Otto Warmbier versus the Republic of Torture

By Robert Collins

As he announced the re-listing of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism on November 20, President Trump referred to the death of Otto Warmbier while in North Korean custody. The young Ohio native’s death was a tragedy, and just the latest occurrence of the unbelievable cruelty that human beings suffer at the hands of the Kim family regime. The parents of Otto were interviewed on national television about the arrival of their son from North Korea and the terrible condition he was in. Mr. Warmbier expressed how it was obvious to him that his son had been tortured due to the condition of his teeth and a severe cut on his foot.

When Otto arrived back home, doctors at the University of Cincinnati Medical Center could not determine the exact nature of the injuries that left Otto with “an extensive loss of brain tissue.” Following that, local coroners stated that they could not see decisive evidence or proof of torture. However, the human rights community is well informed on North Korea’s use of torture against those imprisoned by the regime’s party-state. Historically, tens of thousands of North Koreans have suffered the same fate as Otto–death at the hands of the regime’s security apparatus–as have other foreigners in decades past.

North Korea’s criminal justice system is guided by the Kim regime’s political ideology far more than criminal law. Regime founder Kim Il-sung and his son-successor Kim Jong-il publicly stated that the law exists to serve political purposes and those purposes are designed to serve the North’s supreme leader. Consequently, those who are accused of a political crime are automatically treated as an enemy of the state. The worst “enemies” are those that slander the personage or name of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, or Kim Jong-un. Otto allegedly tore down a propaganda poster praising Kim Jong-il. Under the Kim regime, such an act is regarded as a direct threat to the security of the supreme leader. In notorious North Korean practice, such a crime is punishable by the most draconian of methods, as evidenced by the regime’s slaughter for the past five and a half years of hundreds of ranking military, government, and Party cadre perceived as opposing or disrespecting Kim Jong-un. Hundreds of testimonies from North Korean defectors confirmed torture while imprisoned or being investigated.

For those arrested by the Kim regime’s security apparatus, torture begins immediately after arrest. The Ministry of People’s Security (MPS) is North Korea’s national police, and MPS officers are stationed at every level of North Korean society down to the village level. Unlike countries where the police conduct their mission according to law, MPS officers, as well as their counterparts in the Ministry of State Security (MSS), employ the Korean Workers’ Party’s (KWP) doctrinal “ten principles of monolithic ideology” (TPMI) as their base justification for arrest. Though North Korea has a criminal code delineating what constitutes a crime, the TPMI is used to judge the type, severity, and nature of the crime. Every North Korean is responsible for memorizing these principles in school, the workplace, and at home. Police officers, members of the other security services, and legal officials are evaluated weekly in a KWP format on their performance of duty in relation to the TPMI. Individual careers are forged through showing the chain of command thoroughness in vetting alleged, potential, and actual “criminals” through the prism of the TPMI.

After Otto was arrested, standard North Korean police practice would have handed him over from the Pyongyang Police Bureau to the MPS Pretrial Examination Bureau (PEB). MPS PEB officers are responsible for criminal investigations and for reporting the results of the investigations not only to the local prosecutor’s office, but also to their KWP representatives. The latter are those within the Party that judge the MPS PEB officers and their counterparts in the MSS PEB on their efficiency in protecting the supreme leader and the regime. PEB officers are notorious in North Korea for their ruthless investigative methods based on extracting confessions from the accused. As attested by numerous North Korean escapees, confessions are the “queen of evidence” and torture is employed systematically and ruthlessly to obtain such confessions. To succeed in their specific profession, each PEB officer must develop competency in torture to extract the confessions that prosecutors employ in criminal trials. Depending on the nature of the case, this torture continues during and even after the trial if the prisoner does not comply with instructions on behavior and obedience to directives. In the case of many arrested for political crimes, trials are bypassed and torture becomes part of the retribution and sentencing as the arrested are sent directly to political prison camps. PEB officers are professionally rewarded for their efficiency.

The type of torture Otto must have experienced is quite telling in terms of his likely resistance. The vast majority of foreigners succumb to the pressures and threats of torture early and comply with directives while in custody. However, resistance to the demands of the PEB officers and prosecutors–whether those demands be for propaganda purposes (which is the case most of the time) or actions in support of regime intent in foreign policy–will result in further and more specific torture.

This torture does not apply to all. Many foreigners who are arrested are handled for eventual release to suit a diplomatic purpose—but not all. Even as far back as the 1960s, Venezuelan Ali Lameda and Frenchman Jacques Sedillot served as translators in North Korea but were subsequently accused of being spies and imprisoned. They were tortured regularly and the latter died in Pyongyang. In 1982, Joseph White deserted from the U.S. Army’s 2nd Infantry Division and crossed the DMZ. He suspiciously ended up drowning in a North Korean river two years later.

Otto’s condition upon arrival in Cincinnati indicates that Otto resisted PEB officer demands. For the time period Otto was tortured, it is apparent that he bravely resisted the torturers face-to-face, thus the torture. The intensity of the torture should not be underestimated. The PEB officers likely miscalculated the intensity and impact of their torture on Otto in terms of what they thought they could get away with. Several forms of torture would not have left visible external trauma, including water-boarding, electrical shock, and physical confinement in small boxes.

Those who understand the functioning of the North Korean internal security system in detail will be able to tell that Otto likely displayed courage in the face of torture by the most brutal of modern regimes.

North Korea’s practice of torture of individuals in detention violates Articles 7 and 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which North Korea acceded to in 1981. Article 7 states, “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” while Article 10(1) states, “All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.” As part of two Universal Periodic Review cycles for North Korea to date, 19 recommendations by UN Member States to North Korea have explicitly addressed torture. These recommendations call for North Korea to accede to or ratify the Convention against Torture, take immediate steps to stop the use of torture and ill-treatment in all instances of deprivation of freedom, and grant the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Special Rapporteurs on Torture and Violence against Women access to its detention facilities.

Should change come to the Korean peninsula, MPS and MSS PEB officers who conduct this torture in North Korea must be held accountable under future transitional justice mechanisms. 

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Categories: DPRK, Human Rights, international relations, Kim Jong Un, Korea, Ministry of People's Security, Otto Warmbier, PEB, Pretrial Examination Bureau, Pyongyang, Republic of Torture, RobertCollins, Torture

The Challenge of Giving Thanks in North Korea

By Robert Collins

Recently, Melanie Kirkpatrick wrote an outstanding book on the history of Thanksgiving in America that examines our country’s Thanksgiving experience over the last four centuries. Thanksgiving: The Holiday at the Heart of the American Experience reminds us that those of us in the United States give thanks this holiday for the many things that make our country one of unparalleled freedom, bountiful opportunity, and relative comfort despite challenges all along the way. To enjoy these same blessings that most of us take for granted, about a million people continue to immigrate to America each year with many more waiting in line. In that vein, possession of well-protected human rights is not one of those blessings that we normally acknowledge with any specificity at the Thanksgiving table. However, for many in the world, there is a longing desire to be in a position where they could give thanks. Nowhere is that more true than in North Korea.

Both sides of the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) celebrate Thanksgiving where thanks are given in autumn for a bountiful harvest and blessings possessed. For South Koreans, they celebrated the Korean Thanksgiving called “Chuseok,” on September 15th in 2016. The holiday is always on the 15th day of the 8th month of the lunar calendar. Therefore, it slightly differs each year from the Gregorian (international standard) calendar. The holiday goes back to the Silla dynasty more than 1200 years ago. Originally called “hangawi” or “the great middle of autumn,” the holiday celebrates the autumn harvest, which is parallel to the American Thanksgiving celebrating harvest. A central tradition of “Chuseok” is the “charye,” where Koreans prepare a table of traditional foods and honor previous generations of their ancestors, frequently visiting their graves. These days, South Koreans increasingly observe a morning celebration in their homes, where traditional foods are laid out as symbolic representation of thanks to their ancestors.

Image of the "Chuseok" table. 
Photo Credit: Namwon030 (Own work) [CC BY-SA 3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons.

Above the DMZ, North Koreans celebrate Korean Thanksgiving in a very different manner and give thanks for blessings possessed in a vastly different dynamic than their South Korean counterparts. In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, North Koreans officially celebrate “Chuseok” by praising and memorializing the Kim Family—Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un, as well as Kim Il-sung’s parents and grandparents. In reality, North Koreans have little for which they can be thankful.

South Koreans have many things for which to count their blessings: being the world’s 15th largest economy and the observance of their civil rights, including freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom to elect one’s representatives, and freedom to protest peacefully. South Korea has fully developed democratic institutions that enable celebrations to be as the people wish. In sharp contrast, the 25 million North Koreans’ GDP per capita is ranked 197th at the bottom on the world scale. The national economy is deliberately designed by the Kim regime to not focus on food security for the people, but rather, focus on nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, the military in general, and, most importantly, anything that supports regime survival. On top of that, the Kim Regime prioritizes the nearly 3 million citizens of Pyongyang over all other North Korean population sectors in terms of food security and a host of other privileges. This leaves the remaining 22 million citizens to fend for themselves in an economy where personal food security efforts for all but the ruling class are based in limited, but sanctioned individual market booths, small 10m by 10m agricultural plots, and black market activity. 

Photo Credit: Associated Press/Wong Maye-E

The Kim regime’s highly politicized focus on cult-like worship of the Kim Family leaves little for the North Korean to celebrate. The deliberate denial of Korean traditions accentuates the Kim Regime’s complete denial of human rights. Brutality and Thanksgiving are two words that are normally not associated with each other. Unfortunately, in the case of North Korea and its human rights record, these two words are both regrettably appropriate. North Koreans cannot count sufficient food, competent healthcare, or adequate housing among their blessings. They cannot be thankful for protection under the law, comfort in religion, or freedom of choice. Their lives are filled with restrictions, limitations, and political terror. They can expect nothing from their government or leaders and instead, only rely upon themselves and, on occasion, their families—if the Party-state hasn’t invaded that as well. The attempt by the internal security services to subvert family relations for the sake of ensuring political reliability through reporting is deplorable.

Photo Credit: KCNA

The Kim regime’s oppressive rule and brutal treatment of its own people is unparalleled today. The North Korean regime’s policy of human rights denial suppresses even the freedom to give proper thanks on Chuseok/Thanksgiving. For us and our friends, allies, and partners in South Korea, this is one additional reason to give thanks to our forebears for being blessed to live in a democracy, and for the freedom to vote, assemble, debate, and demonstrate to ensure that our democracies remain vibrant and resilient. Perhaps most importantly, the holiday gives us pause to appreciate family and bountiful sustenance, two of the essential elements of thanks on this holiday.

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Categories: Chuseok, Democracy, DPRK, hrnkus, Human Rights, KimJongUn, North Korea, RobertCollins, ROK, South Korea, Thanksgiving

Kim Jong-un’s Hats: the Concept of Authority in North Korea

By Robert Collins

Photo credit: KCNA/Reuters

Numerous political and military leaders around the world hold simultaneously different positions of authority, each with specific powers of execution. For example, the President of the United States is also the Commander-in-Chief of the United States military. Most national leaders throughout the world hold similar authorities. Another example is the Commander of United States Forces Korea who also serves as the Commander of the United Nations Command, Commander of the Republic of Korea—United States Combined Forces Command, and the senior U.S. military officer assigned to Korea. Each of these positions holds specific authorities that enable him to make specific military decisions during armistice and crisis situations on the Korean peninsula.

North Korea’s Kim Jong-un is no different. Kim wears several “hats”—or holds several positions of authority—that enable him to command the challenging, albeit ruthless, issues that come with being a totalitarian dictator. Each hat serves Kim in a specific manner that enables him to maintain his grip on power, policy, and decisions, however stable or unstable his power consolidation may be. The following are Kim’s specific “hats,” each with powers based in the party charter of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), state authority, including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Constitution, or political ideology:

1. Supreme Leader of North Korea.

Political power in North Korea is centered in the “suryong.”[1]

Best translated as “supreme leader,” the suryong concept was initially based on party ideology first developed in 1967 by Kim Il-sung’s younger brother, Kim Yong-ju, and promulgated later by Kim Jong-il. Through the Ten Great Principles of Monolithic Ideology, the suryong/supreme leader concept has been utilized by the regime to demand from every North Korean citizen the study of, and obeisance to, the ten principles. As a consequence, the concept of supreme leader is how every North Korean understands leadership in the North. These principles are inculcated into every North Korean from government minister and military five-star to kids in kindergarten—no exceptions, nobody. It is through these ten principles and the concept of the suryong that human rights denial is vigorously pursued by the regime under the supervision of the KWP Organization and Guidance Department (OGD). 

Furthermore, at the 4th Session of the 13th Supreme People’s Assembly in June 2016, the DPRK Constitution was amended to designate Kim Jong-un specifically as the supreme leader (최고영도자),[2] thus officially making him the legal, as well as ideological leader, of the entire Korean population living in the North and related party, state, military, economic, and social organizations. It should also be noted that the KWP Charter starts out by stating the KWP is the party of “suryong Kim Il-sung.”[3] 

2. Chairman, Korean Workers’ Party (KWP).

The KWP Charter was amended at the 7th Party Congress in May 2016 to state the “KWP Chairman is its supreme leader who represents the party and leads the whole party."[4] Through this authority, Kim Jong-un oversees all party functions within every geographical and functional area of North Korea and its society down to party cells at the most remote villages in North Korea and the most distant enterprise or embassy overseas. It is the ultimate political organizational authority that enables Kim to hold other party positions and to supervise party control of the government, the economy, and the military. The DPRK Constitution states: “the Democratic People's Republic of Korea conducts all activities under the leadership of the Workers' Party of Korea.”[5] By extension, the party chairman oversees that designated conduct. Furthermore, the 7th Party Congress amended the KWP leader’s title from First-Secretary to “KWP Chairman,” thus assuming the party title that Kim Il-sung used from 1946 to 1966.[6] 

3. Director, KWP Organization and Guidance Department (OGD).

Kim Jong-il was appointed to this position in 1973 by Kim Il-sung to succeed Kim Yong-ju. Kim Jong-il rebuilt this department to channel the entire party’s reporting and personnel evaluation systems under his personal control and never gave up the post, even after becoming the KWP General Secretary in 1997, and held it until his death in December 2011. Why? The reason is Kim Jong-il turned the OGD into the clearing house for all policy vetting and senior official assessments based on OGD-led daily political evaluations and police surveillance. Anybody who is somebody in North Korea is there because the OGD has vetted them, and in return, the OGD is respected and, most of all, feared. One cannot be a military flag officer, a government minister, an economic advisor, or a senior party cadre unless the OGD has vetted that person for the supreme leader’s approval. No policy recommendation crosses Kim Jong-un’s desk unless it goes through the KWP OGD for verification to be in line with Kim’s guidance. The OGD is the singular most politically influential organization in the Kim regime and serves as center mass for control of the entire party-state. It does not control the guns of the military or security services, but it controls each and every one of those organizations’ leaders.

There have been scattered reports that Kim Jong-un’s aunt, Kim Kyong-hui, and/or his sister, Kim Yo-jong, has taken over as the OGD Director, but there is no substantiation or confirmation of such reports. Indeed, the reason Kim Jong-il kept the position even after gaining the ultimate party position is that he could not trust another person with so much power. Until North’s Korea’s state or party media publishes the assignment of another person as the OGD Director, we must assume Kim Jong-un is doing the same as his father, i.e. maintaining North Korean leadership control close to his chest through the directorship of the KWP OGD.

4. Supreme Commander, Korean People’s Army (KPA).

This position commands all strategic and operational aspects and decisions of the North Korean military. The position of KPA Supreme Commander came about through “strong recommendations” from Soviet Union leader Stalin in return for Soviet support for Kim Il-sung’s war effort in 1950. Subsequently, the KWP appointed Kim Il-sung as KPA supreme commander in July 1950, soon after the war started.[7] Kim Jong-il became supreme commander in 1993, and Kim Jong-un in December 2011. Through an expanded meeting of the KWP Politburo, this was the first title conferred on Kim Jong-un after his father’s death, thus demonstrating the importance of the position within the regime in controlling the military.

The KPA Supreme Commander oversees three reporting chains, a system Kim Jong-il put in place in the 1970’s to ensure maximum control over KPA leaders. The three chains are the standard commander-to-commander chain; the General Political Bureau chain whereby the political officer[8] at every level of command from battalion to the KPA General Staff, as well as frontline companies, reports independently from the commander; and the Military Security Command officer[9] who separately parallels the chain of the political officer (see rendition of this command and control system above).

It should be noted that Kim holds the military rank of Marshal of the Republic (국가원수). This is the highest military rank in the KPA today. Kim Il-sung held the rank of Generalissimo (대원수), and the only one to do so. There is a lesser rank of Marshal of the KPA (인민군 원수) for a handful of former anti-Japanese partisans who supported Kim Il-sung, but that is a different and subordinate designation.

5. Member, Standing Committee, KWP Politburo.

The mission of the KWP Politburo is to organize and direct all party work on behalf of the party's Central Committee between plenary meetings. From this position, Kim Jong-un leads all policy deliberations for national directions and goals. Under Kim Jong-il, Politburo meetings were not held at all as Kim Jong-il made all decisions on his own. But Kim Jong-un has demonstrated an interest in holding such meetings, the most memorable being the arrest of his uncle, Jang Song-taek, as distinctly displayed in the North Korean media.

6. Chairman, KWP Executive Policy Bureau.

At the 7th KWP Congress in May of 2016, the KWP Secretariat was replaced by the KWP Executive Policy Bureau. Kim Jong-un was designated chairman and former party secretaries were re-designated vice-chairmen. From this position, Kim Jong-un supervises all policy implementation within the party-state. The KWP Executive Policy Bureau ensures the supreme leader's guidance is carried out through direct political supervision of DPRK government functions and procedures.

7. Chairman, KWP Central Military Committee.

From this position, Kim Jong-un oversees all military policy consultation, deliberation, and decisions that impact the North Korean military, whether military, government, economic, or social. It is this position that is most critical to crisis decision-making. During Kim Jong-il’s rule, he did not hold meetings of the KWP Central Military Committee, making all decisions based on forwarded recommendations from military leaders and agencies/commands.

8. Chairman, DPRK State Affairs Commission.

On June 29, 2016, the 4th Session of the 13th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) amended the DPRK’s socialist constitution to establish the DPRK State Affairs Commission, thus replacing the authority of the National Defense Commission.[10] Kim Jong-un was designated by the SPA as the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission. From this position, Kim Jong-un oversees state implementation of party decisions on all programs and projects in every field of North Korean society.

Kim Jong-un also holds two other positions: membership in the KWP Central Committee and in the DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly.[11] 

The former position is within the KWP senior membership organization that carries out no direct decision-making processes but is designated as the organization that oversees all party affairs. In reality, it is the “good-old-boys club.” The latter position holds no decision-making authority, only voting authority in what is a rubber-stamp legislative body blindly subservient to party direction.

Though it may be the least known title understood by the Western world, there is no title more effective at imprinting upon the North Korean populace the supreme leadership other than the title “suryong.” However, respect for Kim as the suryong has proven to be far less than that of his father and grandfather. If there is a weakness within the leadership identification system, one has to look no further than that.

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[1] For a detailed discussion on the suryong (supreme leader), see Robert Collins, Pyongyang Republic: North Korea’s Capital of Human Rights Denial (Washington, D.C.; Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2016), pp.18-21.

[2] Lee Sang-hyun, “北 개정헌법 살펴보니…'최고영도자' 김정은 권력집중에 초점 (Looking at the North’s Revised Constitution…”Supreme Leader” Kim Jong-un Focuses on Consolidating Power),” Yonhap News, June 30, 2016, http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2016/06/30/0200000000AKR20160630057551014.HTML.

[3] Korean Workers’ Party Charter, 2010, http://world.moleg.go.kr/KP/law/24980?astSeq=580.

[4] Kim Soo-yeon, “N.K. adopts decision to elect its leader as ruling party's chairman,” Yonhap News, May 10, 2016, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2016/05/10/95/0401000000AEN20160510001551315F.html.

[5] See http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/kn00000_.html.

[6] After 1966, Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il used the title “General Secretary.” See http://en.paperblog.com/power-organizations-after-7th-party-congress-1472350/.

[7] Torkunov, A. 2000. The War in Korea 1950-1953: Its Origins, Bloodshed, and Conclusion. Tokyo: ICE Publishers; see also Ko Jae-hong, 북한군 최고사령관 위상 연구 (Studies on the Status of the North Korean Military’s Supreme Commander) (Seoul: Korean Institute of National Unification, Policy Studies No. 06-07, 2006); pp. 37-38.

[8] See Lee Tae-kun, 북한군 총정치국 (North Korean Military’s General Political Bureau) in Chun Yun-jun, et al, 북한의 군사 (North Korea’s Military) (Seoul: Kyongin Munhwa Publishing, 2006), pp.169-205.

[9] Yoon Kyu-sik, Understanding the Korean People’s Army: the Military Security Command, Republic of Korea Army Administration College, accessed June 28, 2010, http://kookbang.dema.mil.kr/kdd/CultureTypeView.jsp?writeDate=20080324&writeDateChk=20070712&menuCd=2004&menuSeq=36&kindSeq=1&menuCnt=30917.

[10] This does not mean that the National Defense Commission has been disbanded. 

[11] Kim Song-hun, “김정은, 北헌법 바꿔 국무위원장 추대 (Kim Jong-un, North Korea Change Constitution, Appoint Kim as Chairman, State Affairs Commission),” Maekyung News, June 30, 2016, http://news.mk.co.kr/newsRead.php?no=468243&year=2016.

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Categories: DPRK, hats, HRNK, hrnkus, humanrights, international affairs, KimJongUn, Korea, KWP, Leadership, North Korea, power consolidation, RobertCollins, SPA, Suryong

Doubling Down on Human Rights Denial at North Korea’s 7th Party Congress

By Robert Collins, HRNK Senior Advisor and Author

When one evaluates North Korea’s Workers’ Party (KWP) 7th Congress, it is apparent that the Kim Regime completely rejected the findings and recommendations of the 2014 Report of the UN Commission of Inquiry on human rights in the DPRK as well as subsequent UN Human Rights Council and General Assembly resolutions. Major shifts in the 7th Party Congress’ organizational structures and the personnel staffed by North Korean elites within those structures indicate that Kim Jong-un and his Kim family regime have no intention of improving human rights for the North Korean people. The 7th Party Congress themes—projected policy lines, Party reorganization, and new elite appointments—all bolster the regime’s ability to enforce its draconian policy of human rights denial by changing nothing in that socio-political dynamic. Indeed, Kim Jong-un’s focus at the 7th Party Congress was on securing his power base and economic programs that support regime objectives,[1] which significantly, if not primarily, focus on North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.[2] This comes as little surprise to most and is even expected by those who pay close attention to the regime’s policy of human rights denial and its implementation practices. While there are those who are optimistic about improvements in North Korea’s human rights environment,[3] we are frankly left with mere hope; however, as the saying goes, “hope is not a strategy.”

The two concepts of human rights and weapons of mass destruction stand in stark contrast in terms of regime focus and resource allocation. Kim Jong-un emphasized that Party-led national priorities would focus on economic development and the North Korean nuclear program in his speeches at the 7th Party Congress, thus ensuring the continued conflict between nuclear weapons and human rights as well as impacting the diplomatic priorities of nation-states and international organizations that try to deal with both. As long as this conflict dynamic continues, each North Korean will suffer from deprivation of state support and Party-state denial of the principles enunciated in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Indeed, Kim Jong-un admitted as much in his full report of the 7th Party Congress, where he stated, “our people, though they are not well-off …”[4]

Accordingly, the recent sanctions against North Korea by the U.S. Department of the Treasury are welcome indeed. Following the release of the U.S. Department of State’s most recent Human Rights Report, the U.S. Department of the Treasury ’s Office of Foreign Assets Control initiated sanctions against 11 personnel (all KWP members even though not all of them work in Party posts) and five organizations, including the KWP Organization and Guidance Department (OGD), the Ministry of Public Security (national police) and its prison bureau, and the Ministry of State Security (also known as the State Security Department or SSD) and its prison bureau. The most significant sanction was against the ruler of the regime himself, Kim Jong-un.[5], [6] Such actions are the best way to ensure the international community’s efforts will be most effective along with the physical sanctions.

Amanda Mortwedt Oh of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea recently did a superb job detailing how the North Korean human rights situation has proceeded under Kim Jong-un: the suppression continues—if it has not increased—and the international community is taking more actions, such as the U.S. sanctions mentioned above.[7] Those concerned with this issue would do well to read it.

As expected, the regime’s reaction was vitriolic and threatening. Han Song-ryol, Director-General of the U.S. Affairs Department at North Korea's Foreign Ministry, insisted that "the United States has crossed the red line in our showdown," and "we regard this thrice-cursed crime as a declaration of war."[8] However, the 7th Party Congress was all about Kim Jong-un. The strategy that Kim and his subordinates employed was to control the attendance at the Congress and thus, the participation in voting—not to mention the requisite cheering and clapping in response to Kim’s speeches. This control would eliminate any opposition from the beginning. The reorganization and re-staffing were, by specific design, to strengthen Kim Jong-un’s leadership at the top of the regime. To ensure the success of these moves, the KWP OGD (one of the organizations sanctioned by the U.S.) and its sub-elements—provincial, city, and county levels under each local Party committee’s organization secretary—politically vetted each and every delegate to ensure that only the most loyal Party members participated in the 7th Party Congress and its delegate selection process.[9]

Furthermore, the 7th Party Congress Implementation Committee—those responsible for oversight of the Congress and its proceedings—was made up of long-time regime supporters:

1. Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) Standing Committee Chairman Kim Yong-nam
2.  General Political Bureau (GPB) Director, Vice-Marshal Hwang Pyong-so
3. Premier Pak Pong-ju
4. KWP Vice-Chairman Choi Ryong-hae
5. KWP Vice-Chairman Kim Ki-nam
6. KWP Vice-Chairman Choi Tae-bok
7. Minister of People’s Armed Forces Pak Yong-sik
8. Korean People’s Army (KPA) Chief of General Staff General Ri Myong-su
9. SPA Standing Committee Vice-Chairman Yang Hyong-sop
10. National Defense Commission (NDC) Vice-Chairman Vice Marshal Ri Yong-mu
11. NDC Vice-Chairman General O Kuk-ryol
12. SSD Director General Kim Won-hong
13. KWP Vice-Chairman and KWP Finance Department Director Kwak Bom-ki
14. Hamgyeong North Province KWP Party Chairman O Su-yong
15. KWP Vice-Chairman and KWP Cadre Department Director Kim Pyong-hae
16. KWP Vice-chairman and Director of the KWP United Front Department Kim Yong-chol
17. Minister of People’s Security Choi Bu-il
18. Vice-Premier No Du-chol
19. OGD First Vice-Director Cho Yon-jun
20. SPA Standing Committee Honorary Vice-Chairman Choi Yong-rim
21. KWP Vice-Chairman Ri Su-yong
22. Vice-Premier and former Chagang Province KWP Committee Chairman Kim Dok-hun
23. Vice-Premier Kim Yong-jin
24. Vice-Premier Ri Mu-yong
25. Vice-Premier Ri Chol-man
26. KWP Workers’ Organization Department Director Ri Il-hwan
27. KWP Military Industries Department Director Ri Man-gon
28. Former KWP Light Industries Department Director An Jong-su
29. KWP Science and Education Department Director Choi Sang-gon
30. KWP Military Department Director Ri Yong-nae
31. KWP History Research Center Director Kim Jong-im
32. Former Rodong Shinmun Editor Kim Jung-yop
33. KWP First Vice-Director Kim Man-song
34. Former Pyongan South Province Party Committee Chairman Hong In-bom
35. Former KWP Military Industries Department Director Pak Do-chun
36. OGD First Vice-Director Ri Pyong-chol
37. Former KWP Military Industries Department Director Chu Kyu-chang
38. Second Economic Committee Chairman Cho Chun-yong[10]

Every one of these individuals is from the core of the Party elite and has profited enormously from their loyalty to the regime, and from service to the Party and its policies, including human rights denial.

Kim Jong-un’s consolidation of authority goes even further. According to South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, 129 (54.9%) of the Central Committee's 235 members and candidate members were replaced during the 7th Party Congress,[11] implying that Kim has placed a new set of supporters in the regime’s core positions. If any of those newly appointed personnel had any thoughts of recommending changes to the regime’s policy of human rights denial, they would not have even been considered for appointment to the regime’s core political group. This was undoubtedly one of the reasons why the KWP OGD vetted every attendee. The major shifts in organization and personnel indicate that Kim Jong-un has no intention of improving human rights for any North Koreans, ordinary citizens and select elites alike.

By the time the 7th Party Congress was held in May 2016, the KWP membership stood at 3,467,000 or 13%[12] of the population, including 200,000 candidate members.[13] A total of 1,387 members, including 315 women, participated in the Congress at the April 25th Cultural Hall and there were 200 speakers led by Kim Jong-un,[14] SPA Presidium leader Kim Yong-nam, and GPB Director Hwang Pyong-so. Participating in one form or another at the Congress were 1,545 political workers; 719 military personnel; 423 state administrators; 52 workers’ organizational representatives; and 112 scientists, health specialists, culture and arts representatives, and publishing personnel. One representative for every 1,000 Party members participated in the 7th Party Congress.[15]

Following the 7th Party Congress, Kim Jong-un redoubled his moves to solidify his hold on power at the 4th Session of the 13th SPA. Changes were made to the state constitution, but there were no changes that improved the human rights situation for the North Korean people. The primary change to the state’s constitution was that of Kim Jong-un’s official title becoming “Supreme Leader.” In doing so, Kim has guaranteed that there will be no changes to the regime’s policy of human rights denial because the concept of Supreme Leader is based on North Korean ideology, and is perpetuated and implemented through observance at every level of society for every North Korean through the Ten Great Principles of Monolithic Ideology. This doctrine, which serves as the North’s true constitution, obligates all citizens to sacrifice themselves in every aspect for the Supreme Leader, eliminating human rights as a consideration.

Indeed, if there was ever an opportunity to change policy on human rights in North Korea, it would have been at a time when changes were made to the constitution. But that opportunity was surely missed, or likely never considered. Regrettably, there were no judges, lawyers, or prosecutors appointed to any positions in the new leadership structures either at the 7th Party Congress or the 4th Session of the 13th SPA. There were no human rights observers, pro-Pyongyang or otherwise, invited to either meeting.

Furthermore, it should be noted that all policy change proposals must be processed through the KWP OGD.[16] The tight control exhibited by the OGD during the 7th Party Congress indicates that there was no intent whatsoever to initiate changes. When will the human rights situation in North Korea improve? Certainly, based on evidence and precedent accumulated over the past four and a half years, improvement would be difficult during the reign of Kim Jong-un. Unfortunately, the regime’s policy of human rights denial is likely to get worse before it gets better.

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[1] Michael Madden, “Deciphering the 7th Party Congress: A Teaser for Greater Change?” 38 North.org, May 20, 2016. URL: http://38north.org/2016/05/mmadden052016/.

[2] Kim Sooyeon, “N. Korea's party adopts decision on nukes at key congress,” Yonhap News, May 9, 2016. URL: http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2016/05/09/56/0401000000AEN20160509001200315F.html.

[3] Lee Jung-Hoon and Joe Phillips, “Drawing the Line: Combating Atrocities in North Korea,” Washington Quarterly, 39:2, pp. 61–77. URL: https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Summer2016_Lee-Phillips.pdf.

[4] Michael Madden, “KJU Full Report to 7^th Party Congress,” NK Leadership Watch, June 21, 2016. URL: https://nkleadershipwatch.wordpress.com/2016/06/21/kju-full-report-to-7th-party-congress/

[5] “Report on Human Rights Abuses and Censorship in North Korea,” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, July 6, 2016. URL: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/259366.htm.

[6] “Treasury Sanctions North Korean Senior Officials and Entities Associated with Human Rights Abuses,” U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Center, July 6, 2016. URL: https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0506.aspx.

[7] Amada Mortwedt Oh, “The Human Rights Factor: Changes Under Kim Jong-un,” HRNK Insider, August 15, 2106. URL: http://www.hrnkinsider.org/2016/08/the-human-rights-factor-changes-under.html.

[8] Eric Talmadge, “5 Points from AP Interview with N. Korean Diplomat,” New York Times via Associated Press, July 29, 2016. URL: http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2016/07/29/world/asia/ap-as-nkorea-tensions-5-things.html?_r=0.

[9] Michael Madden, “Conferences Held to Elect Delegates to 7^th Party Congress and Provincial Party Meetings,” North Korea Leadership Watch, April 16, 2016. URL:  https://nkleadershipwatch.wordpress.com/2016/04/16/conferences-held-to-elect-delegates-to-7th-party-congress-and-provincial-party-meetings/.

[10] Cho Jong-hun, “양복입은 김정은 전체인구 약13%가 당원 (Kim Jong-un in Western Suit: 13% of the Population are Party Members),” Tongil News, May 7, 2016. URL: http://www.tongilnews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=116535.

[11] “Recent N. Korean congress replaces over half of party’s central committee,” Yonhap News Agency, May 13, 2016. URL: http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2016/05/13/0200000000AEN20160513008000315.html.

[12] In comparison, the Chinese Communist Party membership makes up about 6% of the population.

[13] Cho Jong-hun, “양복입은 김정은 전체인구 약13%가 당원 (Kim Jong-un in Western Suit: 13% of the Population are Party Members),” Tongil News, May 7, 2016. URL: http://www.tongilnews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=116535.

[14] April 25, 1932 is the day that North Korea celebrates the establishment of the KPA with respect to the beginning of Kim Il-sung and the anti-Japanese partisans’ efforts against Japan’s colonial government in Korea. The KPA Foundation day was formerly February 8^th and the hall was named the February 8^th Cultural Hall at its founding in October 1975. The hall property covers 124,000 square meters. The seven-story hall itself is about 80,000 square meters and houses a 6,000-seat viewing hall, a 1,100-seat theater, and a 600-seat movie theater. The 6^th Party Congress of October 1980 was also held there.

[15] Cho Jong-hun, “양복입은 김정은 전체인구 약13%가 당원 (Kim Jong-un in Western Suit…13% of the Population are Party Members),” Tongil News, May 7, 2016. URL: http://www.tongilnews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=116535.

[16] Hyun Seong-il, 북한의 국가전략과 파워 엘리트: 간부정책을 중심으로 (North Korea’s National Security Strategy and Power Elite: Focus on Cadre Policy) (Seoul: Sonin Publishing, 2007), p.400-403.

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Categories: HRNK, hrnkus, humanrights, KimJongUn, Korea, KWP, North Korea, NorthKorea, OGD, RobertCollins, ROK, South Korea

An HRNK Interview with Robert Collins, Author of "Pyongyang Republic: North Korea's Capital of Human Rights Denial"

Please click here to view the video. 

Q1: What was your motivation to be a leader on North Korean human rights?

Robert Collins: When I decided to retire from the army six years ago, I felt that my knowledge could be useful in writing materials that would contribute to an overall understanding of how North Korea makes its decision and to how they carry out their policies. And so, since retirement, I’ve just continued with what the army taught me to do over those decades at the end of the 20th century and doing it unilaterally. And now I’m doing it in support of HRNK.

Q2: What do you think is the relationship between human rights issues and security concerns for the U.S. – R.O.K. relationship regarding North Korea?

Robert Collins: The deplorable human rights condition of North Korea has a direct impact on their military. They have a million man army that can’t be composed of everybody in the country that is on the positive side of the political classification system—songbun. Many, if not close to half, are recruits—those that receive a denial of human rights through their entire life because they have been classified, socially and politically, as enemies of the state. Therefore, they have grown up with inadequate food, poor education, poor housing, and the opportunities that they receive in the military are very, very limited. Those in the lower songbun classifications can’t become officers. The few that do can’t go past the company grade. And even up until a few years ago, many of the individuals in the North Korean military that were regarded as low songbun—low trust on the political scale—weren’t even allowed to carry weapons because they didn’t trust them.

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Categories: analysis, committeehrnk, crimes against humanity, defector, dictatorship, DPRK, HRNK, hrnkus, humanrights, Kaesong, KIC, KimJongUn, military, NK, OGD, RobertCollins, southkorea

Training North Korea’s Supreme Leader

By Robert Collins 

How does one train a “supreme leader”—especially a young and inexperienced one—on how to handle crisis when any mention of his mistakes may lead to the notorious termination of the trainer by anti-aircraft gun? Difficult question, to be sure, but an even more difficult process. After all, North Korea had never gone to any external crisis of this depth under the short reign of Kim Jong-un, the North’s hereditary First Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, and Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army. Now it has.

During the past two weeks, the two Koreas have once again put on shows of military force in responses and counter-responses to the North’s planting of landmines in the Demilitarized Zone that maimed two young South Korean soldiers. The South’s response was to resume loudspeaker broadcasts across the DMZ, designed to attack and undermine the legitimacy of the regime. Essentially, these types of South Korean propaganda targeting the North’s leadership drive that same leadership up the proverbial wall. A series of kinetic responses and counter-responses elevated a provocation into a crisis requiring raises in military alerts, shows of great force on both sides and, finally, face-to-face negotiations at Panmunjom in the DMZ.

So how much “training the trainer” went into planning for these actions? Driven by fear for their lives, North Korea’s generals and admirals must couch their recommendations on courses of action within the cocoon of absolute and bellicose loyalty to the supreme leader. Most likely, they must parse their requests and answers in strategy deliberations in such a manner that makes any suggestion by Kim Jong-un appear to be sheer tactical brilliance reminiscent of Sun Tzu, Napoleon, or, even better for North Koreans, of the much celebrated greatness of the supreme leader’s grandfather, Kim Il-sung.

This loyalty demanded by the North’s incessantly inculcated ideology has definitively negative by-products that have the world’s attention—impetuous purges and executions of senior leaders, human rights denial, political prison camps; imprisoning up to 120,000 inmates; and resource de-prioritization for any individual North Korean perceived by the regime as not faithfully serving the interests of the supreme leader.  

When North Korea and South Korea held talks at Panmunjom beginning on August 22 to defuse this most recent crisis, it was a meeting of two sides whose characteristics are dramatically different. Not only are the two political systems antithetical, but their social and ideological values are antithetical as well. The backgrounds of the four South and North Korean participating delegates are polar opposites, both politically and militarily. Their backgrounds clearly indicate that the South is at the negotiating table because it values the safety of its citizens and the North is at the talks because it values the “face,” i.e. the reputation of its supreme leader over everything else.

How so? The intent and values of the South are self-evident. Democratic societies look to preservation and safety of their nation-state above all else, as essential in safeguarding the human security of their citizens. The presence of President Park’s National Security Adviser, Kim Kwan-jin, and her Minister of Unification, Hong Yong-pyo, demonstrates that resolving this crisis focused on the security of the South. Kim Kwan-jin is a lifelong military man who has commanded army units from the company-level up through field army and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, followed by a stint as the Minister of National Defense. Hong Yong-pyo serves as the leader of the government agency dedicated to finding peaceful means of unification. However, on the North’s side, there are polar opposites. The one man in the group who wore a military uniform with a military rank of vice-marshal (5-star) was the North’s Hwang Byong-so. Oddly enough, he is not truly a military man. He is a lifelong political commissar who has worked for the Korean Workers’ Party his whole life. He has never commanded a battalion, a regiment, a division, a corps, or a field army… ever. His job has always been to monitor North Korea’s military officers to ensure their loyalty to the supreme leader and the party as well as their compliance with all aspects of North Korean ideology. Hwang’s function has always been to ensure that those officers that supposedly fail to meet that standard are purged from the military ranks. In the first three and a half years of his rule, Kim Jong-un has gone through four Chiefs of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army and six Ministers of People’s Armed Forces. The other North Korean negotiator, Kim Yang-gon, heads the party’s United Front Department, tasked to foment South Korean social and political instability by employing a “toolkit,” including espionage, sabotage, propaganda and even inter-Korean dialogue.  

The final agreement by the four to end the crisis was a statement of regret (the same language Kim Il-sung used after the DMZ axe murders in 1976) from the North concerning the landmine incident and the end of the South’s propaganda broadcasts across the DMZ. As the profiles of the four negotiators indicate, while South Korea’s concern was the security of its soldiers, North Korea’s concern was the security and reputation of its supreme leader.  

In the long run, training the supreme leader may have created a larger mutated political logic in the mind of the Supreme Commander of 1.2 million soldiers armed with nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Future trainers—at least those who survive the purges—will deal with a supreme leader who thinks he now knows it all. Decision-making within the North’s national security structure will likely lose some operational and strategic agility due to his hubris. To emphasize this, Kim Jong-un will likely demonstrate his leadership through internal propaganda claims of having made the Republic of Korea-United States alliance “stand down.”  

One of the outcomes of this crisis is that it will work toward consolidating Kim Jong-un’s power, at least in the young leader’s mind. Surely, it is still possible for an individual or a group of senior officials to fall on their sword after using it on the young, impetuous leader. But for the time being, the outcome of the crisis also enables the continued suppression of the North Korean people, including denial of the most basic of human rights and political prison camp internment of those perceived as disloyal. Another outcome of the crisis is the continued threat to the security of 51 million South Korean citizens, not to mention the threat of nuclear war.

The North’s military trainers may have made themselves look good in the eyes of the supreme leader for now, but the next time he may be the one “training the trainers” on further threats to the people of both North and South Korea.

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Categories: analysis, committeehrnk, conflict, dictatorship, HRNK, hrnkus, humanrights, KimJongUn, KWP, military, NK, nonprofit, NorthKorea, RobertCollins, training, WashingtonDC

Lenin’s Theory of Utility

By Robert Collins

The concept of manipulating others to promote one’s own cause is no doubt millennia old.  It is not an original thought by Lenin.  Those that employed this concept likely existed in the ancient Egyptian dynasties, the Roman Empire and most other political realms, as well as Lenin’s establishment of the communist domain.  Utility is a fascinating concept that somewhat defies logical description – support for an external cause through belief that one’s vision of right will prevail though it contradicts political reality.

Lenin’s theory of utility is based in those that find benefit and comfort from others who are willing to deceive themselves about another’s intent in order to comfort themselves in their view of the world.   To feel good about one’s contribution to a false premise is indeed comforting if one chooses to either ignore reality or choose not to accept political discomfort.  In one recent case, choosing to support the values of human rights denial versus support for the defense of democracy and human rights based upon one’s observation that “I talked to them and they seemed real and sincere” is to ignore human dignity and succumb to the propaganda of deception.

When Code Pink and WomenCrossDMZ visited North Korea they did so without having an appreciation for Lenin’s theory.  The fact that these women met and conversed with North Korean women was apparently, in their minds, a major victory for human rights if one believes their testimony once they crossed the DMZ.  Women of note from among those that crossed praised their opportunity to speak to North Korean leaders and agree that the term “human rights” was included in their statement.  Was there utility for the North Koreans to agree to do so?

Within the context of North Korea’s propaganda-dominated diplomacy, the answer would most certainly be yes.  To be sure, Lenin would have been proud to include it in a statement that had no impact on the reality of his rule.  The same goes for the Kim Family Regime. The North Korean woman who talked to a representative of Code Pink or WomenCrossDMZ was surely not so fortunate to be so self-deceived.  The North Korean woman, or group of women, whom the DMZ crossers so eloquently praised was prepped to say what the party-state wanted them to say – to the last syllable.  That woman has been indoctrinated since she was in pre-school on how to think, what to say, and how to obey the party.  She met her first official propagandist at the age of seven and listened to that person present how the United States was evil to the core and South Korea was merely puppets in the hands of Washington, DC.  Her parents were compelled to listen to the propaganda put out by the education director at every level, the neighborhood unit chief in every local community, and the individual work-line propagandist who gave verbal feedback to everything they admitted during daily and/or weekly self-critique sessions. She has been compelled throughout her lifetime to do the same as her parents. She studied how North Korea’s supreme leader was always right and all had to worship him and do his bidding by serving the wishes of the Korean Workers’ Party.  And yes, that they had to comply with the collective and do so through self-reliance.  But self-reliance in North Korea is more akin to survival in an environment of unparalleled political terror, rather than self-motivation. Even if she had learned that what she heard was absurd – and it is – the secret police prepped her for every meeting and debriefed her on every word that was said.  Every meeting that the Code Pink/WomenCrossDMZ had with individual North Koreans was planned, rehearsed and vetted before it took place. Every North Korean engager of the Code Pink/WomenCrossDMZ was required to report what they heard from every North Korean in their small team, not to mention that based on the secret police’s well-known tactics, there were several undercover secret police female officers within the group as well.

What benefit is there for the Kim Regime in doing this?  The party and the police state control “the happening” and learn how to do a better job with those that serve Lenin’s Theory of Utility by developing such sub-theorems as Kim Jong-un’s Theorem on Manipulating Western Naiveté, or secret police commander General Kim Won-hung’s Theorem on Personal Deception.

How do we know of this propaganda, deception and the employment of the utility theory?  Every one of the 27,000 North Korean defectors to South Korea has told us as much – in great detail.  Their testimony of human rights denial, political terror, and mental and physical brutality are legion.  Every one of them understands Lenin’s Theory of Utility.  Apparently, such theories are beyond the understanding or at least the appreciation of Code Pink/WomenCrossDMZ.  Useful? You bet…just ask the 27,000.

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Categories: analysis, dictatorship, DMZ, DPRK, HRNK, hrnkus, humanrights, KimJongUn, KoreanWar, lenin, manipulation, NK, nonprofit, NorthKorea, RobertCollins, southkorea, theoryofutility