HRNK Advisory Opinion to His Excellency Tomoya Obokata

Submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, regarding contemporary forms of slavery affecting currently and formerly incarcerated people

April 12, 2024

Over ten years ago, in February 2014, the UN Commission of Inquiry (UN COI) reported that the DPRK was responsible for crimes against humanity. The gravity, scale, and nature of the DPRK’s violations of human rights reveal a state that has no parallel in the contemporary world. The DPRK’s systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations are thoroughly documented, including its imposition of arbitrary detention, arbitrary death penalties, political prison camps, slave labor, the absolute monopoly of information released to the public, and total control of all organized social life under the hierarchical system of songbun. Under Kim Jong-un’s rule, the scale and scope of these violations have continued to worsen and intensify.

Contemporary forms of slavery in North Korean detention facilities represent a grave and systematic violation of human rights. In these facilities, detainees, including political prisoners, are subjected to forced labor.

 

Please provide the details of labor programme(s) implemented in your country for incarcerated individuals, including:

Types of work performed.

Detainees work in mining, under dangerous conditions. Detainees are forced to work in agriculture involving strenuous labor, regardless of the detainee's physical condition or age. Detainees work in logging, typically in harsh weather conditions without adequate clothing or safety equipment. Detainees work in textile production, producing goods that may enter international markets despite sanctions.^[i]

Detention facilities often assign harsh conditions to detainees without considering their age, gender, or health condition, leading to injuries, illnesses, and deaths.^[ii] Political detainees may be subjected to even harsher treatment. Hundreds of thousands of individuals are held in a network of camps. Many of them are subjected to forced labor.^[iii]

Further evidence on forced labor from escapee testimonies can be found in the HRNK and No Chain report “An Investigation into the Human Rights Situation in North Korea’s Political Prison Camps: Testimonies of Detainee Families”.^[iv]

c) Working environment/conditions, including wages and any deduction for incarceration costs, working hours, and provisions for health & safety.

The working environment in North Korean detention facilities is harsh and dangerous, lacking basic health and safety measures.^[v]

Detainees are often unpaid for their labor, with nominal wages often deducted to cover incarceration costs.^[vi] Detainees work for 10-12 hours per day, seven days a week, with minimal rest.^[vii] This, combined with insufficient nutrition and rest, negatively impacts their physical and mental health.^[viii] Health and safety provisions are non-existent, and injuries or illnesses often go untreated, leading to numerous deaths.^[ix]

Is there evidence of labour practices which may amount to exploitation? If so, please provide details.

Some of the abuses include excessive working hours. Another type of abuse includes no or extremely low pay. In addition, detainees work in an unhealthy or dangerous working environment. Conditions in North Korean detention facilities are unsanitary and hazardous. Detainees work in dangerous environments, leading to injuries and health complications. Furthermore, they face discriminatory treatments where certain groups of individuals, such as political prisoners and all those deemed to be disloyal to the regime, are subjected to even harsher treatment and forced labor practices. Finally, there is a lack of access to medical facilities.^[x]

Is there evidence of sexual exploitation among incarcerated individuals? If so, please provide details.

Many camp orders are conducted in secret.^[xi] Despite stringent information control, escapee testimonies, reports by human rights organizations, and investigations conducted by international bodies have provided insight into the grim reality faced by inmates, which involves modern forms of slavery, including sexual exploitation (sometimes referred to as sexual slavery).^[xii]

Sexual exploitation and abuse in North Korean detention facilities, particularly targeting female prisoners, is widespread. Escapees report rape, forced abortion, and sexual assault, often used as torture and control methods.^[xiii] Male guards and officials abuse their power, targeting political prisoners, women suspected of having illegally crossed the border, and those detained for petty crimes.^[xiv]

Are victims of labor and sexual exploitation able to seek justice and remedies? Please provide details, including legislative frameworks and complaint mechanisms.

On paper, DPRK laws prohibit forced labor. The DPRK Constitution includes articles on the dignity and rights of citizens, and the country is a signatory to several international human rights treaties. However, in practice, the government does not uphold these laws, especially within detention facilities. The legal system is opaque and subordinated to the dictates of the ruling Korean Workers' Party.

There is virtually no avenue for victims to seek justice or remedies within the DPRK. The judicial system lacks independence, and there is no mechanism for detainees to file complaints or challenge abuses.^[xv]

Victims of labor and sexual exploitation in North Korean detention facilities are caught in a grim situation with no available mechanisms for seeking justice or remedies. The international community continues to struggle with effective strategies to address these human rights abuses, given the geopolitical complexities and the DPRK's self-imposed isolation.

What are the main challenges in eliminating labour and sexual exploitation among incarcerated individuals, and what recommendations would you make to address them effectively?

Despite the veil of secrecy surrounding the country's penal system, escapee testimonies and satellite imagery have provided the international community with glimpses into the dire conditions faced by incarcerated individuals. The DPRK executes a deliberate policy of human rights denial.

The international community should increase pressure through targeted sanctions and hold the government accountable. Supporting North Korean escapees and running advocacy campaigns can help mitigate abusive government control and encourage reform. Educating North Koreans about their rights and the outside world can also help create and enhance awareness of international human rights standards.

Does your government provide tailored support to formerly incarcerated individuals which effectively meets their needs? Please provide details particularly in relation to access to temporary/long term accommodation, education/training, decent work, finance and pension, and other essential services.

The United States provides assistance to refugees and asylum-seekers including North Koreans, to rebuild their lives.^[xvi] However, the effectiveness of this support can vary based on resources, individual circumstances, and local community capacity. Challenges including cultural adjustment and language barriers can also impact resettlement experiences.

What is the role of other stakeholders, including educational institutions, jobs/training centres, housing providers, businesses/employers’ organisations, financial institutions, trade unions and civil society organisations, in providing support to formally incarcerated individuals? Does your government actively coordinate or cooperate with them?

Individuals who escape from the DPRK, including former detainees, face challenges ranging from psychological trauma to the need for basic necessities and integration into a new society.

Educational institutions, job centers, housing providers, businesses, financial institutions, trade unions, and CSOs are all crucial. Educational programs, language training, vocational training, housing solutions, inclusive workplace environments, financial literacy programs, and legal assistance are essential in ensuring the rights and fair treatment of North Korean escapees.

CSOs including HRNK^[xvii] and various other stakeholders often provide direct support and advocacy work to help individuals and raise awareness about human rights abuses in the DPRK.

What are ongoing challenges in promoting successful economic and social reintegration to formally incarcerated individuals in your country, which may include discrimination (including intersecting forms based on age, gender identity/sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, indigenous, migration, socio-economic and other status), corruption, lack of opportunities and support?

After escaping from the country, former North Korean detainees face challenges including lack of opportunity and inadequate support systems as well as age and socio-economic status discrimination.

What recommendations would you make to overcome the existing obstacles and prevent formally incarcerated individuals from being subjected to labour and sexual exploitation?

The situation of detainees in North Korean detention facilities remains deeply concerning, drawing attention from international human rights organizations and governments worldwide. The available reports indicate severe conditions, including forced labor, torture, inadequate food, and medical neglect, leading to high mortality rates.^[xviii]

To address these issues and protect both current and former detainees from exploitation, we respectfully put forth the following recommendations:

1. International Pressure and Sanctions: Continue and intensify international pressure on the North Korean government to adhere to international human rights standards, using targeted sanctions against individuals and entities responsible for human rights abuses.
2. Engagement and Dialogue: Encourage diplomatic dialogue that includes human rights as a core component, alongside denuclearization and security concerns. Leverage diplomatic channels to press for the closure of camps and the release of political prisoners.
3. Support for Escapees: Enhance support for North Korean escapees who can provide firsthand accounts of the conditions within detention facilities. Support should include protection, rehabilitation services, and platforms to share their experiences on the global stage.
4. Use of Technology: Increase the use of satellite imagery analysis and other means to monitor detention centers and gather evidence of human rights abuses.
5. Humanitarian Aid: Ensure that humanitarian aid, when possible, is conditioned on improvements in human rights, prioritizes vulnerable groups including people in detention, and is not diverted by the regime. Aid should be designed to minimize the risk of bolstering the capacities of the regime to continue its repressive practices. Access and transparency are of the essence.
6. Awareness and Advocacy: Support international and regional human rights organizations in their efforts to raise awareness about the conditions in North Korean detention facilities. Promote campaigns that advocate for the rights of current and former detainees.
7. Legal Mechanisms: Explore legal avenues to hold North Korean leaders accountable for crimes against humanity, including labor and sexual exploitation, through international courts, tribunals, or other accountability mechanisms.

The challenges in addressing the human rights abuses in North Korean detention facilities are significant, particularly given the closed and authoritarian nature of the regime. However, sustained international focus, combined with a strategic mix of pressure and engagement, can create conditions for change and provide some level of protection for those who have suffered in these facilities.

Thank you very much for your kind consideration.

 

^[i] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Greg Scarlatoiu and Raymond Ha, “North Korea’s Political Prison Camp, Kwan-li-so No. 25, Update 4” and European Parliament, Parliamentary Question, “Forced Labor in North Korea,” April 2, Parliamentary question | Forced labour in North Korea | E-004134/2014 | European Parliament (europa.eu).

^[ii] The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) & the International Bar Association (IBA), “Report: Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers,” March 2022, https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Report%20Findings%20Inquiry%20on%20Crimes%20Against%20Humanity.pd.f and European Parliament, Parliamentary Question, “Forced Labor in North Korea”.

^[iii] Amnesty International, “Images Reveal the Scale of North Korea Political Prison Camps,” May 2011, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2011/05/images-reveal-scale-north-korean-political-prison-camps/.

^[iv] The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) and No Chain, “An Investigation into the Human Rights Situation in North Korea’s Political Prison Camps: Testimonies of Detainee Families,” 2018, https://www.hrnk.org/publications/hrnk-publications.php?page=3.

^[v] U.S. Department of State, “2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: North Korea”.

^[vi] HRNK & IBA, “Report: Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers.”

^[vii] Ibid.

^[viii]  HRNK & IBA, “Report: Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers.”

^[ix] Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2024: North Korea, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/north-korea.

^[x] HRNK & IBA, “Report: Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers.”

^[xi] The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) and No Chain, “An Investigation into the Human Rights Situation in North Korea’s Political Prison Camps: Testimonies of Detainee Families”.

^[xii] HRNK & IBA, “Report: Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers.”f and Anti-Slavery International, “Forced Labor in North Korean Prison Camps,” December 2007, https://www.antislavery.org/reports/forced-labour-in-north-korean-prison-camps/.

^[xiii] The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) and No Chain, “An Investigation into the Human Rights Situation in North Korea’s Political Prison Camps: Testimonies of Detainee Families”.

^[xiv] HRNK & IBA, “Report: Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers.”

^[xv] Ibid.

^[xvi] The Bush Institute, “U.S.-Based North Korean Refugees,” https://gwbcenter.imgix.net/Resources/gwb_north_korea_executive_summary_r4.pdf.

^[xvii] See HRNK’s policy recommendations to the U.S. government: https://www.hrnk.org/publications/policy-recommendations.php.

^[xviii] The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) and No Chain, “An Investigation into the Human Rights Situation in North Korea’s Political Prison Camps: Testimonies of Detainee Families”.

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Categories: North Korea, United Nations

North Korean Forced Labor in the U.S. Seafood Supply Chain

By Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director

October 27, 2023

Note: On October 24, 2023, HRNK Executive Director Greg Scarlatoiu was invited to testify before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) for a hearing on the subject of forced labor in the U.S. seafood supply chain. The following text reflects his remarks during the hearing, as prepared for delivery. The full text of his written submission to the CECC can be viewed at this link.

Chairman Smith, Chairman Merkley, distinguished Commissioners, I wish to begin by thanking you for inviting me to testify today. The official dispatch of North Korean workers to China’s seafood processing plants is a breach of applicable UN Security Council Sanctions, international human rights instruments, and most importantly of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).

Mindful of CAATSA provisions relating to Sanctions for Forced Labor and Slavery Overseas of North Koreans, HRNK has made a preliminary determination as to whether the working conditions these workers face are subject to Section 302(b) of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9241 (b)). We further endeavored to identify Chinese entities that employ North Korean laborers, with the aim of determining if such entities and individuals in charge meet the criteria under Section 111 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7108). 
 
Until their repatriation began on August 23 or August 29, there were thousands of North Korean workers officially dispatched to Chinese seafood processing factories. In many cases, these workers processed seafood imported from North Korea. The importation of seafood processed by North Korean workers in China, seafood exported from North Korea to China, or a combination of both, into the United States would constitute a blatant violation of CAATSA.
 
Three major seafood processing companies have historically employed North Korean labor and have exported their products to the United States.^[1] Witnesses mentioned the presence of at least three seafood processing factories that employ North Korean workers in Donggang (東港), Dandong City.
 
 
Have Chinese Factories Processed Seafood Imported from North Korea?
 
North Korean seafood exported to China from Najin Port is primarily transported overland by vehicles, through Chinese customs.^[2] It is then distributed and sold in China's Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, Liaoning Province, or flown to inland cities including Beijing. Seafood processed in Hunchun is exported as frozen or dried seafood to the United States, Europe, Japan, and other countries.^[3] The main North Korean seafood products transported inland in this manner include various species of squid, croaker, snow crab, hair crab, and blue crab.^[4] 
 
North Korean workers process fish caught seasonally, such as cod and pollock as well as clam during clam season. They also process octopus and shellfish, packaged as Chinese export products. There are reported instances of processed seafood marked “Made in China” being shipped out to Vladivostok, where labels are switched to “Made in Russia” and exported to third countries.
 
 
North Korean Workers in Chinese Seafood Processing Plants: 

International Legal Implications
 
The employment of North Korean workers in Chinese seafood processing plants and labor standards violations may contravene the ILO’s Forced Labor Convention (No. 29) and the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention (No. 105), other ILO conventions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (also known as the Palermo Protocol).
 
The North Korean seafood processing workers face:
 
1.  Inhumane Working Conditions: Long working hours, denial of proper rest and breaks, harsh treatment, and minimal safety measures, posing a risk to their physical and mental well-being.
 
2.  Lack of Freedom and Communication: They are often isolated, facing limited contact with the outside world and their families. They are unable to exercise their right to freedom of movement and communication. 
 
3.  Absence of Labor Rights: Such rights, including the right to unionize and engage in collective bargaining, are nonexistent.
 
 
Living and Working Conditions for North Korean Overseas Workers
 
North Korean workers covet overseas positions, as the average monthly remittance of $70 (500 Chinese yuan) is dramatically higher than the $3-dollar average monthly industrial wage in North Korea.^[5] The average bribe paid to be dispatched overseas is $2,000 - $3,000. The workers must borrow the funds from money lenders and pay it back with interest.^[6] The workers are lured with false promises and subsequently entrapped under abysmal working conditions.
 
Wage violations through compulsory “contributions” extracted by the North Korean authorities, unpaid overtime, precarious safety, and health conditions are widespread. 
 
The workers must moonlight for other companies to pay back their loans, with the approval of three site supervisors (party, security agency, technical manager), who must also be bribed. Including moonlighting, a North Korean seafood processing worker in China may make up to about $210 a month. (1,500 Chinese yuan).
 
The North Korean workers' monthly wages are paid upon their repatriation, in North Korean currency, at the official exchange rate. 
 
During the COVID-19 quarantine, the workers received no wages, and the interest on loans increased, reportedly leading to about thirty suicides, most of them women.
 
The Chinese companies pay the North Korean regime mostly based on production volume. The payment is made in Chinese currency. 
 
Men mainly carry frozen fish blocks, and women sit down and peel fish or squid or sort clams and crabs by size. Most of the North Koreans work the whole day in cold storage. Additionally, the pungent smell inside is unbearable. 
 
North Korean workers at the Chinese seafood processing plants usually work about 10 hours a day. If production targets are not met, the workday can extend to over 12 hours. 
 
 
Recommendations
 
The witness respectfully recommends the following:

Continue to encourage civil society groups with relevant networks to continue investigating conditions of work at Chinese seafood processing factories and whether products processed by North Koreans may end up on the U.S. market.

Propose that new findings on violations affecting North Koreans at such factories be included in the Annual Report on Trafficking in Persons, required under Section 110(B) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 707(B)).

Seek to determine whether the government of China has made any serious and sustained efforts to eliminate severe forms of trafficking in persons, as they relate to the official dispatching of North Korean workers to Chinese seafood processing plants.

Seek to confirm whether seafood exported from China to the United States contains North Korean seafood products, and whether North Korean workers officially dispatched to China processed seafood exported from China to the United States. If confirmed, such products would have to be denied entry at any of the U.S. ports, pursuant to a prohibition under Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307).


The witness wishes to thank HRNK team members Ingyu Choe, Mohona Ganguly, Doohyun (Jake) Kim, and Damian Reddy, as well as Jung Gwang-il, Ko Young-hwan, Lee Hyun-seung and Ri Jong-ho for their invaluable contributions to research, translation, direct testimony, and securing testimony by key witnesses in China and North Korea.

^[1] Tim Sullivan, Martha Mendoza, and Hyung-Jin Kim, “NKorean Workers Prep Seafood Going to US Stores, Restaurants,” AP News, August 21, 2021. https://apnews.com/article/sports-middle-east-canada-europe-global-trade-8b493b7df6e147e98d19f3abb5ca090a.
^[2] Baek Seong-ho, “North Korea’s Seafood Production and Exports” [in Korean], KITA Inter-Korean Trade Report vol. 7 (2020). https://www.kita.net/cmmrcInfo/internationalTradeStudies/researchReport/northKoreaTradeReportDetail.do?pageIndex=1&no=13&classification=19&searchReqType=detail&pcRadio=19&searchClassification=19&searchStartDate=&searchEndDate=&searchCondition=CONTENT&searchKeyword=&continent_nm=&continent_cd=&country_nm=&country_cd=&sector_nm=&sector_cd=&itemCd_nm=&itemCd_cd=&searchOpenYn=.
^[3] Ibid.
^[4] Ibid.
^[5] Interview with North Korean escapee, October 8, 2023.
^[6] Interview with North Korean escapee, October 9, 2023.

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Categories: China, Forced Labor, Human Rights, North Korea, Seafood, United States

A Window of Opportunity: Addressing the Human Rights-Security Nexus in North Korea

By Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director

October 13, 2023

Photo Credit: travelview - stock.adobe.com

The following essay is adapted from virtual remarks delivered to an event hosted by HRNK Canada in Ottawa on September 28, 2023. The text has been updated to reflect recent developments. 

I gained an interest in North Korean human rights because I was born and raised in communist Romania, the one communist country in Eastern Europe that was closest to North Korea. Nicolae Ceaușescu and Kim Il-sung were very close friends as well. I was on the streets in December 1989 when the Ceaușescu regime fell. I was 19 years old and a first-year student at Bucharest University majoring in English language and literature. More than a thousand of my peers, members of the same generation, died in the streets. I was old enough to be a part of that.
 
I then took exams for overseas scholarships and became the first Romanian ever to study in South Korea. I went to South Korea and received one year of language training, as well as a BA and MA, from Seoul National University. I worked in media broadcasting in South Korea for a few years. Then, I went to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts, and in 2002 I relocated with my family to Washington, D.C., where I worked in international development for six years. After working at the Korea Economic Institute for three years, I have been executive director of the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) since July 2011.
 
This is a very personal issue to me. Ceaușescu wanted to turn Romania into the North Korea of Eastern Europe. Then I spent ten years on a divided Korean Peninsula while studying, working, and living in South Korea. Initially, I thought like many others that North Korea would collapse because communism had collapsed in so many other places, in Eastern Europe in particular. But then during the days of the Great Famine, the days of the gonan-ui haenggun (Arduous March), I came to the realization that this was an entirely different situation. That is when I acquired this interest in North Korean human rights, which was almost 30 years ago.

 

North Korean Human Rights: An Overview

 
North Korea is a party to multiple international instruments: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as a UN member state; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities. North Korea has a constitution that includes, amazingly, human rights as well, including freedom of religion and freedom of expression. And yet, each and every human right is violated in North Korea.
 
The worst human rights violations happen at North Korea’s detention facilities, including its kwan-li-so political prison camps, kyo-hwa-so reeducation-through-labor camps, and also at short-term detention facilities. If they are short-term, it does not mean that human rights violations do not happen there. We conducted a study with the International Bar Association and a law firm, Debevoise & Plimpton, on short-term detention facilities. This investigation concluded that there are “reasonable grounds” to believe that crimes against humanity are occurring at short-term detention facilities also. Egregious human rights violations, especially perpetrated against women forcibly repatriated from China, happen at these facilities.
 
We have identified several trends under Kim Jong-un through satellite imagery analysis and North Korean escapee testimony. Number one, some detention facilities that were close to the border with China have been shut down and detainees were moved inland. Detention facilities inland have expanded. Camp 25 is one such example. Second, women have taken the brunt of human rights abuse. During and after the Arduous March, the gonan-ui haenggun, women assumed primary responsibility for the survival of their families. They are the ones who go to the jangmadang, the market; the nongmin sijang, the farmers’ market; or the amsijang, the black market. They are the main market agents. They are the ones who are arrested and punished, sometimes tortured or imprisoned, for perceived wrongdoing at the markets.
 
Women also often cross the border into China without official approval. The goal is to end up in a third country and then in South Korea or other countries. They are in search of economic opportunity. We have a serious problem with China when it comes to North Korean refugees. China is a party to the 1951 Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees and the 1967 additional protocol. These North Korean refugees in China, eighty percent of whom are women, are returned to North Korea, where they are tortured, imprisoned, and sometimes killed. We have had terrible reports of forced abortions performed on women with children of Chinese men—infanticide. People of religious faith are particularly in danger. 
 
According to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, if individuals return to a place where they face a credible fear of persecution, they qualify to have access to the process leading to acquiring political refugee status. There are at least 2,000 North Korean refugees in detention in China awaiting forcible repatriation now that North Korea is gradually opening its borders post-COVID, and there are reports from reliable sources that some of these refugees may already have been sent back to North Korea. There are many human rights groups that are doing their best to prevent the forcible repatriation of North Korean refugees.

 

The Human Rights-Security Nexus

 
The February 2014 report of the UN Commission of Inquiry on human rights in North Korea recommended the referral of the North Korean regime and its leadership to the International Criminal Court (ICC). North Korea is not a party to the 2002 Rome Statute that established the ICC, so it would take a referral by the UN Security Council.
 
The UN Security Council is deeply divided. There are the status quo powers amongst the five permanent (P5) members of the Security Council: the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. On the other hand, there are the revisionist powers, Russia and China. We all know the abomination of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and the tremendous human suffering that this invasion has caused in Ukraine. A veto by a P5 member can block the referral, and it is practically certain that China or Russia would veto the referral of the North Korean case to the ICC.
 
If we look at recent history, there have been special tribunals such as the ICTY—the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Rwanda was another precedent. In each case, it required a resolution of the UN Security Council. Even if it is difficult, it does not mean we should give up. We should press for the referral. Every time China vetoes an attempt to refer Kim Jong-un to the ICC, it paints itself into a corner as a P5 member that aids and abets a regime that commits crimes against humanity. I think that the role of civil society is very important here. Civil society is very creative. Many of us have tried a lot of different ways and means, including mock trials. I think eventually that creative solutions will come from civil society.
 
North Korea’s human rights violations and crimes against humanity threaten international peace and security. There is a clear security-human rights nexus. Why? For two main reasons. Reason number one: the North Korean regime oppresses and exploits its own people at home and abroad to procure the resources it needs to develop its nuclear program. Reason number two: what the United States, Canada, and the international community want is CVID—complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization. How can one have CVID if there is no access to the political prison camps? One camp in particular comes to mind. Camp 16 is very close to the nuclear test facilities at Punggye-ri. We are just about to publish a very interesting report that establishes a connection between the two facilities.
 
North Korean human rights violations threaten international peace and security because they are instrumentalized by the Kim regime to procure the resources it needs to develop its nuclear program. Since the regime does not admit to the existence of these camps, there is also the possibility of concealing equipment, for example. CVID is impossible without access to the political prison camps.

 

The North Korean Human Rights Act in the United States

 
We have a problem with the North Korean Human Rights Act in the United States. It has not been reauthorized yet. S. 4216 was introduced by Congresswoman Young Kim on the House side and by Senator Marco Rubio on the Senate side. It has not passed so far, and it is very unlikely that it will pass by the end of this month. The new reauthorized version would authorize the appropriation of $10 million each year. Initially, it was from 2023 to 2027. We hope the reauthorization will pass. It will probably be 2024 to 2028, $10 million each year for ongoing programs managed by the U.S. State Department, USAID, and the U.S. Agency for Global Media to improve access to information in North Korea, to promote democracy and human rights, and provide humanitarian assistance to North Korean refugees.
 
What is my assessment of the bill so far? In terms of documentation of North Korean human rights abuses supported by the U.S. State Department—the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor in particular—and the National Endowment for Democracy, the record is positive. We know much more about the North Korean human rights situation through the efforts of such agencies and organizations.
 
In the information field, there are groups that have been quite successful. There is a North Korean information firewall. Eventually, that information firewall will fall. Things were very difficult under COVID. North Korea cracked down very hard on information coming in from the outside world, those attempting to distribute such information, and those attempting to access such information. It is a difficult environment, and now we have a gradual opening of the border. We will see what impact that has on information.
 
In terms of the refugee element, we have not done too well. The number of North Korean refugees that have resettled in the United States after requesting asylum is very low, just about 240. There are many factors behind this. The U.S. debriefing process takes longer than the South Korean debriefing process. On the other hand, throughout their lives, they have been taught that the United States is the greatest enemy of Korea, and it is very difficult to get over this psychological obstacle.
 
In South Korea, the same language is spoken, and there are resettlement allowances and vocational training. The system is not perfect, but the people and the government have tried hard to assist North Korean refugees. Many of them have had trouble. It is a very different society, after all. This tells us that there is a need for information enhancing the understanding of the United States and what the United States stands for as we approach North Korean refugees who are in transit in third countries.
 

The North Korean Human Rights Act in South Korea

 
South Korea has enacted a North Korean Human Rights Act of its own, but it has not been fully implemented. The problem is with the Human Rights Foundation because of disagreement between the two sides of the aisle. This foundation has not become operational yet. To deal with this issue, the previous unification minister, Minister Kwon Young-se, established a Human Rights Promotion Committee with fifteen outstanding individuals with expertise in North Korean human rights.
 
There is disagreement over the board membership of the foundation. This is the fundamental issue. According to the law, the unification minister is tasked with nominating two candidates for the board of directors. The ruling party and the opposition parties are charged with nominating five candidates each. Due to disagreement between the two main political parties, no one has been appointed to the foundation’s inaugural board in the past seven years.
 
If you ask me whether there will be some movement and positive change here, the elections next April will likely be a decisive factor in the operation of the Human Rights Foundation. The unfortunate thing is that human rights is being politicized. Human rights in general and human rights in North Korea should not be politicized in democratic countries, such as the United States, Canada, or South Korea.
 

Human Rights Up Front: A Window of Opportunity

 
Canada has been a great champion of human rights in general and human rights in North Korea in particular. I think that the establishment of a Canadian special envoy for North Korean human rights would be a very important step. Coordination will be very important moving ahead. There could be political shifts in South Korea a couple of years from now, so we have a very narrow window of opportunity to coordinate on and address North Korean human rights.
 
President Joe Biden, President Yoon Suk-yeol, and Prime Minister Kishida had a very good meeting at Camp David. They mentioned human rights, but it is not necessarily an area where there is a coherent strategy. The promoters of North Korean human rights on the international scene and at the UN—the United States, South Korea, the European Union, Canada, and Japan—can definitely achieve even better coordination if Canada passes a North Korean human rights act, and in particular if it creates a special envoy position.
 
The United States passed a North Korean Human Rights Act in 2004, and others—including South Korea—have passed such acts also. Human rights violations in North Korea will continue unless these laws become part of a coherent “human rights up front” policy that elevates human rights to a position comparable to that of political, security, and military issues. For more than 30 years, human rights has been sacrificed on the altar of political, military, and security issues. As I mentioned earlier, there is a clear security-human rights nexus when it comes to North Korea. Without addressing human rights, it is impossible to resolve the security issues.

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Categories: Human Rights, North Korea, North Korean Human Rights Act, South Korea, United States