HRNK Advisory Opinion to His Excellency Tomoya Obokata

Submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, regarding contemporary forms of slavery affecting currently and formerly incarcerated people

April 12, 2024

Over ten years ago, in February 2014, the UN Commission of Inquiry (UN COI) reported that the DPRK was responsible for crimes against humanity. The gravity, scale, and nature of the DPRK’s violations of human rights reveal a state that has no parallel in the contemporary world. The DPRK’s systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations are thoroughly documented, including its imposition of arbitrary detention, arbitrary death penalties, political prison camps, slave labor, the absolute monopoly of information released to the public, and total control of all organized social life under the hierarchical system of songbun. Under Kim Jong-un’s rule, the scale and scope of these violations have continued to worsen and intensify.

Contemporary forms of slavery in North Korean detention facilities represent a grave and systematic violation of human rights. In these facilities, detainees, including political prisoners, are subjected to forced labor.

 

Please provide the details of labor programme(s) implemented in your country for incarcerated individuals, including:

Types of work performed.

Detainees work in mining, under dangerous conditions. Detainees are forced to work in agriculture involving strenuous labor, regardless of the detainee's physical condition or age. Detainees work in logging, typically in harsh weather conditions without adequate clothing or safety equipment. Detainees work in textile production, producing goods that may enter international markets despite sanctions.^[i]

Detention facilities often assign harsh conditions to detainees without considering their age, gender, or health condition, leading to injuries, illnesses, and deaths.^[ii] Political detainees may be subjected to even harsher treatment. Hundreds of thousands of individuals are held in a network of camps. Many of them are subjected to forced labor.^[iii]

Further evidence on forced labor from escapee testimonies can be found in the HRNK and No Chain report “An Investigation into the Human Rights Situation in North Korea’s Political Prison Camps: Testimonies of Detainee Families”.^[iv]

c) Working environment/conditions, including wages and any deduction for incarceration costs, working hours, and provisions for health & safety.

The working environment in North Korean detention facilities is harsh and dangerous, lacking basic health and safety measures.^[v]

Detainees are often unpaid for their labor, with nominal wages often deducted to cover incarceration costs.^[vi] Detainees work for 10-12 hours per day, seven days a week, with minimal rest.^[vii] This, combined with insufficient nutrition and rest, negatively impacts their physical and mental health.^[viii] Health and safety provisions are non-existent, and injuries or illnesses often go untreated, leading to numerous deaths.^[ix]

Is there evidence of labour practices which may amount to exploitation? If so, please provide details.

Some of the abuses include excessive working hours. Another type of abuse includes no or extremely low pay. In addition, detainees work in an unhealthy or dangerous working environment. Conditions in North Korean detention facilities are unsanitary and hazardous. Detainees work in dangerous environments, leading to injuries and health complications. Furthermore, they face discriminatory treatments where certain groups of individuals, such as political prisoners and all those deemed to be disloyal to the regime, are subjected to even harsher treatment and forced labor practices. Finally, there is a lack of access to medical facilities.^[x]

Is there evidence of sexual exploitation among incarcerated individuals? If so, please provide details.

Many camp orders are conducted in secret.^[xi] Despite stringent information control, escapee testimonies, reports by human rights organizations, and investigations conducted by international bodies have provided insight into the grim reality faced by inmates, which involves modern forms of slavery, including sexual exploitation (sometimes referred to as sexual slavery).^[xii]

Sexual exploitation and abuse in North Korean detention facilities, particularly targeting female prisoners, is widespread. Escapees report rape, forced abortion, and sexual assault, often used as torture and control methods.^[xiii] Male guards and officials abuse their power, targeting political prisoners, women suspected of having illegally crossed the border, and those detained for petty crimes.^[xiv]

Are victims of labor and sexual exploitation able to seek justice and remedies? Please provide details, including legislative frameworks and complaint mechanisms.

On paper, DPRK laws prohibit forced labor. The DPRK Constitution includes articles on the dignity and rights of citizens, and the country is a signatory to several international human rights treaties. However, in practice, the government does not uphold these laws, especially within detention facilities. The legal system is opaque and subordinated to the dictates of the ruling Korean Workers' Party.

There is virtually no avenue for victims to seek justice or remedies within the DPRK. The judicial system lacks independence, and there is no mechanism for detainees to file complaints or challenge abuses.^[xv]

Victims of labor and sexual exploitation in North Korean detention facilities are caught in a grim situation with no available mechanisms for seeking justice or remedies. The international community continues to struggle with effective strategies to address these human rights abuses, given the geopolitical complexities and the DPRK's self-imposed isolation.

What are the main challenges in eliminating labour and sexual exploitation among incarcerated individuals, and what recommendations would you make to address them effectively?

Despite the veil of secrecy surrounding the country's penal system, escapee testimonies and satellite imagery have provided the international community with glimpses into the dire conditions faced by incarcerated individuals. The DPRK executes a deliberate policy of human rights denial.

The international community should increase pressure through targeted sanctions and hold the government accountable. Supporting North Korean escapees and running advocacy campaigns can help mitigate abusive government control and encourage reform. Educating North Koreans about their rights and the outside world can also help create and enhance awareness of international human rights standards.

Does your government provide tailored support to formerly incarcerated individuals which effectively meets their needs? Please provide details particularly in relation to access to temporary/long term accommodation, education/training, decent work, finance and pension, and other essential services.

The United States provides assistance to refugees and asylum-seekers including North Koreans, to rebuild their lives.^[xvi] However, the effectiveness of this support can vary based on resources, individual circumstances, and local community capacity. Challenges including cultural adjustment and language barriers can also impact resettlement experiences.

What is the role of other stakeholders, including educational institutions, jobs/training centres, housing providers, businesses/employers’ organisations, financial institutions, trade unions and civil society organisations, in providing support to formally incarcerated individuals? Does your government actively coordinate or cooperate with them?

Individuals who escape from the DPRK, including former detainees, face challenges ranging from psychological trauma to the need for basic necessities and integration into a new society.

Educational institutions, job centers, housing providers, businesses, financial institutions, trade unions, and CSOs are all crucial. Educational programs, language training, vocational training, housing solutions, inclusive workplace environments, financial literacy programs, and legal assistance are essential in ensuring the rights and fair treatment of North Korean escapees.

CSOs including HRNK^[xvii] and various other stakeholders often provide direct support and advocacy work to help individuals and raise awareness about human rights abuses in the DPRK.

What are ongoing challenges in promoting successful economic and social reintegration to formally incarcerated individuals in your country, which may include discrimination (including intersecting forms based on age, gender identity/sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, indigenous, migration, socio-economic and other status), corruption, lack of opportunities and support?

After escaping from the country, former North Korean detainees face challenges including lack of opportunity and inadequate support systems as well as age and socio-economic status discrimination.

What recommendations would you make to overcome the existing obstacles and prevent formally incarcerated individuals from being subjected to labour and sexual exploitation?

The situation of detainees in North Korean detention facilities remains deeply concerning, drawing attention from international human rights organizations and governments worldwide. The available reports indicate severe conditions, including forced labor, torture, inadequate food, and medical neglect, leading to high mortality rates.^[xviii]

To address these issues and protect both current and former detainees from exploitation, we respectfully put forth the following recommendations:

1. International Pressure and Sanctions: Continue and intensify international pressure on the North Korean government to adhere to international human rights standards, using targeted sanctions against individuals and entities responsible for human rights abuses.
2. Engagement and Dialogue: Encourage diplomatic dialogue that includes human rights as a core component, alongside denuclearization and security concerns. Leverage diplomatic channels to press for the closure of camps and the release of political prisoners.
3. Support for Escapees: Enhance support for North Korean escapees who can provide firsthand accounts of the conditions within detention facilities. Support should include protection, rehabilitation services, and platforms to share their experiences on the global stage.
4. Use of Technology: Increase the use of satellite imagery analysis and other means to monitor detention centers and gather evidence of human rights abuses.
5. Humanitarian Aid: Ensure that humanitarian aid, when possible, is conditioned on improvements in human rights, prioritizes vulnerable groups including people in detention, and is not diverted by the regime. Aid should be designed to minimize the risk of bolstering the capacities of the regime to continue its repressive practices. Access and transparency are of the essence.
6. Awareness and Advocacy: Support international and regional human rights organizations in their efforts to raise awareness about the conditions in North Korean detention facilities. Promote campaigns that advocate for the rights of current and former detainees.
7. Legal Mechanisms: Explore legal avenues to hold North Korean leaders accountable for crimes against humanity, including labor and sexual exploitation, through international courts, tribunals, or other accountability mechanisms.

The challenges in addressing the human rights abuses in North Korean detention facilities are significant, particularly given the closed and authoritarian nature of the regime. However, sustained international focus, combined with a strategic mix of pressure and engagement, can create conditions for change and provide some level of protection for those who have suffered in these facilities.

Thank you very much for your kind consideration.

 

^[i] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Greg Scarlatoiu and Raymond Ha, “North Korea’s Political Prison Camp, Kwan-li-so No. 25, Update 4” and European Parliament, Parliamentary Question, “Forced Labor in North Korea,” April 2, Parliamentary question | Forced labour in North Korea | E-004134/2014 | European Parliament (europa.eu).

^[ii] The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) & the International Bar Association (IBA), “Report: Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers,” March 2022, https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Report%20Findings%20Inquiry%20on%20Crimes%20Against%20Humanity.pd.f and European Parliament, Parliamentary Question, “Forced Labor in North Korea”.

^[iii] Amnesty International, “Images Reveal the Scale of North Korea Political Prison Camps,” May 2011, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2011/05/images-reveal-scale-north-korean-political-prison-camps/.

^[iv] The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) and No Chain, “An Investigation into the Human Rights Situation in North Korea’s Political Prison Camps: Testimonies of Detainee Families,” 2018, https://www.hrnk.org/publications/hrnk-publications.php?page=3.

^[v] U.S. Department of State, “2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: North Korea”.

^[vi] HRNK & IBA, “Report: Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers.”

^[vii] Ibid.

^[viii]  HRNK & IBA, “Report: Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers.”

^[ix] Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2024: North Korea, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/north-korea.

^[x] HRNK & IBA, “Report: Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers.”

^[xi] The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) and No Chain, “An Investigation into the Human Rights Situation in North Korea’s Political Prison Camps: Testimonies of Detainee Families”.

^[xii] HRNK & IBA, “Report: Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers.”f and Anti-Slavery International, “Forced Labor in North Korean Prison Camps,” December 2007, https://www.antislavery.org/reports/forced-labour-in-north-korean-prison-camps/.

^[xiii] The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) and No Chain, “An Investigation into the Human Rights Situation in North Korea’s Political Prison Camps: Testimonies of Detainee Families”.

^[xiv] HRNK & IBA, “Report: Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers.”

^[xv] Ibid.

^[xvi] The Bush Institute, “U.S.-Based North Korean Refugees,” https://gwbcenter.imgix.net/Resources/gwb_north_korea_executive_summary_r4.pdf.

^[xvii] See HRNK’s policy recommendations to the U.S. government: https://www.hrnk.org/publications/policy-recommendations.php.

^[xviii] The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) and No Chain, “An Investigation into the Human Rights Situation in North Korea’s Political Prison Camps: Testimonies of Detainee Families”.

Read More

Categories: North Korea, United Nations

North Korean Human Rights: The Path Ahead

By Dr. Kim Dong-su, Senior Advisor to the Institute for National Security Strategy

June 22, 2023

Dr. Kim Dong-su, Senior Advisor to the Institute for National Security Strategy, is a former North Korean diplomat who last served at North Korea’s mission to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Rome before defecting in 1998. Since arriving in South Korea, he has written extensively on North Korea’s foreign policy and regime structure. He recently served as an advisor to the Yoon Suk-yeol Presidential Transition Committee and a visiting scholar at Waseda University. Dr. Kim has a B.A. in Political Science from Dar-es-Salaam National University and the Pyongyang University of Foreign Studies, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from Kyungnam University.

The following text is adapted from remarks delivered at "North Korean Human Rights: Is There Still a Way Forward?," a conference hosted by HRNK, the Hoover Institution, and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) on May 18, 2023 at NED’s headquarters in Washington, D.C. 

 

The Kim Jong-un regime presents a challenge of the utmost urgency to the international community. Without denuclearization and fundamental political change in North Korea, peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula will only be an illusion. Likewise, the values of freedom and human rights on the Korean Peninsula will not be truly realized either. To achieve denuclearization and internal political change, we first need to carefully assess the situation the Kim Jong-un regime is facing, as well as the steps that it may take. 

The current situation in North Korea is defined by four characteristics: i) rapid nuclear advancement; ii) severe economic hardship; iii) deepening public discontent and widening social unrest; and iv) intensifying coercion, control, surveillance, and punishment against the population.

As most of the national budget is spent on developing weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons and missiles, the North Korean people are facing an economic catastrophe. Moreover, in the past few years, North Korea has been battered on three fronts: sanctions, the COVID-19 pandemic, and natural disasters. This has exacerbated the shortage of goods and food supplies. Recently, there have been cases of starvation.

This has given rise to greater public discontent in North Korea. The regime is losing popular support, and the influence of South Korean popular culture is expanding across the country. Under these circumstances, the Kim Jong-un regime has intensified its reign of terror as it commits egregious human rights violations. It has enacted unjust laws such as the “Anti-Reactionary Thought and Culture Act” and the “Youth Education Act." 

In this way, the Kim Jong-un regime's excessive obsession with nuclear weapons leads to a vicious cycle of severe economic difficulties, greater suffering among the people, deepening popular discontent, and harsher surveillance and repression.

 

The Future of North Korea’s Human Rights Diplomacy

Over the past decade, many international entities and countries, including the United Nations (UN) Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Human Rights in the DPRK , the North Korea Freedom Coalition (NKFC), the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), the UN, the European Union (EU), the United States, and Japan—together with many other NGOs in South Korea and elsewhere—have persistently advocated for and promoted North Korean human rights.

Through such efforts, the human rights situation in North Korea has been exposed to the world. This includes the situation in North Korea’s kwan-li-so (political prison camps), kyo-hwa-so (long-term prison labor facilities), and jip-kyul-so (short-term detention facilities), where detainees are publicly executed, and egregious human rights violations are committed. Violations of women’s rights and children’s rights have been brought to light, including the use of children for forced labor.

There have been more opportunities for North Korean escapees to testify on the international stage, resulting in greater international attention toward the issue. This has made it considerably more difficult for North Korea to address the issue through diplomacy.

Through the work of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Seoul office, which specializes in investigating North Korea’s human rights violations, there is now a greater capacity to document and collect evidence of human rights violations in North Korea. Meanwhile, the Kim Jong-un regime continues to purge and execute officials and take severe measures to block the inflow of outside information.

Following the release of the UN COI report in 2014, North Korea largely ignored human rights on the international stage. However, the international community has been more assertive toward North Korea on this issue. Specifically, the work of the UN COI and NGOs such as NKFC and HRNK in Seoul, London, Washington, D.C., and Tokyo helped to investigate and document the human rights situation in North Korea. The willingness of many North Korean escapees to provide testimony seemed to indicate that the Kim Jong-un regime’s days were numbered. 

Going forward, North Korea’s diplomacy on human rights is likely to focus on preventing Kim Jong-un’s name from being directly tied to documentation and accountability initiatives. To do so, North Korea will firmly shut its doors. It will cease contact, exchange, and dialogue with international human rights institutions, human rights organizations, and human rights activists.

At the same time, however, North Korea will seek to counter international pressure on human rights by seeking help from its close allies on the international stage. Pyongyang will engage with individual states and do everything it can to prevent Kim Jong-un’s name from being included in UN human rights resolutions. 

In particular, North Korea will frame criticisms of its human rights record as a scheme to subvert the regime, and thereby further justify the development of nuclear weapons as a means of protection. It will heighten political tensions and pressure South Korea to break away from international efforts to address North Korean human rights.

Over the past few years, efforts to address North Korean human rights on the international stage have been successful in several ways. The UN has taken a proactive role in comprehensively investigating human rights violations in North Korea. Specifically, the presence of the OHCHR’s Seoul office provides a lasting, institutional basis for systematically documenting North Korean human rights issues. It appears that North Korea is paying very close attention to these efforts by the international community to address the human rights issue.

Going forward, North Korea will react aggressively to the international community’s action on human rights, which it regards as part of a “peaceful transition strategy” to overthrow the regime. At the same time, North Korea will try to fundamentally block the West’s calls to improve human rights, emphasizing its "political autonomy" and "right to development." Moreover, to deflect criticisms of its human rights record, North Korea will persistently raise human rights issues in South Korea, the United States, and Japan.

How to Raise the Profile of North Korean Human Rights

From now on, we must develop and execute an intensive campaign of psychological warfare to blow the wind of freedom and truth into North Korea, which stands on a sand castle of the worst lies and fabrications in the world. Comprehensive psychological warfare against the highly closed North Korean regime will be more powerful than nuclear weapons.

We have the responsibility to raise awareness among the international community about the worst human rights situation in the world. At the same time, we must also seek ways to inform the North Korean people about freedom, democracy, and human rights, so that they can resist the tyrannical regime. For this purpose, the Yoon Suk-yeol government must place the protection of the North Korean people’s human rights, as well as the improvement of their economic rights, at the very center of its North Korea policy.

The people of North Korea, who are citizens of the Republic of Korea (ROK) pursuant to the ROK Constitution, are dying away as slaves of the Kim family. No objective—be it unification, exchange, cooperation, or peace—can take precedence over the North Korean people's right to live or their human rights. In other words, any policy towards North Korea which ignores the suffering of the North Korean people is bound to be hypocritical.

If the North Korean people are neglected, any related act and even unification itself are bound to be hypocritical. This is because the ultimate purpose of North Korea policy or unification policy is not to maintain peace or secure power, but to firstly liberate the North Korean people from slavery. If that is not the goal, then there is no reason to deal with North Korea or seek unification. It would be enough to protect ourselves and ensure our own safety.

The experiences of the past half century and recent years have clearly shown that the Kim dynasty will never change its ways. Moreover, considering the Kim regime’s nature, history, and institutional structure, it is meaningless to seek reconciliation, negotiation, compromise, or coexistence with the Kim regime. It is also clear that the Kim dynasty remains the source of all evils that arise from the division of the Korean Peninsula, including nuclear and missile issues, human rights violations, threats to national security, and the “South-South divide” in South Korea.

In this context, I believe it is necessary to set a basic direction for international efforts to promote human rights in North Korea. It is necessary to actively raise the issue of human rights through the UN and other related institutions which North Korea has joined. In addition, it would be productive to discuss North Korean human rights in the context of economic & security cooperation. Creating a new regional human rights body in the region would also provide a forum for discussing North Korean human rights.

It is especially important for the Yoon administration to work together with the rapidly growing network of domestic and international human rights NGOs to call for improvement of human rights in North Korea.

There are three priorities in this regard. First, it is necessary to raise North Korean human rights issues more proactively at the UN. Second, it is critical to discuss human rights in North Korea within the framework of economic or security cooperation. A new regional human rights body could be created for such discussions as well. Third, it is of paramount importance to institutionalize cooperation with human rights NGOs, and to actively support human rights NGOs led by North Korean escapees.

The North Korean human rights issue is critical because the action we take on this issue can catalyze changes in not only the consciousness and ideology of the North Korean people, but also the political system in North Korea. To facilitate political change in North Korea and address its serious human rights situation, it is imperative to develop a strategy aimed at specific segments of the population: the ruling elite; the middle class, who are forced to blindly obey the regime; and the lower class, which Kim Jong-un ignores.

To realize these objectives, we need a massive information campaign to send information into North Korea about what is happening in South Korea and the world; about freedom, human rights, and the superiority of democracies; and about reform and opening. This can be via radio broadcasts, print media, movies, music, and other means. It is important that the North Korean people, including soldiers, develop an accurate understanding of freedom and democracy.

By doing so, we can empower the North Korean people by enabling them to clearly recognize the repressive nature of the Kim Jong-un regime and become the driving force of opening and reform, which will lead to unification under a liberal democratic form of government. There is a surging demand for information among the North Korean people and North Korean soldiers.

To the key ruling elite of North Korea, we need to disseminate information about high-ranking North Korean officials, possible succession scenarios after Kim Jong-un, South Korea’s policy toward North Korea, and how this policy is being implemented.

To the leadership of the Korean People’s Army, we specifically need to send in information about the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance, President Yoon’s recent state visit to Washington, the nature and objectives of the Kim regime, the capabilities of the ROK military, and the ROK’s military strategy.

To the North Korean population, including the youth, it would be valuable to disseminate Korean cultural content and American movies (such as action and martial arts movies), games, the Bible and other religious materials (including print materials), and documentaries on human rights.

Conclusion

In light of growing international interest in and action on North Korea’s human rights situation, it is becoming increasingly critical for the Yoon administration to pursue a North Korean human rights policy.

To raise the profile of North Korean human rights issues on the international stage and facilitate political change in North Korea, the Yoon administration must closely cooperate with NGOs led by North Korean escapees. This is an urgent priority, just as much as the nuclear issue.

Many escapee-led organizations have long dedicated themselves to bringing freedom to North Korea, with an emphasis on human rights. These organizations have the capacity to be a strategic asset for the Yoon administration, which has proclaimed a principled approach to North Korean policy.

The General Association of North Korean Human Rights Organizations, a coalition of 23 organizations based in South Korea, is carrying out a wide range of activities for the cause of human rights and democracy in North Korea.

Escapee-led organizations which many of you know well, including the Committee for the Democratization of North Korea, Free North Korea Radio, Free North Korea Movement Alliance, North Korea Strategy Center, and North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity, are preparing for a new leap forward after enduring a hostile political atmosphere under the previous administration.

Mr. Kim Seong-min, the founder of the General Association of North Korean Human Rights Organizations and the leader of Free North Korea Radio, stresses that “North Korean escapees have a responsibility to fight for the North Korean people’s right to know, which is crucial for North Korea’s democratization and the unification of the Korean Peninsula as a free and open country.”

Park Sang-hak, Heo Kwang-il, Kim Heung-kwang, and Jang Se-yool, who are part of the General Association of North Korean Human Rights Organizations, sent hundreds of thousands of leaflets and 5,000 USBs to the North via balloons on April 12. This was in direct opposition to the so-called “Anti-Leaflet Law,” an unjust law that was passed under the Moon Jae-in administration. 

Kim Seong-min and other leaders in the escapee community have all said that Suzanne Scholte’s Defense Forum Foundation provided invaluable support when the Moon administration harshly suppressed the activities of North Korean escapees. They have also said that the sending of leaflet balloons these past few years would not have been possible without the support of Ms. Suzanne Scholte’s NKFC and individual American citizens who were driven by a sense of justice.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to Ms. Suzanne Scholte, whom many escapees regard as the godmother of the North Korean human rights movement. 

I would also like to express my gratitude and respect for all American citizens who have lent their support to the work of North Korean escapees in our struggle for freedom and democracy in North Korea.

Thank you very much for your attention.

Read More

Categories: Human Rights, North Korea, South Korea, United Nations

The UN COI at 10 Years: Strategic Priorities & Considerations

By Michael Kirby, former Chair of the UN COI on Human Rights in the DPRK

January 26, 2023

Next year will mark the 10th anniversary of the report issued by the UN Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Discussions have begun in Seoul, Washington D.C., and other capitals about the steps that might be taken to commemorate and reflect upon this milestone. The goal of these efforts would be to revive knowledge about the COI report and its detailed recommendations, and to rekindle a commitment to remedial action by the international community.

With this in mind, I am pleased to offer a non-exhaustive list of follow-up initiatives, together with guidance that might be taken to mark this 10th anniversary (hereafter “COI+10”).

UN MANDATE HOLDERS

From 2013 to 2014, I held the UN mandate of Chair of the COI on Human Rights in the DPRK, acting always with the participation of the other members of the Commission, Mr. Marzuki Darusman and Ms. Sonja Biserko. Our mandate was effectively completed when we delivered our report to the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) on 7 February 2014, or possibly after we followed up with the delivery of the report to the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly (GA) in the fall of 2014. On 22 December 2014, we attended the meeting of the UN Security Council, to which the GA had transmitted the COI report, together with expressions of its concern and recommendations.

Since the mandate of the COI has concluded, its members have no current authority to speak or act for the UN. Although individual members of the former COI have been invited by interested audiences to share their reflections on many occasions since 2014—especially in Seoul, Washington D.C., Tokyo, and London—they have always made it clear, as I do now, that their mandate for the UN has concluded. This role belongs to successors appointed by the United Nations, acting through its relevant agencies, including the HRC and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The mandate holder of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK plays an especially important role. This is presently Professor Elizabeth Salmón, who was appointed to replace Tomás Ojea Quintana in that office last year.

It will therefore be important that any follow-up action on the COI taken by member states or their agencies or individuals should always include full notification to, and cooperation with, the Special Rapporteur. In organising any hearings or events (actual or virtual), it will be important to inform the Special Rapporteur to ascertain any views she may wish to express, and to comply as far as possible with scheduling that would facilitate, where so decided, her participation in any follow-up events.

ANNIVERSARY DATES

Many believe that a useful way to mark the 10th anniversary of the COI would be to keep in mind (and try to coincide with) significant dates in the history of the COI, and possibly also at the venue of important earlier events. These dates include:

• 21 March 2013: Resolution of the Human Rights Council at its 22nd session in Geneva to establish the COI on Human Rights in the DPRK. This was done by HRC Resolution 22/13, mandating the body to investigate the “systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights in the DPRK, with a view to ensuring full accountability, in particular for violations that may amount to crimes against humanity’’ (A/HRC/RES/23/13). The resolution to establish a COI was taken without a vote.
  
  
• 7 May 2013: Appointment of the members of the COI by the then-President of the HRC, Ambassador Remigiusz Achilles Henczel of Poland. The appointments announced to the HRC were Michael Kirby of Australia (Chair), Marzuki Darusman of Indonesia (then-Special Rapporteur on North Korean Human Rights, who recommended the creation of a COI), and Sonja Biserko of Serbia (human rights expert and subsequently the holder of a mandate of a follow-up UN expert group).
  
  
• 1 July 2013: First meeting of the COI at the Palais Wilson in Geneva, when the members of the COI established the methodology of transparency and openness that was to be adopted in the discharge of their mandate. This novel methodology was adopted unanimously by the COI and observed throughout the discharge of its mandate.
  
  
• 20 August 2013: Commencement of the COI’s public hearings and consultations at Yonsei University in Seoul, Republic of Korea (ROK).
  
  
• 29 August 2013: Public hearings and consultations at the UN University in Tokyo, Japan.
  
  
• 23 October 2013: Public hearings and consultations in London, UK.
  
  
• 30–31 October 2013: Public hearings and consultations in Washington D.C.
  
  
• 1 December 2013: Commencement of deliberations of the COI at Palais Wilson, followed by approval of the draft report and arrangements for follow-up.
  
  
• 17 February 2014: First official publication of the COI report (UN Doc. A/HRC/25/63 and detailed findings, A/HRC/ 25/CRP.1). A press conference was held the same day at Palais des Nations, Geneva.
  
  
• 17 March 2014: Formal presentation of the report by the COI Chair to the HRC plenary session, followed by questions, comments, and remarks.
  
  
• 30 March 2014: Transmission of the COI report by the HRC to the UN General Assembly with strong endorsement (Vote: 30 pro; 6 contra; 9 abstain). This HRC resolution called for the report’s transmission to the GA, and by the GA to the Security Council (A/HRC/RES/25/25).
  
  
• 17 April 2014: Arria-formula meeting at UN headquarters in New York of Security Council members—and by other states as observers—to receive the COI report. The meeting was not attended by the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, with apologies conveyed by the latter.
  
  
• 18 November 2014: After many months of deliberation by the GA Third Committee in New York, a Cuban amendment supporting the DPRK was defeated. The GA Third Committee then endorsed the COI report with another strong vote, followed by a GA plenary vote on December 18 (Vote: 116 pro; 20 contra; 53 abstain). As recommended by the COI, exceptionally, the GA transmitted the COI report to the Security Council (A/RES/69/188).
  
  
• 5 December 2014: Letter initiated by the Ambassadors of France, United States and Australia (then a non-permanent member of the Security Council) to the President of the Security Council (Chad), signed by 10 Council members, for a procedural resolution to place human rights in the DPRK on the Security Council’s agenda. For a procedural resolution to be adopted by the Security Council, an affirmative vote of nine of its members is required.
  
  
• 22 December 2014: UN Security Council adopted the procedural motion put forward by the 10 states, which was read out by Australia. The People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation challenged the contention that the proposed resolution was procedural, but ultimately it was so decided, with 11 states in favour (Vote: 11 pro – Argentina, Australia, Chile, Jordan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, ROK, and Rwanda together with three permanent member states – France, United Kingdom, and United States; 2 contra – China, Russia; 2 abstain – Nigeria, Chad). The COI report was thus placed on the Security Council’s agenda. Thereafter, the human rights situation in North Korea was raised under the agenda item added by this procedural vote.

THE UN, UNITED STATES, AND JAPAN

The United Nations and its various organs and agencies must be an obvious focus of the consultations surrounding the COI’s 10th anniversary. The problem of Korea preceded the formal establishment of the UN in 1945. As the COI report indicated, the origins of the partition of the Korean Peninsula may be found in the meeting of the Allied Powers at the Cairo Conference in 1943 (COI Report, para. 95). They agreed that, after the defeat of Japan, the colonial power, the independence of Korea would be achieved “in due course.”

Thus began, in 1946, the division of Korea into two zones of control: the United States in the south, and the Soviet Union north of the 38th parallel. This was a pragmatic decision, intended to be of short duration. It was not consistent with the requirements of the UN Charter of 1945, which envisaged the right of “self-determination” for those who had been under colonial rule. The Korean people have never decided for themselves in favour of partition. Exercise of the right of self-determination is the overriding obligation of the UN and the right of the Korean people.

As the effective cause of the division of Korea, the United States of America and the Russian Federation, as successor to the USSR, have a primary, continuing, unfulfilled obligation. So does the United Nations itself. It is therefore proper that, in consultation, where possible with the post-war Korean states, the United States should play an important role in assisting the Korean people to exercise their fundamental human rights, and the right of peoples to self-determination. This contextual theme should inform the discussions surrounding the COI’s 10th anniversary.

It also explains why the two Korean states, intended to be temporary, have an obligation of their own to promote and achieve the self-determination of the Korean people, so far denied. The ROK cooperated fully with the COI. However, despite repeated efforts to make contact and to secure entry and cooperation, the DPRK has so far declined to cooperate either with the UN agencies concerned with human rights, the COI, or with the ROK.

Throughout its work, the COI insisted upon affording opportunities to the DPRK to participate in its work and to provide opportunities for inspection, provision of submissions, and commentary on conclusions. It would be desirable that consultations regarding the post-COI events should likewise insist at every stage on inviting cooperation, entry, inspection, and commentary by the DPRK, just as the COI did in pursuing the neutral interests of the UN and the COI. Renewed efforts at dialogue should be made before, during, and after the 10th anniversary consultations.

In the face of refusal and hostility, there should be the same neutrality as has been displayed by the UN’s organs, agencies, the COI, and the Special Rapporteur. This has an important symbolic value and, even now, may ultimately attract the engagement of the DPRK. Whether it does so or not, it is the correct stance for the UN and all impartial observers to adopt.

Lastly, Japan actively supported the work of the COI throughout its inquiry. It still has a special interest in the issues presented to the world by the DPRK. This includes human rights issues, notably that of the abduction of Japanese nationals from Japan; the abduction of nationals of other countries; the return to Japan of its nationals who were induced to seek a “promised land” in the DPRK and were retained; and the need to account for prisoners of war retained in the DPRK, as well as the remains of abductees and former prisoners; and other problems that overlap with the issue of abduction. The DPRK itself has acknowledged that this issue is not concluded.

The recent international security issue presented by the firing of North Korean missiles over Japanese territory and Japanese waters adds to these further unresolved issues of human rights. The recent re-election of Japan to membership in the UN Security Council also arguably provides another reason for the special involvement of Japan in events surrounding the COI’s 10th anniversary. According to media reports, the bilateral relationship between the ROK and Japan has recently improved. Consideration should be given by the sponsors to involving Japan in the COI+10 anniversary events and their design.

CHANGING ADMINISTRATIONS
IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The COI performed its functions during the administration of President Park Geun-hye in the ROK. She extended courtesies to the COI and the assistance of officials. A weakness of the COI’s consultations was the absence of most members of the then-opposition parties and supporters. Since at least the time of President Kim Dae-jung and his “Sunshine Policy,” there have been political differences within the ROK concerning the proper response to reports of human rights abuses in the DPRK, and the investigation and criticism of reported human rights abuses in the north. There have also been differences of opinion about initiatives taken by the ROK for the pursuit of unification, contact with the DPRK, and cooperation with human rights critics, including the COI.

With the election of President Moon Jae-in, the ROK’s policies towards the COI report and responses to evidence of abuses changed. The participation of the ROK in annual UN resolutions condemning the abuse of human rights in the DPRK, in particular ROK co-sponsorship, was suspended. Criminal proceedings (challenged in the Constitutional Court) were brought against citizens of the ROK for releasing balloons containing information critical of the DPRK, including the report of the COI, which is not available in North Korea. The election to succeed President Moon Jae-in led to the election of President Yoon Suk-yeol, who entered office on 10 May 2022.

The Yoon administration appears to have taken several different policy directions from its predecessor. It will be essential that the participants in the 10th anniversary events should be given information, not always available to foreign observers, on the differences already evident in the policies affecting reported human rights abuses in North Korea. Furthermore, it will be important that the omission of the COI to engage effectively with opposition parties and individuals in the ROK should not be repeated.

Without intruding into partisan political issues, it will be the responsibility of public officials to alert overseas participants about any changes in policy towards the COI report; human rights investigations; participation in UN investigations; and responses to activities designed to inform citizens in the DPRK about relevant UN activities, especially the report of the COI and its follow-up. As we mark COI+10, it would be desirable for appropriate experts to give information to participants about the availability of access to international news, including UN investigations of human rights abuses.

CIVIL SOCIETY, DEFECTORS, AND ESCAPEES

Apart from the possible weakness in the COI’s consultation with diverse civil society organisations, resulting from limited time and impartial reliance on official sources, it is also essential for relevant actors to consult more widely with the fullest possible range of civil society organisations, reflecting divergent points of view.

Although some consultation was held with “defectors” (also referred to as escapees or refugees), it would be desirable that appropriate new consultations should be arranged with a larger number of civil society organisations, in general, and organisations of defectors, in particular. Although the number of such entrants into the ROK from the DPRK has diminished, due partly to the impact of COVID restrictions, such persons are vital sources of information on the human rights abuses that drove them to depart from the DPRK.

Leading members of this community (including some who have been elected to the ROK National Assembly) should be sought out and invited to offer their perspectives to the COI+10 consultations, particularly on any changes that have occurred in the situation of human rights in the DPRK over the past 10 years.

UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS

The 75th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) will occur on 10 December 2023. The organisation of COI+10 should emphasize this anniversary and its relevance to following up the essential criterion of the COI's critique of abuses of human rights in the DPRK. That critique was grounded in the principles of the UN Charter (with its insistence on universal human rights) and of the UDHR, which gives expression to the content of such rights, as later elaborated by several UN human rights treaties. The DPRK was, and still is, a party to some of these treaties.

Although some criticism of UN organs and agencies is commonly based on alleged Western influence over the contemporary content of human rights, the UN Charter and UDHR are universal statements that apply to all member states, nations, peoples, and individuals. It would be desirable that COI+10 should rebut the suggestions of regional or national exceptionalism. The anniversary of the UDHR affords the international community an opportunity to re-assert its commitment to these universal principles.

It would be desirable for the responses of the DPRK to the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), conducted by the HRC, to be analysed and measured against the criticisms expressed in the COI report and subsequently by UN Special Rapporteurs.

DIPLOMATIC TECHNIQUES

When considering the most effective ways to achieve the DPRK’s compliance with universal human rights, it is essential to embrace normal diplomatic techniques for negotiation and securing change. This involves, normally, the avoidance of mere condemnation and noisy criticism. It involves seeking out and identifying issues on the borderline of those held in common with the negotiator concerned.

Although former U.S. President Donald Trump prided himself on reaching a “deal,” his professional career was in real estate. Recent evidence suggests that he was sustained by the fortune secured by his father. Even to those—like myself—who were not opposed to President Trump’s outreach to the DPRK, after years of isolation, his negotiation technique was counterproductive.

It began with his initial speech to the UN General Assembly, threatening the DPRK with destruction “like nothing seen before.’’ He then shifted his approach to a “bromance’’ with Kim Jong-un, the Supreme Leader of the DPRK. He invited Kim first to Singapore and then to Hanoi. He plunged immediately into attempting to secure a deal regarding the most difficult subject for ultimate negotiation: nuclear weapons and long-range missile systems. As these were central to the protection and survival of the Kim family regime, the attempt quickly failed. That failure was compounded by the breakdown of the Hanoi summit on the morning of its second day. Whatever opportunity the U.S. president had from his surprising initiative was squandered and apparently wasted.

The normal technique of diplomacy is to start at the outside of a circle of issues, negotiating first those issues, initially less significant, where there may be common ground and where limited agreements might be reached. This can then lead to more comprehensive agreements. Central, extremely difficult, issues are typically left to be addressed in later negotiations, especially if there is a chance of first building mutual respect and negotiating trade-offs.

In its report, the COI was conscious of this diplomatic technique. Although its recommendations certainly included difficult subjects such as undertaking “profound political and institutional reforms without delay to introduce genuine checks and balances upon the powers of the Supreme Leader’’ (COI Report, conclusions, para. 89a), it was accompanied by other recommendations susceptible to agreement. This included: 

• measures to ensure gender equality in practice;
• the right to food without discrimination giving particular attention to the needs of women and vulnerable groups and to providing free and unimpeded access for humanitarian aid;
• a moratorium on execution of the death penalty;
• establishment of independent media and allowing citizens to freely access the Internet, social media, international communications, and foreign broadcasts; 
• abolition of the prohibition on foreign travel;
• provision of full information to families of persons abducted;
• ratification of human rights conventions;
• establishment of a field-based presence with technical assistance from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; and
• introduction of postal services, restoration of railway and airline services, sporting links, and cultural links (COI Report, conclusions, para. 89).

It would be desirable for COI+10 to have expert advice from diplomats, experienced in difficult international negotiations, to reflect upon how, in practice, success can be achieved where the initial differences between the parties are large and entrenched.

REVIVING AWARENESS OF THE COI REPORT

The passage of 10 years has erased much of the impact caused by the COI report at the time of its issue. One of the problems of UN human rights reports is that they are usually not well published or circulated. A UN report will generally sink like a stone before the ink is dry. Real efforts were made by the COI to render its report accessible and readable. The fact that it was preceded by a series of widely publicised public hearings meant that, on publication, it was something of a sensation. It secured much international publicity. It provided detailed practical cases, based on evidence presented at public hearings, thereby identifying and personifying the human rights abuses found. It remains a different model for the writing of UN human rights reports.

Although highly readable, no readily accessible version of the COI report was made available in print form. The electronic version was available online, but relatively little is known against the background of many other UN human rights reports. The 10-year anniversary affords an opportunity to reconsider creatively what can be done to better distribute the knowledge contained in this report. Perhaps if UN human rights reports were published in an improved format, there would be more follow-up. The COI report should be reconsidered for the lessons it provides for UN human rights reports more generally.

The COI report, the annual reports on the DPRK’s human rights record, and other UN human rights reports should not be filed away and forgotten once delivered. There needs to be a regular system for considering their implementation and follow-up. Auditing the performance of mandate holders will also be more effective if there are available and readable reports.

UN HUMAN RIGHTS APPARATUS

COI+10 affords an appropriate opportunity to review the COI report in the context of the UN’s human rights apparatus more generally. To what extent did the innovations in the procedures of the COI on Human Rights in the DPRK provide models that (a) have been followed in the HRC; or (b) should have been followed with or without variations? Inevitably, the immediate danger presented to the UN and international community by the DPRK’s development of nuclear weapons, the testing of such weapons, the development of further technology, and the risks of proliferation enliven international concern.

Concern about abuses of universal human rights is important, but human rights issues tend to be regarded as endemic and less urgent when it comes to international action. Given the existential danger of nuclear weapons, the case of North Korea continues to provide an urgent reminder of the inadequacy and weakness of current international institutions to protect global peace and security, to uphold universal human rights and existential values, and to achieve justice. This is the basic lesson from the experience of the COI on Human Rights in the DPRK. The present dangers revealed in the COI report and the urgency of the problems disclosed therein have not been matched by enhanced and effective responses by the UN and the international community.

PRAGMATISM, REALISM, AND OPTIMISM

Reflecting on the last 10 years, there are many reasons for pessimism—even despair and alarm. We should use the 10th anniversary of the COI to reflect on whether humanity may take encouragement by reflecting on the alternative. What would have happened if there had been no COI or no UN?

Since there is no immediate prospect of major changes to relevant international institutions, should we derive a measure of optimism about the present dangers to humanity that the world did its best? Does a practical and pragmatic approach support an optimistic perspective—that humanity usually muddles its way to survival and to accountability for crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes? How, if at all, can we build on the experience of the COI on Human Rights in the DPRK to provide enhanced international remedies for grave wrongdoings that comes to light? Or are we doomed to an inescapable failure of the international community to respond quickly enough and effectively enough to the dangers to humanity? And if so, what precisely can we do to enhance human rights, international peace and security, and the attainment of justice?

It would clearly be desirable for a report to be written about the engagements surrounding the 10th anniversary of the COI. This report should be followed by international dialogue and criticism. It should also be presented in an appropriate way to the UN Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the President of the UN HRC, civil society organisations, and national officials and experts.

Those who silently accept the defects in the current response to the existential dangers that humanity faces are themselves part of the problem that threatens the survival of the human species.

Edited for HRNK by Roberta Cohen, HRNK Co-Chair Emeritus

Read More

Categories: Human Rights, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, United Nations, United States