the COI, amount to crimes against humanity. UNGA resolutions have encouraged the UNSC to “continue its consideration of the relevant conclusions and recommendations of the commission of inquiry and take appropriate action to ensure accountability,” including referral of the human rights situation in the DPRK to the ICC. UNGA resolutions also recommended to the UNSC to consider targeted sanctions against those deemed most responsible for acts the COI found to amount to crimes against humanity.

The UNSC held an Arria Formula Meeting on human rights in the DPRK in April 2014. Subsequently, the UNSC took up the human rights situation in the DPRK as a formal agenda item in December 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017. That outcome has not been replicated in 2018, 2019 or 2020.

Building on the COI report, HRC and UNGA resolutions on human rights in the DPRK and the UNSC taking up the issue as a formal agenda item have maintained pressure on the DPRK, kept the issue in focus and galvanized civil society worldwide.

On Limitations:

The perennial obstacle to efforts to address human rights and accountability in North Korea is that political, security, and military issues end up outcompeting and sidelining human rights.

UNSC referral of DPRK crimes against humanity to the ICC is unlikely, due to almost certain opposition by one, if not two P5 members.

On the Way Forward:

HRC and UNGA resolutions on the human rights situation in the DPRK must continue to include strong language on both DPRK crimes against humanity and the need for accountability, including ICC referral.

UNSC failure to take up DPRK human rights as a formal agenda item for three years in a row has given the impression of withdrawal from the high ground the UN and the international community once held on this issue. Moreover, this “withdrawal” roughly coincided with several rounds of US and ROK “summit diplomacy” with the DPRK, giving the impression that human rights was sidelined for the sake of addressing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. We would welcome it as a very positive development if the UNSC resumed taking up DPRK human rights as a formal agenda item.

UNSC resolutions establishing a DPRK sanctions regime have aimed to prevent the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. UNSC resolutions have never comprised a human rights-based rationale.

There is a need for UNSC resolutions to address DPRK crimes against humanity and other severe human rights violations, although that would be possible only while turning the DPRK human rights issue into a substantive, rather than procedural issue, subject to a potential P5 member veto.

Despite the seemingly insurmountable obstacle of a potential P5 veto, seeking UNSC referral of the DPRK to the ICC will continue to pressure the DPRK to consider addressing and improving its human rights situation.

Given the difficulty of the ICC referral route, UN member states could consider alternative accountability mechanisms, with the support of CSOs worldwide.

Although not necessarily within the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur or within the scope of his reporting to the HRC, the role of CSOs, in particular CSOs holding consultative status with ECOSOC, could be emphasized. Under circumstances where the UN’s accountability efforts appear to have somehow stagnated, CSOs can strive to maintain the COI’s momentum.

One such example would be a documentation project HRNK is carrying out in collaboration with the International Bar Association (IBA). Once international travel is again possible, HRNK and IBA will conduct a hearing/mock trial in Seoul, based on the joint documentation project, and involving most respected international jurists and judges.

2. What are your views on the approach that should be taken to ensure that the obligation to respect human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including on accountability measures and ending impunity, and the need for the establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula are fulfilled?

Peace and human rights can never be mutually exclusive. “Saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and “reaffirming faith in fundamental human rights” are enshrined together in the Preamble to the UN Charter. The Korean Peninsula is no exception.

Nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and military tensions aside, human rights and human security are closely intertwined. Efforts must be undertaken to persuade the DPRK that neither humanitarian, nor development assistance can be divorced from human rights.

The COI recommended that “the United Nations Secretariat and agencies should urgently adopt and implement a common ‘Rights up Front’ strategy to ensure that all engagement with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea effectively takes into account, and addresses, human rights concerns,” including those concerns collected in the COI report.

As emphasized by the COI, the adoption of a “Rights up Front” approach would help prevent “the recurrence or continuation of crimes against humanity” in the DPRK.

A Human Rights up Front (HRuF) approach to disbursing humanitarian assistance to the DPRK continues to be imperative. There are certainly extraordinary difficulties facing UN humanitarian agencies involved in the DPRK, in particular pertaining to access. COVID-19-related restrictions in the DPRK have exacerbated such difficulties. With only a couple of UN international workers left in-country, conducting humanitarian operations is nearly impossible.

Nevertheless, the situation created by COVID restrictions in the DPRK may provide the opportunity of a reset in the disbursement of humanitarian assistance by UN agencies. Such a reset may include the fundamental building blocks of an actual HRuF strategy, beginning with requesting access to the most vulnerable groups affected by precarious health care, water and sanitation and hygiene as well as natural disasters, including women, children, and people in detention.

The path to peace on the Korean Peninsula would hit a dead end in the absence of measures to prevent the recurrence of crimes against humanity in the DPRK. UN agencies and UN member states must seek access to detention facilities in the DPRK, in particular to political prison camps, whose existence the DPRK denies, despite thorough documentation via satellite imagery and escapee testimony. Recognizing the UN Special Rapporteur and allowing Mr. Quintana unconditional and unfettered access inside the country would help initiate a human rights-centered trust-building process with the DPRK.

As emphasized by HRNK author David Hawk in an upcoming report, UN accountability mechanisms—applying international criminal law to the DPRK—have constituted the sole approach which has led the DPRK to make some changes to its human rights policies, however small or insignificant. For example, after the COI report, the DPRK responded with a shift in its UPR policy, “accepting” and “rejecting” recommendations for the first time. Naturally, such moves could be purely tactical, and their importance should not be exaggerated.

Ultimately, peace on the Korean Peninsula would be peace between Koreans living in the South and in the North, including both victims and perpetrators. In order to prepare for peace on the Korean peninsula, the documentation process by the Seoul Office must continue. To end impunity, while engagement aimed at peace process on the Korean peninsula may continue, efforts at the HRC, UNGA, and possibly the UNSC must not relent.


Respectfully submitted,

Greg Scarlatoiu
Executive Director

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Categories: COVID, DPRK, HRuF, Human Rights, Kim Jong Un, North Korea, Tomas Ojea Quintana, UN, UNCOI, UNSR

Fixing Distorted History, a Prerequisite to Democratizing North Korea

On the occasion of the 102nd anniversary of the March First Movement
By Kim Myong
Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK Executive Director

On March 1, 1919, one hundred and two years ago to this day, the Korean people turned a new page in their history by proclaiming the annulment of the 1910 Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty and the independence of Korea, and by launching a non-violent national movement for independence from Japanese colonial rule, also called the “March First Movement.”[1] Encouraged by the concept of “national self-determination” promoted by then U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, patriotic forces in Korea, a country Japan annexed by force in 1910, began a nationwide anti-Japanese movement to regain national sovereignty through a peaceful demonstration. That momentous effort was unsuccessful, crushed by the brutal repression of the Japanese imperial forces.[2] However, the March First Movement marked a paradigm shift in the minds of Koreans that the sovereignty of their country and nation mattered the most, above anything personal. On this occasion, they also learned that the independence of their country could be achieved only through armed struggle, not through bare-handed peaceful demonstrations. Later on, the Korean independence movement took one step forward with the establishment of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, tasked to lead the anti-Japanese independence struggle amidst Japanese colonial rule.

To observe the national pride this movement symbolizes, the Republic of Korea (ROK) proclaimed March 1 as a National Day and Public Holiday through the National Holiday Act of October 1, 1949. On the contrary, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has never made March 1 a national holiday. They hold sporadically commemorative events attended by “religious” or social organizations under the control of the Korean Workers’ Party’s United Front Department as part of their effort to reunify the Korean peninsula under communism by rallying their supporters inside South Korea. Unaware of what is really going on, South Koreans may be impressed that the North Korean authorities “cherish” the common history of our nation’s anti-Japanese struggles.

For North Koreans who have been brainwashed for life by history education centered on the so-called “revolutionary activities” of Kim Il-sung and his Baekdu Bloodline Family, March 1 is just an ordinary and “meaningless” day. While living in North Korea, I had no proper understanding of the March First Movement, nor did I spend this day honoring all the martyrs who died for the country. Despite being a short moment in the nation's 5,000-year history, this day is very important: The March First Movement demonstrated the national aspiration for independence and helped to catalyze the growing popular anger towards Japanese occupation. Deceived by the false propaganda of the North Korean authorities, who are so skilled in distorting the national history, dozens of millions of my fellow countrymen in North Korea worship only the Kim family while devaluing or ignoring the brilliant traditions and true historic accomplishments of their nation. Changing their distorted perceptions of history should be the first step toward democratizing North Korea.

North Korea’s Absurd Sophism Distorts the Historical Facts on the March First Movement

Distorted education by the North Korean authorities on the March First Movement is just the tip of the iceberg. There are many other historical facts that they have warped to their liking.

First, North Korean education doesn’t provide any details on the 33 national activists who initiated the March First Movement and prepared the Declaration of Independence. Instead, the movement is used and abused to idolize the Kim family by claiming that it originated in Pyongyang under the leadership of Kim Il-sung's family members.

In North Korea, it is taught that the first flame of the March First Movement started in Pyongyang and then spread down to Seoul, and that “the patriotic young students of Pyongyang Soongsil Middle School played a leading role under the revolutionary influence of Kim Hyong-jik, an outstanding leader of the anti-Japanese national liberation movement.” [3] In other words, North Korean propaganda claims that Kim Hyong-jik, father of Kim Il-sung, had a decisive influence on initiating this movement through the students of Pyongyang Soongsil Middle School, where he had earlier studied. North Korean propagandists and “educators” insist that the movement was a turning point in shifting the struggle for national liberation from the nationalist movement to the communist movement.

However, according to historical archives at the time, Kim Hyong-jik, who had already dropped out of school, was arrested in 1917 by the Japanese police in South Pyongan Province for the “Korean National Association” incident and was released in 1918.[4] He immediately moved to Jung-gang-jin (a geographical area of North Pyongan Province), which proves that he could not participate in the March First Movement in Pyongyang. Besides, there is no specific record of his contribution to this movement, either.

Even in Kim Il-sung's memoirs, “With the Century,” perhaps by his mistake, nowhere is there any mention that the students who were influenced by his father commenced this movement. Instead, he wrote that his maternal grandfather Kang Don-uk urged his fellow villagers and young people to participate in the anti-Japanese independence demonstration. According to Kim Il-sung’s memoirs, he then took the lead in their march from Chilgol to Pyongyang during the March First Movement. In his memoirs, Kim Il-sung also claims that his maternal uncle, Kang Jin-sok, led the march together with his father. He described the March First Movement in Pyongyang in more detail than that in Seoul. He also described Ryu Gwan-sun as an ordinary female student without mentioning her name,[5]and characterized the 33 national activists who led the March First Movement as incompetent elite and bourgeois nationalists.[6] This shows that Kim Il-sung was trying to distort the truth about the March First Movement by under-evaluating the importance of Seoul as the origin of the movement and ignoring the historical figures who led it.

Second, North Korea exaggerates, claiming that, just before his seventh birthday, Kim Il-sung participated in person in the March First Movement, and that his participation provided an opportunity to raise his national consciousness and pushed him to later engage in the anti-Japanese armed struggle.[7]

“I was only eight years old at the time, but I joined in the march wearing my worn-out shoes full of holes. I shouted hurrah over and over with the marchers and reached the Botong Gate. The marchers rushed inside the castle past the Gate; I could not keep up with them in my tattered shoes and so I took them off and ran after the marchers as fast as my little legs could move. When adults sang hurray for independence, I sang hurray together.” [8]

As written above, Kim Il-sung recalled in his memoirs that he had joined the demonstrators at a young age to march with them past the Botong Gate of Pyongyang. Given that the round-trip distance from Mangyongdae where he lived to the Botong Gate was about 15-20 miles, it is hard to believe that he marched alone without help or company of any of his family members. He also recounted that in the following days, he went up to Mangyongdae Peak, blowing a trumpet and beating the drum, and shouting hurrah for independence even after sunset. Unlike his Chilgol family members, who personally participated in the March First Movement, no other members from his Mangyongdae family seemed to join him in the movement, which casts a shadow of doubt on his participation itself.

Kim Il-sung wrote that his worldview broadened and he matured much faster than others by experiencing the scenes of marchers shouting hurrah for independence and witnessing people being killed by the armed police during the movement.

“The March First Movement placed me in the rank of the people and left an image on my eyes of the true nature of the Korean people. Whenever I hear the echo of the March First hurrahs, I feel so proud of the Korean people's unbending determination and heroism.” [9]

In fact, North Korean textbooks show drawings illustrating young Kim Il-sung, marching in the front row of Pyongyang demonstrators and shouting hurrah with them to convince school students that their great leader hated Japanese imperialists profoundly and nurtured the big ambition of regaining the independence of his country since childhood.

Third, while arguing that the Kim family was directly or indirectly involved in the March First Movement, North Korea paradoxically makes an inappropriate and parsimonious evaluation of this movement, emphasizing that only the anti-Japanese armed struggle by Kim Il-sung was appropriate and effective as a manifestation of the independence movement.

North Korea’s official interpretation is that the March First Movement failed because of the following factors: a) it was not guided by an outstanding leader, a revolutionary class, and a revolutionary party; and b) the nationalist leaders of this movement had class-based limitations and deep-rooted pro-Americanism. They say that despite its failure, the movement has historical significance in that it raised the Korean people’s anti-Japanese national liberation movement to a higher level, in an attempt to secure the legitimacy for, and link it to, Kim Il-sung’s armed struggle only.[10]

North Korea labels the 33 national activists who wrote the March First Declaration of Independence “Bourgeois Nationalists.” Furthermore, North Korea blames them for having failed to identify an appropriate way to fight against the armed Japanese imperialists, as they were presumably “prisoners” of President Woodrow Wilson’s idea of national self-determination and counted too much on powers such as the United States. They also say that the movement proved that the nationalists were no longer in a position to lead the anti-Japanese national liberation movement.[11]

In his memoirs, Kim Il-sung wrote: “The failed March First Movement taught us that in order to win our fight for independence and freedom, we must have effective revolutionary leadership and organizational structures; we must use the right tactics and strategies; and we must debunk toadyism and build up our strength on our own.” And he highlighted the importance of his anti-Japanese armed struggle for combating Japanese imperialism and liberating the country.[12]

In history education, North Korea neither gets the historical events across to their population based on objective facts only, nor does it allow them to use their judgment to assess history. Instead, there is “one-way injection” education, based on the textbooks prepared by the Korean Workers’ Party. Therefore, North Koreans are obliged to believe and accept the severely distorted history as it is taught to them by the public education system.

History Education in North Korea is a Legal Means to Build the Kim Family’s Cult of Personality

The main purpose of history education in North Korea is to highlight that Kim Il-sung’s family has been, across generations, the most revolutionary and patriotic family in the country, and that it is the only family that can yield an outstanding leader representing the popular masses.

Currently, the school education’s curriculum contains four subjects related to the Kim family’s “revolutionary activities”—i.e., the history of Kim Il-sung, of Kim Jong-il, of Kim Jong-un, and of Kim Jong-suk—giving priority to these subjects and totally neglecting the Korean history per se. Instead of gaining sufficient knowledge about the Korean nation with its 5,000-year history, the North Koreans are more focused on learning about “the revolutionary life, immortal achievements and great human features” of the Kim family members, starting from Kim Il-sung’s anti-Japanese struggle and his activities after liberation. At school, students do not know much about Ryu Gwan-sun, An Jung-geun[13] and any other patriots or independence activists who devoted their lives in the anti-Japanese struggle. When the Shanghai-based Provisional Government or the Korean Liberation Army is introduced to North Korean students, more emphasis is placed on the perceived mistakes by these organizations rather than what they did right. By the end of history education, students get convinced that the anti-Japanese armed struggle by Kim Il-sung was the one and only right way to achieve national liberation.

In addition, they also learn about other members of the Kim family, beginning with Kim Il-sung’s great-grandfather Kim Ung-woo, as if they were all “great examples of revolutionaries and patriots who devoted their entire lives to the independence of the country and happiness of the nation.” They are taught that great-grandfather Kim Ung-woo took the lead in destroying and sinking the General Sherman in the Daedong River, [14] that grandfather Kim Bo-hyon and grandmother Ri Bo-ik were passionate patriots who raised their children for the revolutionary struggle, that maternal grandfather Kang Don-uk was a patriot who dedicated his life to education and the independence movement, and that all his uncles and younger siblings were revolutionaries who fought for independence (Table 1). By portraying the Kim family as the most revolutionary and patriotic family in the country, the North Korean authorities have justified the hereditary ruling by the Kim family and made it a moral obligation for their people to loyally support their leaders.

Table 1: Designations used in the idolization of the Kim family

Names	Relationship with Kim Il-sung	Designations
Kim Jong-suk	First wife (1919­–1949)	Anti-Japanese heroine; great female revolutionary; the quintessential example of ideal Korean mothers
Kim Ung-woo	Great-grandfather (1845–1930)	Passionate patriot
Kim Bo-hyon	Grandfather (1871–1955)	Passionate patriot
Ri Bo-ik	Grandmother (1876–1959)	Passionate patriot
Kim Hyong-jik	Father (1894–1926)	Indomitable revolutionary fighter; passionate patriot; prominent leader of the anti-Japanese national liberation movement of the country
Kang Ban-sok	Mother (1892–1932)	Indomitable revolutionary fighter; great mother of Korea; great female revolutionary; the best example of Korean mothers; outstanding leader of the Korean women's movement
Kim Hyong-gwon	Uncle (1905–1936)	Indomitable revolutionary fighter; the best example of revolutionary believers; inflexible revolutionary with conviction and commitment
Kim Chol-ju	Brother (1916–1935)	Indomitable revolutionary fighter; the embodiment of great revolutionaries
Kim Won-ju	Cousin (1927–1957)	Indomitable revolutionary fighter
Kang Don-uk	Maternal grandfather (1871–1943)	Passionate patriot; great educator
Kang Jin-sok	Maternal uncle (1890–1942)	Passionate anti-Japanese revolutionary fighter

Source: Based on the North Korean version of the History of Korea.

From April 1992 until his death in July 1994, Kim Il-sung wrote and published eight volumes of his autobiographical memoirs, "With the Century.”[15] As pointed out earlier, controversy exists over many of the historical “facts” introduced in his memoirs.

As soon as Kim Il-sung’s memoirs were published, all North Koreans were called on to read them every day and study their “essence” during the weekly Saturday saeng-hwal-chong-hwa “life and ideological guidance” group meetings, according to the ideological study plans assigned by the Korean Workers’ Party’s Propaganda and Agitation Department. Kim Il-sung’s memoirs constitute an important part of his cult of personality.

“Ga-gye Politics” Thrives on the Dictatorship of the Kim Family

North Koreans internally refer to the extended family of Kim Il-sung as ga-gye (lineage). For example, if someone says that “he or she is married to ga-gye,” it means that he or she married someone who is lineally descended from Kim Il-sung—including his paternal and maternal lineages, i.e. Mangyongdae Kim family or Chilgol Kang family. The term ga-gye does not apply to any other families, for whom the term ga-jok (family) is used. As the years went by, the ga-gye expanded rapidly by marriage between ga-gye members and ga-jok members of different surnames or same surnames from different clans. For example, by marrying Kim Kyong-hui, who is Kim Il-sung's daughter, Jang Song-taek and his bloodline were integrated into the ga-gye. The same was true of Ho Dam, former Foreign Minister of North Korea, who married Kim Il-sung’s cousin, Kim Jong-suk, who was president of the DPRK Committee for Foreign Cultural Relations until recently. For the people of North Korea, ga-gye means royal family and represents absolute power.

From the late 1960s, when Kim Il-sung’s one-man rule was being established, members of the ga-gye began occupying high-level positions in the Korean Workers’ Party, the State, and the Military. In fact, their positions did not matter in exercising power. If, for example, someone introduces him or herself as Kim Il-sung's cousin or his maternal niece’s husband, he or she will enjoy a higher privilege than the general managers or the Party secretaries of the enterprises. No one could be more powerful than a ga-gye member in resolving practical issues for smooth management of a business enterprise.

For example, when public enterprises in North Korea want to build houses for their employees or import some raw materials from China, they have to obtain permission to do so from several state agencies by undergoing a multi-phased process. The North Korean term for the license they get for such business is called “waku.” Depending on the content and nature of the business, a waku requires a very complicated and hard process that, in most cases, is “facilitated” through bribery. People often fail to get a waku, even after spending a lot of time and energy for it. Members of ga-gye can help figure things out using their networks and connections because lots of their family members or relatives are already in key positions at the powerful state agencies that issue the waku. In addition, when high-level officials are subjected to legal punishment for an administrative mistake made in the line of work, ga-gye members often help them to be acquitted. It is needless to say that they receive handsome “compensation” for their help. So, fierce competition often rages among agencies in order to attract members of ga-gye to their offices. 

In this way, Kim Il-sung's relatives or members of the ga-gye penetrated all major state agencies to run “ga-gye politics,” which contribute greatly to widespread corruption and inefficient business management.

As I was surrounded by a number of ga-gye members during my life in North Korea, I knew their nature like the back of my hand. I found them everywhere I went—at the schools I attended and at my workplaces as well. They enjoyed all kinds of privileges and immunities that ordinary people could not aspire to even in their dreams. To me, they were living in a totally different world, and they belonged to a different class in all aspects.

Without making any effort to study hard, they were easily accepted to the top universities of their choice, regardless of their scores on the entrance exams. Even if their school attendance was lower than 50 percent, or even if they did not diligently participate in the school’s organizational life, it did not matter. They were never reprimanded and graduated from their universities with the highest results, as if they had been excellent students. Later on, they found good jobs of their choice in the Party, law enforcement, armed forces and security agencies, in the offices that enabled them to work abroad, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Foreign Trade, or in the foreign currency-earning companies under Office 39 of the Korean Workers’ Party. They were frequently exempted from social work duties in their offices, were lazy and unfaithful in the implementation of their main tasks, but they received good end-of-year evaluations and got promoted faster than others.

With no concerns at all about their daily living, they had a lot of free time. They were wasting their lives on pleasure and entertainment. Many of them became addicted to alcohol, drugs, and sex. Instead of having a bookshelf filled with books at home, they collected South Korean and foreign movies, including pornographic videos, that were banned in North Korea. If ordinary people got caught watching South Korean movies, they would be immediately sent to the kwan-li-so (political prison camps), but the members of ga-gye, accused of the same “crime,” were released soon upon receiving a severe warning. Besides, “yeon-jwa-je,” the North Korean method of punishing up to three generations of the family when a person is found guilty of a “serious crime,” hardly applied to the Kim family and ga-gye members.

In a word, North Korea was the country of the Kim family and ga-gye. These people were living with a sense of superiority, as if the space where we lived together belonged only to them and as if they were untouchable. They were the North Korean “nobility,” and lived extraordinarily selfish lives.

As the dictators changed, the Mangyongdae Kim family and the Chilgol Kang family seemed to be pushed away out of the core of North Korean power, whose center seems to be shifting gradually toward the “Wonsan Kim family.” This will bring another type of ga-gye politics to North Korea.[16]

Truth is More Powerful than Lies

The denial of historical facts by the North Korean authorities is absolutely necessary to maintain their regime. During their seven decade-long reign, the Kim family has committed countless unforgivable crimes against the nation and humanity. They needed to alter or distort the facts to hide their crimes, and they needed to cheat their people to continue ruling over them. If the North Koreans knew the truth of history, the Pillars of Belief in the Kim family and the Myth of the Great Leader would collapse in a matter of seconds like a wall washed away by a deluge, and this would undoubtedly lead to the collapse of the North Korean regime. Truth exists to be eventually revealed. Truth always prevails over deception and lies (Diagram 1).

Diagram 1: Truth Is More Powerful than Lies

“Knowledge is power. Information is liberating. Education is the premise of progress, in every society, in every family.”

Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the United Nations

Out of so many facts that the North Korean authorities are trying to distort or hide, two facts about Kim Il-sung’s and Kim Jong-il’s births were the most shocking to me. Kim Il-sung was born into a family of devout Christians who believed in God. Kim Jong-il was born in Russia and was named “Yuri Irsenovitch Kim.” Let me take the liberty of presenting a few facts on Kim Il-sung’s birth, although they are already known to the world (Box 1).

Box 1: Kim Il-sung was born into a family of Christian believers Kim Il-sung's parents, Kim Hyong-jik (father) and Kang Ban-sok (mother), were devout Christians. American Presbyterian missionary Nelson Bell brokered their marriage, which would result in the birth of Kim Il-sung. Kim Hyong-jik, in his childhood, dreamed of becoming a pastor. He attended Pyongyang Sunhwa School, which was established by American missionaries, and learned to write the Bible in Korean calligraphy. At the time, American missionaries paid a cent in Korean coins to students who came to church. The missionaries loved Kim Hyong-jik, especially for showing his faith by putting all the coins he received into the church offering box. On the recommendation of American missionaries, Kim Hyong-jik entered Soongsil Middle School. This school was founded in 1897 in Pyongyang as a private school by American Presbyterian missionary William M. Baird. Kang Ban-sok was born as the second daughter of Kang Don-uk, who was a devout Presbyterian. Her real name at birth was Kang Shin-hi, but she was baptized in church by Nelson Bell and renamed Ban-sok, the Korean translation of Saint Peter, one of Jesus’ Twelve Apostles. Through Nelson Bell’s brokerage, Kim Hyong-jik and Kang Ban-sok got to know each other and married. As a result, Kim Il-sung was born into a devout family. When he was a child, Kim Il-sung followed his mother to church and faithfully believed in Christianity. Ironically, under Kim Il-sung’s rule, North Korea was transformed into the world’s worst religious persecutor. Source: Kim Il-Sung and Christianity in North Korea by Dae Young Ryu, Journal of Church and State, Volume 61, Issue 3, Summer 2019, Pages 403–430

The reason why the North Korean authorities hide the true facts about Kim Il-sung’s and Kim Jong-il's births is because, once known to the people, they may become an obstacle to deifying and idolizing their “great leaders.”

Like anyone else in the world, North Korean people have the right to access information. This right is an integral part of the fundamental right of freedom of expression, as recognized by Resolution 59 of the United Nations General Assembly adopted in 1946,[17] as well as by Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[18] It has also been enshrined as a corollary of the basic human right of freedom of expression in other major international instruments, including the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.[19]

If any government takes measures to block, for any reason, the free access to information by the North Korean people, they will be blamed by the entire Free World for forsaking 25 million North Koreans and enabling the Kim dynasty to continue to enslave them. As a result of such actions, the prospects for democratization of North Korea and for the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula will remain uncertain.

---

[1] The declaration released on this day is called the “March First Declaration of Independence.”

[2]  Encyclopedia of Korean Culture (https://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Contents/Item/E0026772).

[3] North Korean version of the History of Korea (for the 4th grade of high schools). Printed in 2000 by DPRK Educational Books Publishing House.

[4] The “Korean National Association” was a pro-independence clandestine organization founded in Pyongyang in 1915. It was soon discovered by the Japanese imperial authorities and its founding members were imprisoned in 1918, which led to its immediate dissolution. For more details on this organization, please visit: https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/조선국민회 .

 

[5] Ryu (Yoo) Kwang-sun (1878~?) was a Korean independence fighter and believer in Cheondoism. Arrested and sentenced to 1 year and 3 months of prison for anti-Japanese activities on November 22, 1920, her fate is unknown after that date.

[6] Kim Il-sung's Memoirs “With the Century” Vol. 1 (April 1992). Chapter One: Land of misfortunes.

[7] Kim Il-sung was born on April 15, 1912. According to the Western way of counting age, he was about to turn seven in March 1919. According to the Korean way of counting age, he was about to turn eight.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] North Korean version of the History of Korea (for the 4th grade of high schools). Printed in 2000 by DPRK Educational Books Publishing House.

[11] In his memoirs, Kim Il-sung wrote that the national self-determination was a hypocritical slogan issued by the US to prevent the influence of Russia’s October Socialist Revolution from spreading to other parts of the world.

[12] Kim Il-sung's Memoirs “With the Century” Vol. 1 (April 1992). Chapter One: Land of misfortunes.

[13] An Jung-geun (1879–1910) was a Korean nationalist and independence activist who assassinated Prince Ito Hirobumi, a four-time Prime Minister of Japan and former Resident-General of Korea, in 1909. He was subsequently imprisoned and executed by the Japanese authorities on March 26, 1910.

[14] The General Sherman was a U.S. Merchant Marine side-wheel steamer attacked and sunk in the Daedong River in 1866. The incident is often credited as a catalyst to the end of Korean isolationism in the second half of the 19^th century.

[15] The eight volumes of Kim Il-sung’s memoirs cover the period from his childhood to his repatriation upon the liberation. The last two volumes were posthumously published.

[16] Kim Jong-un is presumed to have been born in Wonsan, on January 8, 1984.

[17] The UN General Assembly Resolution 59, A/RES/59(1), adopted on December 14, 1946, is available at: https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/1 .

[18] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted on December 10, 1948, is available at: https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ .

[19] The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted on 16 December 1966, is available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx .

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Categories: crimes against humanity, DPRK, History, Human Rights, Independence, Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong Suk, Kim Jong Un, Kim Regime, March 1 Movement, Nonviolence, North Korea, ROK, South Korea, Truth

Education, Information, and Liberation for North Koreans

 By Jihyun Park

Translated into English by Jeune Kim, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK Executive Director

HRNK contributor Ms. Jihyun Park is a British North Korean escapee and human rights activist. Ms. Park is co-author of “Deux Coréennes.” She is a survivor of forced marriage and human trafficking. She escaped from North Korea twice, enduring imprisonment in gulags and many near-death experiences. Today, she displays immense courage, raising awareness of the plight of North Korean women and the crimes against humanity they suffer. In doing so, she continues to face danger on a daily basis. Ms. Park received the NatWest's Chairman's Award AWA in 2018 and the Amnesty Brave Award in 2020. Currently, she is running as a conservative candidate for local election in the United Kingdom.

North Korean teachers have always had control over the ideology of the children. They teach history, and the idolization of Kim Il-sung for the ultimate purpose of cementing the Kim family regime’s grip on power. Korean War orphans sent to Eastern Europe had a different educational experience. Eastern European teachers educated them, taking on subjects such as art and music. The role of literature was particularly significant. Of course, the repression of intellectuals in Eastern European countries that received those North Korean children was harsh. But, particularly after the death of Stalin in 1953, Eastern European countries experienced a slight relaxation of draconian restrictions. That all ended with the Hungarian anti-communist revolution of 1956.

Their Eastern European teachers taught the North Korean children about ancient Greek mythology, classical literature and had them read the works of Shakespeare. Many of the children realized that there was a world out there, completely different from the one of uniform collectivism emphasized by North Korean teachers. There were even children who secretly borrowed books and read them when they were out of the sight of North Korean teachers. What they discovered was self-reflection, the power to reflect back on themselves.

The children’s eyes were opened to the freedom and universal human rights that shaped modern civil society in Europe. They learned this from Eastern European teachers, even though Eastern Europe itself was, at the time, under the yoke of communist dictatorship. It was a profound change that could not have taken place if these children had not lived in Eastern Europe. Oppressed as they were, some of their Eastern European teachers still had memories of different times, and different political systems.

Why did Kim Il-sung bring the war orphans living in Eastern Europe back to North Korea during the late 1950s and start shutting out all information from the outside world? Finding out what it is that transformed the thoughts and behavior of these children is the fundamental key to solving this North Korean puzzle today.

Kim Il-sung brought these children back to North Korea because of the art and culture they encountered in Eastern Europe. He did so because, even though Eastern Europe was ruled under a communist system at the time, its culture had been founded on individualism and the way of thinking that shaped modern European civil society had also evolved from individualist philosophy.

Just as it did 70 years ago, North Korea continues to maintain the most brutal regime in history under the Kim family dictatorship and, in the name of xenophobia, blocks information coming from the outside.

Why does North Korea restrict information? In a totalitarian dictatorship, they must root out all the flowers and trees that grow in the fields, and instead plant flowers of their own favorite color, and divide and cultivate them based on their components (songbun). In addition, North Korea regards “double thinkers” (those who pay lip service to the Kim regime, but are suspected of being sympathetic to different political systems) as a hostile class, so people cannot share what they really think with their families at home, nor with their relatives outside.

When I was young, there was a song that my father would always sing during the holidays, when he and his friends had one drink too many. It was a folk song called “Let Us Go to the Sea.” He would sing, “Let’s go to the sea over there, let’s go to the sea…” Because I was young then, I did not understand what that song meant. But now, I understand that it was about the desire to gaze at the vast blue sea and freely express all the sorrow and resentment from deep within to one’s heart’s content. My parents’ generation only knew loyalty to the Supreme Leader. They could not even confidently answer their own children’s questions, fearing a mistake could downgrade their songbun status; they feared even inquiring about the whereabouts of their own relatives.

It was in the 1990s when the Arduous March began to permeate this dark land. Numerous people dying of starvation left; they were people who left North Korea and went to China, clutching their starving stomachs, because they had to survive.

The place where they went was also dominated by a communist regime, but for the people of North Korea, it was an opportunity to discover a new world. And as we saw the distorted and falsified history of North Korea, we were able to open our eyes.

The first thing we heard in China was Chinese people cursing Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. Even though the government controlled everything, the Chinese people could freely watch dozens of TV channels. The moment I saw them watching South Korean dramas on satellite TV and singing South Korean songs, I was so surprised by this kind of world that I asked myself the question: “Who am I and where am I from?”

Even as I was forcibly repatriated, beaten, and tortured as a “traitor” in a North Korean prison, I was able to endure the suffering because of the image that sparked before my eyes: being in that place, like I was receiving a gift for the first time in my life. I lived determined to go back to that place. This is why people who are forcibly repatriated twice, even three times, still want to leave that hellscape.

For those who are not living in a tunnel but in a lightless cave, information, culture, and art are like warmth that melts away the chill on a cold winter’s day, a moment to forget the struggles and dance beneath the palm trees, and a lighthouse in the middle of a dark sea that you are blessed to see as a gift from God.

What the North Korean regime fears is this gift from God—that the people of North Korea will think differently from the regime. Therefore, the North Korean regime regulates its people according to a planned daily schedule from when they wake up in the morning to when they go to sleep in the evening, coercing them into forced labor, and not allowing for any free time.

Even as they see the people dying of starvation, without any concern for their lives, they continue to force upon them an overwhelming amount of political brainwashing, never stopping even once.

They use idolization to entrap the minds of the North Korean people living under a dictatorship and oppress their souls.

The law that has been proposed on the order of Kim Yo-jong in step with this North Korean regime is the law regarding the development of inter-Korean relations; it is the anti-leaflet law in South Korea. Anti-North Korea leaflets not only include information that discloses the brutal atrocities committed by the dictatorial North Korean regime, but also things that will melt the hearts and ease the hardships of North Koreans. Activists even send gifts, such as vitamins, Bibles, and portable media devices containing culture and art.

Before Germany was reunified, the East German government said that their enemies were on the roofs, fearing the antennas mounted on the roofs used to watch West German TV. After reunification, the people of East Germany said that during the day they were in East Germany and at night they were in West Germany, demonstrating how the information flowing in from West Germany had changed them.

The current administration that speaks of peace on the Korean peninsula, President Moon Jae-in’s family were also refugees who came to South Korea during the Hungnam evacuation that is referred to as the Christmas Miracle. If they had no information, would they have gotten on that boat? Moon, whose family received the miraculous information that others did not receive and settled in South Korea and became president, is now obstructing the miraculous information that the people of his hometown longed for while shouting for peace on the Korean peninsula. Whom does this hypocritical “peace” serve?

The following line from the bill sparked much anger:

Article 25 (Penalties) ① A person who violates Article 24 (1) shall be sentenced to a maximum of three years in prison or fined up to 30 million won.

Reading this bill sent chills down my spine, reminding me of the forced repatriation from China. The Chinese government made sure that if a Chinese national discovered a North Korean escapee, they would immediately inform the Chinese Ministry of Public Security, and then get paid with a reward. As a result, the Chinese would feverishly search for North Korean defectors and report them, driving them to be forcibly repatriated. Many North Korean lives were lost, and this resulted in many separated families.

This law, which is like the South Korean government making a public notice to its citizens to report those who launch anti-North Korea leaflets to authorities, is mortifying for North Korean escapees.

It is the duty and mission of a free individual to lend a helping hand to those who are reaching out and seeking help from a dark place.

There are many people in North Korea who are living as “double thinkers,” and it is information about culture and art that has come in from the outside world that has brought about this change of thought.

Even though we are not able to travel to North Korea, we should not forget the extraordinary sense of accomplishment when information and news from the outside world reach the North Korean people.

Even now, there is something that the South Korean government should not forget. If the enemy of the North Korean dictator right now is the free government of South Korea, then tomorrow, those who put this bill into effect must keep in mind that they could easily become enemies of the dictator. One day, they may even become slaves as well.

One thing is sure: No leader, no government, and no law will be able to prevent the North Korean people from accessing information from the outside world—not even Kim Jong-un or Moon Jae-in. They have already tasted the free world through information entering North Korea. There is no turning back.

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Categories: China, communism, crimes against humanity, DPRK, education, Escapee, Famine, Freedom, Human Rights, Information, Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong Un, Liberation, North Korea

A Message to the Incoming Biden Administration – Pay Attention to North Korea

By George Hutchinson 

Growing Signs of an Economic Crisis 

As the Biden administration gets underway amidst ongoing political strife in the U.S., signs of a progressively destabilizing North Korea might not get the level of recognition required to ensure coordinated plans are in place to deal with regional instability. Rather than wait for a deep crisis to occur in Northeast Asia, it will be essential that comprehensive planning and coordination occur early in the new administration. What exactly are the vulnerabilities of the Kim regime to instability, what are the risks of highest concern, and what can be done?

Media and policy establishment attention to North Korea has been mostly fixated on the regime’s nuclear program—from the tests and missile launches that culminated in late 2017 to Trump-Kim summitry that many hoped would lead to denuclearization negotiations to where we are now, waiting to see how Kim will size up the Biden administration and whether North Korean provocations will resume.

Getting less attention but having as much potential impact on regional stability is Kim Jong-un’s need to get the North Korean economy going. At a plenary meeting of the North Korean Workers’ Party held on April 21, 2018, Kim announced to his central committee that nuclear and long-range missile tests were no longer needed—the nuclear program was complete. It was time, according to Kim, to focus on building a powerful economy.[1] But that was almost three years ago, and conditions for North Korea have grown worse.

Initial hopes for getting the North Korean economy on track were dashed in February 2019 at the Hanoi summit when Kim tried to negotiate a generous package of sanctions relief up front in return for watered down commitments to dismantle the Yongbyon nuclear complex. Donald Trump refused to go along, resulting in a long train ride home for the empty-handed North Korean leader. Sanctions have remained in place since, and Trump, the only sitting U.S. president to ever engage a North Korean leader directly, lost his reelection bid. Meanwhile, there are no signs in sight that North Korea’s economy will improve any time soon.

Kim may sense that patience over the economy is running thin. On January 5, 2021, at the opening of the 8th Workers' Party Congress, North Korea’s largest and most important political event, he admitted the regime had fallen short of meeting the country’s economic goals.[2] Not long after experiencing punishing typhoon-related flooding, he openly shed tears while apologizing for the regime’s failures during an October military parade speech celebrating the founding of the Korean Workers’ Party.[3] But things are not likely to get better. Sanctions continue and the country’s borders with China have remained sealed due to the COVID pandemic, causing trade with its neighbor to plummet by 75 percent over the first 10 months in 2020.[4] Are these warning signs enough to get North Korea, and the possibility of regime instability on the administration’s radar?

 

The Real Possibility for Regime Instability

In late April 2020, rumors mushroomed and swirled over the condition of Kim Jong-un’s health. North Korea’s cheese-loving, chain-smoking leader was reportedly being treated after undergoing a “cardiovascular procedure” on April 12 at the Hyangsang Medical Center in North Pyongan Province.[5] The previous month, North Korea’s state news agency had ham-handedly issued a self-flattering statement about the country’s response to COVID-19, praising the regime’s vigilance at keeping the number of cases contained at zero. Even at this early stage of the pandemic, North Korea’s claim of nil cases seemed highly dubious. The virus originated in Wuhan, the first country outside of China to experience a spike in cases was South Korea, and North Korea is sandwiched between the two countries.[6] What was this seemingly flagrant suppression of information intended to cover up? Were the elite in Pyongyang hiding something?

Kim’s absence from several key events that April, including the annual public celebration of his grandfather’s birthday, fueled speculation over the potentially perilous condition of his health. Adding to the disquietude were reports that made it seem like the North Korean system was in the initial throes of breakdown—movement of trains was allegedly disrupted on both sides of the border between China and North Korea while low-flying helicopters were supposedly spotted over Pyongyang as panic-stricken residents stockpiled goods in the capital. The U.S., meanwhile, was monitoring indications that suggested Kim was in purported “grave danger.” Then in early May, as quickly as they had begun, rumors and speculation over Kim’s ill health halted when pictures appeared of him at a ribbon-cutting event for a new fertilizer factory.[7]

The extent to which Kim Jong-un may or may not have been incapacitated during April 2020 may never be known. Regardless, the media-driven speculation over Kim’s health did provide an opportunity for decisionmakers, planners and policy practitioners to re-ponder Kim dynastic power transition and the potential for regime instability, along with the attendant risks and possible responses. To be sure, Pyongyang has demonstrated a degree of resilience for decades, weathering natural disasters, muddling through self-inflicted crises, and managing precarious dynastic successions. The regime’s success, if one can call it that, lies largely in a suffocating system of control that restricts society, controls ideas and information, and brutally punishes violators with force.[8] Nevertheless, the regime remains vulnerable.

There are numerous potential exogenous and endogenous causes that would create instability and the Kim regime is highly vulnerable to all of them. These range widely, from a premature exit by Kim Jong-un—natural or unnatural, to coups, uprisings, or simply the regime’s inability to continue coping with international pressure against the backdrop of myriad other ongoing crises. Also included are scenarios like widescale natural disasters or accidents that do not begin as direct challenges to the Kim’s party leadership, but simply shake the regime due to their staggering implications. A Chernobyl-scale environmental or safety-related event could create chaos and confusion at levels that rupture regime stability. Should the regime unsuccessfully withstand these shocks to its ruling structure, countless unsettling scenarios could unfold.[9]

The Hazards of the Korean People’s Army without Clear Command and Control

Any scenario involving breakdown of the Kim regime creates grave concerns over the disposition and employment, intentional or inadvertent, of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and its highly destructive weapons, not to mention North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction, which of course include a portfolio of nuclear warheads. The scenarios are further complicated by the numerous variables involved: China’s potential intervention; U.S. involvement vis-à-vis OPCON considerations, existing contingency plans, and the U.S.-ROK military alliance; South Korea’s political approach; involvement by the UN and NGOs; refugees and other humanitarian considerations; and the potential formation of factional groups, each competing to fill the vacuum of power.

This list of notional factors represents just some of the variables within the full range of possibilities. Adding even more complexity to concerns over the disposition and employment of KPA forces is the vertical rigidity of North Korea’s command and control system. As a means to control the KPA, information is rarely allowed to flow horizontally. Information generated at the bottom of the command chain flows up vertically and orders flow back down the chain. Little, if any, communication is shared among adjacent KPA units.[10] In a scenario where the regime is destabilized, KPA units, with no command and control node in place to issue orders, may have no other choice than to default to pre-built checklists and execute pre-assigned tasks with no regard to, and no understanding of, the real-world events going on around them. Cut off from information, these units could operate in a highly suboptimal way, thinking they are going about business as per a pre-approved plan.

The high stakes involved over the disposition and employment of the KPA along with the added complexity of numerous interacting variables not only puts primacy on maintaining contingency plans that are well-coordinated and up to date, but it also places prioritization on understanding potential communication pathways capable of reaching KPA military forces in the event of a regime breakdown. This will be vital in order to provide lines of emergency communication outside of broken-down regime control channels to prevent the unnecessary employment of weaponry or force, prepare for complex humanitarian operations intended to provide assistance, and if needed, sustain internal defensive operations. Campaigns of information dissemination must be designed to inform KPA forces, down to the soldier level, of the real-world situation occurring outside North Korea, imminent or ongoing human rights violations targeting them, and humanitarian help that is on its way to tend to them. To achieve these vital activities, it is essential that comprehensive interagency planning and coordination occur early in the new administration, rather than waiting for a crisis to occur.

 

 

 

---

[1] “DPRK Report on the Third Plenary Meeting of the Seventh Central Committee,” The National Committee on North Korea,
https://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/dprk_report_third_plenary_meeting_of_seventh_central_committee_of_wpk.pdf, accessed January 10, 2021

[2] Shim Kyu-seok, “Kim Concedes Economic Shortfalls as Congress Opens,” Korea JoongAng Daily, January 6, 2021, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2021/01/06/national/northKorea/North-Korea-8th-Party-Congress-Kim-Jongun/20210106165200570.html, accessed January 10, 2021

[3] “Kim Jong Un’s Admitting to Economic Failure,” The Dong-A Ilbo, January 7, 2021, https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20210107/2353213/1/Kim-Jong-Un-s-admitting-to-economic-failure, accessed January 10, 2021

[4] Hyung-jin Kim and Kim Tong-hyung, “Mired in Crises, North Korea's Kim to Open Big Party Meeting,” AP, December 29, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/pandemics-seoul-south-korea-north-korea-storms-5cae55abfc7a3db4ee10672530d591b7, accessed January 10, 2021

[5] Ha Yoon-a, “김정은, 최근 심혈관 시술 받았다…여전히 특각서 치료 중 [Kim Jong Un Receives Recent Cardiovascular Procedure...Still Being Treated at Villa],” DailyNK, April 20, 2020, https://www.dailynk.com/김정은-최근-심혈관-시술-받았다여전히-특각서-치/, accessed January 3, 2021, 

[6] George Hutchinson, “Reckless Response: North Korea Should Come Clean on COVID-19,” Center for Security Policy Studies, George Mason University, March 19, 2020, http://csps.gmu.edu/2020/03/19/reckless-response-north-korea-should-come-clean-on-covid-19/?fbclid=IwAR3HQxs5RXQ3fqKiAJ6ghqV4iB3Bq0sRi7g-VsnzsAEWEMwLBMAIYo1xCpg, accessed January 5, 2021

[7] For overlapping coverage of the speculative reporting and reactions over Kim Jong-un’s status, see Ha, “김정은, 최근 심혈관 시술 받았다…여전히 특각서 치료 중[Kim Jong Un Receives Recent Cardiovascular Procedure...Still Being Treated at Villa]”; Anna Fifield, “Is the Talk About Kim Jong Un Being Sick—or Worse—True? Pyongyang is Abuzz, Too,” The Washington Post, April 26, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/is-the-talk-about-kim-jong-un-being-sick--or-worse--true-pyongyang-is-abuzz-too/2020/04/26/d29b9770-873e-11ea-81a3-9690c9881111_story.html; Jim Sciutto, Joshua Berlinger, Yoonjung Seo, Kylie Atwood and Zachary Cohen, “US Monitoring Intelligence That North Korean Leader is in Grave Danger After Surgery, CNN, April 21, 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/04/20/politics/kim-jong-un-north-korea/index.html; Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “North Korea’s Leader May Be in Ill Health. Here’s What We Know About Instability in the World’s Most Secretive Regime,” The Washington Post, April 22, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/04/22/north-koreas-leader-may-be-ill-health-heres-what-we-know-about-instability-worlds-most-secretive-regime/; Chad O'Carroll and Oliver Hotham, “Life Continues as Normal in Pyongyang as Kim Jong Un Health Rumors Swirl,” NK News, April 20, 2020, https://www.nknews.org/2020/04/life-continues-as-normal-in-pyongyang-as-kim-jong-un-health-rumors-swirl/; Choe Sang-hun, “Kim Jong-un Is Back. What Happens When He’s Really Gone?” The New York Times, May 2, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/02/world/asia/kim-jong-un-alive.html; Paul Farhl, “Kim Jong Un Appears to be Alive After All. So Why Did CNN and Other News Outlets Report He Was on His Deathbed?” May 6, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/media/kim-jong-un-appears-to-be-alive-after-all-so-how-did-his-death-make-the-news/2020/05/05/e9cf7f0e-8d6c-11ea-a0bc-4e9ad4866d21_story.html; all accessed January 3, 2021

[8] For a detailed description of North Korea’s “Authoritarian Toolbox,” see, “Daniel L. Byman and Jennifer Lind, "Pyongyang's Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea," International Security, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Summer 2010), pp. 44-74

[9] For examples of scenarios that could occur involving a Kim regime collapse, see Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., “Planning for the Future: Conditions of Combined ROK-U.S. Military Intervention in Potential DPRK Contingencies,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 2012), p. 492, http://www.kida.re.kr/data/kjda/06_Bruce%20E_Bechtol.pdf, accessed January 5, 2020; David S. Maxwell, “Catastrophic Collapse of North Korea: Implications for the United States Military,” a monograph prepared for the School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, Academic Year 1995-96, pp. 5-15 https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a314274.pdf, accessed January 5, 2020; Bruce W. Bennett and Jennifer Lind, “The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Fall 2011), pp. 87-89. Also, see Robert Collins’ phases of North Korean collapse, Robert D. Kaplan, “When North Korea Falls,” The Atlantic (October 2006), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/10/when-north-korea-falls/305228/, accessed January 11, 2021. 

[10] Joseph S. Bermudez, "Information and the DPRK's Military and Power-Holding Elite," in Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, eds., "North Korean Policy Elites," IDA Paper, P-3903 (Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Defense Analysis, June 2004), p. I-S-2

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Categories: analysis, Crisis, DPRK, Economic, Human Rights, Kim Jong Un, KPA, KWP, North Korea, Party Congress, Regime instability