Showing posts with label southkorea. Show all posts
Showing posts with label southkorea. Show all posts

February 18, 2021

Anti-Leaflet Law in South Korea & Freedom of Expression in North Korea

[Policy Report from the Office of Tae Yong-ho]
January 5, 2021

Tae Yong-ho, Member of the National Assembly

(the People Power Party)


<Table of contents>

Introduction


1. The Constitution of the Republic of Korea and the Amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act (“Anti-Leaflet Law”)


Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea

Enactment Process of the Anti-Leaflet Law

Freedom of Expression vs. Lives and Safety of South Korean Residents in the Border


2. The Legal Problems with the Anti-Leaflet Law

Laws on Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation

The Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act

Criticism from the International Community

Government Stance on the Criticism from the International Community


3. The Reality of the Right to Freedom of Expression in North Korea

North Korean Legal Structure

Compulsory Political Activities

Juche Ideology of North Korea

Religious Policy of North Korea

State Control on Outside Information


4. Recent Changes in North Korea

Active Flea Markets

Korean Wave (Hallyu) in North Korea

Adoption of Law on Rejecting Reactionary Ideology and Culture


Conclusion


Introduction

I am honored to have been given an opportunity to serve my country, the Republic of Korea, as a member of the National Assembly. However, just four years ago, I was North Korea’s former deputy ambassador to the United Kingdom. But in 2016, I defected to South Korea with my family in search of freedom, leaving behind all privileges rendered to me. But the turning point in my life did not just happen overnight. My perspectives on the world have been shaped by the time I had spent traveling between Pyongyang and various European capitals every three to four years as a North Korean diplomat. Years of living abroad have completely transformed my belief in the North Korean system and eventually influenced my decision to defect to the South, one of the most flourishing democracies in the world.

In fact, it was the elite education in North Korea that first opened my eyes to the outside world. In my teens, I was lucky enough to attend a foreign language school in Pyongyang, usually reserved for the children of the country’s elite ruling class, where we were even shown American cinema. Enthralled, I remember humming Edelweiss from The Sound of Music created by U.S. imperialists, our sworn enemies. It was a tiny opening that eventually led to my family’s flight to freedom during my posting in London in 2016 following in the von Trapp family’s footsteps.

The leaflets flown north in balloons from the inter-Korean border area have likewise been an invaluable source of information for those trapped behind the Juche curtain. Having learnt about the Kim Jong-Un regime’s opulence and its self-serving diversion of resources into weapons of mass destruction over the welfare of its people, some vote with their feet by escaping a life of oppression in North Korea; others elect to stay but remain aware that there are alternatives.

Pyongyang knows this too. Perhaps that is why it has been apoplectic about leaflets even by North Korean standards. On October 10, 2014, North Korean forces opened fire on balloons carrying leaflets. In June 2020, Pyongyang threatened military action for South Korea’s failure to ban leafleting.

North Korea has made a series of threats against the sending of leaflets along border. The newly amended provisions of the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Law, colloquially known as the “anti-leaflet law,” goes far beyond in its banned items and geographic scope. The South Korean authorities have belatedly suggested issuing legally dubious “interpretive guideline” to narrow the application, but they have been silent about revising the law. The government also likes to cite inter-Korean agreements to end leafleting but they do not cover activities by private citizens or groups.

Nor do I share the government’s expectation that the anti-leaflet law will “contribute to the improvement of inter-Korean relations and promotion of peace on the Korean Peninsula”. Instead, bending over backwards to appease totalitarian rulers may embolden them to ask for more as Hitler did after the 1938 Munich agreement. What assurance is there that Pyongyang would not promise reprisals for sending of Bibles or South Korean movies through China?

I am deeply grateful to the South Korean people for warmly welcoming my family, guaranteeing my life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and giving me the privilege and honor of representing my electors. None of the “people’s deputies” in North Korea would dare to speak against a government bill let alone filibuster it.

The North Korean people are entitled to the same freedoms that I have enjoyed for the past four years here and its realization will be the surest guarantee of human rights and democracy, peace and prosperity in South Korea in the long term. As Martin Luther King Jr. wrote, “injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”

That is why I ask your support to stand with human rights defenders in speaking up against the anti-leaflet law and protecting freedom of expression in North and South Korea before it comes into force on 30 March 2021.

This special report on the anti-leaflet law has been prepared to aid your understanding of several legal issues surrounding the amendment in light of the Constitution and international law and of brutal reality of freedom of expression in North Korea. The report concludes that the anti-leaflet law is extremely problematic for three fundamental reasons. First, it undermines democracy by restricting freedom of information in North Korea. Second, the law suppresses human rights and religious freedom. Third, it also restricts freedom of expression, a fundamental right protected by the Constitution of South Korea.

The Republic of Korea is one of the extremely rare countries among the colonized that achieved both industrialization and democracy. It is the law of nature that water flows from high to low points. The same could be said about the two Koreas. It is the law of nature that North Korean citizens, oppressed under the authoritarian rule of Kim Jong-un, accept free and democratic values of the South. The freer and democratic North Korea becomes, the sooner peaceful unification will arrive in the Korean peninsula.

I will continue to fight against all attempts to blind North Korean people to the truth. I sincerely hope that you will join me in this important endeavor.

January 5, 2021

Tae Yong-ho, Member of the National Assembly (the People Power Party)


1. The Constitution of the Republic of Korea and the Amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act (“Anti-Leaflet Law”)

Article 4, Constitution of the Republic of Korea


Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea reads that “the Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the basic free and democratic order.” As stated in the Constitution, the North Korea policy, therefore, should be based on the two pillars of ‘free and democratic order and peace,’ because after all, the most important duty of the President is to defend the Constitution.

If the Constitution seeks to establish peaceful unification, North Korean people should be given more opportunities to learn about democracy and build ethnic affinity with fellow South Koreans. The decision to voluntarily give up soft power that has earned the hearts of the North Korean people, specifically through the South Korean cultural wave (Hallyu), will only serve to undermine the constitutional pillar of ‘the basic free and democratic order.’

The Enactment Process of the Anti-Leaflet Law


The psychological warfare between the two Koreas first began during the Korean War. The government-led distribution of leaflets halted when Kim Dae Jung administration agreed to halt the activity to meet a precondition for the June 15th Inter-Korean summit. Kim’s successor, former President Roh Moo-hyun followed suit and agreed in 2004 to stop propaganda activities along the inter-Korean border and to remove all tools and means that facilitate such activities. Government-mandated ban on the sending of leaflets led to a rise of civilian-led launching of leaflets.

In the Panmunjom Declaration signed on April 27, 2018, President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong-un agreed to cease all hostile acts against each other in order to defuse acute military tensions that had built up. Such acts included the loud-speaker broadcasting and scattering of leaflets in the areas along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL).

In fact, the distribution of leaflets by civilians contributes to promoting the rights to know of the North Korean people. The downside is that it could cause inter-Korean tension. For instance, on Oct 10, 2014, the North Korean army fired some 10 bullets with anti-aircraft guns at balloons carrying leaflets launched in Yeoncheon County, to which the South Korean military responded with return fire. Whenever North Korea ramped up its threat, past South Korean administrations responded with either prohibiting the launching of leaflets with police force or attempting to dissuade civic groups from sending leaflets at all. However, each time the government made such attempt, it received fierce criticism from the public, mainly because no legal basis existed to ban leaflet-launching activities. The government ban on the sending of leaflets would have violated freedom of expression, a fundamental right protected by the Constitution.

There have been eight motions to amend the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act from years between 2008 and 2018 which aimed to prohibit the launching of leaflets to North Korea. However, all motions received criticism and were later discarded on the ground that they violated the basic right protected by the Constitution.

What changed the dynamics was when Kim Yo-jong, the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, demanded that the South Korean government make laws to ban the sending of leaflets by activist groups consisting of defectors. Since her statement on June 4, 2020, the legislative process to enact the anti-leaflet law progressed rapidly. She threatened to shut a joint liaison office and factory town in the border town of Kaesong or discard the inter-Korean comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA), if the South Korean government failed to take necessary action.

In response to Kim Yo-jong’s demand, South Korean Ministry of Unification quickly held a press briefing and announced that all activities that endanger the lives and property of residents living in the border should be prohibited and that it was preparing to take steps to improve current legislation that can fundamentally correct the situation, signaling that it would hastily enact the anti-leaflet law in order to completely ban the leaflet drop.

Both the South Korean public and international community denounced the anti-leaflet bill, calling it ‘legislation made under the single order of Kim Yo-jong’ and ‘legislation that guards authoritarian Kim Jong-un.’ They demanded the government retract its decision to pursue the legislative process. For example, Tomás Ojea Quintana, United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea, advised the two Koreas to work together to resolve the leaflet issue, while Signe Poulsen, head of the Seoul office of the UN Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights, commented that the sending of leaflets is an activity intended to deliver information to North Korean citizens and thus a form of individual freedom of expression.

However, despite North Korea’s demolishing of a joint liaison office in Kaesong on June 16, the government introduced a bill to the general meeting of the Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee of the National Assembly on August 3. On September 22, a South Korean civil servant from the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries was killed by North Korean soldiers while on duty, and his body was incinerated. Although the South Korean government did not even receive an assurance from Pyongyang that North Korea would take action to punish the perpetrators and prevent similar cases from occurring again, South Korea did not participate in the joint committee for the adoption of resolution on situation of human rights at UN General Assembly. On December 2, the anti-leaflet law passed with majority voting for the bill. What happened was that the super-majority of the ruling Democratic Party forcibly passed the bill, disregarding and breaking a conventional rule of passing the bill only with an agreement between the ruling and opposition parties in a Foreign Affairs and Unification subcommittee a day before the vote.

The anti-leaflet law passed the vote in the general meeting of the National Assembly on December 14. The bill was then debated and deliberated (Dec 22), approved by the President (Dec 24), promulgated (Dec 29), and is set to take effect three months after promulgation, resulting in the birth of unjust law that outrightly denies the spirit of the Constitution. While the ruling party and the government claim that this is a minimal step necessary to protect the lives and safety of South Korean residents in the border, legal experts on domestic and international law, human rights activists, US Congressmen, and media criticized the passage of the bill as one that severely restricts the rights of individual to speak freely, a basic constitutional right.


Freedom of Expression vs. Lives and safety of South Korean Residents in the Border

The South Korean government and ruling party pointed out that the distribution of leaflets should be banned, as it endangers the lives and safety of South Korean citizens living along the border. However, this is an extremely weak argument in light of the Constitution, international law, and legal views of the National Human Rights Commission of South Korea, a national advocacy institution for human rights protection.

The Republic of Korea Constitution states that “all citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech and the press, and freedom of assembly and association (Clause 1, Article 21).” Nevertheless, the extent to an individual can express his or her freedom is not without limit. The Constitution also reads that “the freedoms and rights of citizens may be restricted by Act only when necessary for national security, the maintenance of law and order or for public welfare (Clause 2, Article 37).” The distribution of leaflet can escalate military tension between the two Koreas and may violate the right to live of the residents in the border.

In fact, Defector A argued in a court case that government prohibition on the distribution of leaflets caused psychological damage to him. The South Korean Supreme Court ruled in 2016 that causality exists between the act of sending leaflets and provocation of North Korea which could directly incur bodily harm and imminent danger to the lives of residents in the border region. Therefore, it confirmed the original verdict that dismissed a claim for damages, ruling that the government can limit the leaflet sending activity under the Act on the Performance of Duties by Police Officers and civil law.

The government frequently cites this court case to support the legality of the anti-leaflet law. However, the Supreme court ruling was merely that it was not unlawful for the police to stop individuals from sending leaflets, but not that individuals who distribute leaflets should be criminalized. In particular, the ruling reads that ‘it was not unlawful unless the restriction is not excessive,’ leaving ample avenue for the law to not violate freedom of expression. Hence, this court ruling does not provide legal evidence to justify the government claim that prohibiting and criminalizing an act of distribution leaflets is legally sound.

A report titled ‘Legal Response and Task of the Distribution of Leaflets’ published by the Korea Institute for National Unification, a national research institution, concludes that “the distribution of leaflets goes beyond the bound of the right to freedom of expression and can already be limited by existing legislation. If a special law was to be enacted, it should be reviewed thoroughly from legal and policy perspectives so that it does not violate the principle of excess prohibition laid out in the Constitution.”

The report also added that “if a special law that prohibits and criminalizes the sending of leaflets is to be introduced, it should be drafted and written with much precision to ensure all constitutional requirements are met. Otherwise, it will be vulnerable to the claim of unconstitutionality.”

Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (a.k.a. the International Covenant Civil and Political Rights) states that “the right to freedom of opinion and expression includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. Both South Korea and North Korea are the parties to the Covenant. International law is not legally binding, but carries the same force as domestic law; therefore, the two Koreas have the responsibility and duty to ensure and protect the right to freedom as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as stated in the Covenant.

Moreover, the National Human Rights Commission of Korea concluded in the 2nd plenary committee in 2015 that the sending of leaflets by civic groups or individuals is a form of freedom of speech. It also expressed a view that the government should not monitor or deter the distribution of leaflets by individuals or civic groups, since threat from North Korea or the agreement between the two Koreas to stop slander or defamation of each other cannot be used to restrict basic civil liberties. This view takes into consideration the safety of South Korean citizens, including those who live in the border region.

In conclusion, the Constitution, international law, and legal view of the National Human Rights Commission all point out that existing law is sufficient to restrict the sending of leaflets, and even if the enactment of special law is necessary to prohibit such an act, it should be carefully drafted to not violate the principle of excess prohibition as stated in the Constitution.


2. The Legal Problems with the Anti-Leaflet Law

Laws on Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation


It was the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act that the National Assembly enacted to regulate the distribution of leaflets in 2008. The prescribed purpose of the law was to define activities necessary to promote mutual exchange and cooperation. Therefore, critics of the legislation pointed out that the sending of leaflets, an act of unilateral expression of opinion, cannot be regarded as an act to promote inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, and therefore, does not fulfill the intended purpose of the legislation.

Moreover, contrary to “the exchange, contact, and trade with North Korea” as stipulated in the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act, the act of sending leaflets to North Korea is ‘prohibited in principle,’ which damages the unity of law itself.

Furthermore, since the sending of leaflets is a form of expression of opinion, all-out prohibition and stipulating a penalty clause of such an activity by law could be considered as pre-censorship which may violate constitutional right to speech.

For the reasons above, a total of eight proposed amendments to the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act in the years between 2008 and 2018 were all discarded.


The Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act

When Kim Yo-jong denounced the distribution of leaflets in her statement on June 4, the South Korean government announced that it was preparing to review legislation that can fundamentally improve all legislation that intensifies tension along the inter-Korean border. The proposed law that followed was an amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act. The legislation defines an act of spreading leaflets as a violation of the terms of the inter-Korean agreement and stipulates criminal penalties for committing such an act.

In other words, while the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act seeks to ban the act of sending leaflets by requiring approval from the Minister of Unification, the Amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act is intended to fundamentally prohibit the distribution of leaflets by defining it as a violation of the inter-Korean agreement and criminalizing that activity.

The main provisions added to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act are as follows:

Article 4 (Definitions)

5. “Leaflets and other items” are defined as, items (including but not limited to advertising propaganda materials, printed materials, auxiliary memory units), cash and other means of property gains.

6. “Scattering” is defined as distributing leaflets to unspecified individuals in North Korea or move them to North Korea without obtaining approval under Article 13 or 20 of ‘Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act’for propaganda, donation, etc (leaflets sent to North Korea simply via a third country is also included).

Article 24 (Prohibition of Violation of the Inter-Korean Agreement) (1) No person shall harm the lives or bodies of the people or cause serious danger by doing any of the following acts.

1. Loudspeaker broadcasting toward North Korea in areas along the Military Demarcation Line.

2. Posting visual materials (posts) toward North Korea in areas along the Military Demarcation Line.

3. Scattering leaflets and other items

② The Minister of Unification may, if necessary to prevent prohibited acts under each subparagraph of paragraph (1), request cooperation from the head of the relevant central administrative agency or the head of a local government. In such cases, the head of the relevant central administrative agency or the head of a local government shall cooperate, except in extenuating circumstances.

Article 25 (Penalty Provisions) ① Any person who has violated Article 24 (1) shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 3 years or by fine not exceeding 30 million won. However, the provision shall not apply when South-North Korean agreements are suspended (this shall be limited to actions prohibited by Article 24 (1)) based on Article 23 (2) and (3).

② A person who has attempted any crime under paragraph (1) shall be punished.


First of all, Subparagraphs 5 and 6 of Article 4 are problematic for the following reasons:

5. “Leaflets and other items” are defined as, items (including but not limited to advertising propaganda materials, printed materials, auxiliary memory units), cash and other means of property gains.

Clause 5 reads that “Leaflets and other items” include items, cash and other means of property gains. This means that the law prohibits sending not only leaflets, but virtually all items to North Korea, which is clearly beyond the scope of legislative intent, as the government claims. The South Korean government argues that these items were included in the legislation, as balloons carrying leaflets could include dollar notes, mini-radios, and flash drives. However, it is not convincing why cash and items which are in fact a form of economic aid to help ordinary North Korean citizens, are banned along with leaflets that Pyongyang has denounced so severely.

In other words, the inclusion of “other items” in the amendment demonstrates that the government claim that this law is intended to protect South Korean citizens living in the border by prohibiting “an act of distributing leaflets and other items” that “condemns” North Korea is clearly flawed.

6. “Scattering” is defined as distributing leaflets to unspecified individuals in North Korea or move them to North Korea without obtaining approval under Article 13 or 20 of ‘Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act’ for propaganda, donation, etc. (leaflets sent to North Korea simply via a third country is also included).


According to the definition of “scattering” as laid out in Clause 6, the act of “scattering” already implies that any person who engages in such an act did not obtain approval for taking out or bringing in goods, etc. (Article 13) and for operating transportation equipment (Article 20) from the Minister of Unification as stipulated in the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act.

In the meantime, any person who takes out or brought in goods, etc. or operates transportation equipment between South Korea and North Korea without prior approval from the government is punished by imprisonment for not more than three years or by a fine up to thirty million won under the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Law.

INTER-KOREAN EXCHANGE AND COOPERATION ACT

Article 27 (Penalty Provisions)

(1) Any person who falls under any of the following subparagraphs shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than three years or by a fine up to thirty million won:

1. Any person who visits North Korea without obtaining approval under Article 9 (1) and the provision to Article 9 (6);

2. Any person who obtains approval under Article 9 (1) and the proviso to Article 9 (6) by fraud or other improper means;

3. Any person who takes out or brought in goods, etc. without obtaining approval under Article 13 (1);

4. Any person who carries out any cooperative project without obtaining approval under Article 17 (1);

5. Any person who operates transportation equipment between South Korea and North Korea without obtaining approval under Article 20 (1);

6. Any person who obtains approval under Article 13 (1), 17 (1) or 20 (1) by fraud or other improper means.

There has already been a legal debate in the judiciary on whether the sending of leaflets to North Korea is subject to approval under the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Law. In fact, courts have interpreted and determined that the sending of leaflets is not subject to approval from the Minister of Unification. In response to the court rulings, the government has tried to punish individuals who engaged in the distribution of leaflets under other laws such as the High-Pressure Gas Safety Control Act and Wastes Control Act.

However, the newly amended anti-leaflet law now makes the distribution of leaflets legally subject to government approval by defining the term “distribution/spread,” which could cause controversy on the interpretation of the law.

Article 24 (Prohibition of Violation of the Inter-Korean Agreement) (1) No person shall harm the lives or bodies of the people or cause serious danger by doing any of the following acts.

1. Loudspeaker broadcasting toward North Korea in areas along the Military Demarcation Line.

2. Posting visual materials (posts) toward North Korea in areas along the Military Demarcation Line.

3. Scattering leaflets and other items

 

The most problematic aspect of Article 24 is that the act of scattering leaflets and other items (Subparagraph 3) is not limited to the “Military Demarcation Line.” If the intent of the law was indeed to protect the lives of residents who live in the border region, as the government claims, then Subparagraph 3 should clearly state that the law prohibits the act only if it occurs along the Military Demarcation Line.

Essentially, an act of sending any materials of value to North Korea in China-North Korea border without approval from the South Korean government will constitute an act of scattering leaflets and other items under Subparagraph 3, Paragraph 1, Article 24.

Article 25 (Penalty Provisions) ① Any person who has violated Article 24 (1) shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 3 years or by fine not exceeding 30 million won. However, the provision shall not apply when South-North Korean agreements are suspended (this shall be limited to actions prohibited by Article 24 (1)) based on Article 23 (2) and (3).

② A person who has attempted any crime under paragraph (1) shall be punished.

An act of sending leaflets to North Korea (particularly sending leaflets in China-North Korea border) itself does not directly involve danger that causes bodily harm to South Korean citizens. It is, in fact, North Korea’s hostile act including military provocation that causes serious harm or threat to the lives of South Korean citizens.

The basic principle of criminal law is that in order to impose criminal punishment on a person for committing a specific act, that act should infringe upon another person’s benefit and protection of law. However, the amendment to this law is unusual in that the legislation punishes an individual not for the act he or she has committed, but depending on a reaction from a third party.

As a result, one receives criminal punishment if his or her sending of leaflets has led North Korea to engage in an act of hostility. On the other hand, if North Korea showed no reaction, then that person would not receive punishment. Such arbitrary penalty provisions could be problematic in consideration of the principle of legality in criminal law.

Another potential issue is a penalty provision for attempted crime as stated in Subparagraph 1, Paragraph 2, Article 25. In other words, even if the sending of leaflets did not cause “harm or serious danger to the lives and body of citizens,” an individual can be investigated, prosecuted, and tried for having the intent to do so. Moreover, another ambiguity is with the interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Article 25; it is not clear whether the attempted crime refers to an attempt to spread leaflets and other materials or an attempt to incur harm or danger to citizens.

The amendment has been promulgated on Dec 29, 2020 and is set to take effect in three months. All legislative process has been completed, and only the interpretation of the law remains on the table. The Ministry of Unification is working on ‘interpretive guidelines,’ but as an executive branch, it has no authority whatsoever to substitute for a role of the judicial branch charged with interpreting the law.


Criticism from the International Community

In his unusual op-ed in a South Korean conservative newspaper, Tomás Ojea Quintana, United Nations' Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea, urged that South Korea should reconsider the legislation before it goes into effect. His main concern was that the penalty provision of a maximum three years of imprisonment for sending leaflets violates individual right to expression. In his article, Special Rapporteur Quintana requested the South Korean government and National Assembly yet another review of the legislation before its enforcement.

Mr. Quintana commented that “there must be justification for restricting freedom of expression, and such restriction should be applied proportionately.” He added that the legislation used ambiguous terms such as ‘advertising propaganda materials’ and ‘other means of property gains,’ arguing that the use of those terms challenges the standards of international human rights which do not allow margin of appreciation when it comes to freedom of speech.

On Dec 14, several US Congressmen including Chris Smith (R-NJ), Co-chair of the bi-partisan Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, Michael McCaul (R-TX) and Gerald E. Connolly (D-Va.) have expressed criticism for the anti-leaflet law. Congressman Chris Smith called the legislation “insane,” urging the South Korean government to review critically its commitment to democratic values. He also declared that he intended to convene a congressional hearing regarding this issue.

Former U.S. Representative Eliot Engel (D), Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, commented in his recent interview with Voice of America that while he “recognizes the importance of building trust between the two Koreas,” he does not believe that building trust should come “at the expense of a common goal of promoting human rights in North Korea.” Mr. Engel added that he “hopes to work together with the South Korean government to resolve any issues that may arise as a result of the enactment of this legislation.”

Robert R. King, former Special Envoy for North Korea human rights issues at the U.S. Department of State, warned in his commentary submitted to the Center for Strategic & International Studies, that “there is no assurance that even with the silencing of freedom of expression in banning balloons that the North Koreans will take any action to improve inter-Korean relations. The consequence, however, could be erosion of the South Korean relationship with the United States, which is important for the people of both countries.”

Politicians and human rights activists from outside of the U.S. have also joined the force in expressing their criticism for the anti-leaflet law.

In the United Kingdom, David Alton, a British politician who represents All Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea, urged Secretary of State Dominic Raab to send formal request to the South Korean government to reconsider the decision to enact the anti-leaflet law.

Similarly, Canada also expressed its concern over the passage of the bill. Christelle Chartrand, spokesperson for Global Affairs Canada, commented that “Freedom of expression is a cornerstone of prosperous society and a critical element in the promotion of human rights.” Similar views were found in Europe. Human Rights Without Frontiers, a non-government organization based in Belgium, stated that it would send EU leadership an official statement that requests EU member states to officially protest against the passage of the anti-leaflet law.

In Japan, the Asahi Shimbun published an editorial titled ‘The Moon Jae-in administration should consistently protect the principle of freedom.’ The article stated that the anti-leaflet law “includes provisions that damage the principle of civic freedom and democracy.” It concluded that while “democracy may differ from a country to country, the South Korean government should take a cautious action regarding the new amendment because it will not be free from the voice and concern of the international community with regards to issues on conventional values such as freedom and democracy.”


Official Stance of the South Korean Government on the Criticism from the International Community


When the anti-leaflet bill officially became law on Dec 15, critics pointed out that the amended law ‘criminalizes even the distribution of flash drives containing Korean dramas.’ The Ministry of Unification quickly issued a statement, refuting the claim that the law does not prohibit such an act.

The Ministry argued that the amended law, which critics have called ‘legislation made with a direct order from Kim Yo-jong,’ was not enacted because of the demand from Pyongyang, but to fulfill basic government duty to protect the lives and safety of its citizens. It also emphasized that this law is necessary to perform constitutional obligation of promoting substantial development of the inter-Korean relations and peace in the Korean peninsula and pursuing a policy for peaceful unification.

The Ministry added that “while freedom of speech is a constitutional right, it does not prevail over the right to live of our own citizens who live along the border.”

The Ministry of Unification also stated that “expressing Seoul’s commitment to comply with the inter-Korean agreement through the systematic enactment of the amended law could effectively call on and encourage North Korea to abide by the inter-Korean agreement.”

Moreover, the Ministry explained that the phrase of ‘leaflets sent to North Korea simply via a third country’ refers to a case where leaflets launched from the South Korean territory are sent into North Korea via territory of a third country. It also added that this amended law is to prohibit an activity that causes serious harm to the lives of our citizens, pointing out that an act of launching leaflets in a third country will be governed by the national law of that country, not the amended legislation of South Korea.

However, the Ministry of Unification has no authority to make legal judgment on how the law is interpreted and enforced. The judiciary branch does. Therefore, it is inappropriate for the Ministry, an executive branch, to interpret the law on behalf of the courts.

The Ministry of Unification announced that it is working to provide 'guidelines for interpreting new regulations on launching leaflets and other materials' before the law takes effect. However, doing so would be acknowledging that the bill is not without fault, given that it requires specific guidelines to be fully understood.

South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha said in her recent interview with CNN that “some people argue that the law violates freedom of expression, but while such freedom is absolutely vital to human rights, it’s not absolute.” She further argued that freedom of expression can be limited for the safety of people.

Ruling Democratic Party Chairman Lee Nak-yon of South Korea expressed his regret over the decision of US Congress to urge the Korean government to review the amendment (of the Inter-Korean Development Act). In fact, the South Korean government has been working to prevent the worst case scenario from happening, that is, being labeled as a human rights abuser. The government has frequently convened high-level meetings chaired by Director of National Security Office Suh Hoon. In particular, the Blue House is making all-out efforts to prevent the holding of a US congressional hearing, being organized by the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission by utilizing international media outlets. As part of its effort, the government has urged the international community to take into consideration ‘the distinct characteristics of the inter-Korean relations’ and ‘suffering of South Korean residents living along the border.’

However, factual evidence clearly suggests that there is no causality between an act of distributing leaflets and its impact on the lives and safety of residents. First, not a single human casualty occurred due to an act of sending leaflets. Second, the passage of the new amendment is unnecessary since existing law could already restrict the act.


3. The Reality of the Right to Freedom of Expression in North Korea

North Korean Legal Structure


In the North Korean legal system, Kim Jong-un’s directives and guidelines come first before any law. Below Kim Jong-un’s directives is the ‘10 principles to protect the one and only leader,’ basic bylaws of the Korean Workers’ Party, followed by the Constitution, sublaws and enforcement decrees of each administrative branch.


Compulsory Political Activities

In North Korea, all citizens are forced to engage in political activities for their lifetime. North Korean people are taught that they are born with two lives: a physical life rendered to them by their biological parents and political life, aka spiritual life, from the supreme leader of North Korea.

Regardless of the age of the people, the political activities of all North Korean citizens are controlled by the Korean Workers’ Party. The required membership in the Party enables the state to control the daily lives of citizens. Moreover, their private lives are under complete control of the state monitoring, as no criticism whatsoever of the state is permitted. All North Korean citizens receive punishment for taking part in any type of anti-state activities or even expressing opposition to the state policies. They also get reward for reporting anyone suspected of committing an anti-state crime.


Juche Ideology of North Korea

The Juche ideology of North Korea is commensurate with a religious one. It postulates that ‘man is the master of his own destiny.’ However, since a man is an individual, men must be organized centrally in order to achieve their full potential. It is the Party that forms and manages such a central organization. The Juche ideology states that since the Party is a collection of the masses, the Kim family must lead the organization.

In North Korean society with extreme vertical organizational structure, the Kim family has indoctrinated the North Korean people that all citizens should pay allegiance and faith to the Kim family, the brain of all lives, in order for them to effectively manage the state. This is why there are numerous statues of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il in every corner of North Korea, to which North Koreans are forced to pay tribute on a daily basis.

North Korea has institutionalized an ideological education that seeks to make North Korean people worship and pay blind allegiance to the Great Leaders, effectively blocking all access to outside information unrelated to the Juche ideology. Political propaganda in North Korea is utilized to instigate nationalistic hostility towards the enemies of the state, namely the United States, South Korea, and Japan.


Religious Policy of North Korea

Karl Marx claimed that "religion is the opium of the people." This dictum served as a basis for communism to suppress any religious activities. However, the only communist country that obliterated religion is North Korea.

While the Soviet Union, communist countries in Eastern Europe, and China persecuted religious activities, they still allowed the existence of churches and pastors.

Pyongyang, once called Jerusalem of the East, is now devoid of all religious institutions, as the North Korean regime completely banned all churches and executed clerics under its policy of exterminating all religions. Churches that now exist in North Korea such as Bong-su Church, Cil-gol Church, and Jang-choong Catholic Church were all built after 1988, the year Seoul Olympics was held. In order to compete against South Korea that successfully hosted the Olympics, North Korea organized the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students in Pyongyang just a year after the Seoul Olympics were held. Building these churches targeted foreign visitors who visited Pyongyang to attend the Festival, an attempt by the North Korean regime to make a false appearance that religious activities are tolerated in the country.


State Control on Outside Information

North Korean citizens are deprived of the right to access independent information that is not sourced from the state. The only provider of information in North Korea is the state-controlled media. The state strictly controls internet access as well as TV and radio broadcasting. All broadcasted materials go through watertight inspection by the state and are rejected, if they are not in line with the principles of the Korean Workers’ Party. All private phone calls are monitored, while ordinary citizens are only allowed to make domestic calls. North Korean people are punished for watching or listening to foreign media, including foreign films and dramas.


3. Recent Changes in North Korea

Active Flea Markets


The major change in North Korea has taken place in an upward manner, not the other way around as could be seen in the cases of East Germany, Soviet Union, and China.

The main force leading the upward change is Jang-ma-dang, flea markets in North Korea which first emerged at the end of 1990s. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, foreign assistance plummeted, resulting in widespread famine struck North Korea in the mid-1990s. Millions of North Koreans, who relied exclusively on state food rationing, died in hunger. They started to sell whatever they had in an empty lot in their town in order to survive. The emergence and rise of Jang-ma-dang was the birth of capitalism in North Korea.

The state authority could not stop North Korean citizens from engaging in such commercial activities, when it could not even provide enough food to the people. The North Korean regime also tolerated Jang-ma-dang activities in order to secure national budget by collecting tax from sellers in the market.

Despite strict state crackdown and high price, South Korean products are extremely popular among North Korean residents. Numerous products ranging from flash drives containing Korean films and dramas, cosmetics, hanbok (traditional Korean costumes worn on special occasions such as wedding), and underwear are smuggled into North Korea and sold in Jang-ma-dang. Even state inspectors take bribery and turn a blind-eye to the illegal sale of South Korean products in the flea market which has raised a concern among North Korean officials.


Korean Wave (Hallyu) in North Korea

The infusion of South Korean culture in North Korea since early 2000 through Jang-ma-dang has transformed the lives of North Koreans. Thanks to the Korean Wave, the worldviews and cultures of North Korea have slowly resembled those of the South. Moreover, with technological progress, more North Koreans now have mobile phones and video cameras at home.

For example, a young North Korean couple used to call each other ‘Mr. or Miss Comrade,’ a term used in communistic society. However, the millennial generation, influenced by South Korean films and drama, instead use a South Korean expression such as ‘Oppa or Honey’ to address each other. In addition, young North Koreans use South Korean colloquial expressions such as ‘ã…‹ã…‹, ã…Žã…Ž (meaning lol)’ in text messages. Fashion style among young North Koreans has also started to resemble that of young people in South Korea. Three pillars of revolution, ideology, technology, and culture, which the North Korean regime have promoted for internal solidarity are shaken to the core, thanks to the Korean Wave.


Adoption of Law on Rejecting Reactionary Ideology and Culture

North Korean state media reported in an article titled ‘Invisible fight, silent war’ on Oct 19, 2019 that the state is faced with a silent war. The article warned the public that while North Korea, which possess nuclear weapons, may not be vulnerable to a physical attack, the inflow of South Korean media content such as films and dramas could topple down the state. It described the spread of South Korean culture as a “virus invading the body.”

For this reason, North Korea passed a series of law on ‘rejecting reactionary ideology and culture’ at a plenary meeting of the Supreme People’s Assembly. The intent of the law, the media reported, was to prevent the spread of anti-socialist ideology and safeguard North Korea's spirit and culture.


Conclusion

Since 2000, the two Koreas have focused on promoting exchange and cooperation, breaking away from an ideological conflict inherited from the Cold War. The thawing relations greatly reduced leaflet sending activities organized by the South Korean government. Civic groups, on the other hand, started to distribute leaflets by launching balloons along the inter-Korean border.

North Korea has continued to denounce the leaflet launching by various civic groups in South Korea and demanded Seoul to prohibit such activities. The South Korean government responded that restricting these activities would be in violation of the right to freedom of expression as specified in the Constitution. In response, North Korea threatened to use military force and eventually demolished the inter-Korean Liaison Office on June 16, escalating tension between the two Koreas.

The South Korean National Assembly, which consists of the super-majority of the ruling Democratic Party, forcibly passed the anti-leaflet bill. The bill was then debated and deliberated (Dec 22), approved by the President (Dec 24), promulgated (Dec 29), and is set to take effect within just three months.

The South Korean public and international community demanded the law be rescinded, criticizing the legislation for violating the right to freedom of expression protected by the Constitution and international law. They have also argued that this ambiguous law will cause legal controversy on the interpretation and enforcement of the law. Human rights activists in South Korea announced that they would file a petition to the Constitutional Court, as the law is slated to take effect in upcoming March.

The South Korean government argued that restriction of the basic constitutional right is inevitable to protect the lives and safety of residents who live in the border. Moreover, it maintains that freedom of right is not absolute and that it will continue to make effort to dissipate public concern by publishing guidelines for interpreting the newly amended law. However, one can reasonably conclude that the true intention of the Moon Jae-in administration for amending the law in such a hurried manner was to initiate a dialogue with Pyongyang in desperate attempt to appease to Kim Jong-un. The fact that there has been no human casualty incurred by the sending of leaflets weakens their claim.

Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea reads that “it shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the basic free and democratic order.”

North Korean people have been enslaved, having been blocked from the outside world under the brutal line of hereditary dictatorship of the Kim family in the past 70 years. However, they have started to recover their basic rights as human beings by independently maintaining their means of living through commercial activities in Jang-ma-dang. The inflow of South Korean culture smuggled into North Korea has contributed to reducing hostility towards South Korea and rebuilding ethnic identity as one Korean people.

For regime survival, North Korea has vigorously sought to control the inflow of outside information into the country by enacting new laws on rejecting reactionary ideology and culture on December 4.

The South Korean government, if it was sincere about protecting freedom and democratic values that the nation as a whole has worked so hard to build, should rescind its decision to enact the anti-leaflet law which hampers peaceful unification in the Korean peninsula. The least it should do is to remove unconstitutional provisions and work to make far more meticulous laws that can satisfy the original legislative intent, that is, to protect the lives of residents living in the border region. This law should not serve to blind the North Korean people suffering under the brutal dictatorship of the Kim family.

March 21, 2016

English Translation of South Korea's North Korean Human Rights Act


North Korean Human Rights Act
Law No. 14070
Enacted: Mar. 3, 2016, Entry into force: Sept. 4, 2016

Article 1 (Purpose)
The purpose of this Act is to contribute to the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights by pursuing the rights to life and liberty as defined in international human rights treaties, including the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Article 2 (Basic Principles and Responsibilities of the State)
(1) The State shall acknowledge that the North Korean people have the right to human dignity and to pursue happiness, and shall endeavor to promote the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights.
(2) The State, while promoting the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights, shall also endeavor to develop inter-Korean relations and work towards peace on the Korean Peninsula.
(3) The State shall consistently provide sufficient financial resources to promote the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights.

Article 3 (Definitions)
The term “North Korean,” as used in this Act, means persons who reside in the area north of the Military Demarcation Line, and have formed the basis of their livelihood—including immediate family members, spouses, or workplace—in that area.

Article 4 (Relationships with other Acts)
In endeavoring to promote the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights, this Act shall apply except in cases where there are special provisions in the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act, Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund Act, and Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act.

Article 5 (North Korean Human Rights Advisory Committee)
(1) The North Korean Human Rights Advisory Committee (hereafter “the Committee”) shall be established under the Ministry of Unification for the purpose of deliberating on policies to promote North Koreans’ human rights.
(2) The Committee shall be composed of ten or fewer members recommended by the National Assembly, and the chairperson shall be elected by and from the members. In selecting the Committee members, the negotiating body of the current or former party of the incumbent President shall recommend one half of the members, and the negotiating bodies of other parties shall recommend one half of the members. Committee members shall be commissioned by the Minister of Unification.
(3) Necessary matters concerning the composition and management of the Committee shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree.

Article 6 (Basic Plan for the Promotion of North Koreans’ Human Rights and Implementation Plan)
(1) The Minister of Unification shall formulate a basic plan to promote the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights (hereafter “basic plan”) every three years in consultation with the head of relevant central administrative agencies and the Committee. A basic plan shall include the following matters.
  1. Research on human rights conditions in North Korea 
  2. Measures to protect and improve North Koreans’ human rights, including, but not limited to, inter-Korean human rights dialogue and humanitarian assistance 
  3. Other matters deemed necessary for protecting and improving North Koreans’ human rights, as determined by Presidential Decree 
(2) In accordance with the basic plan, the Minister of Unification shall formulate every year an implementation plan (hereafter referred to as “implementation plan”) in consultation with the Committee.
(3) Once the basic plan and implementation plan have been formulated, the Minister of Unification shall inform the National Assembly without delay.

Article 7 (Promoting Inter-Korean Human Rights Dialogue)
(1) The Government shall pursue inter-Korean human rights dialogue regarding important matters in promoting the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights.
(2) Necessary matters regarding the appointment of the representatives participating in inter-Korean human rights dialogue shall be governed by Article 15 of the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act, with the necessary modifications.
(3) Other necessary matters in pursuing inter-Korean human rights dialogue shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree.

Article 8 (Humanitarian Assistance)
(1) The State shall observe the following matters when providing humanitarian assistance to the North Korean authorities and North Korean agencies for the purpose of promoting the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights.
  1. The distribution of assistance shall be conducted transparently and in compliance with internationally recognized standards. 
  2. The most vulnerable groups, including children and pregnant women, shall be prioritized in the provision of assistance. 
(2) The State shall endeavor to ensure that humanitarian assistance delivered by private organizations observes the conditions stated in the sub-clauses of clause (1).

Article 9 (International Cooperation to Promote North Korean Human Rights)
(1) The State shall cooperate with foreign governments, international institutions, international organizations, and other entities with regards to people-to-people exchanges and information sharing in promoting the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights, and shall endeavor to raise international attention towards promoting human rights in North Korea.
(2) In accordance with clause (1), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may appoint an Ambassador-at-large for Human Rights in North Korea (hereafter “Ambassador for International Cooperation on North Korean Human Rights”) to promote international cooperation for promoting human rights in North Korea.
(3) Necessary matters concerning the Ambassador for International Cooperation on North Korean Human Rights, including duties and qualifications, shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree.

Article 10 (Establishment of North Korean Human Rights Foundation)
(1) The Government shall establish the North Korean Human Rights Foundation (hereafter “the Foundation”) to investigate human rights conditions in North Korea, and to conduct research and develop policies on matters related to promoting the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights, including inter-Korean human rights dialogue and humanitarian assistance.
(2) The Foundation shall be an incorporated body, and it shall be duly formed once it is registered at the physical location of its main office.
(3) The Foundation shall conduct the following projects, and each project may be managed by a specialized body.

1. Projects to promote the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights, including inter-Korean human rights dialogue:
A. Investigation and research on human rights conditions in North Korea
B. Formulating and recommending policy options for the Government on issues including inter-Korean human rights dialogue
C. Other projects reviewed by the Committee and assigned by the Minister of Unification
D. Providing support to civic society organizations necessary for conducting the above projects

2. Projects to promote the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights, including humanitarian assistance:
A. Investigation and research on the need for humanitarian assistance in North Korea
B. Formulating and recommending policy options for the Government regarding humanitarian assistance to North Korea
C. Other projects reviewed by the Committee and assigned by the Minister of Unification
D. Providing support to civic society organizations necessary for conducting the above projects

(4) Other necessary matters concerning the establishment of the Foundation shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree.

Article 11 (Operation of the Foundation)
(1) Funds for the Foundation’s operation shall be drawn from the following.
  1. Contributions by the government
  2. Other income
(2) The Foundation may accept voluntarily donations with the approval of the Minister of Unification, provided that such donations are used for purposes within the scope of the Foundation’s activities, notwithstanding the provisions under Article 5.2 of the Act on the Collection and Use of Donations.
(3) The Minister of Unification shall manage and supervise the Foundation.
(4) If deemed necessary for the Foundation to achieve its objectives, the Minister of Unification may request the heads of relevant agencies to send to the Foundation public officials belonging to such agencies.
(5) Unless otherwise prescribed by this Act, the provisions of the Civil Code concerning incorporated foundations shall apply in regard to the Foundation, with the necessary modifications.
(6) Other necessary matters concerning the management and supervision of the Foundation and the process for accepting donations shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree.

Article 12 (Composition of Foundation Board Members)
(1) The Foundation shall have not more than twelve board members, including a president. The board shall be composed of individuals recommended by the National Assembly, including two board members recommended by the Minister of Unification. In recommending the board members, the negotiating body of the current or former party of the incumbent President shall recommend one half of the members, and the negotiating bodies of other parties shall recommend one half of the members. The board members shall be appointed by the Minister of Unification.
(2) With the exception of the president and other full-time members as designated by the articles of association, the board members will serve in a part-time capacity.
(3) The president shall be elected from among the board members. The term for the president and the executives shall be three years, and all board members may be re-appointed once. The term of ex officio board members shall be the term of their office.
(4) Other necessary matters concerning the selection of board members for the Foundation shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree.

Article 13 (Database Archive for North Korean Human Rights)
(1) The Ministry of Unification shall establish the Database Archive (hereafter “the Archive”) for North Korean Human Rights to collect and record information related to human rights conditions in North Korea and promoting the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights.
(2) The Archive shall conduct the following activities and collect, research, document, and publish information and other materials.
  1. Matters related to investigating and researching the human rights situation of the North Korean people
  2. Matters related to South Korean prisoners of war, abducted South Korean citizens, , and separated families
  3. Other matters as reviewed by the Committee and deemed necessary by the Minister of Unification
(3) The activities listed under clause (2) may be entrusted to external institutions. For this purpose, financial support may be provided within the scope of the budget.
(4) The Archive shall have a director appointed or commissioned by the Minister of Unification. The director shall be chosen from among senior government officials or civilian experts who have extensive knowledge and experience in the area of human rights in North Korea.
(5) The materials collected and documented by the Archive shall be transferred every three months to the Ministry of Justice, under which a specialized body shall be established for the purpose of preserving and managing such records.
(6) Other necessary matters concerning the composition and management of the Archive shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree.

Article 14 (Cooperation with Relevant Institutions)
(1) In conducting tasks that aim to promote the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights, the Minister of Unification may, as deemed necessary, request administrative agencies, public institutions, and relevant individuals to submit information, provide testimony, and provide other forms of cooperation necessary to policy implementation.
(2) The heads of administrative agencies or public institutions and relevant individuals shall, upon receiving requests under clause (1), comply with such requests in the absence of any specific reasons to the contrary.
(3) The heads of relevant central administrative agencies and local governments who seek to enact or amend an Act or ordinance related to the activities proscribed under this Act shall notify the Minister of Unification thereof.

Article 15 (National Assembly Report)
(1) In addition to the basic plan and implementation plan, the Minister of Unification shall give an annual report to the National Assembly before the beginning of the regular session regarding the following matters.
  1. Human rights conditions in North Korea
  2. Degree of progress and results pertaining to efforts to promote the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights
  3. Formulation of plans regarding South Korean prisoners of war, abducted South Korean citizens, and separated families, and degree of progress in the implementation of such plans
  4. Evaluation of projects referred to in sub-clauses 1 to 3, as conducted by the government, central administrative agencies, and local governments
  5. Other matters as deemed relevant by the Minister of Unification
(2) In relation to reports referred to in clause (1), the National Assembly may, when deemed necessary, request rectification or improvement.

Article 16 (Application of Penal Provisions relating to Public Officials)
In the performance of their duties, the executives and staff members of the Foundation may be considered public officials subject to Article 127 and Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Code.

Article 17 (Penalty Provisions)
Any person who receives financial support under this Act by fraudulent or other illegal means shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than three years or by a fine not exceeding thirty million won.


Addenda (No. 14070, March 3, 2016)


Article 1 (Entry into force)
This Act shall enter into force six months after the date of its promulgation.

Article 2 (Preparation for Establishment of the Foundation)
(1) The Ministry of Unification shall appoint a founding committee of not more than seven individuals within thirty days of the promulgation of this Act, so that they may execute tasks related to the establishment of the Foundation.
(2) The founding committee shall prepare the articles of association of the Foundation and obtain authorization from the Minister of Unification. Once this authorization has been received, the founding committee shall complete without delay the registration of the Foundation through joint signatures.
(3) As soon as the registration has been completed, the founding committee shall hand over its affairs without delay to the president of the Foundation, and thereafter, the members of the founding committee shall be deemed to have been released from commission.
(4) Expenses incurred in relation to establishing the Foundation shall be borne by the State.


Translated by Hyebin Jeon, HRNK Research Intern

Edited by Raymond Ha, HRNK Office Manager and Outreach Coordinator

March 08, 2016

An HRNK Interview with Robert Collins, Author of "Pyongyang Republic: North Korea's Capital of Human Rights Denial"


Q1: What was your motivation to be a leader on North Korean human rights?

Robert Collins: When I decided to retire from the army six years ago, I felt that my knowledge could be useful in writing materials that would contribute to an overall understanding of how North Korea makes its decision and to how they carry out their policies. And so, since retirement, I’ve just continued with what the army taught me to do over those decades at the end of the 20th century and doing it unilaterally. And now I’m doing it in support of HRNK.

Q2: What do you think is the relationship between human rights issues and security concerns for the U.S. – R.O.K. relationship regarding North Korea?

Robert Collins: The deplorable human rights condition of North Korea has a direct impact on their military. They have a million man army that can’t be composed of everybody in the country that is on the positive side of the political classification system—songbun. Many, if not close to half, are recruits—those that receive a denial of human rights through their entire life because they have been classified, socially and politically, as enemies of the state. Therefore, they have grown up with inadequate food, poor education, poor housing, and the opportunities that they receive in the military are very, very limited. Those in the lower songbun classifications can’t become officers. The few that do can’t go past the company grade. And even up until a few years ago, many of the individuals in the North Korean military that were regarded as low songbun—low trust on the political scale—weren’t even allowed to carry weapons because they didn’t trust them.

March 01, 2016

The Korea Society Featuring HRNK Executive Director Greg Scarlatoiu

The Korea Society
"North Korean Human Rights: Two Years beyond the COI Report"
February 18, 2016


Stephen Noerper: Welcome to the Korea Society. We’re delighted to have you here this afternoon on a very important anniversary—that of the second year since the release of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry (UNCOI) on Human Rights Abuses in North Korea. This is an area that we know many of you in our studio audience here feel very strongly about and we welcome all of our viewers online as well as those listening via podcast or watching the video. We are delighted to have with us Greg Scarlatoiu, who is the Executive Director of HRNK, the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. And we are absolutely delighted to welcome a member of his Board, Ambassador Winston Lord, who is in our audience today as well.

Before we begin in our discussion with Greg, we wanted to offer a few minutes of commentary from Seoul with a frequent guest to the Korea Society, Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon, who is the South Korean Ambassador for Human Rights. He was unable to join us physically here today, but is very much with us in spirit and wanted to offer a few comments to kick us off. So, this will be about seven minutes of his thoughts on where we are at two years since the release of the UNCOI. Peter? Thank you.

Peter Stuehmke: Welcome Ambassador Lee. What do you make of the COI anniversary and current state of play?

Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon: February is a very important month because it commemorates the second anniversary of the Commission of Inquiry report, which really stands as a landmark event. It really changed not only the way the international community views the North Korean human rights issues in a comprehensive way, but also, I would say that it really changed how the North Korean regime also deals and handles the human rights issue. It really, I think, was a game changer and it remains so. I think it’s very good that we’re addressing this second anniversary and really looking at so many things that were addressed by the COI report.

What has been done? And what still needs to be done? It is a very important gauge as to where we stand and what we still need to do as we move forward. We all know that crimes against humanity is one of the four major violations of international law. But the United Nations, after one year of very intensive investigation, has concluded that in North Korea, crimes against humanity are being committed and that this is something that needs to be referred by the Security Council to the International Criminal Court (ICC) so that those people who are responsible and who are committing these crimes against humanity ought to be prosecuted. It is on the agenda of the Security Council. It has been discussed in the most recent Security Council as well. So, we still need to get to the ICC, but I believe that the foundations are still there. And I think it is very important for the international community, whether it’s individuals, NGOS, churches, or whoever it may be, to keep raising these issues so that a lot of the points that have been raised by the COI can be followed up with.

Peter Stuehmke: What of the North Korean response?

Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon: North Korea is responding to this issue as it’s never done so before—even at the Security Council level. For example, Ri Su-yong, who is the North Korean Foreign Minister who never came to the UN General Assembly for 15 years, all of a sudden shows up at the General Assembly and addresses the General Assembly by giving a speech. And he did that again in 2015. So, two years in a row. We see high ranking North Korean diplomats making rounds in Europe, meeting with, for example, the EU head of human rights, Mr. Lambrinidis. We have incidents of North Korea inviting Special Rapporteur Darusman to North Korea on the condition that he help to take out those conditions of referral to the ICC. This is hitting the core of the North Korean leadership because they know that now the international community is watching over them. For three years, the North Korean human rights issue will remain as an agenda item so that at any time it can be discussed. But just the fact that a North Korean human rights issue sits as an agenda item at the Security Council is a source of very significant pressure on North Korea. It's fully aware now that the UN, not only the General Assembly, but also the Security Council and the wide spectrum of the international community are scrutinizing the human rights conditions in North Korea. Increased pressure on North Korea is making North Korean violators of human rights think twice. And I think that’s a very important first step towards actual improvement in the human rights condition.

Peter Stuehmke: What of the new Seoul UN office on human rights?

Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon: Just the fact that the field office was set up is a very significant development. The most important function of this office, number one, would be to continue to get testimonies and collection of data of human rights violations so that it can be kept as records for future reference. Just in case that, let’s just say, the issue does get referred to the ICC or if there is finally reunification on the Korean peninsula. There have to be measures to deal with what has happened in the past. It also serves the purpose of gathering people as a venue for discussions and trying to come up with better policies: improvement of relations so that we can actually begin to see improvements in human rights conditions in the North; just the advertisement factor; or just keeping the issue on the radar so that there’s a greater amount of media coverage. It’s very important, I think, to keep sending the message that the world is looking out.

Peter Stuehmke: What of new US sanction legislation?

Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon: Once this Sanctions Enforcement Act of the US is in place, I think that it will just add to the pressure that North Korea will feel because it is about a secondary boycott. So it’s not just North Korean individuals and companies, but whoever else deals with North Korea will also be subject to sanctions.

Peter Stuehmke: And [South] Korea's human rights legislation?

Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon: We remain hopeful that it will pass in the next general election. If it does, it will only add to, for example, the funding of a lot of the NGOs that do great work to deal with human rights problems.

Peter Stuehmke: And in closing, international efforts?

Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon: I believe that there has to be a comprehensive global campaign. For example, what we have seen against South Africa’s apartheid system, where there was really a concerted effort made by the international community to really target South Africa to get rid of this system of constitutional segregation. And the sanctions, of course, applied to sports, culture, financial investments, and so on. I believe that it will take that kind of concerted effort by the international community to make a dent.

Peter Stuehmke: Thank you, Ambassador Lee.

Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon: I hope you continue with this effort and I thank the Korea Society for all that you do. Thank you.

Stephen Noerper: And we really do thank Ambassador Lee for taking the time for that. And I’d like to thank Nikita Desai and Peter Stuehmke, part of our staff, for putting all of that together. Thank all of you for your attention.

Greg, we are honored to have you here. You are both a nationally and internationally recognized expert in this area. Your service with HRNK is remarkable as Executive Director and we’re so very pleased to have you on the stage of the Korea Society. Welcome.


What in this very eloquent and concise summary that Ambassador Lee has shared with us grabbed you the most?

Greg Scarlatoiu: Steve, first and foremost, the honor is all mine. Delighted to be here with you today and delighted that Ambassador Winston Lord is in the audience. Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon visited all of the key points pertaining to the UNCOI and implementation of the UNCOI recommendations. I was extraordinarily impressed with his remarks about the need for a campaign on par with what was done to do away with South Africa’s apartheid. Many of us may have been under the wrong impression that North Korea was one of the most sanctioned countries in the world. It is not. And the sanctions regime as it stands today only addresses counter-proliferation—efforts to counter the proliferation of North Korean nuclear and missile technology. It has nothing—absolutely nothing—to do with North Korea’s crimes against humanity or egregious human rights violations. Now, HR 757, the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act, will be most likely—surely I would say—signed by President Barack Obama. This is a piece of legislation that factors in human rights concerns. This is going to be a first. This is a very important part of the story if implementation is adequate and if others participate in implementing these sanctions.

A second point that I would like to make is that yes, a campaign on par with what was done to do away with South Africa’s apartheid is important and if we are to see that, we really need the grassroots organizations. The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea does not have that capacity. We are a research organization. Of course, there is an embedded advocacy element in everything that we do since we deal with North Korean human rights, but we need the large international grassroots human rights organizations to engage in a global campaign to end crimes against humanity and bring improvement to the North Korean human rights situation.

Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon was right on the mark in his comments on accountability and the need for accountability in North Korea. The UN Commission of Inquiry recommended that the North Korean case be referred by the UN Security Council to the International Criminal Court. As Ambassador Lee said, we’ve had good progress in 2014 and 2015. Both the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva and the UN General Assembly here in New York City had two very strong resolutions on North Korean human rights, addressing both accountability and the ICC referral. Indeed, the Security Council held two meetings on North Korean human rights. North Korean human rights was placed on the agenda. Just a couple of months ago in December 2015, our own Ambassador to the United Nation, Ambassador Samantha Power, gave, I would say, one of the most powerful speeches ever given by U.S. a government official on North Korean human rights. We begin to understand that North Korean human rights violations and crimes against humanity in North Korea pose a threat to regional and international peace and stability. Yes, we are fully aware that merely including an issue in the agenda of the UN Security Council is a procedural issue that requires 9 out of 15 votes of permanent and nonpermanent members. Now, taking up the issue is a different matter. It becomes a substantive matter subject to a veto by a P5 member (a permanent member): potentially China or even Russia. We are fully aware of that difficulty. However, one has to remember that every time China attempts to block an initiative to address the egregious human rights situation in North Korea, China places itself in a position where it’s aiding and abetting a regime that’s committing crimes against humanity. Moreover, I think we have to remember, Steve, that the North Korean Kim regime has been a master of playing one super power against another: the Soviets against the Chinese during the Cold War and arguably, after the end of the Cold War, possibly the United States against the European Union and China regarding humanitarian assistance and other issues on a smaller scale. The point that I would like to make is that this is not a comfortable position for the Kim regime. The Kim regime cannot be comfortable knowing that China is the only one standing between Kim Jong-un and referral to the International Criminal Court.

In addition to the UN Security Council referral, in his most recent report to the UN Human Rights Council submitted just a few days ago, the UN Special Rapporteur, Mr. Marzuki Darusman, reminded us that the UN General Assembly can also rely on its residual powers to establish a tribunal dealing with crimes against humanity in North Korea. If this is done in response to the Security Council’s incapacity, an inability to address a situation that poses a threat to international peace and security, this would go to the precedent of Resolution 377 uniting for peace, which we all recall in relation to the Korean War.

Speaking of Special Rapporteur Darusman’s report, another point that he makes is that one of the recommendations of the UN Security Council was to establish a panel of experts, which would examine the applicable legal standard—a panel of experts that would prepare the ground for accountability in North Korea. The point that the Special Rapporteur makes in his most recent report is that there is no amnesty for crimes against humanity. Moreover, we cannot prepare overnight. We must be prepared when faced with a contingency—with a situation that most likely will require immediate procedures pertaining to accountability. And thus, once again, the Special Rapporteur has called for the establishment of a panel of experts. An international NGO consortium or several international NGOs are sure to push in this direction. This could be another step that we could see in the near future. And of course, as emphasized by Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon, one very important recommendation of the UNCOI report was implemented: the establishment of a field office of the Office of the High Commission of Human Rights in Seoul. That office has been there just a few months. They’re already doing an extraordinary job collaborating with NGOs in South Korea and beyond, and also continuing to document human rights violations happening in North Korea.

Stephen Noerper: Thank you, Greg. That’s a very comprehensive and bold overview, and we appreciate your eloquence on that. You’ve given us a lot to work with here and I’m sure a lot will come out in the Q&A as well with those in the studio. I’d like to focus in on a few points and ask you for a bit more. One is this issue of China, where South Korea has put a tremendous amount of effort into its diplomacy and where you do have to ask the question about whether China gets to a point where there are trade-offs and whether its defense of the North Korean regime is really worth it. What are the practicalities of where you see China in terms of opposing further movement on this front? Where do you think there might be flexibility? And how does this relate to the broader security dynamic we see now given the January 6 nuclear test, the February 7 missile test, and the movement for stronger sanctions?

Greg Scarlatoiu: Now certainly, fundamentally, China is opposed at the UN to the so called “country-specific mechanisms”: UN Commissions of Inquiry and UN Special Rapporteurs. It’s not only China. It’s the Russian Federation, Venezuela, and others. Of course, the reason is simple: this establishes a precedent. Some other countries might be next. So, the point that China has made, time and time again, is that it opposes this type of country-specific mechanism, but it’s going beyond that. Of course, we could surely have a discussion about the traditional ties between the DRPK and China. We know that this has not always been a love story. There have been great times in this relationship. There have been terrible times in this relationship and in particular, during the days of the Cultural Revolution in China. China continues to be a fairly pragmatic actor. Its approach to North Korea is that it wants stability on its borders and unfortunately, under the current circumstances, China still believes that the only arrangement that can maintain stability on its border is the Kim Jong-un regime—as terrible as it might be. And I hope that China would see how terrible this regime is and what a liability it is. Secondly, China does not want to see any massive refugee inflows. Thirdly, if China can create a couple of business opportunities in the process, so be it.

Doing business in North Korea, of course, is not easy for China either and I’m speaking of those investors who go there for business reasons, for economic reasons. It’s a tough environment: bad infrastructure; the investment has to be front loaded; once you’ve front loaded it, they take you prisoner; informal taxation is a big problem; and North Korea is highly corrupt. So it’s not easy from China’s viewpoint either. Every time North Korea conducts another provocation—a missile launch or a nuclear detonation—China cannot be too happy to see U.S. B-52s, F-22s conducting nuclear bombing exercises so close to Chinese airspace. So China is not happy with North Korea, but at the same time, China has not reached a point where it’s ready to change its fundamental strategic stance on North Korea.

On human rights in particular, China could be tremendously helpful. This is a point made by the UNCOI. China forcibly repatriates North Korean refugees. Of course, China does not repatriate all North Koreans. There are North Korean workers officially dispatched to China by the North Korean government as part of their moneymaking operations. They work under terrible working conditions. This is pretty much bonded labor or forced labor; many organizations see it as slave labor. I’m speaking about those refugees who try to escape those dire circumstances in North Korea. If apprehended, they are forcibly repatriated to the North. China does this because it claims they are "illegal economic migrants" and not political refugees. It claims that many of them are in China because they are hungry and in search of economic opportunity. Are many of them in China in search of economic opportunity? Possibly, but what matters is that China is a party to the 1951 UN Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees, which stipulates that if a person has crossed an international border and upon repatriation faces a credible fear of persecution based on a political rational, then that person clearly qualifies to gain access to the process leading to acquiring political refugee status. As you know, leaving the country without the government’s approval is a criminal act in North Korea. Those returned to North Korea, in particular if they came across South Korean nationals and in particular if they came across Christian missionaries, are subjected to very aggressive interrogation and if it turns out that they did come across South Koreans or Christian missionaries, the punishment is extraordinarily harsh: imprisonment in the political prison camps or re-education camps and in some instances, even death. We’ve had terrible terrible reports, fully confirmed, of women who became pregnant with Chinese men along the road of defection. They were subjected to forced abortions and we’ve had reports of infanticide.

"...what matters is that China is a party to the 1951 UN Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees, which stipulates that if a person has crossed an international border and upon repatriation faces a credible fear of persecution based on a political rational, then that person clearly qualifies to gain access to the process leading to acquiring political refugee status."

So once again, there is a very simple step that China can take by protecting these refugees: allowing them access to the process leading to acquiring political refugee status. If China is afraid of increased numbers of ethnic Koreans in its border areas, the best way to ensure that they leave is to allow them access to this process because if they can approach the High Commission for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross, they won’t stay. They’ll leave. Probably, China’s fear here is a process similar to the “European Picnic” of 1989, when the Hungarians opened their border to East Germany and East Germans were flowing out of West Germany and this is what eventually brought about the fall of the Berlin Wall. Possibly, China might see this as opening the door to a process similar to what happened in Europe in 1989. Thus, bringing about the collapse of the Kim regime in North Korea.

Stephen Noerper: It seems, Greg, there have been two things in recent memory that have elicited a strong response from the North Koreans. One has been the restrictions around Banco Delta Asia and the other has been this and the frequent mention of ICC referral. The regime seems to be taking it very strongly and very personally. Do you have any sense or any intelligence that the behavior of the regime has at all altered in the last two years? Or that there has been any movement within North Korea relative to the camps? Has there been any easing of the gulags as far as you and the community are aware?

Greg Scarlatoiu: Unfortunately, as far as we are aware, there hasn’t been an easing on the gulags. What we have seen is a transformation of the gulag that may be related to international efforts to focus attention on North Korea’s political prison camps. As you know, there are at least four fully functional political prison camps in North Korea where anywhere between 80,000 and 120,000 people are imprisoned. A couple of years ago, one of the camps, located close to the border with China, Camp No. 22 in Hoeryong North Hamgyong Province, was shut down. It ceased to function as a political prison camp. Why? We can speculate that this happened because of international efforts to focus attention on North Korea’s gulag and also because it was so close to the border with China. It was bad PR. There were Chinese businesses in the area. There were Chinese tourists visiting the area. And also, the last thing North Korea wants is another escapee from a political prison camp managing to cross the border into China to tell his or her story about the horrors witnessed in the prison camps: the forced labor, the induced malnutrition, the torture, the rapes, the public executions, and the secret executions happening at the camps.

Most unfortunately, what we also know is that a few thousand inmates, a few thousand prisoners, went unaccounted for. We had reports from sources inside the country that they were put on trains and taken away in the middle of the night. We had reports that many of them were starved to death. They simply went unaccounted for. What we know is that other detention facilities—and this is based on satellite imagery research that we’re conducting corroborated with testimony by witnesses, former prisoners, former guards, former officials in charge of running the camps—have expanded. For example, Camp No. 25 in Chongjin, North Hamgyong province expanded pretty much twofold. These are reports by our organization, the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, in collaboration with AllSource Analysis in Colorado; this is a satellite imagery company. Amnesty International and others also focused attention on Camp No. 14, for example. That facility has also expanded. It has actually expanded into the adjacent village. So, we have seen a transformation of the political prison camp system in North Korea. It may be in response to international efforts to address North Korea’s human rights situation.

Unfortunately, as pointed out in the UNCOI report itself, the Kim regime still sees these human rights violations as part of its modus operandi. These are not unfortunate side effects. These are at the very core of how the Kim regime operates.

Stephen Noerper: I know tomorrow in Washington you’re participating in a larger event. I was wondering if you could say a few words about that. And also, tell us here and to those viewing and listening, within the field, who do you consider to be the most effective actors right now? And I’m thinking primarily of suggestions in terms of the NGO world. How are they helping to move the agenda along?

Greg Scarlatoiu: Tomorrow we’ll be having an event in Washington DC hosted by CSIS, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, our second anniversary of observation of the UNCOI report. It’s a large conference and very well attended. We still have room for more attendees I hope. Basically, this is a collaborative effort. It’s us, the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea; CSIS; the National Endowment for Democracy; our good and dear friend Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon and the Human Liberty Center at Yonsei University; and the George W. Bush Institute in Dallas, Texas. This event will feature experts; witnesses; Justice Michael Kirby, the former Chief Commissioner of the UNCOI; and Mrs. Sonja Berserko, another member of the UNCOI. Unfortunately, Mr. Darusman will be unable to join us this time. He was there last year. So this conference will not only focus on the celebration of the UNCOI, but we will also discuss all of these key issues, which are part of the process of moving forward. Anything from the panel of experts to possible future efforts at the General Assembly and to the “rights up front” approach put forth by the UN Commission of Inquiry as a recommendation to those UN agencies involved on the ground in humanitarian operations in North Korea.

This main conference will be followed by our first ever celebration of the memory and legacy of one of our founding board members, Dr. Fred Iklé, who is well known for having been a great American who kept America safe and developed the nuclear deterrence strategy during the years of the Reagan administration in particular. We remember Dr. Iklé as one of the founding board members of our organization and as a board member who was extraordinarily dedicated to North Korean human rights. The stars aligned and our first keynote speaker at the Fred Iklé Lecture is going to be none other than Justice Michael Kirby. This will also happen at CSIS from 4:30 to 6:00 p.m. tomorrow in Washington, DC.

Stephen Noerper: And that’s open to the public?

Greg Scarlatoiu: That is also open to the public.

Stephen Noerper: And so, other than HRNK, other bright lights in the NGO community and other people and organizations we should be paying attention to?

Greg Scarlatoiu: There are different organizations playing critical roles. What HRNK does, primarily, is to investigate and to publish on the North Korean human rights situation based on interviews with witnesses, based on satellite imagery, based on interviews with experts, and based on work out in the field. This is a very important role because this is what those engaged in advocacy need in order to move forward with their advocacy. Of course, there is an advocacy element embedded in what we do because, after all, what we deal with is North Korean human rights. But there are organizations tasked exclusively with advocacy. Their role is extraordinarily important. These are organizations that brought us the UNCOI. This was an effort, I want to say, spurred by NGOs. NGOs were also involved in efforts to push for the passage of HR 757 here in the United States, the North Korea Sanction Enforcement Act. NGOs have been fully engaged in efforts to persuade the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea to pass the North Korean Human Rights Act. This has been going on for more than 10 years now as Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon said. All we can do is hope to see this act pass.

There are NGOs that have performed, I would say, the most important role of all. These are the NGOs that have been engaged in rescuing North Korean refugees or North Korean escapees. Remember that prior to the great famine that decimated North Koreans in the mid- to late-1990s, we had just seen a handful of refugees or a handful of defectors in South Korea. The numbers have increased sharply during and after the famine, and there are now 29,000 North Koreans, or former North Koreans, living in South Korea. Without their testimony and without their courage, we would not have had the UNCOI, we wouldn’t be seeing all of these efforts going on at the UN and elsewhere. I would say that organizations tasked with rescuing, protecting North Korean refugees, and enabling them to adapt to their new life—in South Korea, in Europe, in the United States, or Canada—perform an extraordinarily important role. And I would also say that NGOs that endeavor to provide training to former North Koreans—in particular, to young former North Koreans in their teens, twenties, and thirties—perform an extremely important role. I’m not trying to say that they should all become political leaders of a reunified Korea, but they need all the help they can get to become leaders and experts in their chosen areas of expertise. This is a mosaic of organizations performing very important roles that are complementary, I want to say, at the end of the day.

Stephen Noerper: Very important. Thank you. And before I turn to the audience, let me just ask quickly if you can say a few words about your work with Radio Free Asia in that I know that support for broadcast into North Korea has been one of the primary emphases both with the new legislation and in terms of some of the debate on how to move things forward.

Greg Scarlatoiu: I want to say that my work with Radio Free Asia is a labor of love just like my work with HRNK. I have had a weekly Korean language column for the past 13 years since 2003. Initially, I was building on my own personal experiences as one who was born and raised in Nicolae Ceausescu’s Romania, and this was the one country most similar to Kim Il-Sung’s North Korea, as you recall, and also as one who had lived for 10 years on a divided Korean peninsula while living, studying, and working in South Korea. I think that broadcasting is extraordinarily important. What we all want to see on the Korean peninsula is change. And change in North Korea can only come from the people of North Korea themselves. What we can do in order to enable them to see that there are alternatives to the current political arrangement in North Korea is to tell them three basic stories.

First and foremost, to tell them the story of their own human rights situation. They don’t know it. They don’t understand it living under such an oppressive regime. Religious freedom and freedom of speech and association have all been embedded in the constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, but North Koreans never read their own constitution. That’s the story we need to tell them. We need to tell them about international obligations North Korea has assumed by being a UN member state and thus, bound by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by being a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic and Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention of Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; and the International Convention of Rights of a Child.

Secondly we must tell them the story of the corruption of their leadership, in particular, the corruption of the Kim family regime.

Thirdly, we need to continue to tell them the story of the outside world, in particular, the story of South Korea, which is, as we all know, a miraculous success story. Once one of the poorest countries in the world just a few decades ago, [South Korea is] now the world’s 12th largest economy and moreover, a liberal democracy that’s a model for others in the region and beyond. Yes, a noisy liberal democracy, but that’s how we like liberal democracies—noisy. It’s very important to keep telling these stories to North Koreans and what we know based on surveys conducted by InterMedia and other companies tasked to monitor radio broadcasts into North Korea, former North Koreans interviewed state that about one third of them did listen to foreign broadcasting while they were in North Korea. South Korean broadcasting is also classified as foreign broadcasting. So here we’re talking Radio Free Asia, Voice of America, stations based in South Korea staffed with North Korean defectors, Kookmin TV (Korea TV), KBS, and so on and so forth. So, some North Koreans are listening, but probably not one third of all North Koreans. After all, these were the North Koreans who actively sought out information from the outside world. These are the North Koreans who had the courage to escape. But, nevertheless, we’ve seen the percentage of those who state that they listened to foreign broadcasting on the increase. We have to remember that there are new media storage devices. We know that USBs, DVDs, memory chips—in particular, memory chips and USBs—are very popular in North Korea today. We know that some North Koreans are familiar with the Hallyu (with the South Korean wave), the South Korean pop culture, and soap operas. Extraordinarily important.

Stephen Noerper: Greg, thank you for this very rich hour. Before we close, I wanted to give you an opportunity to share a few thoughts on Ambassador Steven Bosworth, who passed away earlier in January. Those of you who have been with us for programs over January and February know that we have tried to make frequent mention of Ambassador Bosworth’s very deep commitment to and effort for Korea-U.S. relations. We have on our website on koreasociety.org a tribute to Ambassador Bosworth. But I know that he was a mentor and friend to you, and was wondering if you would offer a few thoughts on his guidance and contributions in your life.

Greg Scarlatoiu: Ambassador Bosworth will always be remembered as an extraordinary diplomat. To us, those who graduated from the Fletcher School, he will always be remembered as the Dean who brought the Fletcher School into the 21st century. This has always been an extraordinary school, but he has added new programs, he has brought a true sense of strategic vision, I would say into the next century as well. For that we are all grateful to him. Personally, I am extraordinarily grateful to Stephen Bosworth. It so happened that we arrived at Fletcher at about the same time—both of us from Korea. I also happened to sit on the student council and I got to meet him regularly, at least a couple times a week, and work with him very closely. He was extraordinarily supportive. He was a friend; he was a mentor; he was a role model; and his personal support went to the extent that years after my graduation from Fletcher as I was applying for a position, he picked up the phone and called my employer to provide a recommendation that was tremendously helpful. I will dearly miss Stephen Bosworth. I was deeply saddened to hear the news of his passing. And I think that the best way for all of us to honor the extraordinary legacy of Steven Bosworth is to continue performing our mission. In our case, addressing this extraordinarily difficult situation in North Korea. I’m certain that Stephen Bosworth would be extraordinarily happy to see all of us here today. And what you have done here today, Steve, is an extraordinary way of honoring the legacy of Stephen Bosworth.

Stephen Noerper: Well, thank you very much. Please join me in thanking Greg for his keen insights. We do hope that you join us at koreasociety.org to become a member or to find out about future events. We would also note that this is our twelfth program on North Korean human rights leading up to and since the UN COI, so please feel free to consult and share any of those programs, which are available online, free of charge, in both audio and video form. And we would welcome you back next Thursday for a very interesting discussion on political forecasting: Korea and regional relations that will feature Ralph Casa, the President of Pacific Forums CSIS; Victor Cha who is the Korea Chair at CSIS and Korea Foundation Professor at Georgetown University—Victor will be hosting you tomorrow in Washington; and Scott Snyder of the Council on Foreign Relations. And so, really, three of our nation’s top analysts on political and security issues. Again, 12:30 next Thursday and we look forward to seeing you then. Thank you again for your attention today. Thank you, Ambassador Lord, for sharing your time with us and we’re delighted to have you here.

Greg Scarlatoiu: Thank you.


Edited by Rosa Park, HRNK Director of Programs and Editor

Original transcription by Liz Cheek, HRNK Research Intern