New Thoughts: Cementing Kim Jong-un’s Rule

By Robert Collins

It does not seem possible, but George Orwell’s Big Brother thought control has reached a new level in North Korea.  This summer the Kim Jong-un Regime has introduced two new requirements to which North Koreans must adhere to be “politically correct” in one of the world’s most absolute of totalitarian dictatorships.  Both requirements concern the inclusion of Kim Jong-il at the same level of respect and veneration as his father Kim Il-sung.

Most recently, North Korea has changed the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) card from one that included only Kim Il-sung’s photograph to one that included the photograph of both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.[1]  This is not entirely a new development in North Korea where every North Korean household is required to hang pictures of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il in their living room.  But it is a step in shaping the identification of the KWP and the image of Kim Jong-un as the legitimate heir of power based on the “Paektusan line.”[2]  In the past, the KWP has been identified by North Korean propagandists as “Kim Il-sung’s Party.”  Now, apparently, it is the party of both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.

Secondly, earlier this summer the KWP amended the Kim Regime’s “Ten Great Principles of Establishing the Unitary Ideology” to demand not only complete allegiance to Kim Il-sung (a 39-year constant in North Korean society) but to demand complete allegiance to his successor and son, Kim Jong-il, as well.  These ten principles of conduct are the primary socio-political requirement for every North Korean citizen from the lowest field hand to the highest general or party bureaucrat. The “Ten Great Principles of Establishing the Unitary Ideology”[3] are the KWP’s core mantra for daily thought and behavior that carry the weight of absolute law in North Korea.  Violation of these ten principles is punishable by imprisonment and even execution. 

The Party describes the ten principles, divided into 65 sub-principles, as “The ideological system by which the whole party and people are firmly armed with the revolutionary ideology of the Suryeong and united solidly around him, carrying out the revolutionary battle and construction battle under the sole leadership of the Suryeong.”[4]  Sometimes referred to as “Kimilsungism,” Suryeongjuui, or “Supreme Leaderism,” this ideology places all leadership and guidance in one person in whom the entire Korean nation must trust and to whom it must swear allegiance.  It essentially establishes loyalty to the Supreme Leader as the coin of the realm and law of the land.  And that leader is now the third family member to take the helm of the North Korean party-state, Kim Jong-un.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Kim Il-sung’s brother, Kim Yong-ju, was assumed to be Kim Il-sung’s successor.  The younger brother began developing the ten principles to provide every North Korean the correct thought process for daily political life.  When Kim Il-sung internally designated Kim Jong-il to be his successor in 1973,[5] the younger Kim was employed in the KWP’s Organization and Guidance Department where he worked on party ideology after first starting his career in the KWP Propaganda and Agitation Department.  In 1974, Kim Il-sung appointed a young Kim Jong-il to two critical Party leadership positions: Director of the Organization and Guidance Department and Director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department.  After his appointment, Kim Jong-il wrested the project of developing the ten principles from his uncle, Kim Yong-ju, and proceeded to expand them into the aforementioned 65 sub-principles.  Since the KWP Central Committee adopted the “Ten Great Principles” at a meeting in April 1974, Kim Jong-il, as director of both departments, was able to magnify the Kim Il-sung cult project several fold.

Now that Kim Jong-un has further glorified Kim Jong-il, it is evident there is a projected political path designed to cement his rule.  The ideology specialists of the Party Organizational Life Division of the KWP Organization and Guidance Department have upped the ante on ideological training nation-wide, much less party-wide.  Every organizational life session, self-critique session, party ideology study session and other political meetings to which every North Korean is required to attend will now include this dual loyalty study.  By reshaping the KWP and its ten principles for unitary ideology, Kim Jong-un emphasizes the legitimacy of his third-generation succession.  Though the current younger generations of North Korea do not likely hold him in the same high regard as older generations held Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-un and the KWP are trying to shape society otherwise.  This contributes ideologically to his legitimacy and complements other, more draconian, actions designed to consolidate Kim Jong-un’s power. 

Does it matter to North Koreans whether the Kim Regime directs what they must think?  If one wants to survive, yes!  The ten principles are a primary tool for the regime to prevent North Koreans from considering what their human rights are or should be. While those in the free world think about and demand societal observation of their civil liberties and human rights, North Koreans cannot even get to that level of thought because they need to conform to the ten principles on a daily basis or risk not only their own future, but also that of their families, up to three generations.  Arguably, the prisoner population of North Korea’s political prison camps is predominantly made up of violators of the ten principles.  The camps are run by the Kim Regime’s primary tools of suppression – the State Security Department and the Ministry of Public Security.  Agents of these internal security institutions make careers just off detecting and “eradicating” enemies of the state, i.e., violators of the ten great principles.[6]

Though North Koreans may not really believe the message or veracity of the ten principles, they have no choice but to comply with the requirements.  Even if they are profiting well from today’s new market dynamics, they must demonstrate loyalty to the “new” ten principles during required political sessions or buy their absence through bribes. 

The elimination of human rights in North Korea has always been one of the primary policies of the Kim Regime and thought control is an effective tool.  For Kim Jong-un, whose power consolidation is far from complete, deification of his father is as important to his future rule as deification of Kim Il-sung was for Kim Jong-il.  

What’s next?  Predictably, it will be the hanging of three pictures of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un in every household.  Would one expect otherwise?   

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[1] An Yoon-sok, “北 노동당 당원증 교체 이유는?   (North Korea’s Reason for Changing Korean Workers’ Party Card),” Nocut News, September 14, 2013. URL: http://www.nocutnews.co.kr/show.asp?idx=2615702.

[2]  Paektusan, or Mt. Paektu, lies in the middle of the China-Korea border, is the highest mountain on the Korean Peninsula, and is regarded by all Koreans as the spiritual origins of the Korean race.  Kim Il-sung conducted most of his anti-Japanese partisan operations from the foot of Paektusan and has used this as a foundation of image-building for family leadership legitimacy.

[3] Also translated as the Ten Great Principles Establishing the Monolithic Ideology, as well as other similar variations.  See translation by Joanna Hosaniak, Kyung Eun Ha, Markus Simpson Bell at the Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, translated June 29, 2012. URL: https://eng.nkhumanrights.or.kr:444/board/bbs_view.php?no=3&board_table=bbs_literature&page=1&word=&searchItem=&cate_id=.

[4] Cho Jong Ik, “The Road to One-Man Dictatorial Rule,” Daily NK, August 9, 2013.  URL: http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00400&num=10830.

[5] Kim Jong-il was officially designated the successor at the 6^th Party Congress in 1980.  In the interim, Kim Jong-il was referred to in Korean Workers’ Party documents as the “Party Center.”

[6] Author interview with SSD defector to South Korea.

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Categories: analysis, HRNK, KimJongUn, KWP, NorthKorea, RobertCollins

Continuity of Denial: Kim Jong-un’s Succession and North Korean Human Rights

By Robert Collins

Few countries base their self-sustainment on the concept of denying human rights to its populace. That is, if they are not authoritarian dictatorships, which historically see internal enemies in a far more immediate context than foreign ones.  History has seen plenty of these dictatorships in the 20^th Century and before.  But the 21^st Century has its fair share.  And perhaps there is no dictatorship more totalitarian than that of North Korea’s Kim Jong-un Regime.

North Korean society is characterized by the values of the collective over the individual, the priorities of a dictatorship, and the denial of human rights to any and all citizens.  Led by a regime that overwhelmingly employs pervasive tools of political terror, North Korean society is designed from the top to focus on collective support to the supreme leader through revolutionary thought and constant political indoctrination.  

Contrary to early predictions of economic reform, Kim Jong-un has sustained and promoted the policies of his father and grandfather.  The human rights plight of the North Korean citizen has worsened as those in Pyongyang continue to gain privileges and opportunity for financial success, so long as they work to promote all current regime policies, while those outside Pyongyang continue to work in a feudal system where daily survival is very difficult at best.  The gap between the haves and have-nots, more accurately described as the gap between the privileged and suppressed, continues to widen. 

Inheriting a dictatorship is risky business, to be sure.  Threats abound and plenty of challengers would be ready to step into the leadership position if it were not for the political terror network so prevalent in dictatorships.  The inheritor of dictatorial power, whether he or she had reasonable morals in the first place, must put those morals aside to manage the volatile institutions, personnel and policies implementing human rights as they are until succession is secure.  That means a new dictator must grasp control of the current political structure as it is before considering how to institute any kind of reform – economic, human rights or otherwise.  So after securing the Kim Family Regime and after gaining confidence in his ability to control threats to his position as the North’s Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-un basically has three choices regarding the regime’s human rights policies: improve them, leave current human rights practices as they are, or increase denial and suppression of those rights. From the looks of it, Kim Jong-un has chosen the latter course of action.

Certainly, denying human rights does not happen in a vacuum of security policy.  Indeed, there are many cornerstones to Kim Jong-un’s hold on power, just as there were for his father and grandfather:  political terror, ideological indoctrination of the populace, social classification of each citizen, resource control, border security, and personnel purges on the domestic front, as well as increasing military capabilities for both internal and external defense and to heighten peninsular and regional tensions on the international front.  All of these contribute in some way, directly or indirectly, to Kim Jong-un’s ability to deny human rights to every North Korean. 

The greatest challenge Kim Jong-un faced in the succession process was securing control of the military.  The casual observer of North Korea would think that the North Korean dictator need not regard the control of the military as a component of change in the North’s human rights policy.  However, without control of the military, there is no guarantee of succession and no anticipation of human rights improvement. 

After Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke in August 2008, he began laying the foundation for Kim Jong-un’s succession to replace him.[1]  For Kim Jong-un’s transition to greater and greater authority, Kim Jong-il did not have the 30 years he was given by Kim Il-sung to secure power. As it turned out, he only had three years.

After returning from his secondary education in Switzerland, Kim Jong-un attended a three-year artilleryman course at the Kim Il-sung Military Academy and then a two-year graduate course for regimental and division commanders at the same institution.  His first assignment was in General Political Bureau’s (GPB) division of the Korean Workers’ Party Organization and Guidance Department, a position that taught him how to gain control of the Korean People’s Army through the GPB political commissar system.[2] 

From that point on, Kim Jong-un has used GPB personnel[3] as his means of controlling internal security agencies, the core institutions of human rights denial.  For example, Choi Yong-hae[4] was appointed the new GPB Director in April 2012[5] from one of North Korea’s premier families whose dedication to the Kim Family Regime is total.  After Lee Chin-su died in 1987 as the Director of the State Security Department (SSD), Kim Jong-il did not appoint a new director through the end of his life in 2011.  Essentially, that meant Kim Jong-il himself was the SSD Director and lead implementer of human rights denial.  But within a short time after assuming power, Kim Jong-un appointed General Kim Won-hung to be the SSD Director, moving from the position of vice-director of the GPB.  Kim also promoted another GPB senior officer, Colonel General Cho Kyong-chol, to the position of Commander of the Military Security Command, the SSD’s military counterpart, and lead institution of human rights denial within the Korean People’s Army and defense industries.[6]  These actions followed the dismissal of two SSD Deputy Directors in 2011 (Ryu Kyong) and 2012 (U Dong-chuk).  Loyalty to Kim Jong-un is the supreme requirement of the regime’s lead human rights henchman.  There have been plenty of military personnel purges after Kim Jong-un’s assumption of power.  Vice Marshal Ri Yong-ho was purged from his position of Chief of the KPA General Staff; Admiral Kim Chol was purged from his position of Deputy Minister of People’s Armed Forces; and six of nine KPA corps commanders were replaced, the first time in North Korean history that has happened in such a short period of time.  Indeed, since Kim Jong-un was designated successor in 2010, a total of 32 elite personnel have been purged, a solid indicator of no changes in the North’s human rights policies.[7]  To reinforce this approach of loyalty first, Kim Jong-un gave a speech on October 29, 2012, at Kim Il-sung Military Academy where he stated, “We do not need people who are not devoted to the Party and Suryeong (supreme leader), no matter how militaristic their disposition or excellent their tactical ability.”[8]

As for Kim Jong-un himself, his first military appointment was as the Deputy Chairman of the Party Central Military Committee on September 28, 2010.  Within days after his Kim Jong-il’s death in December 2011, and as an indicator of power priorities, Kim Jong-un was appointed the by Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Politburo Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army on December 30, 2011.  This was based on Kim Jong-il’s wishes dating from October 8, 2011.[9]  Kim Jong-un was then appointed at the 4^th Party Representatives Conference on April 11, 2012 as the Party’s First Secretary[10] and then appointed the Chairman of the National Defense Commission at a meeting of the Supreme People’s Assembly meeting on April 13, 2012.[11]

Another connection between the military and human rights denial are North Korea’s asymmetric military capabilities development and its impact on resources.  The successful long-range missile test in December 2012[12] and its third nuclear test,[13] along with subsequent threats against President Obama, the United States, and South Korea, were effective in raising military tensions across Northeast Asia to the U.S. homeland.  But these capabilities were and are a major contributor to the denial of the right to food as described in the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[14]  The December missile launch was estimated by the South Korean Government to cost US$1.3 Billion, enough to purchase 4.6 million tons of corn to feed its people.[15]  The failed missile test of the previous April cost the Kim Regime US$850 Million, enough to feed 80% of all North Koreans for a year.[16] These expenditures could have easily relieved food security problems in North Korea where, according to the latest quarterly report from the World Food Programme, 81% of all households are at the poor or borderline level in food consumption.[17]  Missiles and nukes before feeding the populace is obviously the priority of the Kim Jong-un Regime, as evidenced by a United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization report that the North only purchased 57% of the grain necessary to feed its population.[18]

Far from being the type of economic reform anticipated by academics and media analysts in the United States and South Korea, mostly based on Kim Jong-un’s western-style education in Switzerland, the regime has introduced the “June 28^th economic reforms” that were actually more about control than economic opening.  For example, the June 28^th policy reduced the amount of land farmers could use as private plots from 30 pyeong to 10 pyeong (one square meter is 0.0325 pyeong); farmers had to pay 50 North Korean won per pyeong to cultivate their private ploys; and farming units were reduced in size down to 4-6 personnel.[19]  The State Security Department (the North’s version of Nazi Germany’s Gestapo), the Ministry of Public Security (national police), and local prosecutors are all out ensuring local farmers are complying with the new directives,[20] an indication that state profits are prioritized before the right to food.[21]  Limiting the work unit size effectively limits assembly and has the added impact of limiting dissident cooperation, thus making the security agencies’ mission easier.

Under Kim Jong-un, border patrol policies and procedures have also been changed so as to suppress the ability to escape into China by bribing the border guards.  Command and control over border guard units has been changed so that they are now under the regime’s most powerful tool of political terror, the State Security Department.  Subsequent to this change, border patrol units are now rotated more frequently in order to break down the ability of brokers – working to help refugees escape – to develop relationships with guards susceptible to bribes.[22]  Another measure introduced by the Kim Jong-un Regime to stop the defections includes limiting the opportunity for border security forces and internal security forces to collect bribes and look the other way.  Now, individuals repatriated from China go directly to jail instead of being interrogated, thus eliminating even North Korea’s draconian legal system from providing rights to those accused of criminal activity.[23]

The number of refugees able to flee their plight in North Korea has dropped considerably since Kim Jong-un took over as the North’s Supreme Leader.  There has been a total of over 24,000 North Koreans that have made it to freedom in South Korea, with 2009 being the top year of such defection at 2,917.  But under the younger Kim, that number dropped to 1,509 in 2012.[24]  However, it should be noted that North Korean defector numbers increased slightly in the first half of 2013 over the same period the year before – 717 compared to 710.  This is the first increase since 2009.[25] 

The recent North Korean defectors-produced-and-directed movie “48M” highlights the extent to which the Kim Regime tries to prevent defections across the border into China.  Ambushes by border patrols to kill any person attempting to cross the Tumen River are common.[26]  These ambushes have increased under Kim Jong-un.[27]

The continuity of denying human rights to the North Koreans seems definitive and any hope of reform in that area is apparently now non-existent.  While Kim Jong-un’s consolidation of power is certainly not an established fact, his control over the personnel, institutions and practices that carry out human rights policies progresses with certainty and ruthlessness.  

The United Nations Commission of Inquiry on North Korea, created earlier this year, is designd to investigate evidence of crimes against humanity committed by the Kim Regime, based on Article 7 of the Rome Statute.  With these developments under the Kim Jong-un Regime, cooperation between the regime and the commission seemed doomed from the start.

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[1] For analysis of this process, see Robert Collins, “Political Dimensions of North Korea’s Third-Generation Succession and the Potential for Crisis,” International Journal of Korean Studies, Spring/Summer 2012, p.74-114. URL:  http://www.icks.org/publication/pdf/2012-SPRING-SUMMER/5.pdf.

[2] Cheong Seong Chang, “Pukhangun Chongjongchikukui Uisangmit Yokhwalkwa Kwonryok Sunggye Munje (Issues of the Rise of the North Korean Military’s General Political Bureau and its Role and Authority in Succession),” Sejong Institute, Policy Research Paper 2013-8, 2013.

[3] The General Political Bureau is a Korean Workers’ Party organization assigned to the Korean People’s Army.  It’s mission is to monitor the political loyalty and performance of every soldier and every unit, particularly unit commanders.  From the KPA General Staff down through battalion and even frontline companies along the DMZ, each unit has a GPB staff that provides daily reports up the chain that are reviewed by the KPA supreme commander, e.g. Kim Jong-un.

[4] Also spelled Choi Ryong-hae.  He is the son of Choi Hyon, former long-time Defense Minister under Kim Il-sung and Kim Il-sung compatriot during the anti-Japanese partisan struggle in Manchuria during the late 1920’s to 1945.

[5] Cheong Seong Chang, “Pukhangun Chongjongchikukui Uisangmit Yokhwalkwa Kwonryok Sunggye Munje (Issues of the Rise of the North Korean Military’s General Political Bureau and its Role and Authority in Succession),” Sejong Institute, Policy Research Paper 2013-8, 2013.

[6] Lee Jong-hun, “김정은에 충성 경쟁 북한 군부 새판은 장성택 작품(Chang Song-taek’s New Project is the North Korean Military’s Loyalty Competition Toward Kim Jong-un),” Donga News, April 23, 2012. URL: http://weekly.donga.com/docs/magazine/weekly/2012/04/23/201204230500014/201204230500014_1.html.

[7] O Gi-Seob, “Kim Jong-un’s Rule After One Year: Regime Stability and Constructing a Transitional Ruling Regime,” Sejong Institute, Sejong Commentary No.257, December 21, 2012. 

[8] Chris Green, “Kim Regime Facing Military Loyalty Battle,” Daily NK, November 2, 2012. URL: http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00300&num=9983.

[9] Lee Jong-hun, “김정은에 충성 경쟁 북한 군부 새판은 장성택 작품(Chang Song-taek’s New Project is the North Korean Military’s Loyalty Competition Toward Kim Jong-un),”Donga News, April 23, 2012. URL: http://weekly.donga.com/docs/magazine/weekly/2012/04/23/201204230500014/201204230500014_1.html.

[10] His father, Kim Jong-il, was appointed KWP General Secretary for life, thus the new title of First Secretary.

[11] O Gi-Seob, “Kim Jong-un’s Rule After One Year: Regime Stability and Constructing a Transitional Ruling Regime,” Sejong Institute, Sejong Commentary No.257, December 21, 2012. 

[12] Jethro Mullen and Paul Armstrong, “North Korea Carries Out Controversial Rocket Launch,” CNN, December 12 2012. URL: http://edition.cnn.com/2012/12/11/world/asia/north-korea-rocket-launch.

[13] Kelsey Davenport, “North Korea Conducts Nuclear Test,” Arms Control Association, March 13, 2013. URL: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_03/North-Korea-Conducts-Nuclear-Test.

[14] See Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, URL: http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.

[15] Jason Mick, “South Korea Says North Korea Dumped $1.3B USD Into Missile Launch,” Daily Tech, December 12, 2012.  URL: http://www.dailytech.com/South+Korea+Says+North+Korea+Dumped+13B+USD+Into+Missile+Launch/article29409.htm

[16] Kevin Voight, “North Korea’s $850 Million Rocket Failure,” CNN Business 360, April 13, 2012. URL: http://business.blogs.cnn.com/2012/04/13/north-koreas-850-million-rocket-failure/

[17] World Food Programme, “Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) 200114 “Nutrition Support for Women and Children in DPRK”,” June 2013. URL: http://www.wfp.org/sites/default/files/PRRO%20200114%20bulletin%202013%202nd%20quarter%20version%202%208%202013%20(2).pdf.

[18] Korea Herald, “N. Korea Food Procurement Effort Inadequate To Cover Shortfalls: Report,” August 9, 2013. URL: http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130809000160.

[19] Kim Kwang Jin, “Farmers in a Muddle over Private Land Order,” Daily NK, January 1, 2013. URL:  http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk09002&num=10270; see also Kim Kwang Jin, “6.28 Policy Goes Live in 3 Yangkang Counties,” Daily NK, July 20, 2012. URL:  http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk09002&num=9551; and Open Doors, “North Korea: Is Change Possible?,” undated; accessed July 30, 2013. URL: http://www.opendoorsuk.org/news/stories/north_korea_change.php.

[20] Kim Kwang-jin, “Putting the Squeeze on Farmers,” Daily NK, August 23, 2012. URL:  http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk09002&num=9706.

[21] See Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, URL: http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.

[22] Jung Young, “Rapid Rotation of North Korea’s Border Guards Hampering Defections,” Radio Free Asia, July 1, 2013. URL: http://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/border-07012013171715.html.

[23] Lee Sang Yong, “Regime Puts Limits on Bribe Time,” Daily NK, August 2, 2013. URL: http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=10800.

[24] Choe Sang-hun, Fleeing North Korea Is Becoming Harder,” New York Times, January 4, 2013. URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/05/world/asia/crackdowns-make-fleeing-north-korea-harder.html?_r=0.

[25] Chosun Daily, “N.Korean Defectors Increase Slightly in First Half,” July 23, 2013. URL: http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/07/23/2013072301030.html.

[26] Joshua Lipes, “Film Captures Refugee Plight,” Radio Free Asia, September 21, 2012. URL: http://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/film-09212012192018.html.  “48” stands for the narrowest distance across the Tumen River separating North Korea’s northeastern frontier from eastern Manchuria, thus an otherwise passable crossing.

[27] Y. Jung, “김정은 등장 후 탈북자 사살 늘어 (North Korean Refugee Deaths Increase After the Rise of Kim Jong-un),” Radio Free Asia, November 8, 2011.  URL: http://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/human_rights_defector/killdefector-11082011101658.html?searchterm=%ED%83%88%EB%B6%81%EC%9E%90+%EB%A7%A4%EB%B3%B5.

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Categories: analysis

American Forces Press Service: Obama Proclaims National Korean War Veterans Armistice Day

WASHINGTON, July 25, 2013 – President Barack Obama has issued a proclamation marking July 27th as National Korean War Veterans Armistice Day.   The following is the text of the President's proclamation:

Today, America pauses to observe the 60th anniversary of the end of the Korean War -- a conflict that defined a generation and decided the fate of a nation. We remember the troops who hit the beaches when Communist forces were pressing south; who pushed back, and fought their way north through hard mountains and bitter cold. We remember ordinary men and women who showed extraordinary courage through 3 long years of war, fighting far from home to defend a country they never knew and a people they never met.

Most of all, we remember those brave Americans who gave until they had nothing left to give. No monument will ever be worthy of their service, and no memorial will fully heal the ache of their sacrifice. But as a grateful Nation, we must honor them -- not just with words, but with deeds. We must uphold our sacred obligation to all who serve -- giving our troops the resources they need, keeping faith with our veterans and their families, and never giving up the search for our missing and our prisoners of war. Our fallen laid down their lives so we could live ours. It is our task to live up to the example they set, and make America a country worthy of their sacrifice.

This anniversary marks the end of a war. But it also commemorates the beginning of a long and prosperous peace. In six decades, the Republic of Korea has become one of the world's largest economies and one of America's closest allies. Together, we have built a partnership that remains a bedrock of stability throughout the Pacific. That legacy belongs to the service members who fought for freedom 60 years ago, and the men and women who preserve it today.

So as we mark this milestone, let us offer a special salute to our Korean War veterans. Let us renew the sacred trust we share with all who have served. And let us reaffirm that no matter what the future holds, America will always honor its promise to serve our veterans as well as they served us -- now and forever.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, do hereby proclaim July 27, 2013, as National Korean War Veterans Armistice Day. I call upon all Americans to observe this day with appropriate ceremonies and activities that honor our distinguished Korean War veterans.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-fifth day of July, in the year of our Lord two thousand thirteen, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and thirty-eighth.

BARACK OBAMA

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Categories: news

Deutsche Welle: A Rare Glimpse into North Korea

By Benjamin Mack. This article originally appeared on Deutsche Welle on July 26, 2013.

Sixty years after the armistice that ended the Korean War, many changes have occurred in North Korea. But seeing them in this reclusive country, which has recently only just begun to promote tourism, is not easy.

"The North Hamgyong Provincial E-Library has 301 computers," translates Suh Byung Kim, the wiry 34-year-old guide, as the head librarian speaks Korean. "It is open every day at 10 a.m. Every person in the provincial capital Chongjin can use them," he says to a group of Westerners visiting the location.
However, the two-floor facility is already half-full - and it's only 9:00 a.m. "Many students come here before it opens," he explains. But Suh has no explanation as to why they're here on what is supposed to be a holiday.

There are many computers in the building. They are all Dell models, only a few years old, boasting features such as Microsoft Office while running on a Windows XP operating system. But most striking is one particular feature: a desktop icon indicating an Internet Explorer browser. Could it be Internet access in North Korea? "I am sorry, but trying now is not possible," Suh says. "We must go quickly so not to disturb the students."

The North Hamgyong Provincial E-Library is said to be among the largest libraries in North Korea

Tablets and smartphones

Proliferating technology is one sign things are changing in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea - North Korea's official name - since an armistice ended the large-scale fighting of the Korean War 60 years ago. Considered less technologically developed than South Korea, more North Koreans are buying mobile phones, which are connected to either a nationwide 3G network called Koryolink or 2G operator SunNet but typically unable to make international calls.

Smartphones such as Apple's iPhone can be purchased - as can their plethora of optional accessories. There's even a third-generation Android-based tablet available to North Korean consumers called "Samjiyon." The device comes installed with a version of the game "Angry Birds," a Korean-English dictionary, and features e-books praising the ruling Kim family and the government's communist system. It even has a web browser, but no Wi-Fi.

Proliferating technology is one sign things are changing in North Korea

But technological advancements have not changed the country's questionable human rights record, say experts. "I have seen no indication towards improving human rights in North Korea," says Greg Scarlatoiu, executive director of the US-based Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. "I am not optimistic."

Scarlatoiu is not alone with his assessment. "Kim Jong Un's succession as North Korea's supreme leader after the death of his father, Kim Jong-Il, in December 2011 had little impact on the country's dire human rights record," writes Human Rights Watch in its 2013 World Report. "Arbitrary arrest, detention, lack of due process, torture and ill-treatment of detainees remain serious and pervasive problems."

New developments, old problems

As is often the case, it is difficult to know with certainty how specifically the lives of ordinary North Koreans are changing. As Suh leads a small group through the city of Hoeryong - despite the distinction of this being the first group of Western tourists to visit the area - he and a pair of minders do their best to restrict photography.

"Please, no photos of people without asking first," he reminds everyone. Later, Suh and the minders have no problems allowing pictures of spotlessly clean homes and smiling citizens in a model village along the coast near Nojok-tong.

Such regulations may seem odd, but it's all part of the North's tourism policy, says Dr. Rajiv Narayan, a researcher with Amnesty International. "The reasoning is both financial and propaganda," says Narayan. "They only let you see what they want you to see. That will continue."

The revenues are adding up thanks to increasing visitor numbers. Around 4,000 Westerners visited North Korea in 2012, a new record that the state-run Korean Central News Agency said was due to "eye-catching achievements made by the country in the effort for building a thriving socialist nation in recent years."

Yet the increased tourism has been unable to mask another purported issue: food shortages. Narayan says the exact scope has been difficult to verify. "They have not been able to resolve the crisis and there is a health crisis as well, with access to basic health care difficult. Many of the health problems being reported are due to the food crisis."

A high standard of living?

In the Rason Special Economic Zone, established in the early 1990s to promote economic growth through foreign investment and based on China's economic model, young women in high heels and Western fashions casually stroll past while checking messages on their phones. In a small photo studio next to the offices of the Rason International Tourist Agency, those with money to spend can purchase new batteries and memory cards for their digital cameras or, for three Chinese renminbi, have a photographer snap pictures of them standing in front of what's supposed to be the Pyongyang skyline.

"As you can see," explains Kim Jaehyok, a 30-year-old guide with a steely expression, "Rason is a highly developed area. Citizens here enjoy a high standard of living."

Conditions in the nearby Rajin Shoe Factory are somewhat different. Here, about 120 workers in four shifts produce around 180,000 pairs of women's and men's shoes to be sold domestically per year.

"The workers are very busy and cannot be disturbed"

Revolutionary music glorifying the state blares from loudspeakers amid an acrid smell of hot glue. Surrounding the workers and their whirring machines are a myriad of propaganda posters inspiring them to work harder. Some are difficult to see from a distance due to the dim light.

"It's not very bright in here," someone remarks. "In another building the workers have more light," Kim replies. We ask if we may go there. "I am sorry," Kim says. "The workers are very busy and cannot be disturbed." He pauses. "Now that we've seen the shoe factory, we will go for ice cream."

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On the Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the Pan Mun Jon Armistice

60 years ago to the day, on July 27th 1953, the Korean War came to an end. Kim Il Sung, – today’s North Korean leader’s grandfather – had started it three years before with the approval of Joseph Stalin and the support of all the communist parties of the world. Thanks to the opposition of the UN and the sacrifice of more than 50.000 American soldiers fighting under its command (approximately the same number of US troops died in Vietnam), not to mention all the fighters, Dutch, French, Turkish, British, Colombian, etc., who lost their lives in this conflict, the attempt by the “socialist camp” to capture the whole of the Korean peninsula was foiled. The lies and manipulations surrounding a so-called “bacteriological war” that the US was said to fight there, – and those lies were spread everywhere by all the communist parties of the world, French communist party included –, were unable to sway public opinion as they were able to years later during the Vietnam War, the arguments used then being somewhat different. And it’s only because thousands and thousands of Chinese soldiers fought alongside the North Korean Army that the North Korean régime set up by the Soviets north of the 38th parallel after the defeat of Japan in 1945 did not collapse.

After the armistice was signed in July 1953, – and there is still no peace treaty today –, China and the USSR went on helping a North Korean state which started building a totalitarian régime unparalleled in the rest of the world. And it is still thanks to the protection of Red China that the so-called “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” can build the atom bomb, oppress its own people and ceaselessly threaten and provoke a South Korea which thanks to a capitalism that the North cannot stand has in sixty years become a free and prosperous country.

We call on all of you who want some 25 million North Koreans who are presently subjected to famines, an insane propaganda and the fear of being sent to a concentration camp, to denounce not only the protections and complicities from which the Pyongyang régime still benefits today, but also its horrendous crimes. We should also try and keep the North Koreans informed of what is going on in the outside world, especially in our western democracies.

It is part of our duty to let the North Koreans know that freedom lies outside their borders and that one day their horrendous régime will die in infamy.

Robert Pépin, Pierre Rigoulot, André Sénik and Guy Tissier 
for the French Committee to Help the Population of North Korea

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Trustpolitik vs. Distrustpolitik: Down and Out on the Korean Peninsula

By Robert M. Collins. This article was originally published on War on the Rocks on July 23, 2013.

Robert M. Collins served 31 years in various positions with the U.S. military in Korea. He is the author of Marked For Life: Songbun – North Korea’s Social Classification System, published by the Committee on Human Rights in North Korea, Washington, DC.

After decades of tensions and stalemate, Trustpolitik, a  fresh approach by South Korean President Park Geun-hye towards North Korea, indicates why it is so difficult to build anything resembling a stable relationship between these troubled neighbors. Through Trustpolitik, Park has sought to avoid the excesses and naïveté of Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine Policy” – which aimed to induce the Kim family’s Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to the table through almost unconditional economic cooperation and aid.

But even President Park’s approach imagines too much sunshine in North Korea.  The distrust between North and South Korea, rooted in their antithetical political systems, cannot be erased.  This distrust has produced one war that has resulted in the death of millions, mostly Koreans, but also troops from the People’s Republic of China, the United States and member nations of the United Nations Command.  It has also produced an armistice that has served as the setting for a 60-year military standoff for, countless provocations, North Korea’s development into a de facto nuclear state, and countless failed attempts at reconciliation.

North Korea remains a family cult-centered dictatorship with the world’s fourth largest military, a poorly-fed populace isolated from the rest of the world, a failed economy, and the ignominious title of the world’s 23rd most failed state, The Republic of Korea in the South, has become an ultra-modern, full-fledged democracy with the world’s 15th largest economy and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) ranking as the world’s 6th most-wired country.

In the 41 years since the first inter-Korean talks of July 4, 1972, there have been 606 meetings between the North and the South.  These meetings have produced small results and great disappointments.  The July 4th 1972 Joint Declaration, supported by the leadership of the North’s Kim Il-sung and the South’s Pak Chong-hui, was significant in that it was the first official negotiations between the North and South. . In 1991, the North and South held several meetings to produce the “Basic Agreement,” signed in 1992, but never implemented the agreement due to the North’s pursuit of nuclear technology. The agreement would have established a security “holding pattern” while the North figured out how to deal with its security and economic problems in the context of the fall of the Soviet Union.

Perhaps the most significant development of these meetings was more meetings: two summits between the North’s Kim Jong-il  and two South Korean heads-of-state –  Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. The first summit, in 2000, produced the June 15 Declaration that stated the two Koreas’ determination to solve Korean reunification without outside interference.

All of these meetings have produced family reunions, billions of dollars of the South’s aid to the North, and on-again, off-again economic cooperation.  Yet, as we approach the 60th Anniversary of the Armistice Agreement on 27 July, military confrontation remains the dominant reality on the Korean Peninsula.  American troops remain after six decades of failed reconciliation, nuclear threats, and frequently deadly provocation.  The bottom line is that the biggest disappointment, particularly to North and South Koreans, is that there has been no progress whatsoever toward reconciliation and unification.

Why is it that, over 600 meetings later, the two Koreas have so little to show for their attempts at cooperation? A partial explanation may lie in the diametric opposition between the South Korean political ethos, which is based at least in part on trust and eventual reunification of the Koreas, and the political system in North Korea, which is explicitly based on distrust. This curious juxtaposition has made it difficult for the two nations to move beyond a stalemate.

Now, a new leader in the South must establish a format for dealing with the North in the face of constant threats. President Park’s Trustpolitik is designed to deal with the North realistically, rather than adopting the assumption of past administrations that the South’s generosity will eventually convince the North to cooperate and reduce tensions.  What most of the world does not realize, however, is that Trustpolitik is not simply a policy for dealing with the Kim family regime in the North – it is in fact the law of the land in South Korea.  Unification policy holds a significant place in South Korean law – so much so that it is addressed in the 1987 Constitution immediately after the three concepts of democracy, nationality and territory, all integral parts of the Korean socio-political psyche.  Article IV of the Constitution states unequivocally that unification must be addressed by the state and, as the President, Madame Park must have a unification policy.

But this is of no consequence in North Korea, where the political system is explicitly opposed to the sort of trust-building Ms. Park might have in mind.  The North’s own constitution merely serves as window-dressing for the outside world.  It is not taught in North Korean schools, is not available in libraries, nor is it viewable by North Koreans on the internet, which is non-existent in North Korea. It is the Korean Workers’ Party Charter that guides socio-political activity for all North Koreans and the charter specifically states that the party belongs to the Supreme Leader. But higher than that is the Ten Great Principles of Unitary Ideology.  These principles, expanded into 65 directives, inform each North Korean how they are to live by respecting the Supreme Leader.  It is a code that cements in the minds of every North Korean who is boss in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.  Violations of this code are addressed far more swiftly by the North’s security agencies than standard laws of addressing criminality.  The code exists because the Supreme Leader does not trust North Koreans in their loyalty to him.  The point is to teach every North Korean how to be loyal in a society where trust does not exist.  Every North Korean must be cautious in every word and deed.  Even North Korea’s highest ranking defector, Hwang Jang-yeop, ranked 22nd in the party hierarchy before defecting via China in 1997, has told many audiences that he had to instruct his 5-year-old granddaughter on North Korean political correctness, particularly on what not to say, based on the Ten Great Principles. Thus, the law of the land to the North is the word of the Supreme Leader.  He adjudicates as he will, without restraint, and based in his own values.  And those values do not contain trust.

North Korea’s Supreme leaders – there have been three of them in the Kim Family Regime with Kim Il-sung, his son Kim Jong-il, and now the grandson Kim Jong-un – have built a society on distrust.  The government politically classifies at the age of 17 every North Korean’s level of loyalty to the Supreme Leader – loyal, wavering, or disloyal.  The latter are literally referred to as the enemy and impure elements. Let’s state that again:  a significant proportion of North Korean citizens are so distrusted by the Supreme Leader that they are officially – through party policy – enemies of the state.

But “disloyal” citizens are not the only ones distrusted by the Supreme Leader.  Even those who are most supportive of the regime, members of the party’s Central Committee who can be regarded as the Kim Regime elite, are watched and monitored extensively by the security agencies.  And this, too, is done at the direction of the party.

The core of the regime-sanctioned distrust are the security agencies, which are extremely powerful in North Korea.  They create political terror and plenty of it.  They are the regime’s most important tool of survival.  These agencies report directly to the Supreme Leader, with their primary mission being to protect the regime security’s from internal challenges.  No one is to be trusted and everybody is to be watched.  The State Security Department, North Korea’s version of Nazi Germany’s Gestapo, maintains offices in all social, economic and administrative units in North Korea. It is tasked with detecting and arresting any person guilty of disloyalty – perceived or real – to the Supreme Leader.  Its sister agency, the Military Security Command, performs the same mission within the Korean People’s Army.  The Ministry of Public Security, or the national police, is grossly misnamed because it is not the public whose security with which they are concerned – it is the Supreme Leader’s.  The North’s People’s Safety Enforcement Law that guides police functions, states that the purpose of the police is “observing systems and maintaining order.” In other words, their purpose is to secure the regime and the Supreme Leader. Not surprisingly, these agencies also monitor each other. Finally, the courts – judges, prosecutors, and lawyers – work for the Supreme Leader and enforce the Ten Great Principles far more than civil law.

Distrust is so deeply embedded in the Kim Regime that concepts such as positive values, human rights, and trust itself have no place in the regime’s conduct, nor in its policy-making.  That not only includes domestic policy, but foreign and military policy as well.  South Korea’s Trustpolitik stands in direct contravention to the North’s entire political concept. South North negotiations to reopen the Kaesong Industrial Complex, now in its fifth session, are just the latest example of the North’s distrust of the South.  Despite South Korea’s good intentions, it should expect to be treated no better than the North’s own citizens.

On the 60th Anniversary of the Armistice Agreement, the Republic of Korea-United States alliance sees itself locked in a security dilemma.  History has proven that confidence-building measures have never worked on the Korean Peninsula.  This is because confidence-building itself requires trust – the kind President Park is looking for, but that the North cannot provide.,  For instance, the DPRK cannot tolerate monitors inside its military, nuclear or missile hierarchies, which would be a key maneuver to build confidence vis-à-vis the South.

Pyongyang’s barriers to trust are higher than ever  as demonstrated by its thermonuclear threats to the United States and President Obama, greater ruthlessness in dealing with North Korean refugees crossing into China and numerous purges of ranking regime elite, to name a few.  So too is the Armistice Agreement as important as it was 60 years ago in maintaining the security of the people of South Korea.  Though the North disavows the Armistice Agreement, it has demonstrated a healthy respect for the military might of the Alliance and generally, outside provocations, abides by the separation of forces aspects of the Armistice.  There is one thing the North can trust:  the Alliance will defend the South, at great sacrifice to the Kim Regime.

Photo Credit: Taylor Sloan

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