Communication to the Commission on the Status of Women

 

Communication to the Commission on the Status of Women

Discrimination and violence against North Korean women in the post-COVID-19 era, with implications from military involvement in Ukraine

Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK)

Written by Damian Reddy, Legal and Editorial Consultant of HRNK

 

Background: Post-COVID Repression and Economic Displacement

The COVID-19 pandemic marked a sharp turning point in the condition of North Korean women, reversing modest gains in economic autonomy. Before the pandemic, women were central to the informal market system, known as jangmadang, comprising up to 80% of traders and acting as primary earners in many households (Human Rights Watch, 2022). These markets emerged in response to the collapse of the public distribution system and allowed women to take on informal but vital economic roles.

However, the DPRK’s prolonged border closure from January 2020 to mid-2023 effectively dismantled the informal economy. Market activity was criminalized, information networks severed, and communities placed under surveillance and lockdown (Washington Post, 2025). As a result, women lost their primary source of livelihood, with severe consequences for food security, especially for female-headed households.

Women living near border towns like Hyesan and Musan have reportedly experienced intensified state scrutiny. Officials exploit travel restrictions to demand bribes or sexual favors during random inspections (Human Rights Watch, 2024). The economic regression has further exacerbated gender-based hierarchies, as patriarchal norms reassert control in both public and private spheres.

Gender-Based Violence and Reproductive Coercion

The criminalization of cross-border movement and China’s continued policy of repatriating defectors have led to widespread abuses against women. Approximately 80% of North Korean escapees are women, many of whom fall victim to trafficking and forced marriage in China (Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 2024). Upon repatriation, women are often subjected to torture, forced abortions, and infanticide, particularly if they are pregnant with children of foreign fathers (Human Rights Watch, 2024).

In detention centers and interrogation facilities, female returnees are reportedly subject to invasive gynecological exams, beatings, and sexual assault, all without medical justification or legal oversight (Transitional Justice Working Group, 2024). These acts are not random but are systematically employed by state agents, reflecting deep-seated misogyny and the instrumentalization of women’s bodies for ideological purposes.

Additionally, inside the country, reproductive rights are tightly controlled. Women are pressured to have children in accordance with pronatalist policies while also facing forced abortions in politically sensitive contexts (UN Human Rights Council, 2023). There is no access to independent reproductive health services, and menstrual health remains taboo, underfunded, and stigmatized.

Militarization and Women’s Indirect Suffering from the Ukraine Conflict

A troubling new development is the reported deployment of North Korean troops to support Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine. In early 2025, multiple independent and official sources confirmed the transfer of up to 14,000 North Korean soldiers to Eastern Ukraine (Reuters, 2025). While men are conscripted for deployment, the consequences for women left behind are devastating and gender specific.

Women are forced to assume sole responsibility for household survival in the absence of male breadwinners. Reports also indicate that bereaved mothers and wives receive little to no information about soldiers’ deaths, and funeral ceremonies are tightly controlled by the state to limit dissent (AP News, 2025). This silencing compounds emotional trauma with economic and social isolation.

Global studies from post-conflict zones, including Ukraine, show a clear rise in domestic violence and PTSD-induced aggression among returning combatants (Time, 2023). The DPRK’s lack of mental health services and patriarchal cultural expectations increase the likelihood that women will bear the brunt of postwar trauma and militarized masculinity.

Legal Analysis

4.1 Violations of CEDAW

The DPRK is a State Party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Its ongoing failure to prevent gender-based violence, ensure access to health care, protect reproductive rights, and eliminate discrimination in the workplace and family directly violates Articles 2, 5, 11, and 12 of CEDAW (CEDAW Committee, 2017).

4.2 Crimes Against Humanity

The UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea (2014) concluded that sexual violence, forced labor, torture, and enforced disappearances rise to the level of crimes against humanity. The widespread and systematic nature of these abuses, particularly against women in detention or repatriated, aligns with the Rome Statute definitions under Article 7.

4.3 Human Trafficking and Non-refoulement

China’s forced repatriation of North Korean women violates the international legal principle of non-refoulement under the 1951 Refugee Convention and the Convention against Torture. Many women face near-certain torture and inhumane treatment upon return (FIDH, 2023). The situation also contravenes obligations under the Palermo Protocol on trafficking, to which China is a party.

4.4 International Humanitarian Law and the Ukrainian Conflict

The conscription and export of troops for a foreign conflict raise significant concerns under international humanitarian law. There is growing consensus that the DPRK’s military collaboration with Russia may violate both UN Security Council sanctions and basic protections under the Geneva Conventions (UN OHCHR, 2025). The indirect impacts on civilian populations, particularly women, are also neglected and unaddressed in state policy.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Women in the DPRK continue to suffer from a convergence of systemic violence, economic disenfranchisement, reproductive coercion, and now the indirect consequences of military adventurism. The erosion of their economic roles after COVID-19, combined with increased repression and trauma linked to the Ukraine conflict, constitutes a multi-layered crisis.

Under the Communications Procedure of the Commission on the Status of Women, there should be calls for international accountability and urgent monitoring of the situation. Specifically, the Commission should:

1. Accept a formal communication on the rights violations described above.
   
   
2. Engage the CEDAW Committee for an urgent inquiry under the Optional Protocol.
   
   
3. Recommend the establishment of a special international investigative body on gender-based abuses in the DPRK.
   
   
4. Advocate to halt forced repatriation of North Korean women from China.
   
   
5. Support humanitarian programs focused on psychosocial, reproductive, and economic assistance for defectors and at-risk women.
   
   

By acknowledging and acting upon these compounded violations, the international community can take meaningful steps toward protecting the dignity and human rights of North Korean women.

Greg Scarlatoiu
President and CEO
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK)
1801 F Street NW, Washington DC
Email: president@hrnk.org

-----------

Sources:

AP News. (2025, May 21). North Korean defectors urge the UN to hold the country's leader accountable for rights abuses. Associated Press, https://apnews.com/article/06be9bdcfa9da3f741879469a5ab9d45. 

CEDAW Committee. (2017). Concluding observations on the combined second to fourth periodic reports of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/ba09815a-1ac4-4fd2-ba3a-266b51d3f3e5.  

FIDH. (2023). Shadow Report for the Universal Periodic Review of China and North Korea. International Federation for Human Rights, https://www.fidh.org/en/region/asia/north-korea/.  

Human Rights Watch. (2022). Submission on the Rights of Women and Girls in North Korea, https://www.hrw.org/asia/north-korea.  

Human Rights Watch. (2024). World Report 2024: North Korea. New York: HRW, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/north-korea.  

Human Rights Watch. (2024). Joint Submission for the UPR of North Korea, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/06/10/north-korea-submission-universal-periodic-review-updated.  

Reuters. (2025, April 27). North Korea confirms troop deployment to Russia, hails ‘heroes’, https://www.reuters.com/world/north-korea-confirms-troop-deployment-russia-first-time-kcna-report-2025-04-27/.  

Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy. (2024). Trafficked and Forgotten: The Plight of North Korean Women in China, https://timep.org/reports/trafficked-and-forgotten-the-plight-of-north-korean-women-in-china/.  

Time. (2023). Ukraine's women are facing a domestic violence crisis, https://time.com/6261977/ukraine-women-domestic-violence/.  

Transitional Justice Working Group. (2024). Mapping the Fate of the Disappeared in North Korea, https://transitionaljustice.org/2024/05/08/mapping-the-fate-of-the-disappeared-in-north-korea/. 

UN Human Rights Council. (2023). Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, https://seoul.ohchr.org/index.php/en/node/540.  

UN OHCHR. (2025). Statement on the human rights implications of North Korea’s military support to Russia,https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/01/16/north-korea-no-easing-systemic-rights-abuses.  

Washington Post. (2025, April 7). How the few freedoms North Koreans enjoyed have vanished since the pandemic, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/04/07/north-korea-kim-jong-un-freedom-dead/.  

 

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United Nations General Assembly High-Level Plenary Meeting Addressing Human Rights Abuses and Violations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Statement by Greg Scarlatoiu, President and CEO

United Nations General Assembly

High-Level Plenary Meeting

Addressing Human Rights Abuses and Violations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Statement by Greg Scarlatoiu, President and CEO

Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK)

Your Excellency Philemon Young, President of the General Assembly at its 79th session; Ms. Ilze Brands Kehris, Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights; Professor Elizabeth Salmón, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK; Your Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen:

Please allow me to speak on behalf of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea—HRNK. We're an NGO holding UN ECOSOC consultative status. Since 2001, we have embarked on a mission to research, investigate, and report on human rights violations perpetrated by the DPRK regime.

The point I wish to emphasize is that DPRK human rights violations reinforce a regime that is exporting violence and instability—not only in the Northeast Asia region, but also in the Middle East and Eastern Europe.

You may all be familiar with the fact that the DPRK has been exporting weapons and ammunition to the terrorist groups that have encircled the State of Israel through Iran. The Type 73 submachine gun—you can see it in the hands of each and every fighter in the Middle East, whether you're talking about Syria, whether you're talking about Iraq, or whether you're talking about Yemen.

The first time the North Korean Musudan ballistic missile was tested—that's a missile based on an old Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile—it did not happen in North Korea. It happened in Iran.

You all remember that massive missile attack against Israel. Those liquid-fuel missiles were based on a North Korean design.

And you know, we see what's happening on the Ukrainian front right now. Millions—millions—of North Korean artillery shells have been exported to Russia, to the Ukrainian front. KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles have been deployed against Ukraine—Ukrainian cities, Ukrainian civilians: men, women, children.

Even troops from the 11th Armed Corps of the Korean People's Army—the North Korean People's Army—have been deployed to the Ukrainian front. 11,000 of them, at the very least. The numbers are increasing.

I do not believe reports that they're just gun fodder. They're not. They're very good troops—well-trained, well-fed, well-indoctrinated. What they have to learn is combined operations: artillery, drones, infantry. They're learning fast.

So, what is the point I'm trying to make here? The point I'm trying to make is that North Korea is no longer just a Korean Peninsula threat. The DPRK is no longer just a Northeast Asian threat. The DPRK is exporting instability and violence to the Middle East and to Europe. And the root cause of this is the human rights violations that the DPRK perpetrates.

Let me quote my good friend John Sifton, and my colleagues at Human Rights Watch, who issued a press release on May 18—just yesterday:

“The United Nations General Assembly should establish a new body to examine the connections between the North Korean government's repressive system and its military programs and nuclear weapons development.”

Concerned governments need to send high-level officials to this plenary today to offer specific ideas on how the General Assembly can better hold North Korea accountable—by documenting the links between the DPRK’s human rights abuses and its weapons programs.

Ladies and gentlemen, what do we know about human rights denial in North Korea?

Most of the 25 million people of North Korea are victims of the Kim family regime's policy of human rights denial. The people of North Korea face discrimination based on a loyalty-based system called Songbun.

The regime preserves itself through producing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, maintaining the Korean People's Army, and keeping its key elites happy through access to luxury goods and hard currency procured from the outside world—generally through illicit means, and also in violation of applicable UN sanctions.

In order to procure the resources needed to preserve itself, the regime oppresses and exploits its people at home and abroad. Prior to COVID, we knew that there were about 100,000 North Korean people deployed—primarily to Russia, China, and the Middle East. Up to 90% of their salaries were being confiscated by the regime.

This DPRK regime perpetuates itself through overwhelming coercion, control, surveillance, punishment, as well as strict information control.

We also know that the major agents of potential change in North Korea are the very people of North Korea. And when I say change, I mean peaceful change—peaceful transformation.

All right. I'm an adopted American, a naturalized American. I was on the streets of Bucharest in December 1989, during the anti-communist revolution. I know how terrible a non-peaceful transformation can be.

What we need in North Korea is peaceful transformation. We need a coherent information campaign focused on telling the North Korean people three stories: the abysmal human rights situation; the corruption of their leadership, particularly the inner core of the Kim family; and the truth about the outside world—especially the free, democratic, and prosperous Republic of Korea, South Korea.

Like-minded UN member states—democracies—must reassume leadership.

We must retake the high ground we once held on DPRK human rights at the UN, and the General Assembly can play an extraordinary role in this process. We must resuscitate the coalition of these like-minded UN member states and democracies. We need stronger UN General Assembly resolutions. We need to advance human rights through multilateral diplomacy, and we need to focus on a human rights-upfront approach to the North Korean conundrum.

We must truly rely on the members of this like-minded coalition. We know who they are: the EU, South Korea, Japan, Australia, and other UN member states. Of course, the Global South—the Global South is extraordinarily important. We must rely on our friends, our partners, our allies in the Global South, who have themselves experienced tremendous human rights violations. They can be absolutely helpful—tremendous, critical allies.

Advancing human rights through multilateral international diplomacy will be key to what I propose as a human rights-upfront approach to the North Korean conundrum.

And of course, I'm speaking on this hallowed ground at the UN. When you say a human rights-upfront approach, what you mean is bringing together the three branches: political, humanitarian, and human rights.

What I mean by this is placing human rights front and center as we deal with the DPRK. What I mean is inducing peaceful change in North Korea.

So let us try to empower the people—and I repeat, the people—of North Korea. Let us step up efforts to send them information from the outside world—information telling them three fundamental stories:

1.     The story of their own human rights.

2.     The story of the corruption of their leadership.

3.     The story of the outside world—especially the story of South Korea, the Republic of Korea.

North Korea joined the UN at the same time as South Korea, in 1991. Upon becoming a UN member state, North Korea assumed international obligations. It must observe the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

North Korea acceded to the two core human rights covenants in 1982—nine years before joining the UN: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).

The DPRK has also joined the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).

And yet, each and every conceivable civil, political, economic, social, and cultural right is violated in North Korea.

Let us take a look at the constitution of the DPRK. Please excuse this shameless exercise in self-promotion—it's on our website, hrnk.org. You can take a look at the constitution of the DPRK there.

The constitution and other laws supposedly protect rights such as freedom of religion and freedom of assembly—but none of these rights are observed in practice. All that matters is North Korean ideology and the TPMI—the Ten Principles of Monolithic Ideology.

So again, we used to think about North Korea as a Korean Peninsula issue, as a regional issue. That is no longer the case.

In order to support the regime—and to support the exportation of instability and violence to the Middle East and Europe—the DPRK regime relies on human rights violations.

And I will strongly argue in favor of a human rights approach to the DPRK. Unless we resolve the abysmal human rights situation, there will be no answer to this challenge.

And we have had a report from the UN COI—the United Nations Commission of Inquiry. I know that some of the distinguished delegates here have an issue with country-specific mechanisms, and that is all right.

But in February 2014, a UN Commission of Inquiry—three head commissioners: one Serbian, Sonja Biserko; one Australian, Michael Kirby; and one Indonesian, Marzuki Darusman—found that crimes against humanity were being committed in North Korea, pursuant to policies established at the highest level of the state.

Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, I will argue that the DPRK regime thrives on crimes against humanity. This regime thrives on human rights violations.

And if we are to bring some resolution to the Korean Peninsula—if we are to restore peace, prosperity, and stability to the Northeast Asia region and other parts of the world—we must focus on North Korean human rights.

Thank you very much for listening, and please remember: hrnk.org.
Thank you very much.

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North Korea’s Lawfare Strategy

North Korea’s Lawfare Strategy^[1]

By Robert Collins

Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu

October 30, 2024

 

The weakening of totalitarian regimes results in the worsening of human rights denial. North Korea is no exception. The Kim regime's latest indicator of this weakness is its recent "lawfare" strategy of extreme punishment for cultural violations, as demonstrated by 2021-2023 legislation designed to stop the infiltration of South Korean culture into the North.

South Korean culture continues to permeate into North Korean society slowly but surely, particularly among the younger generations of the North. Hallyu, the “Korean Wave,” or South Korean culture, entertainment, and information, has proven to be so attractive to younger North Koreans that they are willing to risk their lives and future to enjoy the likes of K-pop, South Korean movies and anything else they can gain access to electronically.

As a response to this infiltration of South Korean culture into North Korea, the Kim regime has taken to the concept of threatening punishment for anyone caught watching or listening to South Korean culture and information. This punishment goes beyond the previous historical approaches to state violence. According to the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB), there has been a 40-fold increase in human rights violations by the Kim regime against the citizens of North Korea.^[2]

The Kim regime has expanded its cultural control to its own version of “lawfare.” While the concept of “lawfare” has been in use for a while, it has recently gained added significance in the United States. The term refers to one political party employing legal challenges and court decisions to attack another political party for the purpose of discrediting the other party and/or its representatives.

In the last four years, the Kim regime has compelled the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Supreme People’s Assembly to pass laws designed to restrict North Korean citizens from learning of what the world is like outside the borders of North Korea, especially what life is like for their fellow ethnic Koreans in the South. Consequently, the Kim regime compelled North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly to promulgate the Law on Rejecting Reactionary Ideology and Culture in 2020, the Youth Education Guarantee Law in 2021 and the Law on Protecting Pyongyang Cultural Language in 2023.

The Law on Rejecting Reactionary Ideology and Culture (반동사상문화배격법) was amended in August 2022 and supplemented by Order No. 1028 of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly. It is made up of four chapters and 41 articles. Articles 1-7 define and list the aims of the anti-reactionary thought law. Articles 8-14 address the responsibilities of the local officials to enforce the law. Articles 15-26 target the media violators of the law access and use. Articles 27-40 describe the punishments to be applied to violators of the law.^[3]

The Youth Education Guarantee Act (청소년 교육 보장법) of 2021 is designed to eliminate among the youth “anti-socialist and non-socialist thought” and ideologically educate young people how to be totally loyal to orders from the party and Kim Jong Un. The law has five chapters and 45 articles. The law states what young people “must not do during efforts to establish a socialist lifestyle,” and lists other institutional and individual violations. It also states that violators must “take legal responsibility” for their wrongdoing. Punishments range from years of forced labor to death sentences.^[4]

The Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act (조선민주주의인민공화국 평양문화어보호법) was implemented by the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly’s Order No. 1028 on August 19, 2022. This act has 4 chapters and 41 articles.^[5]

North Koreans are punished for using ‘anti-socialist’ words picked up from smuggled South Korean dramas. Those youths who are found guilty of violating these laws – listening to K-pop, watching South Korean movies, illegally importing South Korean media technology – are arrested in front of captive youth audiences to emphasize the Kim regime’s staunch attitude against South Korean cultural infiltration into the North. It should be understood that violations of the party’s Ten Great Principles of Monolithic Ideology (TPMI) and not violations of the criminal code are the reason most people are sent to political prison camps. The Kim regime’s lawfare is designed to support these ideological principles.

Under the Kim regime, party influence is pervasive in both criminal and political cases. In criminal cases, the government assigns lawyers to the defense. Defense lawyers are not considered advocates for the defendant so much as independent parties to help persuade the accused to admit his/her guilt, although they apparently present facts to mitigate punishment.^[6] "With the influx of external culture and information such as South Korean soap operas and K-pop, many North Koreans are consuming Juche culture by day, South Korean culture by night," Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho said in his keynote speech at the 2024 International Dialogue on North Korean Human Rights held in Washington.

Regardless, one can be sentenced to prison and heavy labor by organizations other than a court. The Ministry of State Security (the secret police), peer trials and locally based Socialist Life Guidance Committees all can sentence a person without going through the established legal system. Peer trials are particularly political and focus on non-support of the TPMI; failing to study or criticism/distortion of the teachings of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il and party policy; and minor economic crimes.  

North Koreans are punished for using ‘anti-socialist’ words picked up from smuggled South Korean dramas. Yet, there are reports that even the lead initiator of these laws, Kim Jong-un, has been watching some of these South Korean movies, as evidenced by the language he has been using in his public addresses to the North Korean people. When addressing older flood victims recently, though normally referring to them as “comrades”, he referred to them as “citizens.” Rather than referring to older victims as “senior,” he called them “elders.” He called television “TV” rather than the normal North Korean term “terebi.” Lastly, Kim referred to the flood situation as “navigating rough terrain,” a change from the more normal North Korean term of “difficult and tiring situation.”^[7]

Recommendations to pass legislation to change conditions in North Korea historically ignore the actual political power system of the Kim Regime which is party-based and not state-based.  Demands should focus on changing party policies because all state agencies strictly follow party guidelines.  Each state agency or department, regardless of size or level, follows the decisions of the embedded KWP committee in that organization.  An example is asking for changes in the criminal code that presumably would be enforced by the courts and police agencies.  However, all court representatives, including judges, and police take orders from the party, not the state, and legal decisions are made based on political consequences and requirements.^[8]

South Korea's cultural wave is fiercely battling the cultural indoctrination of the Kim Jong-un regime to win the hearts and minds of North Koreans. When human rights demand begins to effectively pressure human rights denial, ruling regimes such as that of North Korea’s Kim double their efforts at suppression through new policies and legislation.

^[1] This paper is a version of a recent conference presentation in Seoul, South Korea.

^[2] 북한인권정보센터, The Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB). 2024년 북한인권백서, White Paper on North Korean Human Rights. October 8, 2024. Pages141 and 356. https://nkdb.org/publication/?bmode=view&idx=121771392. 

^[3] Seulkee Jang, “Daily NK acquires full text of the anti-reactionary thought law,” dailynk.com, March 21, 2023. URL: https://www.dailynk.com/english/daily-nk-acquires-full-text-of-the-anti-reactionary-thought-law/.

^[4] Mun Dong Hui, “North Korean young people stupefied by strong punishments in “Youth Education Guarantee Act”, dailynk.com, February 17, 2022. URL: https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korean-young-people-stupefied-strong-punishments-youth-education-guarantee-act/.

^[5] DailyNK, “The Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act of The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” dailynk.com, January 2023. URL: https://www.dailynk.com/english/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2023/03/Pyongyang-Cultural-Language-Protection-Act_English-and-Korean-Versions_Daily-NK.pdf 

^[6] Kyu Chang Lee, Gwang Jin Chung, “The North Korean Criminal Trial System: Characteristics and Actual Practice,” KINU Research Abstract 11-05. URL: www.kinu.or.kr.

^[7] Ahn Chang Gyu and Park Jaewoo, “Kim Jong Un shocks listeners by using South Korean terms in speech,” rfa.org, August 16, 2024. URL: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/north-korea-south-korea-korean-wave-language-dialects-kim-jong-un-speech-yalu-river-flood-08162024111909.html/ampRFA.

^[8] Andrea Matles Savada, “Country Study – North Korea,” Federal Research Division
Library of Congress, 1993. URL: http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-9648.html.

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