Showing posts with label Juche. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Juche. Show all posts

February 18, 2021

Anti-Leaflet Law in South Korea & Freedom of Expression in North Korea

[Policy Report from the Office of Tae Yong-ho]
January 5, 2021

Tae Yong-ho, Member of the National Assembly

(the People Power Party)


<Table of contents>

Introduction


1. The Constitution of the Republic of Korea and the Amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act (“Anti-Leaflet Law”)


Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea

Enactment Process of the Anti-Leaflet Law

Freedom of Expression vs. Lives and Safety of South Korean Residents in the Border


2. The Legal Problems with the Anti-Leaflet Law

Laws on Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation

The Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act

Criticism from the International Community

Government Stance on the Criticism from the International Community


3. The Reality of the Right to Freedom of Expression in North Korea

North Korean Legal Structure

Compulsory Political Activities

Juche Ideology of North Korea

Religious Policy of North Korea

State Control on Outside Information


4. Recent Changes in North Korea

Active Flea Markets

Korean Wave (Hallyu) in North Korea

Adoption of Law on Rejecting Reactionary Ideology and Culture


Conclusion


Introduction

I am honored to have been given an opportunity to serve my country, the Republic of Korea, as a member of the National Assembly. However, just four years ago, I was North Korea’s former deputy ambassador to the United Kingdom. But in 2016, I defected to South Korea with my family in search of freedom, leaving behind all privileges rendered to me. But the turning point in my life did not just happen overnight. My perspectives on the world have been shaped by the time I had spent traveling between Pyongyang and various European capitals every three to four years as a North Korean diplomat. Years of living abroad have completely transformed my belief in the North Korean system and eventually influenced my decision to defect to the South, one of the most flourishing democracies in the world.

In fact, it was the elite education in North Korea that first opened my eyes to the outside world. In my teens, I was lucky enough to attend a foreign language school in Pyongyang, usually reserved for the children of the country’s elite ruling class, where we were even shown American cinema. Enthralled, I remember humming Edelweiss from The Sound of Music created by U.S. imperialists, our sworn enemies. It was a tiny opening that eventually led to my family’s flight to freedom during my posting in London in 2016 following in the von Trapp family’s footsteps.

The leaflets flown north in balloons from the inter-Korean border area have likewise been an invaluable source of information for those trapped behind the Juche curtain. Having learnt about the Kim Jong-Un regime’s opulence and its self-serving diversion of resources into weapons of mass destruction over the welfare of its people, some vote with their feet by escaping a life of oppression in North Korea; others elect to stay but remain aware that there are alternatives.

Pyongyang knows this too. Perhaps that is why it has been apoplectic about leaflets even by North Korean standards. On October 10, 2014, North Korean forces opened fire on balloons carrying leaflets. In June 2020, Pyongyang threatened military action for South Korea’s failure to ban leafleting.

North Korea has made a series of threats against the sending of leaflets along border. The newly amended provisions of the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Law, colloquially known as the “anti-leaflet law,” goes far beyond in its banned items and geographic scope. The South Korean authorities have belatedly suggested issuing legally dubious “interpretive guideline” to narrow the application, but they have been silent about revising the law. The government also likes to cite inter-Korean agreements to end leafleting but they do not cover activities by private citizens or groups.

Nor do I share the government’s expectation that the anti-leaflet law will “contribute to the improvement of inter-Korean relations and promotion of peace on the Korean Peninsula”. Instead, bending over backwards to appease totalitarian rulers may embolden them to ask for more as Hitler did after the 1938 Munich agreement. What assurance is there that Pyongyang would not promise reprisals for sending of Bibles or South Korean movies through China?

I am deeply grateful to the South Korean people for warmly welcoming my family, guaranteeing my life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and giving me the privilege and honor of representing my electors. None of the “people’s deputies” in North Korea would dare to speak against a government bill let alone filibuster it.

The North Korean people are entitled to the same freedoms that I have enjoyed for the past four years here and its realization will be the surest guarantee of human rights and democracy, peace and prosperity in South Korea in the long term. As Martin Luther King Jr. wrote, “injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”

That is why I ask your support to stand with human rights defenders in speaking up against the anti-leaflet law and protecting freedom of expression in North and South Korea before it comes into force on 30 March 2021.

This special report on the anti-leaflet law has been prepared to aid your understanding of several legal issues surrounding the amendment in light of the Constitution and international law and of brutal reality of freedom of expression in North Korea. The report concludes that the anti-leaflet law is extremely problematic for three fundamental reasons. First, it undermines democracy by restricting freedom of information in North Korea. Second, the law suppresses human rights and religious freedom. Third, it also restricts freedom of expression, a fundamental right protected by the Constitution of South Korea.

The Republic of Korea is one of the extremely rare countries among the colonized that achieved both industrialization and democracy. It is the law of nature that water flows from high to low points. The same could be said about the two Koreas. It is the law of nature that North Korean citizens, oppressed under the authoritarian rule of Kim Jong-un, accept free and democratic values of the South. The freer and democratic North Korea becomes, the sooner peaceful unification will arrive in the Korean peninsula.

I will continue to fight against all attempts to blind North Korean people to the truth. I sincerely hope that you will join me in this important endeavor.

January 5, 2021

Tae Yong-ho, Member of the National Assembly (the People Power Party)


1. The Constitution of the Republic of Korea and the Amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act (“Anti-Leaflet Law”)

Article 4, Constitution of the Republic of Korea


Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea reads that “the Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the basic free and democratic order.” As stated in the Constitution, the North Korea policy, therefore, should be based on the two pillars of ‘free and democratic order and peace,’ because after all, the most important duty of the President is to defend the Constitution.

If the Constitution seeks to establish peaceful unification, North Korean people should be given more opportunities to learn about democracy and build ethnic affinity with fellow South Koreans. The decision to voluntarily give up soft power that has earned the hearts of the North Korean people, specifically through the South Korean cultural wave (Hallyu), will only serve to undermine the constitutional pillar of ‘the basic free and democratic order.’

The Enactment Process of the Anti-Leaflet Law


The psychological warfare between the two Koreas first began during the Korean War. The government-led distribution of leaflets halted when Kim Dae Jung administration agreed to halt the activity to meet a precondition for the June 15th Inter-Korean summit. Kim’s successor, former President Roh Moo-hyun followed suit and agreed in 2004 to stop propaganda activities along the inter-Korean border and to remove all tools and means that facilitate such activities. Government-mandated ban on the sending of leaflets led to a rise of civilian-led launching of leaflets.

In the Panmunjom Declaration signed on April 27, 2018, President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong-un agreed to cease all hostile acts against each other in order to defuse acute military tensions that had built up. Such acts included the loud-speaker broadcasting and scattering of leaflets in the areas along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL).

In fact, the distribution of leaflets by civilians contributes to promoting the rights to know of the North Korean people. The downside is that it could cause inter-Korean tension. For instance, on Oct 10, 2014, the North Korean army fired some 10 bullets with anti-aircraft guns at balloons carrying leaflets launched in Yeoncheon County, to which the South Korean military responded with return fire. Whenever North Korea ramped up its threat, past South Korean administrations responded with either prohibiting the launching of leaflets with police force or attempting to dissuade civic groups from sending leaflets at all. However, each time the government made such attempt, it received fierce criticism from the public, mainly because no legal basis existed to ban leaflet-launching activities. The government ban on the sending of leaflets would have violated freedom of expression, a fundamental right protected by the Constitution.

There have been eight motions to amend the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act from years between 2008 and 2018 which aimed to prohibit the launching of leaflets to North Korea. However, all motions received criticism and were later discarded on the ground that they violated the basic right protected by the Constitution.

What changed the dynamics was when Kim Yo-jong, the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, demanded that the South Korean government make laws to ban the sending of leaflets by activist groups consisting of defectors. Since her statement on June 4, 2020, the legislative process to enact the anti-leaflet law progressed rapidly. She threatened to shut a joint liaison office and factory town in the border town of Kaesong or discard the inter-Korean comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA), if the South Korean government failed to take necessary action.

In response to Kim Yo-jong’s demand, South Korean Ministry of Unification quickly held a press briefing and announced that all activities that endanger the lives and property of residents living in the border should be prohibited and that it was preparing to take steps to improve current legislation that can fundamentally correct the situation, signaling that it would hastily enact the anti-leaflet law in order to completely ban the leaflet drop.

Both the South Korean public and international community denounced the anti-leaflet bill, calling it ‘legislation made under the single order of Kim Yo-jong’ and ‘legislation that guards authoritarian Kim Jong-un.’ They demanded the government retract its decision to pursue the legislative process. For example, Tomás Ojea Quintana, United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea, advised the two Koreas to work together to resolve the leaflet issue, while Signe Poulsen, head of the Seoul office of the UN Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights, commented that the sending of leaflets is an activity intended to deliver information to North Korean citizens and thus a form of individual freedom of expression.

However, despite North Korea’s demolishing of a joint liaison office in Kaesong on June 16, the government introduced a bill to the general meeting of the Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee of the National Assembly on August 3. On September 22, a South Korean civil servant from the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries was killed by North Korean soldiers while on duty, and his body was incinerated. Although the South Korean government did not even receive an assurance from Pyongyang that North Korea would take action to punish the perpetrators and prevent similar cases from occurring again, South Korea did not participate in the joint committee for the adoption of resolution on situation of human rights at UN General Assembly. On December 2, the anti-leaflet law passed with majority voting for the bill. What happened was that the super-majority of the ruling Democratic Party forcibly passed the bill, disregarding and breaking a conventional rule of passing the bill only with an agreement between the ruling and opposition parties in a Foreign Affairs and Unification subcommittee a day before the vote.

The anti-leaflet law passed the vote in the general meeting of the National Assembly on December 14. The bill was then debated and deliberated (Dec 22), approved by the President (Dec 24), promulgated (Dec 29), and is set to take effect three months after promulgation, resulting in the birth of unjust law that outrightly denies the spirit of the Constitution. While the ruling party and the government claim that this is a minimal step necessary to protect the lives and safety of South Korean residents in the border, legal experts on domestic and international law, human rights activists, US Congressmen, and media criticized the passage of the bill as one that severely restricts the rights of individual to speak freely, a basic constitutional right.


Freedom of Expression vs. Lives and safety of South Korean Residents in the Border

The South Korean government and ruling party pointed out that the distribution of leaflets should be banned, as it endangers the lives and safety of South Korean citizens living along the border. However, this is an extremely weak argument in light of the Constitution, international law, and legal views of the National Human Rights Commission of South Korea, a national advocacy institution for human rights protection.

The Republic of Korea Constitution states that “all citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech and the press, and freedom of assembly and association (Clause 1, Article 21).” Nevertheless, the extent to an individual can express his or her freedom is not without limit. The Constitution also reads that “the freedoms and rights of citizens may be restricted by Act only when necessary for national security, the maintenance of law and order or for public welfare (Clause 2, Article 37).” The distribution of leaflet can escalate military tension between the two Koreas and may violate the right to live of the residents in the border.

In fact, Defector A argued in a court case that government prohibition on the distribution of leaflets caused psychological damage to him. The South Korean Supreme Court ruled in 2016 that causality exists between the act of sending leaflets and provocation of North Korea which could directly incur bodily harm and imminent danger to the lives of residents in the border region. Therefore, it confirmed the original verdict that dismissed a claim for damages, ruling that the government can limit the leaflet sending activity under the Act on the Performance of Duties by Police Officers and civil law.

The government frequently cites this court case to support the legality of the anti-leaflet law. However, the Supreme court ruling was merely that it was not unlawful for the police to stop individuals from sending leaflets, but not that individuals who distribute leaflets should be criminalized. In particular, the ruling reads that ‘it was not unlawful unless the restriction is not excessive,’ leaving ample avenue for the law to not violate freedom of expression. Hence, this court ruling does not provide legal evidence to justify the government claim that prohibiting and criminalizing an act of distribution leaflets is legally sound.

A report titled ‘Legal Response and Task of the Distribution of Leaflets’ published by the Korea Institute for National Unification, a national research institution, concludes that “the distribution of leaflets goes beyond the bound of the right to freedom of expression and can already be limited by existing legislation. If a special law was to be enacted, it should be reviewed thoroughly from legal and policy perspectives so that it does not violate the principle of excess prohibition laid out in the Constitution.”

The report also added that “if a special law that prohibits and criminalizes the sending of leaflets is to be introduced, it should be drafted and written with much precision to ensure all constitutional requirements are met. Otherwise, it will be vulnerable to the claim of unconstitutionality.”

Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (a.k.a. the International Covenant Civil and Political Rights) states that “the right to freedom of opinion and expression includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. Both South Korea and North Korea are the parties to the Covenant. International law is not legally binding, but carries the same force as domestic law; therefore, the two Koreas have the responsibility and duty to ensure and protect the right to freedom as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as stated in the Covenant.

Moreover, the National Human Rights Commission of Korea concluded in the 2nd plenary committee in 2015 that the sending of leaflets by civic groups or individuals is a form of freedom of speech. It also expressed a view that the government should not monitor or deter the distribution of leaflets by individuals or civic groups, since threat from North Korea or the agreement between the two Koreas to stop slander or defamation of each other cannot be used to restrict basic civil liberties. This view takes into consideration the safety of South Korean citizens, including those who live in the border region.

In conclusion, the Constitution, international law, and legal view of the National Human Rights Commission all point out that existing law is sufficient to restrict the sending of leaflets, and even if the enactment of special law is necessary to prohibit such an act, it should be carefully drafted to not violate the principle of excess prohibition as stated in the Constitution.


2. The Legal Problems with the Anti-Leaflet Law

Laws on Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation


It was the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act that the National Assembly enacted to regulate the distribution of leaflets in 2008. The prescribed purpose of the law was to define activities necessary to promote mutual exchange and cooperation. Therefore, critics of the legislation pointed out that the sending of leaflets, an act of unilateral expression of opinion, cannot be regarded as an act to promote inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, and therefore, does not fulfill the intended purpose of the legislation.

Moreover, contrary to “the exchange, contact, and trade with North Korea” as stipulated in the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act, the act of sending leaflets to North Korea is ‘prohibited in principle,’ which damages the unity of law itself.

Furthermore, since the sending of leaflets is a form of expression of opinion, all-out prohibition and stipulating a penalty clause of such an activity by law could be considered as pre-censorship which may violate constitutional right to speech.

For the reasons above, a total of eight proposed amendments to the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act in the years between 2008 and 2018 were all discarded.


The Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act

When Kim Yo-jong denounced the distribution of leaflets in her statement on June 4, the South Korean government announced that it was preparing to review legislation that can fundamentally improve all legislation that intensifies tension along the inter-Korean border. The proposed law that followed was an amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act. The legislation defines an act of spreading leaflets as a violation of the terms of the inter-Korean agreement and stipulates criminal penalties for committing such an act.

In other words, while the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act seeks to ban the act of sending leaflets by requiring approval from the Minister of Unification, the Amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act is intended to fundamentally prohibit the distribution of leaflets by defining it as a violation of the inter-Korean agreement and criminalizing that activity.

The main provisions added to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act are as follows:

Article 4 (Definitions)

5. “Leaflets and other items” are defined as, items (including but not limited to advertising propaganda materials, printed materials, auxiliary memory units), cash and other means of property gains.

6. “Scattering” is defined as distributing leaflets to unspecified individuals in North Korea or move them to North Korea without obtaining approval under Article 13 or 20 of ‘Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act’for propaganda, donation, etc (leaflets sent to North Korea simply via a third country is also included).

Article 24 (Prohibition of Violation of the Inter-Korean Agreement) (1) No person shall harm the lives or bodies of the people or cause serious danger by doing any of the following acts.

1. Loudspeaker broadcasting toward North Korea in areas along the Military Demarcation Line.

2. Posting visual materials (posts) toward North Korea in areas along the Military Demarcation Line.

3. Scattering leaflets and other items

② The Minister of Unification may, if necessary to prevent prohibited acts under each subparagraph of paragraph (1), request cooperation from the head of the relevant central administrative agency or the head of a local government. In such cases, the head of the relevant central administrative agency or the head of a local government shall cooperate, except in extenuating circumstances.

Article 25 (Penalty Provisions) ① Any person who has violated Article 24 (1) shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 3 years or by fine not exceeding 30 million won. However, the provision shall not apply when South-North Korean agreements are suspended (this shall be limited to actions prohibited by Article 24 (1)) based on Article 23 (2) and (3).

② A person who has attempted any crime under paragraph (1) shall be punished.


First of all, Subparagraphs 5 and 6 of Article 4 are problematic for the following reasons:

5. “Leaflets and other items” are defined as, items (including but not limited to advertising propaganda materials, printed materials, auxiliary memory units), cash and other means of property gains.

Clause 5 reads that “Leaflets and other items” include items, cash and other means of property gains. This means that the law prohibits sending not only leaflets, but virtually all items to North Korea, which is clearly beyond the scope of legislative intent, as the government claims. The South Korean government argues that these items were included in the legislation, as balloons carrying leaflets could include dollar notes, mini-radios, and flash drives. However, it is not convincing why cash and items which are in fact a form of economic aid to help ordinary North Korean citizens, are banned along with leaflets that Pyongyang has denounced so severely.

In other words, the inclusion of “other items” in the amendment demonstrates that the government claim that this law is intended to protect South Korean citizens living in the border by prohibiting “an act of distributing leaflets and other items” that “condemns” North Korea is clearly flawed.

6. “Scattering” is defined as distributing leaflets to unspecified individuals in North Korea or move them to North Korea without obtaining approval under Article 13 or 20 of ‘Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act’ for propaganda, donation, etc. (leaflets sent to North Korea simply via a third country is also included).


According to the definition of “scattering” as laid out in Clause 6, the act of “scattering” already implies that any person who engages in such an act did not obtain approval for taking out or bringing in goods, etc. (Article 13) and for operating transportation equipment (Article 20) from the Minister of Unification as stipulated in the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act.

In the meantime, any person who takes out or brought in goods, etc. or operates transportation equipment between South Korea and North Korea without prior approval from the government is punished by imprisonment for not more than three years or by a fine up to thirty million won under the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Law.

INTER-KOREAN EXCHANGE AND COOPERATION ACT

Article 27 (Penalty Provisions)

(1) Any person who falls under any of the following subparagraphs shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than three years or by a fine up to thirty million won:

1. Any person who visits North Korea without obtaining approval under Article 9 (1) and the provision to Article 9 (6);

2. Any person who obtains approval under Article 9 (1) and the proviso to Article 9 (6) by fraud or other improper means;

3. Any person who takes out or brought in goods, etc. without obtaining approval under Article 13 (1);

4. Any person who carries out any cooperative project without obtaining approval under Article 17 (1);

5. Any person who operates transportation equipment between South Korea and North Korea without obtaining approval under Article 20 (1);

6. Any person who obtains approval under Article 13 (1), 17 (1) or 20 (1) by fraud or other improper means.

There has already been a legal debate in the judiciary on whether the sending of leaflets to North Korea is subject to approval under the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Law. In fact, courts have interpreted and determined that the sending of leaflets is not subject to approval from the Minister of Unification. In response to the court rulings, the government has tried to punish individuals who engaged in the distribution of leaflets under other laws such as the High-Pressure Gas Safety Control Act and Wastes Control Act.

However, the newly amended anti-leaflet law now makes the distribution of leaflets legally subject to government approval by defining the term “distribution/spread,” which could cause controversy on the interpretation of the law.

Article 24 (Prohibition of Violation of the Inter-Korean Agreement) (1) No person shall harm the lives or bodies of the people or cause serious danger by doing any of the following acts.

1. Loudspeaker broadcasting toward North Korea in areas along the Military Demarcation Line.

2. Posting visual materials (posts) toward North Korea in areas along the Military Demarcation Line.

3. Scattering leaflets and other items

 

The most problematic aspect of Article 24 is that the act of scattering leaflets and other items (Subparagraph 3) is not limited to the “Military Demarcation Line.” If the intent of the law was indeed to protect the lives of residents who live in the border region, as the government claims, then Subparagraph 3 should clearly state that the law prohibits the act only if it occurs along the Military Demarcation Line.

Essentially, an act of sending any materials of value to North Korea in China-North Korea border without approval from the South Korean government will constitute an act of scattering leaflets and other items under Subparagraph 3, Paragraph 1, Article 24.

Article 25 (Penalty Provisions) ① Any person who has violated Article 24 (1) shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 3 years or by fine not exceeding 30 million won. However, the provision shall not apply when South-North Korean agreements are suspended (this shall be limited to actions prohibited by Article 24 (1)) based on Article 23 (2) and (3).

② A person who has attempted any crime under paragraph (1) shall be punished.

An act of sending leaflets to North Korea (particularly sending leaflets in China-North Korea border) itself does not directly involve danger that causes bodily harm to South Korean citizens. It is, in fact, North Korea’s hostile act including military provocation that causes serious harm or threat to the lives of South Korean citizens.

The basic principle of criminal law is that in order to impose criminal punishment on a person for committing a specific act, that act should infringe upon another person’s benefit and protection of law. However, the amendment to this law is unusual in that the legislation punishes an individual not for the act he or she has committed, but depending on a reaction from a third party.

As a result, one receives criminal punishment if his or her sending of leaflets has led North Korea to engage in an act of hostility. On the other hand, if North Korea showed no reaction, then that person would not receive punishment. Such arbitrary penalty provisions could be problematic in consideration of the principle of legality in criminal law.

Another potential issue is a penalty provision for attempted crime as stated in Subparagraph 1, Paragraph 2, Article 25. In other words, even if the sending of leaflets did not cause “harm or serious danger to the lives and body of citizens,” an individual can be investigated, prosecuted, and tried for having the intent to do so. Moreover, another ambiguity is with the interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Article 25; it is not clear whether the attempted crime refers to an attempt to spread leaflets and other materials or an attempt to incur harm or danger to citizens.

The amendment has been promulgated on Dec 29, 2020 and is set to take effect in three months. All legislative process has been completed, and only the interpretation of the law remains on the table. The Ministry of Unification is working on ‘interpretive guidelines,’ but as an executive branch, it has no authority whatsoever to substitute for a role of the judicial branch charged with interpreting the law.


Criticism from the International Community

In his unusual op-ed in a South Korean conservative newspaper, Tomás Ojea Quintana, United Nations' Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea, urged that South Korea should reconsider the legislation before it goes into effect. His main concern was that the penalty provision of a maximum three years of imprisonment for sending leaflets violates individual right to expression. In his article, Special Rapporteur Quintana requested the South Korean government and National Assembly yet another review of the legislation before its enforcement.

Mr. Quintana commented that “there must be justification for restricting freedom of expression, and such restriction should be applied proportionately.” He added that the legislation used ambiguous terms such as ‘advertising propaganda materials’ and ‘other means of property gains,’ arguing that the use of those terms challenges the standards of international human rights which do not allow margin of appreciation when it comes to freedom of speech.

On Dec 14, several US Congressmen including Chris Smith (R-NJ), Co-chair of the bi-partisan Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, Michael McCaul (R-TX) and Gerald E. Connolly (D-Va.) have expressed criticism for the anti-leaflet law. Congressman Chris Smith called the legislation “insane,” urging the South Korean government to review critically its commitment to democratic values. He also declared that he intended to convene a congressional hearing regarding this issue.

Former U.S. Representative Eliot Engel (D), Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, commented in his recent interview with Voice of America that while he “recognizes the importance of building trust between the two Koreas,” he does not believe that building trust should come “at the expense of a common goal of promoting human rights in North Korea.” Mr. Engel added that he “hopes to work together with the South Korean government to resolve any issues that may arise as a result of the enactment of this legislation.”

Robert R. King, former Special Envoy for North Korea human rights issues at the U.S. Department of State, warned in his commentary submitted to the Center for Strategic & International Studies, that “there is no assurance that even with the silencing of freedom of expression in banning balloons that the North Koreans will take any action to improve inter-Korean relations. The consequence, however, could be erosion of the South Korean relationship with the United States, which is important for the people of both countries.”

Politicians and human rights activists from outside of the U.S. have also joined the force in expressing their criticism for the anti-leaflet law.

In the United Kingdom, David Alton, a British politician who represents All Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea, urged Secretary of State Dominic Raab to send formal request to the South Korean government to reconsider the decision to enact the anti-leaflet law.

Similarly, Canada also expressed its concern over the passage of the bill. Christelle Chartrand, spokesperson for Global Affairs Canada, commented that “Freedom of expression is a cornerstone of prosperous society and a critical element in the promotion of human rights.” Similar views were found in Europe. Human Rights Without Frontiers, a non-government organization based in Belgium, stated that it would send EU leadership an official statement that requests EU member states to officially protest against the passage of the anti-leaflet law.

In Japan, the Asahi Shimbun published an editorial titled ‘The Moon Jae-in administration should consistently protect the principle of freedom.’ The article stated that the anti-leaflet law “includes provisions that damage the principle of civic freedom and democracy.” It concluded that while “democracy may differ from a country to country, the South Korean government should take a cautious action regarding the new amendment because it will not be free from the voice and concern of the international community with regards to issues on conventional values such as freedom and democracy.”


Official Stance of the South Korean Government on the Criticism from the International Community


When the anti-leaflet bill officially became law on Dec 15, critics pointed out that the amended law ‘criminalizes even the distribution of flash drives containing Korean dramas.’ The Ministry of Unification quickly issued a statement, refuting the claim that the law does not prohibit such an act.

The Ministry argued that the amended law, which critics have called ‘legislation made with a direct order from Kim Yo-jong,’ was not enacted because of the demand from Pyongyang, but to fulfill basic government duty to protect the lives and safety of its citizens. It also emphasized that this law is necessary to perform constitutional obligation of promoting substantial development of the inter-Korean relations and peace in the Korean peninsula and pursuing a policy for peaceful unification.

The Ministry added that “while freedom of speech is a constitutional right, it does not prevail over the right to live of our own citizens who live along the border.”

The Ministry of Unification also stated that “expressing Seoul’s commitment to comply with the inter-Korean agreement through the systematic enactment of the amended law could effectively call on and encourage North Korea to abide by the inter-Korean agreement.”

Moreover, the Ministry explained that the phrase of ‘leaflets sent to North Korea simply via a third country’ refers to a case where leaflets launched from the South Korean territory are sent into North Korea via territory of a third country. It also added that this amended law is to prohibit an activity that causes serious harm to the lives of our citizens, pointing out that an act of launching leaflets in a third country will be governed by the national law of that country, not the amended legislation of South Korea.

However, the Ministry of Unification has no authority to make legal judgment on how the law is interpreted and enforced. The judiciary branch does. Therefore, it is inappropriate for the Ministry, an executive branch, to interpret the law on behalf of the courts.

The Ministry of Unification announced that it is working to provide 'guidelines for interpreting new regulations on launching leaflets and other materials' before the law takes effect. However, doing so would be acknowledging that the bill is not without fault, given that it requires specific guidelines to be fully understood.

South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha said in her recent interview with CNN that “some people argue that the law violates freedom of expression, but while such freedom is absolutely vital to human rights, it’s not absolute.” She further argued that freedom of expression can be limited for the safety of people.

Ruling Democratic Party Chairman Lee Nak-yon of South Korea expressed his regret over the decision of US Congress to urge the Korean government to review the amendment (of the Inter-Korean Development Act). In fact, the South Korean government has been working to prevent the worst case scenario from happening, that is, being labeled as a human rights abuser. The government has frequently convened high-level meetings chaired by Director of National Security Office Suh Hoon. In particular, the Blue House is making all-out efforts to prevent the holding of a US congressional hearing, being organized by the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission by utilizing international media outlets. As part of its effort, the government has urged the international community to take into consideration ‘the distinct characteristics of the inter-Korean relations’ and ‘suffering of South Korean residents living along the border.’

However, factual evidence clearly suggests that there is no causality between an act of distributing leaflets and its impact on the lives and safety of residents. First, not a single human casualty occurred due to an act of sending leaflets. Second, the passage of the new amendment is unnecessary since existing law could already restrict the act.


3. The Reality of the Right to Freedom of Expression in North Korea

North Korean Legal Structure


In the North Korean legal system, Kim Jong-un’s directives and guidelines come first before any law. Below Kim Jong-un’s directives is the ‘10 principles to protect the one and only leader,’ basic bylaws of the Korean Workers’ Party, followed by the Constitution, sublaws and enforcement decrees of each administrative branch.


Compulsory Political Activities

In North Korea, all citizens are forced to engage in political activities for their lifetime. North Korean people are taught that they are born with two lives: a physical life rendered to them by their biological parents and political life, aka spiritual life, from the supreme leader of North Korea.

Regardless of the age of the people, the political activities of all North Korean citizens are controlled by the Korean Workers’ Party. The required membership in the Party enables the state to control the daily lives of citizens. Moreover, their private lives are under complete control of the state monitoring, as no criticism whatsoever of the state is permitted. All North Korean citizens receive punishment for taking part in any type of anti-state activities or even expressing opposition to the state policies. They also get reward for reporting anyone suspected of committing an anti-state crime.


Juche Ideology of North Korea

The Juche ideology of North Korea is commensurate with a religious one. It postulates that ‘man is the master of his own destiny.’ However, since a man is an individual, men must be organized centrally in order to achieve their full potential. It is the Party that forms and manages such a central organization. The Juche ideology states that since the Party is a collection of the masses, the Kim family must lead the organization.

In North Korean society with extreme vertical organizational structure, the Kim family has indoctrinated the North Korean people that all citizens should pay allegiance and faith to the Kim family, the brain of all lives, in order for them to effectively manage the state. This is why there are numerous statues of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il in every corner of North Korea, to which North Koreans are forced to pay tribute on a daily basis.

North Korea has institutionalized an ideological education that seeks to make North Korean people worship and pay blind allegiance to the Great Leaders, effectively blocking all access to outside information unrelated to the Juche ideology. Political propaganda in North Korea is utilized to instigate nationalistic hostility towards the enemies of the state, namely the United States, South Korea, and Japan.


Religious Policy of North Korea

Karl Marx claimed that "religion is the opium of the people." This dictum served as a basis for communism to suppress any religious activities. However, the only communist country that obliterated religion is North Korea.

While the Soviet Union, communist countries in Eastern Europe, and China persecuted religious activities, they still allowed the existence of churches and pastors.

Pyongyang, once called Jerusalem of the East, is now devoid of all religious institutions, as the North Korean regime completely banned all churches and executed clerics under its policy of exterminating all religions. Churches that now exist in North Korea such as Bong-su Church, Cil-gol Church, and Jang-choong Catholic Church were all built after 1988, the year Seoul Olympics was held. In order to compete against South Korea that successfully hosted the Olympics, North Korea organized the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students in Pyongyang just a year after the Seoul Olympics were held. Building these churches targeted foreign visitors who visited Pyongyang to attend the Festival, an attempt by the North Korean regime to make a false appearance that religious activities are tolerated in the country.


State Control on Outside Information

North Korean citizens are deprived of the right to access independent information that is not sourced from the state. The only provider of information in North Korea is the state-controlled media. The state strictly controls internet access as well as TV and radio broadcasting. All broadcasted materials go through watertight inspection by the state and are rejected, if they are not in line with the principles of the Korean Workers’ Party. All private phone calls are monitored, while ordinary citizens are only allowed to make domestic calls. North Korean people are punished for watching or listening to foreign media, including foreign films and dramas.


3. Recent Changes in North Korea

Active Flea Markets


The major change in North Korea has taken place in an upward manner, not the other way around as could be seen in the cases of East Germany, Soviet Union, and China.

The main force leading the upward change is Jang-ma-dang, flea markets in North Korea which first emerged at the end of 1990s. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, foreign assistance plummeted, resulting in widespread famine struck North Korea in the mid-1990s. Millions of North Koreans, who relied exclusively on state food rationing, died in hunger. They started to sell whatever they had in an empty lot in their town in order to survive. The emergence and rise of Jang-ma-dang was the birth of capitalism in North Korea.

The state authority could not stop North Korean citizens from engaging in such commercial activities, when it could not even provide enough food to the people. The North Korean regime also tolerated Jang-ma-dang activities in order to secure national budget by collecting tax from sellers in the market.

Despite strict state crackdown and high price, South Korean products are extremely popular among North Korean residents. Numerous products ranging from flash drives containing Korean films and dramas, cosmetics, hanbok (traditional Korean costumes worn on special occasions such as wedding), and underwear are smuggled into North Korea and sold in Jang-ma-dang. Even state inspectors take bribery and turn a blind-eye to the illegal sale of South Korean products in the flea market which has raised a concern among North Korean officials.


Korean Wave (Hallyu) in North Korea

The infusion of South Korean culture in North Korea since early 2000 through Jang-ma-dang has transformed the lives of North Koreans. Thanks to the Korean Wave, the worldviews and cultures of North Korea have slowly resembled those of the South. Moreover, with technological progress, more North Koreans now have mobile phones and video cameras at home.

For example, a young North Korean couple used to call each other ‘Mr. or Miss Comrade,’ a term used in communistic society. However, the millennial generation, influenced by South Korean films and drama, instead use a South Korean expression such as ‘Oppa or Honey’ to address each other. In addition, young North Koreans use South Korean colloquial expressions such as ‘ã…‹ã…‹, ã…Žã…Ž (meaning lol)’ in text messages. Fashion style among young North Koreans has also started to resemble that of young people in South Korea. Three pillars of revolution, ideology, technology, and culture, which the North Korean regime have promoted for internal solidarity are shaken to the core, thanks to the Korean Wave.


Adoption of Law on Rejecting Reactionary Ideology and Culture

North Korean state media reported in an article titled ‘Invisible fight, silent war’ on Oct 19, 2019 that the state is faced with a silent war. The article warned the public that while North Korea, which possess nuclear weapons, may not be vulnerable to a physical attack, the inflow of South Korean media content such as films and dramas could topple down the state. It described the spread of South Korean culture as a “virus invading the body.”

For this reason, North Korea passed a series of law on ‘rejecting reactionary ideology and culture’ at a plenary meeting of the Supreme People’s Assembly. The intent of the law, the media reported, was to prevent the spread of anti-socialist ideology and safeguard North Korea's spirit and culture.


Conclusion

Since 2000, the two Koreas have focused on promoting exchange and cooperation, breaking away from an ideological conflict inherited from the Cold War. The thawing relations greatly reduced leaflet sending activities organized by the South Korean government. Civic groups, on the other hand, started to distribute leaflets by launching balloons along the inter-Korean border.

North Korea has continued to denounce the leaflet launching by various civic groups in South Korea and demanded Seoul to prohibit such activities. The South Korean government responded that restricting these activities would be in violation of the right to freedom of expression as specified in the Constitution. In response, North Korea threatened to use military force and eventually demolished the inter-Korean Liaison Office on June 16, escalating tension between the two Koreas.

The South Korean National Assembly, which consists of the super-majority of the ruling Democratic Party, forcibly passed the anti-leaflet bill. The bill was then debated and deliberated (Dec 22), approved by the President (Dec 24), promulgated (Dec 29), and is set to take effect within just three months.

The South Korean public and international community demanded the law be rescinded, criticizing the legislation for violating the right to freedom of expression protected by the Constitution and international law. They have also argued that this ambiguous law will cause legal controversy on the interpretation and enforcement of the law. Human rights activists in South Korea announced that they would file a petition to the Constitutional Court, as the law is slated to take effect in upcoming March.

The South Korean government argued that restriction of the basic constitutional right is inevitable to protect the lives and safety of residents who live in the border. Moreover, it maintains that freedom of right is not absolute and that it will continue to make effort to dissipate public concern by publishing guidelines for interpreting the newly amended law. However, one can reasonably conclude that the true intention of the Moon Jae-in administration for amending the law in such a hurried manner was to initiate a dialogue with Pyongyang in desperate attempt to appease to Kim Jong-un. The fact that there has been no human casualty incurred by the sending of leaflets weakens their claim.

Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea reads that “it shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the basic free and democratic order.”

North Korean people have been enslaved, having been blocked from the outside world under the brutal line of hereditary dictatorship of the Kim family in the past 70 years. However, they have started to recover their basic rights as human beings by independently maintaining their means of living through commercial activities in Jang-ma-dang. The inflow of South Korean culture smuggled into North Korea has contributed to reducing hostility towards South Korea and rebuilding ethnic identity as one Korean people.

For regime survival, North Korea has vigorously sought to control the inflow of outside information into the country by enacting new laws on rejecting reactionary ideology and culture on December 4.

The South Korean government, if it was sincere about protecting freedom and democratic values that the nation as a whole has worked so hard to build, should rescind its decision to enact the anti-leaflet law which hampers peaceful unification in the Korean peninsula. The least it should do is to remove unconstitutional provisions and work to make far more meticulous laws that can satisfy the original legislative intent, that is, to protect the lives of residents living in the border region. This law should not serve to blind the North Korean people suffering under the brutal dictatorship of the Kim family.

February 16, 2021

The Injustice of North Korea’s Hereditary Leadership Succession as Demonstrated by the History of Power Transfer from Kim Il-sung to Kim Jong-il

Published on the occasion of Kim Jong-il’s birthday, February 16, 2021


By Kim Myong, HRNK Contributor

Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK Executive Director

J.A. de Roo, CC BY-SA 3.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0>, via Wikimedia Commons



February 16 of each year is known as one of the most auspicious holidays in North Korea.[1] Kim Jong-il, who took the reins of power in this country after his father Kim Il-sung died, was born on this day. Under the hereditary rule of the Kim family, North Korea has become one of the cruelest modern slave states in the world. However, Kim Jong-il has been worshipped as “Gwang-myong-song” (Shining Star) by his people, and his birthday is called “Gwang-myong-song-jol” (Day of the Shining Star). Since 2011 when his son Kim Jong-un acceded to the throne upon his father’s death, this day has become even more important than April 15, also called the “Day of the Sun”, when Kim Il-sung was born.

This month, the entire country gets engulfed in a festive atmosphere to observe celebrations at the national level for “reviving” the ghost of the late dictator. The celebrations comprise: The Group Exploratory March to Mount Baekdu, known as a “holy” place of Kim Il-sung’s anti-Japanese activities; Oath-Taking Ceremony at Kim Jong-il’s Homeplace; Exhibition of Kimjongilia;[2] Pyongyang International Figure Skating Festival; and Worship at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, where the bodies of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il lay in state, to name just a few. Outside of the country, North Korean diplomatic missions are busy publishing feature articles praising Kim Jong-il in local newspapers or organizing “friendly meetings” with pro-North Korean groups or individuals to watch feature films or deliberate on juche thought. Even though they may neglect their task to protect their own citizens in the host country, they aspire to faithfully perform the role of propaganda agents for the regime, for fear of being reprimanded by the capital in case of minor negligence or errors in their supreme leader’s propaganda.

On the very day of Kim Jong-il’s birth, the first pages of the Rodong Shinmun, the official newspaper of the Korean Workers' Party, carry door-sized lengthy articles on his “revolutionary life and immortal achievements” as well as congratulatory messages sent by pro-North Korean organizations, such as the associations of Koreans living in Japan or China. And North Koreans spend the whole day participating in their routine organizational life like human robots—wreath laying at Kim Il-sung’s and Kim Jong-il’s statues as well as putting on and attending music performances or sports competitions.

My parents' generation devoted their life to establishing Kim Il-sung’s one-man rule and supporting the transfer of his power to his son, whereas the people of my generation, who were born and grew up as baby boomers after the end of the Korean War (1950–1953),[3] spent their childhood, adolescence, and the most prolific period in their life forging and cementing Kim Jong-il’s cult of personality and supporting his dictatorship. Should I have continued to live in the totalitarian state instead of leaving it once and for all, my children would still have been wasting the energy and passion of their precious youth for the young dictator Kim Jong-un. Since I could no longer bear passing down to my children the life of slavery deprived of human dignity and rights that my parents and I lived for two generations, I decided to escape this human hell in search for our lost freedoms and rights, taking with us from the homeland nothing but the memories of our past life from our homeland.

The hereditary rule of the Kim family is at the root of all kinds of misery and pain my fellow countrymen suffer in North Korea. Ending the one-family rule is a prerequisite for recovering their human rights and restoring peace on the Korean peninsula.[4]


The Absurd Ideological and Theoretical Basis to Legitimize the Hereditary Leadership Succession

The vast majority of countries in the world have opted for the republic as their form of government (see Fig. 1). Unlike the monarchy, in which the throne is usually inherited according to the order of succession within one royal family, the republic is based on the principle of having its head of state hold the sovereign power with a fixed term of office, elected directly or indirectly by the people. Today, many monarchies have turned into constitutional ones, to make their monarch a symbolic head of state with limited power and to grant the authority to govern to their parliament elected by direct votes and the prime minister chosen from a majority political party. Electing a head of state by power of the people constitutes the basis of a democratic nation.


Figure 1:

Distribution of United Nations member states by governmental form

 


Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_system_of_government


As reflected in its official name—that is, Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK—North Korea is legally a republic, not a monarchy, and its constitution does not allow the inheritance of power.[5]

However, from the early days of Kim Il-sung's governance back in 1948 to date, the North Korean constitution has always been used as a tool to support the Kim family regime’s hereditary one-man rule.

North Korea is based on the monolithic leadership system in which the “Great Leader” completely controls the Korean Workers' Party (KWP or the Party), the State, and the Military, which form the core governing bodies of the country.[6] The political rationale to justify the one-man rule began to be developed early in the 1950s and systematized in the 1960s. This is the so-called “Kim Il-sung Doctrine” comprising among others: the “Juche Idea”; the “Great Leader Theory”; and the “Ten Principles for the Establishment of the Party’s Monolithic Ideological System”.[7]

According to the Juche Idea, the popular masses, as the driving force of historical development, have endless power to transform nature and society as well as to shape their own destiny, but this power can only be used efficiently and to its full potential when they are commanded by a Leader who can present a revolutionary ideology and guide them along the right path. The Great Leader Theory defines the Leader as the top brain of the popular masses and as such, he or she occupies an absolute position and plays a decisive role in the historical development and revolutionary struggles of the working class. Furthermore, the theory stipulates that the popular masses should be firmly united with the Leader in terms of ideology and will and support the unique guidance of the Leader with loyalty. In addition, the Ten Principles for the Establishment of the Party's Monolithic Leadership System, a fundamental law placed above the constitution and all other laws, and similar to the Decalogue or Ten Commandments, endows Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il with God-like status and elaborates in a total of ten articles and 60 clauses the principles and tasks to ensure the hereditary rule of the Kim family (see annex I).

The Kim Il-sung doctrine was used as an ideological tool for purging all the opposing factions from within the KWP in the 1950s and 1960s, and for establishing Kim’s one-man rule in the country. Through the purging of various factions originating from the South Korean Workers’ Party, the Soviet Union, China, and Gapsan (a geographical area in the South Hamgyong Province), Kim Il-sung succeeded in assuming absolute power by the end of the 1960s, as a founder of the DPRK and the only Great Leader of North Koreans. Despite his attempt to be raised to God-like status, Kim Il-sung was also human, born with an expiration date. As he got older, the issue of the transfer of power came up to the surface. In North Korea, dominated by the Leader’s unique guidance, the transfer of power meant the replacement of the Leader. Therefore, the Kim Il-sung doctrine was further supplemented with the “Continuous Revolution Theory” and the “Leader's Successor Theory” with the aim of ensuring a smooth power transfer within the Kim family.

According to the Continuous Revolution Theory, the revolutionary cause pioneered by the Leader of the working class (meaning Kim Il-sung in this case) is a long-term project that cannot be completed in one generation. Thus, the revolution must continue across generations until it is completed. The Leader's Successor Theory clarifies that, in order to continue the revolutionary cause until its completion, the Leader’s Successor must be selected in a proper manner and that the Successor is required to be endowed with certain qualifications. The need for a good successor to the leader arose from the Soviet Union’s history, that carried out the first socialist revolution under Lenin's leadership to build a powerful state but ruined its socialist cause due to the failure to address leadership succession properly. The qualifications required of the Leader’s Successor were identified as follows: a) the Successor must be infinitely loyal to the Leader; b) be endowed with extraordinary ideological and theoretical knowledge, outstanding leadership, and noble communist virtues; and c) enjoy absolute dignity and authority among the population for his or her achievements and contributions.[8], [9] The legitimacy of the hereditary succession within the Kim family was established by the Kim Il-sung doctrine that implied that no one but a member of the Kim family could succeed Kim Il-sung. In reality, transferring power to one of his sons was an established fact to Kim Il-sung, who had already placed the KWP in his possession.


Characteristics of the Leadership Transfer to Kim Jong-il

In the North Korean constitution, state power is held by all the working people, including workers, peasants, soldiers, and working intellectuals.[10] However, as the country is under one-man rule and the hereditary succession is established for the Kim family, the national system has been proven to be a de facto monarchy, not a democracy-based republic. Nevertheless, the transfer of power from Kim Il-sung to Kim Jong-il, the first succession in the history of North Korea, took considerable time and effort to secure legitimacy in form and content.

In this succession process, Kim Il-sung seemed to be concerned about how he would be perceived by others as his leadership was not as absolute as Kim Jong-un’s today. He was also concerned that a number of his companions-in-arms who fought with him in Manchuria were very assertive on sensitive issues like succession. Moreover, this succession took place amid fierce competition between Kim Jong-il and his half-brothers, children of his stepmother Kim Song-ae, and, therefore, it was accompanied by Kim Jong-il’s pro-active efforts to obtain power rather than waiting until he receives it. Kim Jong-il himself had witnessed his father’s power struggle and learned how hard it was to seize power and keep it once obtained. The transition of power from Kim Il-sung to his eldest son Kim Jong-il had the following characteristics (see Fig. 2).


Figure 2: 




Timeline of Leadership Succession by Kim Jong-il, 1960–2000

First, from his early childhood, Kim Jong-il endeavored to catch the attention of his father in order to be considered as a strong candidate to succeed him.[11]

In 1953, while studying at the Mangyongdae Revolutionary School, he formed a “Research Team on the Biography of General Kim Il-sung” and launched a campaign among the students to learn about Kim Il-sung's revolutionary life. In 1956, when he was studying at Namsan Middle School, he led students to conduct an exploratory march to Mount Baekdu with the aim of making Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese struggle the only historical tradition of the KWP. In the early 1960s, while he was studying at Kim Il-Sung University, Kim Jong-il accompanied his father in field visits to the economic and military sectors to learn about his leadership and help him exercise on-the-spot guidance.

Kim Jong-il, who started working at the Central Committee of the KWP in June 1964, made tremendous contributions to purging the Gapsan group, the last faction existing in the Party, during a KWP plenary meeting in May 1967. On this occasion, a campaign was launched to establish Kim Il-sung’s unique ideology inside the Party. While making his career in the Propaganda and Agitation Department, he guided the project to make films and operas based on the novels created during Kim Il-sung’s anti-Japanese struggle, such as "The Flower Girl", "The Sea of ​​Blood", and "The Fate of a Self-Defense Member.” In February 1974, he framed ​​Kim Il-sung’s ideas and theories as Kim Il-sung-ism and declared that the transformation of the whole society in accordance with Kim Il-sung-ism was an ultimate goal to be achieved by the KWP.

Even after he was designated as Kim Il-sung’s successor in the same year, he continued working to strengthen one-man rule for his father by launching new projects to educate people within the revolutionary traditions and spirits of Mount Baekdu. Satisfied with his work, Kim Il-sung concluded his leadership succession that dragged on for years by officially announcing Kim Jong-il as his only and final successor at the Sixth Congress of the KWP in 1980.


Second, Kim Jong-il established a strong power base for his leadership by removing all the forces that interfered during his succession.

Soon after, he was internally designated as his father’s successor in 1974, Kim Jong-il worked hard to establish his power base within the Party, the State, and the Military and created his cult of personality among the people. In particular, he mercilessly purged or eliminated all the forces that had complained or objected to him being the successor.

His stepmother, Kim Song-ae (second official wife of Kim Il-sung), who had been appointed as the President of the Korean Democratic Women's Alliance in 1969, exercised her power and influence to place her children and relatives in the key positions of the country and, with her aides, she obstructed Kim Jong-il’s designation as the successor. Some of the comrades-in-arms of Kim Il-sung very much disliked Kim Jong-il who, after losing his mother at a young age, was left alone to grow up in his own, without receiving proper education from his family. Considering that Kim Pyong-il, Kim Song-ae's eldest son, was more suitable to be his father’s successor, they naturally gathered around Kim Song-ae. Some historians speculated that Kim Yong-ju, the younger brother of Kim Il-sung and Director of the Organization and Guidance Department of the KWP until the early 1970s, had wished to succeed his brother, but they proved to be wrong. After his nephew’s designation as the successor, he left his public office and went into exile to Jagang Province with his family to disappear from the political scene. In the end, Kim Il-sung, who held the key in the nomination of his successor, made the final decision to designate Kim Jong-il as his successor rather than Kim Pyong-il, who was still young in every aspect—politically and age-wise—and to follow the rule of primogeniture.

When Kim Jong-il became the successor, he classified his stepmother Kim Song-ae, her children, and relatives as “Gyot-ga-ji” (side branches) and dismissed them from public office.[12] Afterwards, all her children were sent abroad one by one, and Kim Song-ae was placed under house arrest doing almost nothing until she died in 2014.[13] In addition, all those who had been opposed to Kim Jong-il's succession or who followed Kim Song-ae as part of her “club” were deported, transferred to the remote provinces, or sent to kwan-li-so political prison camps. Among them were many high-profile people, including a DPRK vice-president and a secretary of the KWP.[14] Later on, Kim Yong-ju returned alone to Pyongyang with the position of vice-president towards the end of his life, but many others were never seen again.

By the mid-1970s, Kim Jong-il was already called the "Central Party” or "Dear Leader," and had feature songs composed for him, such as "Song to Dear Leader Kim Jong-il" and "Long Live Dear Leader Kim Jong-il". These songs were distributed and memorized by the people, to be sung at national events, meetings, and parades. In addition, he launched a national campaign to establish his unique leadership in parallel to the campaign to establish his father’s unique ideology. As a middle school student at the time, I took the lead in the school-wide campaign to uphold Kim Jong-il as “Dear Leader” and establish his leadership.

Third, beginning in 1974, North Korea entered a duumvirate for 20 years, where the two Kims ruled the country together with shared power. That gave Kim Jong-il sufficient time to lay the groundwork for becoming the most powerful man in the land.

At the beginning of the duumvirate, Kim Il-sung wanted his son to concentrate mainly on the internal affairs of the KWP, while he continued to take care of the State’s affairs. After the Sixth Congress of KWP, he passed him two of his military positions—i.e., Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and Chairman of the National Defense Commission—while continuing to hold his other positions until his death in 1994, such as General Secretary of the KWP, Chairman of the KWP Military Committee and President of the DPRK. However, as time passed, Kim Il-sung felt so weak that he gradually released his powers on the Party, the State, and the Military to Kim Jong-il, to spend the rest of his life in peace, keeping only the title of “Head of State.” It would not be an exaggeration to say that by the mid-1980s, all the power for the State administration fell into the hands of Kim Jong-il, who had succeeded in seizing absolute power by then. As Kim Jong-il was in charge of the Organization and Guidance Department, which is like the “yolk” of the KWP in the one-party state, his words became absolute law and command that no one could dare to contradict or challenge. His handwritten or verbal instructions and guidelines outnumbered those from Kim Il-sung, and this gap between the real power of the father and the son widened considerably as time passed.

When the State agencies reported to the highest instances, they prepared two copies of reports—one copy was addressed to the Kumsusan Presidential Palace, where Kim Il-sung was, and the other copy was addressed to the Three-Story Building of the KWP, where Kim Jong-il was. This dual reporting system finally changed into a unified reporting system for Kim Jong-il, who filtered the reports himself to be sent to Kim Il-sung “to reduce his father’s workload and document burdens and ensure his health and longevity.” He made final decisions on his own on the key issues of the Party, the State, and the Military, and later informed his father of a few selected issues. Of course, this did not mean that Kim Jong-il handled the vast amount of documents alone. He ran a super-sized cabinet assisting him in handling the workload, which was given the authority to approve most of the documents on his behalf. If the KWP was in Kim Il-sung’s possession in the 1960s, it turned into a complete monopoly for Kim Jong-il in the 1970s and onwards.

It is noteworthy that, while trying to seize all the power from his father, Kim Jong-il did not want to exercise power in one field: the Cabinet responsible for the national economy.[15] Although Kim Jong-il majored in political economy at Kim Il-sung University, he did not have any knowledge or experience in economic management, nor did he have a desire to acquire the responsibility of running the national economy. When he landed inside the KWP, his work was limited to the fields of ideological propaganda projects to establish the leadership system and guiding the sector of arts and culture, mainly focusing on producing films and operas. If he did anything for the national economy, it was done through his guidance on the Campaign of the Three Revolutions,[16] and the launch of mass labor mobilization campaigns such as “The 70-Day Battle”, “The 100-Day Battle” and other such initiatives to attain the planned targets of economic development in the shortest period of time possible. Kim Il-sung is known to have confessed at a meeting with the Cabinet high-level officials that "the Secretary of the Organization and Guidance Department (which refers to Kim Jong-il) is a stranger to the economy."


Under Kim Jong-il’s Leadership, the Korean Workers' Party Turned into a Gangster Group That Dominates and Rules above the State

If any middle-aged North Korean is asked, “Whom do you hate the most in the Kim family?” They won’t hesitate to answer: “Kim Jong-il.” North Korea was ruled by Kim Jong-il for 17 and a half years after his father’s death, and for nearly 38 years from the day he began exercising real power as his father’s successor. He may not have been hated so much if he had started from scratch like his father who had founded the country after its liberation from Japanese rule. On the contrary, he was given an unlimited mandate to rule a relatively wealthy country, endowed with abundant natural resources, that my parents’ generation had rebuilt out of the devastation of the Korean War with their blood, sweat, and tears.

A few authoritarian countries, such as Singapore, have succeeded in accomplishing economic prosperity and enabling their people to lead a wealthy and happy life. My parents’ generation may have accepted the transmission of power to Kim Jong-il even if they did not agree with succession itself, in the hope that their country could be a second Singapore one day to come. However, the North Korean people have come to conclude that any hereditary rule by one family would lead the country and nation to total failure and ruin.

The KWP was more “privatized” under Kim Jong-il than ever before and turned into a gangster group ruling above the State. This was the greatest harm Kim Jong-il brought onto his people during his governance. Some people assumed that his Songun (military first) governance had put the Military before the Party, based on a lack of understanding of the North Korean system. North Korea has always been a one-party state under the three successive rules of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un, in which the KWP dominates and rules above all, including the State and the Military. In this society, the Party, like its rulers, gets more vicious when generations change. After all, a fish rots from the head down. If the leader of a group, such as the KWP, becomes more violent, members of the group will be equally violent because they could not survive otherwise. On the basis of what I have seen, heard, and experienced in North Korea as well as the historical facts already known to the world, I would like to summarize how the KWP turned into a violent gangster group under Kim Jong-il's leadership.

First, by changing the decision-making process inside the KWP—from the Political Bureau-centered system to the Secretariat-centered system—Kim Jong-il made completely reshuffled the Party’s leadership, which was at least formally democratic before he took the power, to establish his own one-man leadership.

After Kim Jong-il was designated as the successor in 1974, all decision-making powers on key policies, guidelines, and personnel issues began to be transferred to the Secretariat and its specialized departments, which made the Political Bureau and the Central Committee’s Plenary “voting machines” meant to pass all the decisions made by the Secretariat.[17] The Organization and Guidance Department led by Kim Jong-il was at the core of the Secretariat and exercised full power on the most important issues. This meant, in other words, that Kim Jong-il’s one-man dictatorship was being established in the KWP, giving him the authority to change the policy directions according to his thoughts and will, and nominate his “favorite people” in important positions.

The KWP’s leadership is exercised mainly through two functions: (1) guidance on the life of the Party members; and (2) guidance on policy implementation by the state agencies. The former is then divided into guidance on organizational life and ideological life, which is under the responsibility of the Organization and Guidance Department and the Propaganda and Agitation Department who control all the Party organizations at the lower levels. The latter is under the responsibility of other specialized departments of the KWP, which are linked to each sector of the Cabinet or the State affairs. From the mid-1980s, when Kim Jong-il seized all the power within the KWP, policy proposals prepared by the specialized departments were submitted by their secretaries to Kim Jong-il for final approval and were implemented without going through the approval process of the Central Committee’s Plenary or its Political Bureau. In terms of power rankings, Kim Jong-il was a de facto Number Two after his father.

Kim Jong-il did not want to hand over his position of the Secretary of the Organization and Guidance Department to other people even after he was elected the General Secretary of the KWP after Kim Il-sung died. This was due to the fact that he had used this position to exercise full power that placed himself above his father.

Second, once he took the reins of the Party, Kim Jong-il expanded and reorganized the specialized departments inside the KWP, especially those in charge of economic issues, so that he could take control of the whole process of formulation and implementation of national economic policies. By doing so, he placed economic interest projects of the Cabinet under the KWP’s control and greatly increased the Party’s finances.

Until the mid-1960s, the North Korean Cabinet, of which Kim Il-sung was Prime Minister at the time, and its affiliated ministries and economic institutions exercised relative independence, and there were only a few economic departments inside the KWP. However, in the era of Kim Jong-il's rule, the Party was endowed with a set of economic departments—including the Planning and Financing Department, the Light Industry Department, the Agriculture Department, the Defense Industry Department, and the Finance Accounting Department. In addition, he set up a number of departments in charge of affairs with the South—including the United Front Department, the Operations Department, the External Investigations and Intelligence Department, renamed “Office 35”, and the External Liaison Department.[18] As the Party took control of economic affairs of the country and the Party-led State system was established, the KWP became a State-within-a-State with all the power in his hands. At the center of it all was Kim Jong-il, the Secretary of the Organization and Guidance Department (see annex II).

By founding the DPRK in 1948, Kim Il-sung established a centralized system that operated based on a planned economy. In North Korea, private ownership of the means of production is not allowed, and all the elements of economic activities—such as the allocation of labor force, the distribution of natural resources, production and distribution of goods and services, and pricing—are planned and executed by the State.

The Cabinet is supposed to be the command tower of all economic activities with the State Planning Commission at its center. The Commission coordinates and controls all these economic activities. Kim Il-sung worked as Prime Minister of the Cabinet for 24 years spanning from 1948 to 1972, making desperate efforts for a soft landing of North Korea’s planned economic system. By amending the old constitution of 1948 into a socialist constitution in 1972, he established a dual State governance system in which the State power is shared between the President of DPRK and the Prime Minister of the Cabinet, and he took himself the position of President until he died in 1994.

Kim Jong-il's entry into the KWP in 1964 was a starting point for transforming the North Korean Cabinet responsible for the country’s planned economy into a completely vegetative cabinet that fell into a coma. The Party took over the Cabinet’s role as the economic command tower. The KWP’s specialized departments were deeply involved in the formulation and execution of economic policies and national production plans, completely ignoring the relative independence of the Cabinet. The Party's guidance on economic management activities was realized through the Party committees of state-run enterprises specializing in production.[19] Under the Party’s guideline that the general manager, the Party secretary, and the chief engineer should form a trinity for economic management of the enterprise, the Party secretaries' interference into economic management issues became a norm to the point where they used their political power to punish or replace the general managers or the chief engineers who did not obey them. The administrative orders from the general manager and the orders from the Party committee overlapped in many cases, which resulted in confusion in the fields of production. However, when production failed to be normalized, the responsibility for economic mismanagement fell on the shoulders of the general manager and the chief engineer. Still, the interference of the KWP in the Cabinet’s economic activities continues as of today. What has changed in Kim Jong-un’s time is that such interventions are being carried out in a subtle and disguised way in order to create a trap and transfer the responsibility for economic failure to the Cabinet. The Cabinet is formally put forward as an economic command tower, but in reality, it is nothing but a string puppet in the hands of the KWP. The Cabinet is not in a position to do anything on its own to fundamentally change the country’s economic structure and bring about economic prosperity through reform and an open-door policy.

Not only did the dualized system for control of the national economy by the KWP and the Cabinet lead to inefficient and irrational management, but it also caused the ruin of the State’s finances and the national economy. Most of the economic interest projects that earned foreign currency by exporting resources were transferred from the Cabinet to the KWP as well as to the special power agencies—military, public security, and the judiciary—which were led by the senior high-profile executives personally close to Kim Jong-il, who jumped into the economic interest competition to gain their own shares. Finally, the Cabinet became a paper tiger, after foreign currency sources were acquired by others. The special finances owned by the special power agencies existed above the State finance owned by the Cabinet, and the Party finances dominated above all. All the foreign currency earned in exchange for selling natural resources flowed into the vaults of the special finances and the Party finances. Office 39, located at the center of the KWP’s finances, earned money from legal and illegal activities—including drug sales, counterfeiting, arms exports, and smuggling as well as economic aid from South Korea—to financially support the development of weapons of mass destruction, the operations in the South, Kim Jong-il’s governance as well as the super luxurious living standards and entertainment expenses of the Kim family.[20]

In order to secure new sources of foreign currency for the Cabinet, the North Korean authorities enacted the “DPRK Law on Equity Joint Venture” in 1984 to create joint ventures with foreign investors,[21] but they failed to earn enough money due to the lack of enabling investment conditions—including political closure, high risk, and poor social infrastructure. The national economy, which heavily depended on the raw materials and fuels imported from abroad, almost came to a halt due to the depletion of its foreign currency reserves, and it reached a point of collapse when the socialist markets of Eastern Europe were dismantled in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, the “second economy” in North Korea, which supplies arms, military equipment, and munitions of war to safeguard the regime and the permanent rule of the Kim family, was fully operational without interruption to make Kim Jong-il’s slush fund accounts overflow with money.[22]

Oblivious to the country's economic ruin and to his people starving to death due to the sudden collapse of the national food distribution system, which had been maintained for decades prior to his rule, Kim Jong-il was just anxious to build his own kingdom within the KWP. All he wanted was to waste precious foreign currency earned by his laborers to cement his power base. To him, the people were nothing more than pebbles on a sidewalk.

Third, Kim Jong-il transformed the KWP into a playboy group that kills time in backrooms.

The political skills of Kim Jong-il, or his “human governance technique,” can be characterized by: a) favoritism; b) gifting; and c) drinking parties. When Kim Jong-il first entered the political scene in North Korea, he had few close friends. Around him were only a few old politicians of Kim Il-sung’s age, who flattered him because he was a potential crown prince in the royal family, and a handful of alumni from Kim Il-sung University, who helped him in his academic life. His father had lots of old comrades-in-arms from the Manchurian guerilla days, on whom he relied to build his power base after liberation. However, Kim Jong-il had none of that. Social life within the KWP was initially a great challenge, as there were only a few new comrades who could support him.

In a series of books released by the KWP Publishing House, titled “For Illuminating the Juche Era,” there is a collection of memoirs written by the people who worked in various sectors of the Party, Government, and Military in the 1960s and 1970s, and had personal relationships with Kim Jong-il. These stories tell us that, at the time, the young dictator tried to gather a lot of people around him, using the power of his position in the KWP and his family background as Kim Il-sung’s son, even before his nomination as the successor. Later, many of them became close members of his “cronies’ club” and got promoted, assuming important positions in the Party, the State, and the Military. He classified the members of his club into different groups—people who understand him very well and know how to execute his wishes, people who are smart enough to know how to please him under different circumstances, people who are strong drinkers, and people who know how to lighten the atmosphere of drinking parties as well as people who are talented in singing and dancing. He knew well the strengths and weaknesses of each member. He assigned difficult tasks to good workers, invited strong drinkers to his parties, and wanted to be accompanied by the people who lightened his mood when he was embarking on his on-the-spot guidance tours.

Kim Jong-il used to offer gifts to his people on various occasions. By doing so, he wanted to gain their favor and manipulate them as he wished, to get support from the high-ranking officials in the Party, the State, and the Military. Of course, giftpolitik had existed already during the time of Kim Il-sung, too. But the type and scope of gifts offered by Kim Il-sung were limited to groceries and domestically-produced daily necessities, to help relieve them from the concerns of daily life. Contrary to his father, Kim Jong-il's gifts were hardly domestic products. They included Japanese groceries, and expensive items such as electronics, cosmetics, watches, and diamond rings. These were imported by the “Man-gyong-bong-ho” ship, which traveled regularly between Japan and North Korea. There were also high-priced luxury gifts of different types imported from Italy, Switzerland, the UK, and other European countries.

It is noteworthy in his giftpolitik that people of the same rank in the KWP did not receive the same gifts in terms of content, quality, or quantity, and each of them did not know what the others received, as the content, quality, and quantity of gifts received by each person were kept confidential. However, since they were living in the same community of high-class apartments in Changgwang-dong, Central District, Pyongyang, they could at least notice how big the gift boxes were for other people even if they did not know what was in those boxes. From the size and quantity of gift boxes that others received, they could understand their de facto individual position in the mind of Kim Jong-il. By differentiating people in his gifting politics, Kim Jong-il tried to make them greedier and stimulate their desire to become more loyal to him. The closer they were to the heart of the Dear Leader, the more special treatment and expensive gifts they received.

Kim Jong-il's gifting for his close “exclusive club” members and high-ranking officials did not stop there. A supply system for their families delivering food, groceries and other necessities was established inside the KWP, under the responsibility of the Finance and Accounting Department. Such supplies were provided on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis depending on the positions held by the respective officials. The contents of the supplies were kept confidential to the general public. However, the secret of these supplies was gradually exposed to the outside through their family members. The supplies included rare seafood from the Korean seas, rare natural medicinal plants, including decades-old wild ginseng, and natural energizers, including aphrodisiacs, such as the fresh genitals of animals to keep them sexually active at an old age.

The degree to which Kim Jong-il liked women and indulged in a prodigal night life was already revealed to the world by many witnesses, including his former chef, Kenji Fujimoto.[23] Almost all the people in North Korea are aware today of the responsibility assumed by Division No. Five of the KWP Organization and Guidance Department. This Division plays the same role as the Joseon Dynasty’s “Nae-myong-bu”, to select court ladies, including the masseuses, stewards, and bodyguards for the Kim family as well as entertaining ladies who were responsible for the dictator’s night life. The origin of “Ki-pum-jo” (Entertainment Group, also known as the “Joy Brigades”) was the special performance team earlier organized for Kim Il-sung under the name of “Man-su-mu-gang-jo” (Longevity Group), and composed of high-profile singers, dancers, and bands from the Mansudae Arts Troup, which was among the best performing arts groups in North Korea at the time. While guiding the work in the culture and arts fields in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Kim Jong-il set up this Group to entertain his old father. Kim Jong-il, who liked drinking and often organized parties with his close aides, felt that he needed a performance team for himself. He ordered Division No. Five to set up his own performance team, comprising teenage girls selected from all over the country.

“The taste of whiskey is not in its brand nor in the accompanying snack, but it is in the atmosphere, and the atmosphere is in women.” Kim Jong-il, who made this saying into a motto of his parties, brought his own entertainment girls, who were not professional artists, to his parties. The North Koreans who got to be aware of Kim Jong-il's depraved night life called his performance team the “Entertaining Group” behind his back, as opposed to Kim Il-sung's performance team called the "Longevity Group."

In fear that his night life would be known to the people, Kim Jong-il asked his party invitees to not be accompanied by their drivers when they came to the party venue. His invitees, who drank a lot at Kim Jong-il's party overnight, had to drive drunk to go back home in the early morning. At the time, the Rodong Shinmun often carried the obituaries of the high-ranking officials who died in car accidents, and people could count how often Kim Jong-il's drinking parties were held. Kim Jong-il's prodigal night life continued even in the 1990s, while people were starving to death and corpses were piling up, until he collapsed from a stroke in 2008.


The Pseudo-Religious Group Who Believed in the Kim Il-Sung Doctrine Is Being Disbanded

When I was born in North Korea in the 1960s, the first sentence I learned in my language was “Thank you, dear Father Marshal Kim Il-sung!” In my childhood, I said this out loud most often, any time in my school days—before eating snacks at the nursery and kindergarten or beginning classes at primary or middle schools. We stood upright in front of Kim Il-sung’s portrait hung up high on the front wall and recited it after our teacher before beginning our activities. Not knowing what to thank Kim Il-sung for, this gesture was taken for granted as part of our daily life.

My parents’ generation had been born in the 1920s–1930s during Japanese colonial rule and knew how painful life was when their homeland was lost to the foreign colonizers. Upon liberation, they felt grateful to Kim Il-sung, who raised their status to “masters of the country” by undertaking the land reform and a series of other democratic reforms. They remained blindly loyal to his leadership until the last moment of their life. On their last breath, however, they quietly confessed to us that life under the rule of the KWP had in no way been better than under Japanese rule. They lived in two social systems—that is, the semi-feudal and semi-capitalist system ruled by Japan up to liberation and the communist regime ruled by Kim Il-sung. They experienced the strengths and weaknesses of both systems.

On the other hand, my generation was brought up when socialism had already been established in North Korea.[24]From day one, we received brainwashing education and believed that Kim Il-sung was a God-like being we had to follow for our entire life. We were in the most sensitive and vulnerable age group in the late 1960s and in the 1970s, when the indoctrination supporting Kim Il-sung’s personality cult was in full swing in North Korea throughout our life, including education, literature, movies, and music. Our brain was injected with Kim Il-sung’s personality cult and our hearts were filled with blind loyalty to the Great Leader. We were ready to give up our lives anytime for him. The North Korean authorities isolated us from the outside world and spoiled our pure and innocent spirit with the Juche Idea, the essence of Kim Il-sung’s doctrine.

The North Korean authorities tried hard to possess our souls, but they could not completely ensnare our free spirits. From a certain point in our life, we, who so far had depended on Kim Il-sung as if he had been our God, woke up to doubt the social system in North Korea. Our minds and beliefs were shaken by our own life experience full of contradictions and information from the outside world. One question that bothered me all the time since childhood was this question: “If we lived in the world’s ideal regime, why weren’t we allowed to see, hear or experience the outside world, including capitalism, to compare ourselves to others?” I naturally guessed that there was something they wanted to hide and they did not want us to know about. Later, my exposure to the outside world helped me answer that question.

In the early 1990s, when socialist countries in Eastern Europe collapsed one after the other, and even China, a long-time ally of North Korea, took the path of reform and open-door policies, and established diplomatic relations with South Korea,[25] Kim Jong-il felt a sense of isolation. He published his works “Our Socialism Centered on the Popular Masses is Invincible”[26] and “Socialism is a Science,”[27] preaching that North Korean socialism was superior, in an attempt to block the mental deprivation and widespread agitation among the people. At the same time, he took extreme measures to stop TV broadcasting of all Chinese and old Russian films that were once allowed to some extent. However, the more Kim Jong-il tried to suppress people’s aspirations for freedom and to cover their eyes and ears, the more desire for freedom erupted in their minds and the thirstier they became for information from the outside world (see Diagram 1).


Diagram 1:

Interaction of Multiple Factors Affecting Human Behavioral Outcomes


In North Korean society, where the authorities decide how to shape education and the sociopolitical environment, information from the outside world and personal life experience are determinant factors of behavioral outcomes.

 




Source: Adapted from the Cognitive Learning Theory by the Peak Performance Center


Most people of my generation, who once fanatically believed the Kim Il-Sung doctrine, no longer believe in it today. The economic hardship and famine, also known as the “Arduous March” that hit the whole country in the mid-1990s, taught them a noble lesson in life: Nothing would be more foolish than believing once again the Leader, the Party, and the State. Death is a better alternative to believing them.

Nine million people, accounting for 35 percent of the total population of North Korea, were born after Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994. Of these, 3.4 million, or 38 percent, were born after Kim Jong-il died in 2011.[28] They have never seen one or both of them, and they have not been ruled by either of them. In addition, they have learned from life experience that they can only rely on the market to survive over trusting the Party and the State. How could they be convinced that Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il are great leaders who built a human paradise in this country?

I can say for sure that today's North Korea is no longer the same pseudo-religious group that once believed in the Kim Il-Sung doctrine. If the tears shed by the North Korean people in 1994 upon Kim Il-sung’s death contained a little sincerity, their tears in 2011 when Kim Jong-il died were not sincere at all. Rather, these tears contained mixed feelings of resentment for the late dictator, who had enjoyed alone for so many years all the wealth of the country while impoverishing and ruining his people, and of hope that the young leader would be somewhat different from his father.


Conclusion

North Korea has been put under the dictatorial and incompetent rule of Kim Il-sung’s family for three generations in a row. The current dictator, Kim Jong-un, far exceeds his predecessors in terms of brutality and violence. After experiencing his dictatorship for over nine years, the North Korean people have abandoned any expectation or hope in their future and have realized that the only way out is regime change.

One of the things that I envied the most in the Free World is the right of citizens to freely express their will by casting ballots. I am genuinely fascinated by the beauty of democratic states that allow citizens to elect by democratic means their preferred candidates as statesmen or representatives or dismiss them if they failed to meet their expectations.

North Korea should no longer be ruled by any member of the Kim family. The old hereditary system established by Kim Il-sung must end and be replaced with a new system that will allow North Korean citizens to elect a leader according to their free will and choice in order to realize social and democratic changes by themselves. Myself, I will contribute the little strength that I have and my limited capacity to this cause.



Annex I:

Ten Principles for the Establishment of the Party’s Monolithic Leadership System [29]


(Short version)

In order to honor forever our great leaders Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, to remain loyal to them as well as to inherit and complete the causes of Kim Il-sung-ism and Kim Jong-il-ism under the Party’s guidance, we must firmly adhere to the following Ten Principles aimed to Establish the Monolithic Leadership System of the Party:
  1. We must dedicate our life to the struggle aimed to transform the whole society in accordance with the requirements of the Kim Il-sung-ism and Kim Jong-il-ism;
  2. We must hold high the great leaders Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il as eternal leaders of our Party and people, and as the Sun of Juche;
  3. We must sanctify and defend to our death the supreme authority of the great leaders Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, and the authority of the Party;
  4. We must equip ourselves with the revolutionary ideology of the great leaders Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, and its ensuing guidelines and policies of the Party;
  5. We must follow every teaching from the great leaders Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il and implement unconditionally the guidelines and policies of the Party;
  6. We must strengthen once for all the ideological and moral cohesion and the revolutionary unity of the Party, centered on the supreme leader;
  7. We must learn from the examples of the great leaders Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il to possess a high intellectual and moral qualification, a revolutionary working manner, and a people-centered working style;
  8. We must value the political life we were given by the Party and the great leaders, and repay their confidence and consideration with due political awareness and high scores of work performance;
  9. We must establish within the whole Party, the whole country and the entire army a strong organizational rule for moving forward all together under the monolithic leadership of the Party.
  10. We must inherit across generations and complete to the end the revolutionary cause of Juche and the revolutionary cause of Son-gun (military first), pioneered by the great leader Kim Il-sung and advanced by both comrades Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.
All the officials, Party members and workers must establish thoroughly the monolithic leadership system of the Party, holding high the great leaders Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il as eternal leaders of our Party and people, and vigorously advancing on the path of independence, the path of Son-gun, and the path of socialism under the leadership of the Party. As a result, we must complete to the end the revolutionary cause of Juche and the revolutionary cause of Songun, pioneered in the Mount Baekdu.


Annex II:

Specialized Department System of the Korean Workers' Party’s Secretariat under Kim Jong-il’s Rule, from the 1960s to the 2000s



* Doesn’t exist anymore today.  

(1) Renamed “Defense Industry Department”.

(2) Renamed “Economic Department”.

(3) Merged into the Office 39.

(4) Also known as “Office 35”, this was moved to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.

(5) Moved to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.

(6) Moved to the Cabinet.

(7) Renamed “Military Political Affairs Department”.

(8) Abolished after the execution of Jang Song-taek and re-established under the new name “Justice Department”.


[1] Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, this year’s holiday is likely to be celebrated in a reduced format.

[2] Kimjongilia is a new perennial begonia named after Kim Jong-il by a Japanese botanist in 1988.

[3] In North Korea, people born between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s are referred to as “baby boomers.”

[4] Unless otherwise noted, all content in this article is based on the author’s knowledge and life experience in North Korea.

[5] According to the DPRK Socialist Constitution, amended in 2019, the chairman of the State Affairs Commission, who represents the DPRK, should be elected with a five-year term of office by the Supreme People's Assembly.

[6] In North Korea, the State (executive branch) includes the Cabinet in charge of economic and socio-cultural development, and the four special power agencies - Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of State Security, and Ministry of Social Security - in charge of diplomacy, national security and defense. Kim Il-sung was Prime Minister of the Cabinet until December 1972. Since then, the Kim family members have no longer assumed the responsibility of the Cabinet.

[7] The "Ten Principles for the Establishment of the Party’s Monolithic Ideological System”, published in 1974, has been amended in 2013 under the new name of "Ten Principles for the Establishment of the Party’s Monolithic Leadership System".

[8] The third qualification implies that any successor’s qualifications have to be verified by the people. However, since the people are not in a position to elect directly a successor, this is just meaningless rhetoric.

[9] The need for a successor who inherits and completes the revolutionary cause implies that he or she should not be the same generation as the previous leader.

[10] Chapter 1, Article 4 of the DPRK Socialist Constitution.

[11] Based on the North Korean version of Kim Jong-il's Revolutionary Activities.

[12] By calling them “side branches,” Kim Jong-il wanted to make himself the only “original branch” of the Kim family, within the Baekdu bloodline.

[13] Kim Song-ae's eldest son, Kim Pyong-il, was sent to Yugoslavia as assistant military attaché in 1979, and continued his diplomatic career as DPRK ambassador for various countries, such as Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland, and the Czech Republic, until he was repatriated in 2019. Her second son, Kim Yong-il, was sent to Germany in 1995 as councilor and died in 2000. Her daughter, Kim Gyong-jin, is known to have lived abroad for a long time with her husband, who was appointed as DPRK ambassador to the Czech Republic and Austria, until repatriating in 2020.

[14] Kim Dong-gyu, vice-president of the DPRK, was accused for having already surrendered to Japan during his anti-Japanese struggle, and spying for Japan using his high-ranking positions.

[15] As mentioned below, Kim Jong-il's power over the Cabinet was exercised in an indirect manner by controlling the specialized departments of the KWP.

[16] Kim Il-sung elaborated that communism can be achieved through strengthening the people’s power organizations and implementing the Three Revolutions—ideological, technical, and cultural. Earlier on, Lenin defined that communism was Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country (symbol of industrialization).

[17] Korea Institute for National Unification KINU “Research Series 11-4: A Comprehensive Study on Changes in the Organizational Status and Culture by Sector in North Korea”.

[18] When Kim Jong-un appeared on the political scene in 2009, the departments in charge of affairs with the South, except the Unified Front Department, were transferred under the People's Army Reconnaissance General Bureau or the Cabinet.

[19] Economic enterprises were classified into four categories – i.e. special, first, second and third enterprises - depending on the size of production and a Party committee existed in each enterprise.

[20] In the 1970s and onwards, the Office 38 and the Office 39 existed within the KWP to create a slush fund necessary for the luxurious living of the Kim family and financing Kim Jong-il's rule. The former earned foreign currency mainly through the operation of domestic hotels, foreign currency stores, and tourist facilities, while the latter earned foreign currency by exporting domestic resources – i.e. underground natural resources, ground and fishery resources. The Office 38 has recently been merged into the Office 39.

[21] Democratic People's Republic of Korea Joint Venture Act, 1984. Available at: https://www.tongilnews.com/bbs/view.html?idxno=275594&sc_category=1

[22] The “Committee for the Second Economy” overseeing all the transactions of the North Korean military economy was established in the early 1970s under the KWP. It originated from the Ministry of Machinery Industry No. Two that existed under the Cabinet in the 1960s after Kim Il-sung advanced a policy line to develop simultaneously the civil and military economies at a KWP meeting in 1966.  In North Korea, the national economy under the Cabinet’s responsibility is unofficially called the “First Economy” and the economy under Office 39’s responsibility is called the “Third Economy”.

[23] Through his memoir "I Was Kim Jong-il's Chef" published in 2003, Kenji Fujimoto informed the world of Kim Jong-il's luxurious life based on his own experience.

[24] In the post-war period, Kim Il-sung created agricultural cooperatives, carried out socialist reforms of productive relationships and the Chollima Movement, and, in August 1958, declared the establishment of the socialist system.

[25] South Korea and China established Ambassador-level diplomatic relations on August 24, 1992, after the establishment of the Trade Representative Offices in 1991.

[26] Based on the dialogue of Kim Jong-il with the KWP senior officials on May 5, 1991.

[27] Published in Rodong Shinmun on November 1, 1994.

[28] Estimated on the basis of the demographic data from United Nations Population Prospects 2019.

[29] Translated by the author from the original Korean version.