February 23, 2021

What is Wrong with the Anti-Leafleting Law?

Seminar organized by the People Power Party
ROK National Assembly

Opening Remarks by Greg Scarlatoiu
Executive Director, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea
Monday, February 22, 2021




Distinguished Representative Joo Ho-young, Distinguished Assemblyman Cho Taeyong, Distinguished Assemblyman Ji Seong-ho, Esteemed Participants, Friends and Colleagues,

Thank you for the invitation to give brief remarks today. Let me begin by congratulating Assemblyman Cho on this bold initiative. It comes at a time when North Korean human rights defenders face unprecedented pressure in the Republic of Korea.

For 73 years, three generations of the Kim family regime have exercised draconian control of the North Korean population through overwhelming coercion, surveillance and punishment. Information control has been at the center of the regime’s totalitarian grip on power. And yet, for more than two decades, information from the outside world has been slowly, but surely piercing through North Korea’s information firewall. The number of North Koreans who watch American and South Korean movies and come in contact with Hallyu, K-pop, and South Korean TV dramas has been on the rise. And yet the number of vehicles available to deliver such content has been limited: radio broadcasting, micro-SD cards, USBs and other portable media devices sold at North Korea’s black markets, rice bottles and leaflet balloons. Removing any one of these vehicles will significantly impact the volume of information that enters North Korea.

Do all leaflet balloons launched from the South reach North Korea? If the launch is timed properly, taking into account wind speed and direction, yes. Is it possible to track them all the way to the landing grounds? Yes, through GPS and other tracking devices. Do some leaflet balloons end up elsewhere? Yes, if the launch is not prepared or timed correctly. Do the leaflets, movies, K-drama, Bibles, and cash sent via leaflet balloons have an impact? Absolutely. Eighty percent of the 1.2 million-strong North Korean military is forward-deployed, south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. Large parts of the area between that line and the DMZ are within reach. And even if only officers and NCOs were to read the leaflets, the impact would be significant. That is one possible reason why the North Korean regime and its propaganda so adamantly demanded that the balloon launches be banned.

Currently, under the pretext of COVID prevention, the North Korean regime is tightening control over its population. For the past few years, it has employed new content, new technologies as well as judicial and extra-judicial punishment to counter information from the outside world. Most recently, it has enacted draconian laws to punish those who circulate and access such information. The outside world, including South Korea, should answer by increasing, not decreasing the amount of information or the number of information delivery vehicles involved.

The role of information sent into North Korea is critical. Such information must highlight the sharp disconnect between the North Korean regime’s propaganda and the real lives of North Koreans. Such information must empower the people of North Korea and enable them to pierce through the veil of DPRK regime indoctrination and control, by: 1. Highlighting the fundamental contradiction between the DPRK’s Constitution, other legislation and obligations pursuant to international law and treaties on the one hand, and the regime’s propaganda on the other. 2. Explaining to the people of North Korea human rights and their egregious human rights situation. 3. Focusing on the corruption of the DPRK regime, in particular the inner core of the Kim family; and 4. Featuring the story of the outside world, especially free, prosperous, democratic South Korea.

On February 14, in response to a call by the ROK Ministry of Unification, my organization submitted a legal opinion on the “Anti-Leafleting Law,” authored by my colleague Amanda Morwedt Oh, HRNK human rights attorney, and our pro bono counsel.

The memo finds that South Korea’s Amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act (the “Amendment”) violates ROK domestic and international legal obligations, namely the Constitution of the Republic of Korea and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The Amendment infringes on international human rights, including the freedoms of expression, thought, conscience, religion, assembly, and association. The Amendment is flawed in its statutory construction, poses jurisdictional considerations, infringes on fundamental rights, and is excessively punitive. Ultimately, the Amendment unnecessarily targets North Korean escapee groups working to send information, goods, and remittances to their fellow people and families in the North. If entered into force on March 30, 2021, this Amendment will also create second-order effects on the already vulnerable and oppressed North Korean people. The Amendment is a matter of grave concern for international human rights organizations.

Moreover, the Amendment runs counter to the idea that the U.S.-South Korea alliance is grounded in shared values, straining a staunch alliance, partnership, and friendship that has been so resilient for almost seven decades. The U.S. North Korean Human Rights Act, due for reauthorization again soon, will need to be reviewed more closely to find ways to factor in conditions created by the Amendment.

Without human rights, there can be no reconciliation, no peace, no prosperity for Koreans living in the north, and no unification. Positive change can be enacted only by the people of North Korea. In order to empower them, the best South Korea and the outside world can do is to increase the volume and quality of information as well as the range of vehicles available to deliver that information. This Amendment should be repealed before it goes into force on March 30, 2021.

Thank you very much.

February 19, 2021

Legal Opinion: Whether the Republic of Korea (ROK)’s Amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act (“Anti-Leaflet Law”) violates ROK domestic or international legal obligations

February 14, 2021


Authors:
HRNK Pro Bono Counsel
And
Amanda Mortwedt Oh, HRNK Human Rights Attorney


Summary

South Korea’s Amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act (the “Amendment”) violates ROK domestic and international legal obligations, namely the Constitution of the Republic of Korea and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The Amendment to the law is flawed in its statutory construction, poses jurisdictional considerations, infringes on fundamental rights, is excessively punitive, and has implications on existing inter-Korean agreements. The Amendment also infringes on international human rights, including the freedoms of expression, thought, conscience and religion, and assembly and association. Ultimately, the Amendment unnecessarily targets North Korean escapee groups working to send information, goods, and remittances to their fellow people and families in the North. If entered into force on March 30, 2021, this Amendment will also create second-order effects on the already vulnerable and oppressed North Korean people under the totalitarian rule of Kim Jong-un.


Background

1. On February 10, 2005, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“DPRK” or “North Korea”) under Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un’s father and son of Kim Il-sung, declared itself a nuclear state,[1] having developed nuclear weapons during ROK Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun’s administrations. On December 29, 2005, the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act was first enacted under President Roh, who had continued the Sunshine Policy of his predecessor Kim Dae-jung.[2] Current ROK President Moon Jae-In worked as President Roh’s chief of staff from 2007 to 2008.

2. On April 27, 2018, President Moon and Chairman Kim Jong-un signed the Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula (“Panmunjom Declaration”).[3]

Article 2 of the Panmunjom Declaration states:

2. The two sides will make joint efforts to defuse the acute military tensions and to substantially remove the danger of a war on the Korean peninsula.
Alleviating the military tension and eliminating the danger of war is a very important issue related to the destiny of the nation and a very crucial issue for ensuring peaceful and stable life of the Koreans.

① The two sides agreed to completely cease all hostile acts against each other in every domain including land, sea and air that are the root cause of military tension and conflicts.
For the present, they agreed to stop all the hostile acts including the loud-speaker broadcasting and scattering of leaflets in the areas along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) from May 1, to dismantle their means, and further to transform the DMZ into a peace zone in a genuine sense.

3. On September 19, 2018, President Moon and Chairman Kim Jong-un signed the Pyongyang Joint Declaration,[4]adopting the Agreement on the Implementation of the Military Consensus in the Panmunjom Declaration (“Comprehensive Military Agreement” (CMA) or “9.19 Military Agreement”) as an annex to the Pyongyang Declaration.[5] The Pyongyang Declaration’s stated purpose, in part, was to “assess the excellent progress” since the two leaders signed the Panmunjom Declaration.

4. The CMA is an inter-Korean bilateral agreement at a ‘military level’ to ‘ease tension’ and ‘build trust’ between North and South Korea in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). CMA paragraph 1 says the two sides agree to cease all hostile acts, and CMA Annex 4, 1(3)(3) specifically prohibits “psychological warfare” in the “maritime peace zone.”

5. On June 4, 2020, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s sister, Kim Yo-jong, “strongly criticized escapees living in the Republic of Korea for sending anti-leadership leaflets to the North. She also demanded that the Republic of Korea “at least make a law to stop the farce”, in accordance with the Panmunjom Declaration in which both sides agreed to cease all hostile acts, including the distribution of leaflets in the areas along the Military Demarcation Line.”[6]

6. On June 13, 2020, Kim Yo-jong stated that the DPRK would end the military agreement (CMA), “‘which is hardly of any value,’ while calling North Korean defectors who send leaflets from the South ‘human scum’ and ‘mongrel dogs.’”[7]

7. On June 16, 2020, North Korea blew up the joint liaison office in the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The liaison office was situated in North Korea’s territory but built with South Korean funds, designed to facilitate dialogue between the two countries. “North Korea claimed the leaflets violated the deal Kim Jong-un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in struck in 2018 at their first summit, when both leaders agreed to cease ‘all hostile acts and eliminating their means, including broadcasting through loudspeakers and distribution of leaflets’ along their shared border.”[8]

8. Four hours later, the ROK Blue House announced that it would investigate those who disseminated leaflets into North Korea and would continue to uphold the 4.27 Panmunjom Declaration and 9.19 Military Agreement.[9]

9. ROK National Assemblyman and ruling Democratic Party lawmaker Song Young-gil, chair of the Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee, proposed an amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act. This Amendment was passed by South Korea’s National Assembly on December 14, 2020 and was signed into law by President Moon Jae-In on December 29, 2020. It will enter into force on March 30, 2021.[10]

10. According to North Korean human rights civil society organizations and former and current officials in South Korea, “The Song Young-Gil Amendment (North Korean Information Gag Law) criminalizes (1) broadcasting of loudspeakers and posting of placards directed at North Korea in the inter-Korean border area, (2) distribution of “leaflets, etc.” to unspecified multiple persons in North Korea for the purpose of propaganda, gifts, etc. without governmental approval, and (3) movement of “leaflets, etc.” to North Korea for the purpose of propaganda, gifts, etc., including simply moving “leaflets, etc.” via a third country, without governmental approval. While the first category applies only to activities in the inter-Korean border area, the latter two have no such geographical restriction. “The leaflets, etc.” are defined broadly and vaguely to include not only leaflets but also USB flash drives and CDs, books and other publications, humanitarian aid or money. All these offenses as well as attempted offenses are punishable up to 3 years imprisonment or 30 million KRW fine.” [approximately $27,173 USD][11]

11. According to Assemblyman Song Young-gil and Gyeonggi Province Governor Lee Jae-Myung, the Amendment is necessary to ensure the safety and security of Koreans living in the border area.[12]


ROK Domestic Legal Obligations

As written, the Amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act gives rise to several legal issues. The key provisions of the Amendment are as follows:[13]

Article 4


(5) “Leaflets or other items” are defined as, items (including but not limited to advertising propaganda materials, printed materials, auxiliary memory units), cash and other property profits.

(6) “Dissemination” is defined as distributing leaflets to unspecified individuals in North Korea or moving them to North Korea (including the simple movement of leaflets and other items via a third country) without obtaining approval under Article 13 or 20 of “Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act” for the purpose of propaganda, donation, etc.

Article 24 (Prohibition of Violation of the Inter-Korean Agreement)

(1) No person shall harm the lives or bodies of the people or cause serious danger by doing any of the following activities:

1. Loudspeaker broadcasting toward North Korea in areas along the Military Demarcation Line.

2. Posting visual media (posts) toward North Korea in areas along the Military Demarcation Line.

3. Disseminating leaflets or other items.

(2) The Minister of Unification may, if necessary to prevent prohibited activities under each subparagraph of paragraph (1), request cooperation from the head of the relevant central administrative agency or the head of a local government. In such cases, the head of the relevant central administrative agency or the head of a local government shall cooperate, except in extenuating circumstances.

Article 25 (Penalty Provisions)

(1) Any person who has violated Article 24:

1. Shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 3 years or by fine not exceeding 30 million won. However, the provision shall not apply when South-North Korean agreements are suspended (this shall be limited to actions prohibited by Article 24(1)) based on Article 23(2) and (3).

2. A person who has attempted any crime under paragraph (1) shall be punished.


I. Statutory Analysis & Jurisdictional Considerations

The first issue with these provisions as written pertains to the definition of “leaflets or other items” and how it is used in the context of Article 24. The ROK Ministry of Unification (the “MOU”) claimed that the Amendment had to be passed in order to protect its residents in the border region and improve inter-Korean relations and peace on the peninsula.[14] Indeed, the MOU announced that it would plan such legislation just hours after Kim Yo-jong’s blistering statements against the leaflets in the border region, evidently to meet North Korea’s demands.[15] Putting the political and policy-related merits of such a decision aside, the Amendment goes much farther than what it was seemingly intended to achieve.

Unlike Articles 24(1)1 and 2, the prohibition on disseminating leaflets or other items (Article 24(1)3) is not constrained to the “areas along the Military Demarcation Line” (MDL). The provided definition of “dissemination” explicitly includes “the simple movement of leaflets and other items via a third country.” A plain reading of Article 4 and 24 suggests that the dissemination of leaflets or other items from a location other than the MDL would also be criminalized by the Amendment. The MOU released an interpretive guidance of sorts after the Amendment was passed to explain that “‘leaflets sent to North Korea simply via a third county’ refers to an exceptional case in which leaflets and other items scattered from South Korea are sent to North Korea via a third country due to tidal current or air current.”[16]Geographical and logistical realities suggest that the only realistic location other than South Korea from which leaflets or other items can be sent into North Korea is China via its border with North Korea. It seems that any dissemination of leaflets or other items into North Korea through the Sino-North Korea border is also criminalized by the Amendment, which appears to overshoot the legislative intent.

Even beyond the lack of geographical constraints, the list of items that are included in the definition of “leaflets or other items” seems to go beyond the goal and stated purpose of the Amendment. The definition includes any printed materials, auxiliary memory units, cash and “other property profits,” and the MOU has explained that such items were included because many balloons that carry leaflets contain such items. But effectively, such prohibition would arguably include (but not be limited to) the following items, many of which were not the subject of Kim Yo-jong’s stated objections: books, foreign news publications, religious literatures, humanitarian aid such as food, medicine and clothing, mini-radios, and multimedia units such as VHS, CD/DVD, and cassette tapes. This means that parties like humanitarian workers, religious missionaries, civil society organizations, and even individuals that want to send cash remittances to family members in North Korea could get swept up by the Amendment.

As if the implications were not already massive enough, another layer of consideration is that the reach of the ROK’s criminal jurisdiction appears expansive. The general provisions in the ROK’s criminal code can be applied to “both Korean nationals and aliens who commit crimes in the territory of the Republic of Korea,”[17] “all Korean nationals who commit crimes outside the territory of the Republic of Korea,”[18] “aliens who commit crimes on board a Korean vessel or Korean aircraft outside the territory of the Republic of Korea,”[19] aliens who commit a specified list of crimes outside the territory of the Republic of Korea,[20] and “aliens who commit crimes […] against the Republic of Korea or her nationals outside the territory of the Republic of Korea.”[21] Especially as technological advances may allow for various kinds of electronic dissemination of “leaflets or other items” into North Korea in the future, Korean nationals and foreign nationals anywhere in the world may arguably be criminalized by the Amendment, and it is hard to justify prohibiting items and activities that have little to no implications for the inter-Korean border area.

The ROK government would likely say that many of these humanitarian or religious activities unrelated to leafletting would be exempt because they do not “harm the lives or bodies of the people or cause serious danger” in the same way that leafletting does. However, the same argument applies to leafletting. The dissemination of leaflets is arguably not the root cause of the harm or serious danger referenced by the Amendment, any more than the provision of humanitarian services or cash remittances is, and the Amendment seems to implicitly acknowledge this fact—as written, the dissemination of leaflets or other items seems to be a crime only if it results in such harm or serious danger. In actuality, the threat to national security, civilians’ safety, or public order that the ROK government seeks to mitigate stems from a byproduct of the leafletting: North Korea’s provocative statements and hostile postures in relation to the leafletting. In effect, the Amendment is not imposing a criminal punishment on a person for committing a specific act; instead, the criminalized act depends on a reaction from a third party. Indeed, the MOU’s interpretive guidance states that “punishment can be inflicted only when there is an action of disseminating leaflets, and when the actions pose serious danger to the lives and safety of our nationals.”[22]

As such, North Korea’s reactions to leafletting and any complaints and threats that it may communicate about other activities may very well be the biggest determinant in what is ultimately legislated and enforced as crimes under the Amendment—and given North Korea’s penchant for unpredictability and volatility, this is not a sound approach to criminal law. In fairness, the act of leafletting at the MDL did result in a skirmish in 2014 that involved North Korea firing an anti-aircraft gun to shoot down balloons from South Korea carrying leaflets and the ROK army firing back,[23] which cannot be said for most comparable humanitarian activities. However, this was an incident from over six years ago that is, tragically, not unfamiliar to the MDL, and it did not harm any South Korean citizens in the border regions. Though the MOU cites this incident as an important backdrop to the Amendment, this is not a strong justification given the rights that it infringes upon.


II. Infringement of Fundamental Rights

Because even if it were true, however, that the act of disseminating leaflets or other items is being punished by its own merits independent of a reaction from North Korea, this raises other issues. The ROK Constitution states that “all citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech and the press, and freedom of assembly and association.”[24] As the ROK government has noted in its defense of the Amendment,[25] however, such freedom of expression is not unlimited, as the ROK Constitution also states, “The freedoms and rights of citizens may be restricted by law only when necessary for national security, the maintenance of law and order or for public welfare. Even when such restriction is imposed, no essential aspect of the freedom or right shall be violated.”[26] The Amendment, however, is not an appropriate restriction and curtailment of the free expression rights guaranteed in the ROK Constitution, for many of the reasons outlined above and because it falls short of the long-standing international legal principles of necessity and proportionality as they pertain to restrictions on fundamental rights.[27]

The necessity of the Amendment is questionable and unclear. There is no declared emergency, and given the historical backdrop of inter-Korean relations, any current “tension” claimed by the ROK government is not beyond normal bounds; the last realized danger to lives and bodies due to leafletting took place in 2014 which resulted in zero injuries or casualties—there is no “direct and immediate connection between the expression and the threat.”[28] In fact, it seems that a separate law like the Amendment is not needed in order to maintain peace and order near the MDL. In the MOU’s defense of the Amendment, it cites a ROK Supreme Court ruling from 2016, which “ruled that freedom of expression cannot be guaranteed under the Constitution for the flying of leaflets which threatens the safety and lives of the people,”[29] and the ROK government claims that it is simply codifying this ruling into law. However, the fuller passage of the ruling presents far more nuance. The ruling, rather than endorsing the criminalization of leafletting by law, states that police officers and military personnel “may restrain the act of flying of balloons carrying anti-North leaflets in response to such a clear and present danger if it creates the said danger in accordance with article 5 (1) of the Act on the Performance of Duties by Police Officers or article 761 (2) of the Civil Code and, provided that the said restriction is not excessive, such restraining act cannot be considered unlawful.”[30] This ruling actually cuts against the ROK government’s argument, as enforcement personnel already have the authority to respond to any clear and present dangers, even without the Amendment.

But even if such a legislation were necessary, the Amendment also falls short of the proportionality principle. A central tenet of proportionality requires consideration as to whether any government restriction is the “least restrictive means” for achieving the relevant purpose.[31] As discussed above, the Amendment’s definition of “leaflets or other items” is left ambiguous and wanting: it essentially amounts to “items, cash, and other property profits” with “items” supplemented by a parenthetical of non-exhaustive examples and “other property profits” left vague. In addition, the leaflet-related prohibition lacks a tailored geographical scope, and these aspects combine to create a government response that is not the “least restrictive means.”[32]


III. Excessive Punishment

Even the prescribed punishments seem to be incongruent with the prohibited act. Article 25(1)1 prescribes a punishment “by imprisonment for not more than 3 years or by fine not exceeding 30 million won” for offenders of the Amendment. The MOU justifies this by explaining that it is “the same level of punishment applied to the unapproved taking out or bringing in of goods between the two Koreas based on the ‘Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act,’”[33] and the definition of “dissemination” specifically cites Articles 13 and 20 of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act. The issue, however, is that the acts being punished by the Amendment and the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act are very different in nature. Article 13 relates to the taking out or bringing in of goods between the Koreas “for the purposes of sale, exchange, lease, loan for use, donation, use, etc.” (as specified by Article 2.3), and Article 20 relates to the operation of transportation equipment (defined as “any ship, aircraft, railroad vehicles, or motor vehicles, etc.”).[34] These relevant sections of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act deal with the transport of goods for mostly commercial purposes, which may justify a punishment that involves imprisonment and a hefty fine. On the other hand, the Amendment prohibits leafletting and the sharing of information, which is, at its core, an exercise of one’s right to freedom of expression. Tomás Ojea Quintana, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, states that the punishment of imprisonment may violate the proportionality principle, and such a penalty “seems to be excessive for actions which are based on the exercise of the freedom of expression, [a] cornerstone for [a] democratic society. The bill doesn’t provide reasons to justify the use of this criminal punishment instead of sanctions from other branches of the law.”[35]


IV. Implications of Existing Inter-Korean Agreements

The MOU also cites to various other inter-Korean agreements meant to promote peace on the peninsula and improve relations between the Koreas, to show that the two countries agreed to ban mutual slander and leaflet drops on multiple occasions and that the Amendment merely seeks to codify such existing inter-Korean agreements.[36] For example, Article 2.1 of the Panmunjom Declaration of 2018 states, “The two sides agreed to completely cease all hostile acts against each other in every domain including land, sea and air that are the root cause of military tension and conflicts. For the present, they agreed to stop all the hostile acts including the loud-speaker broadcasting and scattering of leaflets in the areas along the Military Demarcation Line.”[37]

However, this argument is also problematic. For one, such agreements place obligations on the DPRK and ROK governments without reference to actions by private parties; it is not clear that such bilateral agreements can allow the ROK to opt out of its constitutional and international obligations to respect and observe fundamental human rights norms, such as the freedom of expression. But even if this were not an issue, the Panmunjom Declaration specifies the geographic scope of the countries’ respective obligations to the areas along the MDL. As discussed above, the Amendment provides no such limitation for leafletting.


ROK International Legal Obligations

In addition to the issues identified above–statutory and jurisdictional considerations, infringement on fundamental rights, excessive punishments, and implications of existing inter-Korean agreements–the Amendment gives rise to several international legal issues based on the ROK’s international human rights treaty obligations and United Nations (UN) membership. 


V. Contravention of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

As a UN Member State, South Korea has agreed to support the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), recognizing that “the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”[38] Enshrined in the UDHR are the right to freedom of thought, conscious or religion (Article 18), the right to freedom of opinion and expression (Article 19), and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association (Article 20). As discussed in part above, the Amendment contravenes the right to freedom of opinion and expression by prohibiting “leaflets, etc.” from being “disseminated” to North Korea. In addition, for private citizens who are sending Bibles or religious materials to North Koreans–who have no right to practice their own religion or have their own beliefs–the Amendment infringes on the right to freedom of thought, conscious or religion. South Koreans or others imparting information or religious materials into North Korea are restricted from this practice in contravention of the UDHR. Moreover, the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association is restricted by this Amendment. Organizations dedicated to gathering and sending information, goods, such as USBs, or financial support back home would be unable to safely carry out their activities under the Amendment as written.


VI. Violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

On April 10, 1990, South Korea acceded to the ICCPR.[39] As a signatory to the ICCPR, the South Korean government is obligated to uphold and not violate certain human rights for South Korean citizens. The relevant provisions of the ICCPR are as follows:[40]

Article 18

1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.

2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.

3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.

Article 19

1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.

2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.

3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:

(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;

(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.

Article 22

1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on members of the armed forces and of the police in their exercise of this right.

3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or to apply the law in such a manner as to prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that Convention.

As such, three fundamental human rights are infringed upon by the Amendment: (1) the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 18); (2) the right to freedom of expression (Article 19); and (3) the right to freedom of association with others (Article 22). Like the arguments discussed in the domestic application of the Amendment, the South Korean state has a duty to uphold and protect these rights, and the justifications and responses by the ROK government are not adequate or appropriate here. While the original issue may have been, as alleged by North Korea, the content of leaflets, the Amendment overreaches in its response and application to North Korea’s illegal, escalatory, and threatening acts and statements. Other items, types of information, and remittances are sent into North Korea for the benefit of a vulnerable and severely repressed people. This often includes religious materials, and the ROK government’s blanket ban on “leaflets, etc.”, as a result, infringes on people’s rights in the South to freedom of religion.

Furthermore, North Korea has an “absolute monopoly on information and total control over organized social life,”[41] yet civil society organizations in South Korea and elsewhere seek to impart information on this repressed society, as they know the potential impacts information of the outside world may have on their North Korean brothers and sisters. People have a fundamental human right to express themselves without interference and to not only receive information, but to “impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” This is what civil society organizations are doing when they send leaflets, however they may be perceived by a government.

As previously mentioned, South Korea may restrict such activity for national security or public safety reasons, but there has only been one incident or cause for alarm made by North Korea. As Special Rapporteur Quintana stated,

Limitations to freedom of expression further require to justify a clear necessity, in particular by establishing a direct and immediate connection between the expression and the threat. In this regard, the necessity to prevent harm to the life or bodies of people or serious damages in border areas is a legitimate purpose. However, it has not been demonstrated a direct and immediate connection between all cross-border actions of civil society organizations and that kind of threat, other than the scattering of leaflets some years ago.[42]

Likewise, the CMA clearly is a bilateral military agreement between North and South Korea, and as such, does not apply to private citizens sending in “leaflets, etc.” Nevertheless, while a State may impose certain restrictions “as necessary,” there are already restrictions in place in the MDL and a police force that has, at times, taken steps “as necessary” to prohibit leaflets from being sent into North Korea, as previously outlined above. There is no appropriate justification to now ban all leaflets, goods, and remittances from being sent into North Korea, especially since this overbroad and unnecessarily restrictive and punitive legislation infringes on fundamental human rights.

Necessarily, some of these activities to send in information, goods, and remittances, involve more than one person joined together in collective action to pursue their interests, which implicates the right to freedom of association. Groups, civil society organizations, and families may work together to send their loved ones in the North support, whether it be monetary or information based. Sadly, due to the severe human rights restrictions in North Korea, South Koreans and others have little choice in the means in which they send their love and support home, but they are often joined together in South Korea by their shared desire to improve the lives of their loved ones. This Amendment would restrict their ability to gather and associate under a common mission and spirit.

In addition, the Amendment’s Article 25 (Penalty Provisions) ensures a harm calculus based on North Korea’s acts, not on those of the information sender. Without question, this targets North Korean escapees and other private citizens, rather than addressing the fundamental issue—North Korea’s disrespect for its international and bilateral agreements and its severe restrictions on human rights, at times constituting crimes against humanity.[43] Moreover, the principles of proportionality and necessity are violated with the Amendment, as discussed in the domestic portion of this memo and by Special Rapporteur Quintana. South Korea already has means to restrict leaflets in the MDL as warranted, and this Amendment unnecessarily criminalizes such behavior deemed by the Amendment as illegal (and by North Korea as hostile).

Of course, the Amendment is not just about leaflets, as the National Assembly had to clarify that “leaflets, etc.” mean flyers, goods (including advertisements and propaganda materials, printed materials, auxiliary memory devices, etc.) and money or other property profits. In fact, while strong legal arguments have been made to argue that the Amendment violates ROK domestic and international legal obligations, this Amendment is largely a political issue and therefore a matter of policy. Not only does this Amendment hurt North Korean escapees and South Korean civil society organizations in its infringements on human rights guaranteed by the ROK Constitution and the ICCPR–which in itself should be too heavy of a price to pay for appeasing the North–it creates second-order effects on innocent North Koreans who depend on these goods and remittances to survive and on information to join the rest of the world—despite being born under a regime that views information and upholding human rights in general as a threat to regime survival.


Policy Considerations

The people working to send in information and to improve North Korean human rights, especially those who are North Korean escapees, are brave, creative, and resilient, but the North Korean human rights community will be forced to think of new ways to overcome the ROK's Amendment should it go into effect on March 30, 2021 as planned. As we have seen, there is great concern by the international community and human rights organizations that the Amendment goes too far and improperly infringes on fundamental rights, thus penalizing North Korean escapees and civil society organizations, rather than standing up for the application of freedom and justice and the oppressed North Korean people. Should South Korea bend in its typical staunch defense of democratic principles under threat by the Kim regime, this may signal a weakness and vulnerability to North Korea ripe for exploitation. Without question, this Amendment seems to show that South Korea is willing to trade its democratic principles and values for the hope of appeasement with a regime that never abides by its own agreements or has true concern or desire to peacefully unify the Korean peninsula.

In addition, the nature of the Amendment conflicts with the idea that South Korea and the United States have shared values, which potentially puts strain on a very important and otherwise resilient alliance that has operated now successfully for decades. The U.S. North Korean Human Rights Act, which is up for reauthorization again soon, will need to be reviewed more closely to find ways to manage this apparent issue.

This Amendment should be repealed before it goes into force on March 30, 2021.


Annex: References

1. Agreement on the Implementation of the Military Consensus in the Panmunjom Declaration (Referred to as the Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA)), September 19, 2018, https://eastasiaresearch.org/2018/09/30/historic-panmunjom-declaration-in-the-military-domain-south-korea-north-korea-military-agreement-signed-on-2018-9-19/ (unofficial translation).

2. Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018 [English], September 18, 2018, https://english1.president.go.kr/BriefingSpeeches/Briefings/322.

3. Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula, April 27, 2018, http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5478/view.do?seq=319130&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=&page=1&titleNm=.

4. Amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act [English, unofficial translation by NK Pro, December 13, 2020].

5. Inter-Korean Relations Development Act [English] (Act No. 7763, Dec. 29, 2005; Amended by Act No. 12584, May 20, 2014; Act No. 15431, Mar. 13, 2018), https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/viewer.do?hseq=47876&type=sogan&key=14.

6. Constitution of the Republic of Korea [English], https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=1&lang=ENG.

7. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx.

8. Policy Report from the Office of Tae Yong-ho, Anti-Leaflet Law in South Korea & Freedom of Expression in North Korea, January 5, 2021.

9. Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR), Justice For North Korea, Mulmangcho, Improving North Korean Human Rights Center, and the Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG), UN Petition Concerning the Song Young-Gil Amendment to the Inter-Korean Relations Development Act (North Korean information gag law), December 30, 2021, https://en.tjwg.org/2020/12/30/un-petition-north-korean-information-gag-law/.

10. Gyeonggi Province Governor Lee Jae-myung, Letter to the Honorable Christopher H. Smith, Co-Chairman of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, January 31, 2021, http://m.kmib.co.kr/view.asp?arcid=0015484894.

11. Former Gyeonggi Province Governor Kim Moon-soo, Open Letter to the US Congress Human Rights Commission by Governor Kim Opposing South Korea’s Anti-Leaflet Law Criminalizing Leaflet Sending to North Korea [English], February 3, 2021, https://eastasiaresearch.org/2021/02/08/open-letter-to-the-us-congress-human-rights-commission-by-governor-kim-opposing-south-koreas-anti-leaflet-law-criminalizing-leaflet-sending-to-north-korea/.

12. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea**, A/75/50326, October 14, 2020.

13. UN Human Rights Council, 43/... Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, A/HRC/43/L.17, March 20, 2020.

14. Young-Gil SONG, “Understanding Recent Revisions to the “Inter-Korean Relations Development Act,” 38 North, December 20, 2020, https://www.38north.org/2020/12/ysong122120/.

15. UN Human Rights Council, Report of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea*, A/HRC/25/CRP.1, February 14, 2021, https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/A_HRC_25_CRP_1_ENG%20LONG.pdf.

16. Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act, https://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=105245&viewCls=engLsInfoR#0000.

17. [단독]킨타나 “대북전단금지법, 국제 인권표준에 도전, dongA, December 17, 2020, https://www.donga.com/news/article/all/20201217/104482008/1 [in Korean, but it contains an official statement in English from Tomás Ojea Quintana, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea].



[1] “DPRK FM on Its Stand to Suspend Its Participation in Six-party Talks for Indefinite Period,” Korean Central News Agency, February 10, 2005,https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/dprk/2005/dprk-050211-kcna01.htm.

[2] Inter-Korean Relations Development Act [English], Act No. 7763, Dec. 29, 2005; Amended by Act No. 12584, May 20, 2014; Act No. 15431, Mar. 13, 2018, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/viewer.do?hseq=47876&type=sogan&key=14.

[3] Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula, April 27, 2018, http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5478/view.do?seq=319130&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=&page=1&titleNm=.

[4] Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018 [English], September 18, 2018, https://english1.president.go.kr/BriefingSpeeches/Briefings/322.

[5] Agreement on the Implementation of the Military Consensus in the Panmunjom Declaration (Referred to as the Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA)), September 19, 2018, https://eastasiaresearch.org/2018/09/30/historic-panmunjom-declaration-in-the-military-domain-south-korea-north-korea-military-agreement-signed-on-2018-9-19/ (unofficial translation).

[6] 조선중앙통신사, “김여정제1부부장 반공화국삐라살포에 북남군사합의파기 경고,” KCNA, June 4, 2020, http://www.kcna.co.jp/calendar/2020/06/06-04/2020-0604-004.html [in Korean]. Kim Yo-jong is a Vice-Director of the Workers’ Party of Korea’s Propaganda and Agitation Department (PAD) under the power Organization and Guidance Department (OGD). The PAD is “the organization that oversees the distribution of all information. Combined, the OGD and the PAD form a symbiotic relationship to violate fundamental human rights in North Korea, as they determine the information that can be seen and accessed by the population, and disseminate this information using the media, art, and group indoctrination sessions.” Since November 2017, she has been sanctioned by the United States Department of the Treasury for censorship activities. Robert Collins, The Organization and Guidance Department: Kim’s Control Tower of Human Rights Denial (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2019), XV, 83, https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Collins_OGD_Web.pdf.

[7] Kim Tong-Hyung, “Kim Jong Un’s sister threatens S. Korea with military action,” AP, June 13, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/d2156411d6b432afeef371ac27bca23d.

[8] Joshua Berlinger, Jake Kwon and Yoonjung Seo, “North Korea blows up liaison office in Kaesong used for talks with South,” CNN, June 16, 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/16/asia/north-korea-explosion-intl-hnk/index.html. For a comprehensive background and discussion on the Moon administration’s targeting of North Korean escapee groups working in South Korea, see reference 9 in the Appendix.

[9] 박경준, “청와대 "삐라는 백해무익…안보위해에 단호 대응할 것,"”연합뉴스, June 4, 2020, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20200604085651001 [in Korean].

[10] Amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act [English, unofficial translation by NK Pro, December 13, 2020].

[11] Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR), Justice For North Korea, Mulmangcho, Improving North Korean Human Rights Center, and the Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG), UN Petition Concerning the Song Young-Gil Amendment to the Inter-Korean Relations Development Act (North Korean information gag law) (December 30, 2021). See also Policy Report from the Office of Tae Yong-ho, Anti-Leaflet Law in South Korea & Freedom of Expression in North Korea, January 5, 2021, and Former Gyeonggi Province Governor Kim Moon-soo, Open Letter to the US Congress Human Rights Commission by Governor Kim Opposing South Korea’s Anti-Leaflet Law Criminalizing Leaflet Sending to North Korea [English], February 3, 2021, https://eastasiaresearch.org/2021/02/08/open-letter-to-the-us-congress-human-rights-commission-by-governor-kim-opposing-south-koreas-anti-leaflet-law-criminalizing-leaflet-sending-to-north-korea/.

[12] Song Young-Gil, “Understanding Recent Revisions to the ‘Inter-Korean Relations Development Act,’” 38 North, December 20, 2020,https://www.38north.org/2020/12/ysong122120/; Gyeonggi Province Governor Lee Jae-myung, Letter to the Honorable Christopher H. Smith, Co-Chairman of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, January 31, 2021, http://m.kmib.co.kr/view.asp?arcid=0015484894.

[13] “On the amended provisions of ‘the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act’ for disseminating leaflets”, The Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, December 2020, https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&mode=view&cntId=54255.

[14] Id.

[15] “South Korean balloons: Plans to stop people sending cross-border messages”, BBC, June 4, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-52917029.

[16] “On the amended provisions of ‘the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act’ for disseminating leaflets”, The Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, December 2020, https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&mode=view&cntId=54255.

[17] Criminal Act, Part I, Ch. I, Art. 2, Korea Legislation Research Institute, Korea Law Translation Center, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=28627&lang=ENG.

[18] Id. at Art. 3.

[19] Id. at Art. 4.

[20] Id. at Art. 5.

[21] Id. at Art. 6.

[22] “On the amended provisions of ‘the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act’ for disseminating leaflets”, The Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, December 2020, https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&mode=view&cntId=54255.

[23] Cho, Joohee, “Koreas Trade Gunfire as Kim Jong-Un Mystery Deepens,” ABC News, October 10, 2014, https://abcnews.go.com/International/koreas-trade-gunfire-kim-jong-mystery-deepens/story?id=26097426.

[24] Constitution of the Republic of Korea, Ch. II, Art. 21(1), July 12, 1948, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4dd14.html.

[25] “On the amended provisions of ‘the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act’ for disseminating leaflets”, The Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, December 2020, https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&mode=view&cntId=54255. See also, Byun, Duk-kun, “FM says freedom of expression can be limited over leafleting ban,” Yonhap News Agency, December 17, 2020, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20201217001000325.

[26] Constitution of the Republic of Korea, Ch. II, Art. 37(2), July 12, 1948, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4dd14.html.

[27] Callamard, Agnes, “Freedom of Expression and National Security: Balancing for Protection,” Columbia Global Freedom of Expression, December 2015, https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/A-Callamard-National-Security-and-FoE-Training.pdf.

[28] [단독]킨타나 “대북전단금지법, 국제 인권표준에 도전, dongA, December 17, 2020, https://www.donga.com/news/article/all/20201217/104482008/1[in Korean, but it contains an official statement in English from Tomás Ojea Quintana, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea].

[29] “On the amended provisions of ‘the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act’ for disseminating leaflets”, The Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, December 2020, https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&mode=view&cntId=54255.

[30] “UN Petition concerning the Song Young-Gil Amendment to the Inter-Korean Relations Development Act (North Korean Information Gag Law)”, Transitional Justice Working Group, December 30, 2020, https://en.tjwg.org/2020/12/30/un-petition-north-korean-information-gag-law/.

[31] Callamard, Agnes, “Freedom of Expression and National Security: Balancing for Protection”, Columbia Global Freedom of Expression, December 2015, https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/A-Callamard-National-Security-and-FoE-Training.pdf.

[32] [단독]킨타나 “대북전단금지법, 국제 인권표준에 도전, dongA, December 17, 2020, https://www.donga.com/news/article/all/20201217/104482008/1[in Korean, but it contains an official statement in English from Tomás Ojea Quintana, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea].

[33] “On the amended provisions of ‘the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act’ for disseminating leaflets,” The Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, December 2020, https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&mode=view&cntId=54255.

[34] Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act, https://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=105245&viewCls=engLsInfoR#0000.

[35] [단독]킨타나 “대북전단금지법, 국제 인권표준에 도전, dongA, December 17, 2020, https://www.donga.com/news/article/all/20201217/104482008/1[in Korean, but it contains an official statement in English from Tomás Ojea Quintana, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea].

[36] “On the amended provisions of ‘the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act’ for disseminating leaflets,” The Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, December 2020, https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&mode=view&cntId=54255.

[37] “Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula (2018.4.27),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 11, 2018, https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5478/view.do?seq=319130&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=&page=1&titleNm=.

[38] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, December 10, 1948, https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html.

[39] Ratification Status for Republic of Korea, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=141&Lang=EN.

[40] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 49, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx.

[41] UN Human Rights Council, Report of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea*, A/HRC/25/CRP.1, February 14, 2014, https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/A_HRC_25_CRP_1_ENG%20LONG.pdf.

[42] [단독]킨타나 “대북전단금지법, 국제 인권표준에 도전, dongA, December 17, 2020, https://www.donga.com/news/article/all/20201217/104482008/1[in Korean, but it contains an official statement in English from Tomás Ojea Quintana, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea].

[43] Id.

February 18, 2021

Anti-Leaflet Law in South Korea & Freedom of Expression in North Korea

[Policy Report from the Office of Tae Yong-ho]
January 5, 2021

Tae Yong-ho, Member of the National Assembly

(the People Power Party)


<Table of contents>

Introduction


1. The Constitution of the Republic of Korea and the Amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act (“Anti-Leaflet Law”)


Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea

Enactment Process of the Anti-Leaflet Law

Freedom of Expression vs. Lives and Safety of South Korean Residents in the Border


2. The Legal Problems with the Anti-Leaflet Law

Laws on Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation

The Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act

Criticism from the International Community

Government Stance on the Criticism from the International Community


3. The Reality of the Right to Freedom of Expression in North Korea

North Korean Legal Structure

Compulsory Political Activities

Juche Ideology of North Korea

Religious Policy of North Korea

State Control on Outside Information


4. Recent Changes in North Korea

Active Flea Markets

Korean Wave (Hallyu) in North Korea

Adoption of Law on Rejecting Reactionary Ideology and Culture


Conclusion


Introduction

I am honored to have been given an opportunity to serve my country, the Republic of Korea, as a member of the National Assembly. However, just four years ago, I was North Korea’s former deputy ambassador to the United Kingdom. But in 2016, I defected to South Korea with my family in search of freedom, leaving behind all privileges rendered to me. But the turning point in my life did not just happen overnight. My perspectives on the world have been shaped by the time I had spent traveling between Pyongyang and various European capitals every three to four years as a North Korean diplomat. Years of living abroad have completely transformed my belief in the North Korean system and eventually influenced my decision to defect to the South, one of the most flourishing democracies in the world.

In fact, it was the elite education in North Korea that first opened my eyes to the outside world. In my teens, I was lucky enough to attend a foreign language school in Pyongyang, usually reserved for the children of the country’s elite ruling class, where we were even shown American cinema. Enthralled, I remember humming Edelweiss from The Sound of Music created by U.S. imperialists, our sworn enemies. It was a tiny opening that eventually led to my family’s flight to freedom during my posting in London in 2016 following in the von Trapp family’s footsteps.

The leaflets flown north in balloons from the inter-Korean border area have likewise been an invaluable source of information for those trapped behind the Juche curtain. Having learnt about the Kim Jong-Un regime’s opulence and its self-serving diversion of resources into weapons of mass destruction over the welfare of its people, some vote with their feet by escaping a life of oppression in North Korea; others elect to stay but remain aware that there are alternatives.

Pyongyang knows this too. Perhaps that is why it has been apoplectic about leaflets even by North Korean standards. On October 10, 2014, North Korean forces opened fire on balloons carrying leaflets. In June 2020, Pyongyang threatened military action for South Korea’s failure to ban leafleting.

North Korea has made a series of threats against the sending of leaflets along border. The newly amended provisions of the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Law, colloquially known as the “anti-leaflet law,” goes far beyond in its banned items and geographic scope. The South Korean authorities have belatedly suggested issuing legally dubious “interpretive guideline” to narrow the application, but they have been silent about revising the law. The government also likes to cite inter-Korean agreements to end leafleting but they do not cover activities by private citizens or groups.

Nor do I share the government’s expectation that the anti-leaflet law will “contribute to the improvement of inter-Korean relations and promotion of peace on the Korean Peninsula”. Instead, bending over backwards to appease totalitarian rulers may embolden them to ask for more as Hitler did after the 1938 Munich agreement. What assurance is there that Pyongyang would not promise reprisals for sending of Bibles or South Korean movies through China?

I am deeply grateful to the South Korean people for warmly welcoming my family, guaranteeing my life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and giving me the privilege and honor of representing my electors. None of the “people’s deputies” in North Korea would dare to speak against a government bill let alone filibuster it.

The North Korean people are entitled to the same freedoms that I have enjoyed for the past four years here and its realization will be the surest guarantee of human rights and democracy, peace and prosperity in South Korea in the long term. As Martin Luther King Jr. wrote, “injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”

That is why I ask your support to stand with human rights defenders in speaking up against the anti-leaflet law and protecting freedom of expression in North and South Korea before it comes into force on 30 March 2021.

This special report on the anti-leaflet law has been prepared to aid your understanding of several legal issues surrounding the amendment in light of the Constitution and international law and of brutal reality of freedom of expression in North Korea. The report concludes that the anti-leaflet law is extremely problematic for three fundamental reasons. First, it undermines democracy by restricting freedom of information in North Korea. Second, the law suppresses human rights and religious freedom. Third, it also restricts freedom of expression, a fundamental right protected by the Constitution of South Korea.

The Republic of Korea is one of the extremely rare countries among the colonized that achieved both industrialization and democracy. It is the law of nature that water flows from high to low points. The same could be said about the two Koreas. It is the law of nature that North Korean citizens, oppressed under the authoritarian rule of Kim Jong-un, accept free and democratic values of the South. The freer and democratic North Korea becomes, the sooner peaceful unification will arrive in the Korean peninsula.

I will continue to fight against all attempts to blind North Korean people to the truth. I sincerely hope that you will join me in this important endeavor.

January 5, 2021

Tae Yong-ho, Member of the National Assembly (the People Power Party)


1. The Constitution of the Republic of Korea and the Amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act (“Anti-Leaflet Law”)

Article 4, Constitution of the Republic of Korea


Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea reads that “the Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the basic free and democratic order.” As stated in the Constitution, the North Korea policy, therefore, should be based on the two pillars of ‘free and democratic order and peace,’ because after all, the most important duty of the President is to defend the Constitution.

If the Constitution seeks to establish peaceful unification, North Korean people should be given more opportunities to learn about democracy and build ethnic affinity with fellow South Koreans. The decision to voluntarily give up soft power that has earned the hearts of the North Korean people, specifically through the South Korean cultural wave (Hallyu), will only serve to undermine the constitutional pillar of ‘the basic free and democratic order.’

The Enactment Process of the Anti-Leaflet Law


The psychological warfare between the two Koreas first began during the Korean War. The government-led distribution of leaflets halted when Kim Dae Jung administration agreed to halt the activity to meet a precondition for the June 15th Inter-Korean summit. Kim’s successor, former President Roh Moo-hyun followed suit and agreed in 2004 to stop propaganda activities along the inter-Korean border and to remove all tools and means that facilitate such activities. Government-mandated ban on the sending of leaflets led to a rise of civilian-led launching of leaflets.

In the Panmunjom Declaration signed on April 27, 2018, President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong-un agreed to cease all hostile acts against each other in order to defuse acute military tensions that had built up. Such acts included the loud-speaker broadcasting and scattering of leaflets in the areas along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL).

In fact, the distribution of leaflets by civilians contributes to promoting the rights to know of the North Korean people. The downside is that it could cause inter-Korean tension. For instance, on Oct 10, 2014, the North Korean army fired some 10 bullets with anti-aircraft guns at balloons carrying leaflets launched in Yeoncheon County, to which the South Korean military responded with return fire. Whenever North Korea ramped up its threat, past South Korean administrations responded with either prohibiting the launching of leaflets with police force or attempting to dissuade civic groups from sending leaflets at all. However, each time the government made such attempt, it received fierce criticism from the public, mainly because no legal basis existed to ban leaflet-launching activities. The government ban on the sending of leaflets would have violated freedom of expression, a fundamental right protected by the Constitution.

There have been eight motions to amend the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act from years between 2008 and 2018 which aimed to prohibit the launching of leaflets to North Korea. However, all motions received criticism and were later discarded on the ground that they violated the basic right protected by the Constitution.

What changed the dynamics was when Kim Yo-jong, the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, demanded that the South Korean government make laws to ban the sending of leaflets by activist groups consisting of defectors. Since her statement on June 4, 2020, the legislative process to enact the anti-leaflet law progressed rapidly. She threatened to shut a joint liaison office and factory town in the border town of Kaesong or discard the inter-Korean comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA), if the South Korean government failed to take necessary action.

In response to Kim Yo-jong’s demand, South Korean Ministry of Unification quickly held a press briefing and announced that all activities that endanger the lives and property of residents living in the border should be prohibited and that it was preparing to take steps to improve current legislation that can fundamentally correct the situation, signaling that it would hastily enact the anti-leaflet law in order to completely ban the leaflet drop.

Both the South Korean public and international community denounced the anti-leaflet bill, calling it ‘legislation made under the single order of Kim Yo-jong’ and ‘legislation that guards authoritarian Kim Jong-un.’ They demanded the government retract its decision to pursue the legislative process. For example, Tomás Ojea Quintana, United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea, advised the two Koreas to work together to resolve the leaflet issue, while Signe Poulsen, head of the Seoul office of the UN Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights, commented that the sending of leaflets is an activity intended to deliver information to North Korean citizens and thus a form of individual freedom of expression.

However, despite North Korea’s demolishing of a joint liaison office in Kaesong on June 16, the government introduced a bill to the general meeting of the Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee of the National Assembly on August 3. On September 22, a South Korean civil servant from the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries was killed by North Korean soldiers while on duty, and his body was incinerated. Although the South Korean government did not even receive an assurance from Pyongyang that North Korea would take action to punish the perpetrators and prevent similar cases from occurring again, South Korea did not participate in the joint committee for the adoption of resolution on situation of human rights at UN General Assembly. On December 2, the anti-leaflet law passed with majority voting for the bill. What happened was that the super-majority of the ruling Democratic Party forcibly passed the bill, disregarding and breaking a conventional rule of passing the bill only with an agreement between the ruling and opposition parties in a Foreign Affairs and Unification subcommittee a day before the vote.

The anti-leaflet law passed the vote in the general meeting of the National Assembly on December 14. The bill was then debated and deliberated (Dec 22), approved by the President (Dec 24), promulgated (Dec 29), and is set to take effect three months after promulgation, resulting in the birth of unjust law that outrightly denies the spirit of the Constitution. While the ruling party and the government claim that this is a minimal step necessary to protect the lives and safety of South Korean residents in the border, legal experts on domestic and international law, human rights activists, US Congressmen, and media criticized the passage of the bill as one that severely restricts the rights of individual to speak freely, a basic constitutional right.


Freedom of Expression vs. Lives and safety of South Korean Residents in the Border

The South Korean government and ruling party pointed out that the distribution of leaflets should be banned, as it endangers the lives and safety of South Korean citizens living along the border. However, this is an extremely weak argument in light of the Constitution, international law, and legal views of the National Human Rights Commission of South Korea, a national advocacy institution for human rights protection.

The Republic of Korea Constitution states that “all citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech and the press, and freedom of assembly and association (Clause 1, Article 21).” Nevertheless, the extent to an individual can express his or her freedom is not without limit. The Constitution also reads that “the freedoms and rights of citizens may be restricted by Act only when necessary for national security, the maintenance of law and order or for public welfare (Clause 2, Article 37).” The distribution of leaflet can escalate military tension between the two Koreas and may violate the right to live of the residents in the border.

In fact, Defector A argued in a court case that government prohibition on the distribution of leaflets caused psychological damage to him. The South Korean Supreme Court ruled in 2016 that causality exists between the act of sending leaflets and provocation of North Korea which could directly incur bodily harm and imminent danger to the lives of residents in the border region. Therefore, it confirmed the original verdict that dismissed a claim for damages, ruling that the government can limit the leaflet sending activity under the Act on the Performance of Duties by Police Officers and civil law.

The government frequently cites this court case to support the legality of the anti-leaflet law. However, the Supreme court ruling was merely that it was not unlawful for the police to stop individuals from sending leaflets, but not that individuals who distribute leaflets should be criminalized. In particular, the ruling reads that ‘it was not unlawful unless the restriction is not excessive,’ leaving ample avenue for the law to not violate freedom of expression. Hence, this court ruling does not provide legal evidence to justify the government claim that prohibiting and criminalizing an act of distribution leaflets is legally sound.

A report titled ‘Legal Response and Task of the Distribution of Leaflets’ published by the Korea Institute for National Unification, a national research institution, concludes that “the distribution of leaflets goes beyond the bound of the right to freedom of expression and can already be limited by existing legislation. If a special law was to be enacted, it should be reviewed thoroughly from legal and policy perspectives so that it does not violate the principle of excess prohibition laid out in the Constitution.”

The report also added that “if a special law that prohibits and criminalizes the sending of leaflets is to be introduced, it should be drafted and written with much precision to ensure all constitutional requirements are met. Otherwise, it will be vulnerable to the claim of unconstitutionality.”

Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (a.k.a. the International Covenant Civil and Political Rights) states that “the right to freedom of opinion and expression includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. Both South Korea and North Korea are the parties to the Covenant. International law is not legally binding, but carries the same force as domestic law; therefore, the two Koreas have the responsibility and duty to ensure and protect the right to freedom as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as stated in the Covenant.

Moreover, the National Human Rights Commission of Korea concluded in the 2nd plenary committee in 2015 that the sending of leaflets by civic groups or individuals is a form of freedom of speech. It also expressed a view that the government should not monitor or deter the distribution of leaflets by individuals or civic groups, since threat from North Korea or the agreement between the two Koreas to stop slander or defamation of each other cannot be used to restrict basic civil liberties. This view takes into consideration the safety of South Korean citizens, including those who live in the border region.

In conclusion, the Constitution, international law, and legal view of the National Human Rights Commission all point out that existing law is sufficient to restrict the sending of leaflets, and even if the enactment of special law is necessary to prohibit such an act, it should be carefully drafted to not violate the principle of excess prohibition as stated in the Constitution.


2. The Legal Problems with the Anti-Leaflet Law

Laws on Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation


It was the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act that the National Assembly enacted to regulate the distribution of leaflets in 2008. The prescribed purpose of the law was to define activities necessary to promote mutual exchange and cooperation. Therefore, critics of the legislation pointed out that the sending of leaflets, an act of unilateral expression of opinion, cannot be regarded as an act to promote inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, and therefore, does not fulfill the intended purpose of the legislation.

Moreover, contrary to “the exchange, contact, and trade with North Korea” as stipulated in the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act, the act of sending leaflets to North Korea is ‘prohibited in principle,’ which damages the unity of law itself.

Furthermore, since the sending of leaflets is a form of expression of opinion, all-out prohibition and stipulating a penalty clause of such an activity by law could be considered as pre-censorship which may violate constitutional right to speech.

For the reasons above, a total of eight proposed amendments to the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act in the years between 2008 and 2018 were all discarded.


The Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act

When Kim Yo-jong denounced the distribution of leaflets in her statement on June 4, the South Korean government announced that it was preparing to review legislation that can fundamentally improve all legislation that intensifies tension along the inter-Korean border. The proposed law that followed was an amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act. The legislation defines an act of spreading leaflets as a violation of the terms of the inter-Korean agreement and stipulates criminal penalties for committing such an act.

In other words, while the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act seeks to ban the act of sending leaflets by requiring approval from the Minister of Unification, the Amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act is intended to fundamentally prohibit the distribution of leaflets by defining it as a violation of the inter-Korean agreement and criminalizing that activity.

The main provisions added to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act are as follows:

Article 4 (Definitions)

5. “Leaflets and other items” are defined as, items (including but not limited to advertising propaganda materials, printed materials, auxiliary memory units), cash and other means of property gains.

6. “Scattering” is defined as distributing leaflets to unspecified individuals in North Korea or move them to North Korea without obtaining approval under Article 13 or 20 of ‘Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act’for propaganda, donation, etc (leaflets sent to North Korea simply via a third country is also included).

Article 24 (Prohibition of Violation of the Inter-Korean Agreement) (1) No person shall harm the lives or bodies of the people or cause serious danger by doing any of the following acts.

1. Loudspeaker broadcasting toward North Korea in areas along the Military Demarcation Line.

2. Posting visual materials (posts) toward North Korea in areas along the Military Demarcation Line.

3. Scattering leaflets and other items

② The Minister of Unification may, if necessary to prevent prohibited acts under each subparagraph of paragraph (1), request cooperation from the head of the relevant central administrative agency or the head of a local government. In such cases, the head of the relevant central administrative agency or the head of a local government shall cooperate, except in extenuating circumstances.

Article 25 (Penalty Provisions) ① Any person who has violated Article 24 (1) shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 3 years or by fine not exceeding 30 million won. However, the provision shall not apply when South-North Korean agreements are suspended (this shall be limited to actions prohibited by Article 24 (1)) based on Article 23 (2) and (3).

② A person who has attempted any crime under paragraph (1) shall be punished.


First of all, Subparagraphs 5 and 6 of Article 4 are problematic for the following reasons:

5. “Leaflets and other items” are defined as, items (including but not limited to advertising propaganda materials, printed materials, auxiliary memory units), cash and other means of property gains.

Clause 5 reads that “Leaflets and other items” include items, cash and other means of property gains. This means that the law prohibits sending not only leaflets, but virtually all items to North Korea, which is clearly beyond the scope of legislative intent, as the government claims. The South Korean government argues that these items were included in the legislation, as balloons carrying leaflets could include dollar notes, mini-radios, and flash drives. However, it is not convincing why cash and items which are in fact a form of economic aid to help ordinary North Korean citizens, are banned along with leaflets that Pyongyang has denounced so severely.

In other words, the inclusion of “other items” in the amendment demonstrates that the government claim that this law is intended to protect South Korean citizens living in the border by prohibiting “an act of distributing leaflets and other items” that “condemns” North Korea is clearly flawed.

6. “Scattering” is defined as distributing leaflets to unspecified individuals in North Korea or move them to North Korea without obtaining approval under Article 13 or 20 of ‘Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act’ for propaganda, donation, etc. (leaflets sent to North Korea simply via a third country is also included).


According to the definition of “scattering” as laid out in Clause 6, the act of “scattering” already implies that any person who engages in such an act did not obtain approval for taking out or bringing in goods, etc. (Article 13) and for operating transportation equipment (Article 20) from the Minister of Unification as stipulated in the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act.

In the meantime, any person who takes out or brought in goods, etc. or operates transportation equipment between South Korea and North Korea without prior approval from the government is punished by imprisonment for not more than three years or by a fine up to thirty million won under the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Law.

INTER-KOREAN EXCHANGE AND COOPERATION ACT

Article 27 (Penalty Provisions)

(1) Any person who falls under any of the following subparagraphs shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than three years or by a fine up to thirty million won:

1. Any person who visits North Korea without obtaining approval under Article 9 (1) and the provision to Article 9 (6);

2. Any person who obtains approval under Article 9 (1) and the proviso to Article 9 (6) by fraud or other improper means;

3. Any person who takes out or brought in goods, etc. without obtaining approval under Article 13 (1);

4. Any person who carries out any cooperative project without obtaining approval under Article 17 (1);

5. Any person who operates transportation equipment between South Korea and North Korea without obtaining approval under Article 20 (1);

6. Any person who obtains approval under Article 13 (1), 17 (1) or 20 (1) by fraud or other improper means.

There has already been a legal debate in the judiciary on whether the sending of leaflets to North Korea is subject to approval under the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Law. In fact, courts have interpreted and determined that the sending of leaflets is not subject to approval from the Minister of Unification. In response to the court rulings, the government has tried to punish individuals who engaged in the distribution of leaflets under other laws such as the High-Pressure Gas Safety Control Act and Wastes Control Act.

However, the newly amended anti-leaflet law now makes the distribution of leaflets legally subject to government approval by defining the term “distribution/spread,” which could cause controversy on the interpretation of the law.

Article 24 (Prohibition of Violation of the Inter-Korean Agreement) (1) No person shall harm the lives or bodies of the people or cause serious danger by doing any of the following acts.

1. Loudspeaker broadcasting toward North Korea in areas along the Military Demarcation Line.

2. Posting visual materials (posts) toward North Korea in areas along the Military Demarcation Line.

3. Scattering leaflets and other items

 

The most problematic aspect of Article 24 is that the act of scattering leaflets and other items (Subparagraph 3) is not limited to the “Military Demarcation Line.” If the intent of the law was indeed to protect the lives of residents who live in the border region, as the government claims, then Subparagraph 3 should clearly state that the law prohibits the act only if it occurs along the Military Demarcation Line.

Essentially, an act of sending any materials of value to North Korea in China-North Korea border without approval from the South Korean government will constitute an act of scattering leaflets and other items under Subparagraph 3, Paragraph 1, Article 24.

Article 25 (Penalty Provisions) ① Any person who has violated Article 24 (1) shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 3 years or by fine not exceeding 30 million won. However, the provision shall not apply when South-North Korean agreements are suspended (this shall be limited to actions prohibited by Article 24 (1)) based on Article 23 (2) and (3).

② A person who has attempted any crime under paragraph (1) shall be punished.

An act of sending leaflets to North Korea (particularly sending leaflets in China-North Korea border) itself does not directly involve danger that causes bodily harm to South Korean citizens. It is, in fact, North Korea’s hostile act including military provocation that causes serious harm or threat to the lives of South Korean citizens.

The basic principle of criminal law is that in order to impose criminal punishment on a person for committing a specific act, that act should infringe upon another person’s benefit and protection of law. However, the amendment to this law is unusual in that the legislation punishes an individual not for the act he or she has committed, but depending on a reaction from a third party.

As a result, one receives criminal punishment if his or her sending of leaflets has led North Korea to engage in an act of hostility. On the other hand, if North Korea showed no reaction, then that person would not receive punishment. Such arbitrary penalty provisions could be problematic in consideration of the principle of legality in criminal law.

Another potential issue is a penalty provision for attempted crime as stated in Subparagraph 1, Paragraph 2, Article 25. In other words, even if the sending of leaflets did not cause “harm or serious danger to the lives and body of citizens,” an individual can be investigated, prosecuted, and tried for having the intent to do so. Moreover, another ambiguity is with the interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Article 25; it is not clear whether the attempted crime refers to an attempt to spread leaflets and other materials or an attempt to incur harm or danger to citizens.

The amendment has been promulgated on Dec 29, 2020 and is set to take effect in three months. All legislative process has been completed, and only the interpretation of the law remains on the table. The Ministry of Unification is working on ‘interpretive guidelines,’ but as an executive branch, it has no authority whatsoever to substitute for a role of the judicial branch charged with interpreting the law.


Criticism from the International Community

In his unusual op-ed in a South Korean conservative newspaper, Tomás Ojea Quintana, United Nations' Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea, urged that South Korea should reconsider the legislation before it goes into effect. His main concern was that the penalty provision of a maximum three years of imprisonment for sending leaflets violates individual right to expression. In his article, Special Rapporteur Quintana requested the South Korean government and National Assembly yet another review of the legislation before its enforcement.

Mr. Quintana commented that “there must be justification for restricting freedom of expression, and such restriction should be applied proportionately.” He added that the legislation used ambiguous terms such as ‘advertising propaganda materials’ and ‘other means of property gains,’ arguing that the use of those terms challenges the standards of international human rights which do not allow margin of appreciation when it comes to freedom of speech.

On Dec 14, several US Congressmen including Chris Smith (R-NJ), Co-chair of the bi-partisan Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, Michael McCaul (R-TX) and Gerald E. Connolly (D-Va.) have expressed criticism for the anti-leaflet law. Congressman Chris Smith called the legislation “insane,” urging the South Korean government to review critically its commitment to democratic values. He also declared that he intended to convene a congressional hearing regarding this issue.

Former U.S. Representative Eliot Engel (D), Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, commented in his recent interview with Voice of America that while he “recognizes the importance of building trust between the two Koreas,” he does not believe that building trust should come “at the expense of a common goal of promoting human rights in North Korea.” Mr. Engel added that he “hopes to work together with the South Korean government to resolve any issues that may arise as a result of the enactment of this legislation.”

Robert R. King, former Special Envoy for North Korea human rights issues at the U.S. Department of State, warned in his commentary submitted to the Center for Strategic & International Studies, that “there is no assurance that even with the silencing of freedom of expression in banning balloons that the North Koreans will take any action to improve inter-Korean relations. The consequence, however, could be erosion of the South Korean relationship with the United States, which is important for the people of both countries.”

Politicians and human rights activists from outside of the U.S. have also joined the force in expressing their criticism for the anti-leaflet law.

In the United Kingdom, David Alton, a British politician who represents All Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea, urged Secretary of State Dominic Raab to send formal request to the South Korean government to reconsider the decision to enact the anti-leaflet law.

Similarly, Canada also expressed its concern over the passage of the bill. Christelle Chartrand, spokesperson for Global Affairs Canada, commented that “Freedom of expression is a cornerstone of prosperous society and a critical element in the promotion of human rights.” Similar views were found in Europe. Human Rights Without Frontiers, a non-government organization based in Belgium, stated that it would send EU leadership an official statement that requests EU member states to officially protest against the passage of the anti-leaflet law.

In Japan, the Asahi Shimbun published an editorial titled ‘The Moon Jae-in administration should consistently protect the principle of freedom.’ The article stated that the anti-leaflet law “includes provisions that damage the principle of civic freedom and democracy.” It concluded that while “democracy may differ from a country to country, the South Korean government should take a cautious action regarding the new amendment because it will not be free from the voice and concern of the international community with regards to issues on conventional values such as freedom and democracy.”


Official Stance of the South Korean Government on the Criticism from the International Community


When the anti-leaflet bill officially became law on Dec 15, critics pointed out that the amended law ‘criminalizes even the distribution of flash drives containing Korean dramas.’ The Ministry of Unification quickly issued a statement, refuting the claim that the law does not prohibit such an act.

The Ministry argued that the amended law, which critics have called ‘legislation made with a direct order from Kim Yo-jong,’ was not enacted because of the demand from Pyongyang, but to fulfill basic government duty to protect the lives and safety of its citizens. It also emphasized that this law is necessary to perform constitutional obligation of promoting substantial development of the inter-Korean relations and peace in the Korean peninsula and pursuing a policy for peaceful unification.

The Ministry added that “while freedom of speech is a constitutional right, it does not prevail over the right to live of our own citizens who live along the border.”

The Ministry of Unification also stated that “expressing Seoul’s commitment to comply with the inter-Korean agreement through the systematic enactment of the amended law could effectively call on and encourage North Korea to abide by the inter-Korean agreement.”

Moreover, the Ministry explained that the phrase of ‘leaflets sent to North Korea simply via a third country’ refers to a case where leaflets launched from the South Korean territory are sent into North Korea via territory of a third country. It also added that this amended law is to prohibit an activity that causes serious harm to the lives of our citizens, pointing out that an act of launching leaflets in a third country will be governed by the national law of that country, not the amended legislation of South Korea.

However, the Ministry of Unification has no authority to make legal judgment on how the law is interpreted and enforced. The judiciary branch does. Therefore, it is inappropriate for the Ministry, an executive branch, to interpret the law on behalf of the courts.

The Ministry of Unification announced that it is working to provide 'guidelines for interpreting new regulations on launching leaflets and other materials' before the law takes effect. However, doing so would be acknowledging that the bill is not without fault, given that it requires specific guidelines to be fully understood.

South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha said in her recent interview with CNN that “some people argue that the law violates freedom of expression, but while such freedom is absolutely vital to human rights, it’s not absolute.” She further argued that freedom of expression can be limited for the safety of people.

Ruling Democratic Party Chairman Lee Nak-yon of South Korea expressed his regret over the decision of US Congress to urge the Korean government to review the amendment (of the Inter-Korean Development Act). In fact, the South Korean government has been working to prevent the worst case scenario from happening, that is, being labeled as a human rights abuser. The government has frequently convened high-level meetings chaired by Director of National Security Office Suh Hoon. In particular, the Blue House is making all-out efforts to prevent the holding of a US congressional hearing, being organized by the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission by utilizing international media outlets. As part of its effort, the government has urged the international community to take into consideration ‘the distinct characteristics of the inter-Korean relations’ and ‘suffering of South Korean residents living along the border.’

However, factual evidence clearly suggests that there is no causality between an act of distributing leaflets and its impact on the lives and safety of residents. First, not a single human casualty occurred due to an act of sending leaflets. Second, the passage of the new amendment is unnecessary since existing law could already restrict the act.


3. The Reality of the Right to Freedom of Expression in North Korea

North Korean Legal Structure


In the North Korean legal system, Kim Jong-un’s directives and guidelines come first before any law. Below Kim Jong-un’s directives is the ‘10 principles to protect the one and only leader,’ basic bylaws of the Korean Workers’ Party, followed by the Constitution, sublaws and enforcement decrees of each administrative branch.


Compulsory Political Activities

In North Korea, all citizens are forced to engage in political activities for their lifetime. North Korean people are taught that they are born with two lives: a physical life rendered to them by their biological parents and political life, aka spiritual life, from the supreme leader of North Korea.

Regardless of the age of the people, the political activities of all North Korean citizens are controlled by the Korean Workers’ Party. The required membership in the Party enables the state to control the daily lives of citizens. Moreover, their private lives are under complete control of the state monitoring, as no criticism whatsoever of the state is permitted. All North Korean citizens receive punishment for taking part in any type of anti-state activities or even expressing opposition to the state policies. They also get reward for reporting anyone suspected of committing an anti-state crime.


Juche Ideology of North Korea

The Juche ideology of North Korea is commensurate with a religious one. It postulates that ‘man is the master of his own destiny.’ However, since a man is an individual, men must be organized centrally in order to achieve their full potential. It is the Party that forms and manages such a central organization. The Juche ideology states that since the Party is a collection of the masses, the Kim family must lead the organization.

In North Korean society with extreme vertical organizational structure, the Kim family has indoctrinated the North Korean people that all citizens should pay allegiance and faith to the Kim family, the brain of all lives, in order for them to effectively manage the state. This is why there are numerous statues of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il in every corner of North Korea, to which North Koreans are forced to pay tribute on a daily basis.

North Korea has institutionalized an ideological education that seeks to make North Korean people worship and pay blind allegiance to the Great Leaders, effectively blocking all access to outside information unrelated to the Juche ideology. Political propaganda in North Korea is utilized to instigate nationalistic hostility towards the enemies of the state, namely the United States, South Korea, and Japan.


Religious Policy of North Korea

Karl Marx claimed that "religion is the opium of the people." This dictum served as a basis for communism to suppress any religious activities. However, the only communist country that obliterated religion is North Korea.

While the Soviet Union, communist countries in Eastern Europe, and China persecuted religious activities, they still allowed the existence of churches and pastors.

Pyongyang, once called Jerusalem of the East, is now devoid of all religious institutions, as the North Korean regime completely banned all churches and executed clerics under its policy of exterminating all religions. Churches that now exist in North Korea such as Bong-su Church, Cil-gol Church, and Jang-choong Catholic Church were all built after 1988, the year Seoul Olympics was held. In order to compete against South Korea that successfully hosted the Olympics, North Korea organized the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students in Pyongyang just a year after the Seoul Olympics were held. Building these churches targeted foreign visitors who visited Pyongyang to attend the Festival, an attempt by the North Korean regime to make a false appearance that religious activities are tolerated in the country.


State Control on Outside Information

North Korean citizens are deprived of the right to access independent information that is not sourced from the state. The only provider of information in North Korea is the state-controlled media. The state strictly controls internet access as well as TV and radio broadcasting. All broadcasted materials go through watertight inspection by the state and are rejected, if they are not in line with the principles of the Korean Workers’ Party. All private phone calls are monitored, while ordinary citizens are only allowed to make domestic calls. North Korean people are punished for watching or listening to foreign media, including foreign films and dramas.


3. Recent Changes in North Korea

Active Flea Markets


The major change in North Korea has taken place in an upward manner, not the other way around as could be seen in the cases of East Germany, Soviet Union, and China.

The main force leading the upward change is Jang-ma-dang, flea markets in North Korea which first emerged at the end of 1990s. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, foreign assistance plummeted, resulting in widespread famine struck North Korea in the mid-1990s. Millions of North Koreans, who relied exclusively on state food rationing, died in hunger. They started to sell whatever they had in an empty lot in their town in order to survive. The emergence and rise of Jang-ma-dang was the birth of capitalism in North Korea.

The state authority could not stop North Korean citizens from engaging in such commercial activities, when it could not even provide enough food to the people. The North Korean regime also tolerated Jang-ma-dang activities in order to secure national budget by collecting tax from sellers in the market.

Despite strict state crackdown and high price, South Korean products are extremely popular among North Korean residents. Numerous products ranging from flash drives containing Korean films and dramas, cosmetics, hanbok (traditional Korean costumes worn on special occasions such as wedding), and underwear are smuggled into North Korea and sold in Jang-ma-dang. Even state inspectors take bribery and turn a blind-eye to the illegal sale of South Korean products in the flea market which has raised a concern among North Korean officials.


Korean Wave (Hallyu) in North Korea

The infusion of South Korean culture in North Korea since early 2000 through Jang-ma-dang has transformed the lives of North Koreans. Thanks to the Korean Wave, the worldviews and cultures of North Korea have slowly resembled those of the South. Moreover, with technological progress, more North Koreans now have mobile phones and video cameras at home.

For example, a young North Korean couple used to call each other ‘Mr. or Miss Comrade,’ a term used in communistic society. However, the millennial generation, influenced by South Korean films and drama, instead use a South Korean expression such as ‘Oppa or Honey’ to address each other. In addition, young North Koreans use South Korean colloquial expressions such as ‘ㅋㅋ, ㅎㅎ (meaning lol)’ in text messages. Fashion style among young North Koreans has also started to resemble that of young people in South Korea. Three pillars of revolution, ideology, technology, and culture, which the North Korean regime have promoted for internal solidarity are shaken to the core, thanks to the Korean Wave.


Adoption of Law on Rejecting Reactionary Ideology and Culture

North Korean state media reported in an article titled ‘Invisible fight, silent war’ on Oct 19, 2019 that the state is faced with a silent war. The article warned the public that while North Korea, which possess nuclear weapons, may not be vulnerable to a physical attack, the inflow of South Korean media content such as films and dramas could topple down the state. It described the spread of South Korean culture as a “virus invading the body.”

For this reason, North Korea passed a series of law on ‘rejecting reactionary ideology and culture’ at a plenary meeting of the Supreme People’s Assembly. The intent of the law, the media reported, was to prevent the spread of anti-socialist ideology and safeguard North Korea's spirit and culture.


Conclusion

Since 2000, the two Koreas have focused on promoting exchange and cooperation, breaking away from an ideological conflict inherited from the Cold War. The thawing relations greatly reduced leaflet sending activities organized by the South Korean government. Civic groups, on the other hand, started to distribute leaflets by launching balloons along the inter-Korean border.

North Korea has continued to denounce the leaflet launching by various civic groups in South Korea and demanded Seoul to prohibit such activities. The South Korean government responded that restricting these activities would be in violation of the right to freedom of expression as specified in the Constitution. In response, North Korea threatened to use military force and eventually demolished the inter-Korean Liaison Office on June 16, escalating tension between the two Koreas.

The South Korean National Assembly, which consists of the super-majority of the ruling Democratic Party, forcibly passed the anti-leaflet bill. The bill was then debated and deliberated (Dec 22), approved by the President (Dec 24), promulgated (Dec 29), and is set to take effect within just three months.

The South Korean public and international community demanded the law be rescinded, criticizing the legislation for violating the right to freedom of expression protected by the Constitution and international law. They have also argued that this ambiguous law will cause legal controversy on the interpretation and enforcement of the law. Human rights activists in South Korea announced that they would file a petition to the Constitutional Court, as the law is slated to take effect in upcoming March.

The South Korean government argued that restriction of the basic constitutional right is inevitable to protect the lives and safety of residents who live in the border. Moreover, it maintains that freedom of right is not absolute and that it will continue to make effort to dissipate public concern by publishing guidelines for interpreting the newly amended law. However, one can reasonably conclude that the true intention of the Moon Jae-in administration for amending the law in such a hurried manner was to initiate a dialogue with Pyongyang in desperate attempt to appease to Kim Jong-un. The fact that there has been no human casualty incurred by the sending of leaflets weakens their claim.

Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea reads that “it shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the basic free and democratic order.”

North Korean people have been enslaved, having been blocked from the outside world under the brutal line of hereditary dictatorship of the Kim family in the past 70 years. However, they have started to recover their basic rights as human beings by independently maintaining their means of living through commercial activities in Jang-ma-dang. The inflow of South Korean culture smuggled into North Korea has contributed to reducing hostility towards South Korea and rebuilding ethnic identity as one Korean people.

For regime survival, North Korea has vigorously sought to control the inflow of outside information into the country by enacting new laws on rejecting reactionary ideology and culture on December 4.

The South Korean government, if it was sincere about protecting freedom and democratic values that the nation as a whole has worked so hard to build, should rescind its decision to enact the anti-leaflet law which hampers peaceful unification in the Korean peninsula. The least it should do is to remove unconstitutional provisions and work to make far more meticulous laws that can satisfy the original legislative intent, that is, to protect the lives of residents living in the border region. This law should not serve to blind the North Korean people suffering under the brutal dictatorship of the Kim family.