ROK-U.S. Relations: Stronger, Safer, and More Prosperous Together
ROK-U.S. Relations: Stronger, Safer, and More Prosperous Together
Greg Scarlatoiu
President and CEO
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, HRNK
Mary O’Leary
Research Intern
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, HRNK
Paper Presented at 12th Korean Peninsula Forum
University of Washington, Seattle WA
Acknowledgments:
The authors wish to thank Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. (Angelo State University) and Dr. George Hutchinson (International Journal of Korean Studies) for their terrific help and guidance.
Abstract:
Under the current administration, the focus is on making America strong, safe, and prosperous. The alliance with the Republic of Korea is key to achieving those goals. The United States and the Republic of Korea cherish their friendship, partnership, and alliance forged on the brutal, bloody battlefields of the Korean War. The alliance has surely evolved beyond security issues, to include strong and fruitful relations on the economic, trade, and investment fronts. As far as political, security, and military relations are concerned, apparent contentious issues are not necessarily grounded in reality. Issues pertaining to sovereignty, OPCON transfer, or Special Measures Agreement (SMA) cost-sharing are rather the result of perceptions created by South Korea’s progressive-leaning governments. Managing the U.S.-ROK relationship must consider the newly emerging international order. Liberal elements of the post-Cold War international order, including shared values and human rights, are losing relevance. A realist, rather offensive realist approach to international relations, is taking root, involving the projection of hard power. The alliance must adapt to this new reality. A strong U.S.-ROK alliance must also be grounded in full understanding of practical issues such as H1-B and other visas for South Korean professionals contributing to making America prosperous through creating good U.S. jobs.
On August 25th, 2025, President Donald J. Trump of the United States and President Lee Jae-myung of South Korea met in Washington D.C. to discuss diplomacy, trade, and military relations between our two nations. This paper also aims to provide a summary of each president’s goals, the alliance between both countries, the outcome of the summit, and the response of other nations.
Pre-Summit Objectives:
Going into the summit, President Lee publicly expressed his desire to strengthen the alliance between South Korea and the United States, specifically stressing the importance of economic exchanges and trade. In the face of growing Chinese influence and the continued nuclearization of North Korea, President Lee also expressed a desire to present a united front with the United States. This course of action is most likely due to the large amount of criticism the president has faced for his more conciliatory relations with China and North Korea in recent months. President Lee follows the contentious leadership of President Yoon Suk-yeol, who placed the nation under martial law in December 2024. For President Lee, showcasing his leadership and the capabilities of South Korea was of the utmost importance, especially considering President Yoon’s controversial actions and the effect they had on South Korean politics.
Unlike President Lee, President Trump did not initially view this meeting as a sign of strengthening the alliance between the two nations, voicing his frustrations with President Lee over the social media platform X.
"WHAT IS GOING ON IN SOUTH KOREA? Seems like a Purge or Revolution. We can't have that and do business there. I am seeing the new President today at the White House. Thank you for your attention to this matter!!!” - President Donald Trump[1]
President Trump expressed during the summit that this remark was made in relation to intel he had been given of churches being raided within South Korea, including the headquarters of the Unification Church, and also a U.S. military base. As such, there were fears of President Trump and President Lee repeating a confrontation similar to the one President Trump had with President Zelenzsky earlier this year. This repeat however did not occur, with both presidents working to strengthen their alliance once the summit began.
Important Military Issues Going forward into the Near Future:[2]
The bedrock of the U.S.-ROK alliance is extended deterrence, involving the nuclear umbrella. The two allies made important progress on that two years ago. We were progressing last year. There is now a U.S.-ROK committee that engages in planning on what needs to be done to keep the nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence current, and that is a key milestone.
Cost-sharing is another key issue. This is more political than it is military. The biggest argument is the Special Measures Agreement (SMA). Japan also has one with the United States. Japan is paying more than the ROK, but the Japanese SMA cost-sharing is also being questioned. Perceptions are at least as important as reality. On the U.S side, perceptions are that the ROK wants US troops on their soil to deter North Korea, but is unwilling to pay its fair share, which is a smaller share of what Japan pays. This time, the issue is that the U.S. president is saying the ROK is not doing its fair share enjoying the protection of the greatest power on earth, against the worst rogue regime on earth. Do ROK politicians really believe the ROK can deter the North Korean nuclear and 1.2-million-man military threat as well as weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) on their own? Europe can’t do that on its own. ROK politicians must be careful what they wish for and stop pushing back the United States on the particular issue of the SMA and cost-sharing.
Training areas in South Korea, including training areas for air force units, are becoming fewer and fewer. This is becoming an operational readiness challenge. The exercises have become more “tabletop,” i.e. computer-generated. Fewer troops have been involved. How do you prepare for readiness? By practicing together. If U.S. and ROK troops don’t train together, it will hurt readiness.
The nuclear umbrella is the ultimate guarantee of military deterrence for South Korea. If one believes the ROK is better off defending itself without the United States, then understanding of military deterrence should come into question. What is the United States getting out of the alliance? The United States could have pulled out of Korea a long time ago. There is a growing perception that too much trouble is involved to keep troops in South Korea. What is the point of keeping troops in the ROK, if they’re having difficulty training? At some point, the Pentagon and U.S. Government viewpoint may shift: If the ROK can do training, planning, and deterrence on their own, let them have what they want.
The link between national security and trade is also of the essence. The ROK is America’s 6th training partner. Why is the USA so keen on defending the state of Israel? Israel is also a big trading partner. The United States sent B2 bombers to destroy Iran’s nuclear program because it was the right thing to do. And also, because Israel is the only U.S. ally in the Middle East and a great trade partner. The USA loves the fact that the ROK is a democracy. It is also important that, if the USA is not there to deter the North Korean threat, U.S. economic interests will also be threatened. It is important to maintain stability in a country that is so close to the United States economically, and that is so important for the international economic order.
OPCON transfer continues to be an issue, especially under progressive ROK governments. Given the current political climate in the United States, putting U.S. forces under the control of ROK forces during war time will create a perception that the ROK four-star general is directing where the U.S. forces go, and how they deploy from the United States. ROK generals are not trained to work worldwide intelligence, logistical, supply, or deployment issues. That is going to be an issue, as they are not ready for the magnitude of such a task. ROK commanders are simply not ready for this. There is no political timeline for readiness. Readiness is simply based on capabilities. Any changes pertaining to OPCON transfer will be political, not based on capabilities. The ROK military is not ready for such a step yet.
Is it really that important that a ROK general gets OPCON command? In the OPLAN, it is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who gets command. Is a ROK four-star in charge really what we want? Is that the most optimal way to lead a war? Probably not. And that is likely the viewpoint one is going to get from the Pentagon, at least for the foreseeable future. Sovereignty should have nothing to do with it, and the so-called “OPCON transfer” should not happen just because the progressive president of the ROK wants it. Why would one not want to have an American general with access to all of those forces in charge? What is the greatest fighting force in the world? Surely, the United States. In wartime, the 28,500 force already stationed in South Korea would increase to hundreds of thousands.
Foreign command of U.S. troops is a big issue from the Pentagon's viewpoint. The United States is very uncomfortable with U.S. troops serving under foreign command. That has not happened since World War 1. Even if it is not command, but just control, But the four-star holding OPCON will be in charge, answering to both the U.S. and the ROK president. The four-star with OPCON will be the military figure running the show.
Focus on sovereignty should be out of the picture, for the sake of the security of the ROK and the strength of the alliance. Is the United Kingdom not a sovereign state? And yet, the NATO commander is always a U.S. general. Does that prevent the United Kingdom from going to war anywhere they want? Definitely not, and the 1982 Falkland War is testament to that. France is no exception, for sure. Having a U.S. general as NATO commander has not prevented France from engaging in multiple African military endeavors over the past few decades. The United States is the best country to provide the commanding general. The U.S. military is best equipped, best trained, best positioned to project military power. The fundamental point is that the OPCON transfer issue is not about real sovereignty. It is about the perception of sovereignty created by the ROK left.
The U.S.–ROK Alliance – Readiness and Deterrence Through a Resilient Training Posture:[3]
October 2025 marks 72 years since the signing of the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. Another important milestone is set to occur this November 7—the 47th anniversary of the establishment of the Combined Forces Command (CFC)–the structure through which the alliance demonstrates U.S.-ROK preparedness to deter threats and defend against a resumption of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. As the U.S.-ROK Alliance heads deeper into its seventh decade, numerous challenges will persist. North Korea’s ever-expanding nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities will require continued preparedness and vigilance to deter threats and ensure peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Internal to the military effectiveness of the Alliance, threats to readiness, such as limited training range availability, insufficient airspace, and impeded access to missile defense sites as well as external problematics, such as chosen approaches to dealing diplomatically with North Korea, trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan relations, and future defense cost-sharing negotiations, will also require continued attention in order to ensure optimal readiness moving forward.
ROK Contributions to Regional and International Peace and Security:
Article V of the SOFA originally stipulated that South Korea would provide facilities and land to the United States, and the United States would be responsible for all costs associated with maintaining U.S. Forces in Korea. However, in 1991, the year South Korea was admitted into the United Nations, the two allies signed the first Special Measures Agreement (SMA)—special measures that allowed for the ROK-U.S. cost-sharing of stationing U.S. Forces in Korea. These special agreements have been concluded and renewed 12 times since 1991, and Korea’s share has continued to gradually increase. South Korea’s share, set at 107.3 billion won in 1991, increased to 1.18 trillion won (about $1 billion) in 2021—a 13.9 percent increase from the previous 2019 SMA and an eleven-fold increase over the 30-year period since the first SMA was signed.[4] Beyond the SMA, South Korea contributed over 90 percent of the $10.8 billion required to build up Camp Humphreys, now the largest U.S. overseas base, and consolidated U.S. Forces there under the Yongsan Relocation and Land Partnership Plans.[5] The last (12th) SMA was signed on November 4, 2024, and entered into force on November 29, 2024. This SMA covers the period 2026-2030 and increases the 2025 ROK contribution by 8.3% in 2026, to roughly $1.19 billion.
Challenges to the Alliance:
While the U.S.-ROK Alliance has successfully endured, the seven-plus decade relationship has been a winding journey not without its ups and downs. Against the ever-present backdrop of North Korean aggression, public sentiment, politically charged budget decisions, and partisan politics have occasionally disrupted relations within the Alliance and created uncertainty over its future. There are numerous examples—President Nixon’s decision to withdraw the 7th Infantry Division in 1971; pressure by the Ford administration to end South Korea’s secret nuclear weapons program; Jimmy Carter’s plan to withdraw all U.S. Army Forces in the late 1970s; tensions between the Clinton and Kim Young-sam administrations during U.S.-North Korea nuclear negotiations in the 1990s, more tensions between the Bush, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations in the 2000s; and previous Trump administration pressure on the ROK during rounds of defense cost-sharing negotiations. It is too early to tell how things will play out in the Trump-Lee Jae-myung era, but as Seoul gears up to host the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum at the end of the month, signs of strain appear within the alliance on the heels of the ICE raid on a Hyundai plant in Georgia and as U.S. tariffs loom. Despite the differences that arise, the Alliance is maintained in stable condition, rooted in the Mutual Defense Treaty and kept up through a Status of Forces Agreement, along with additional coordination frameworks, such as the recently established Nuclear Consultative Group, intended to enhance extended deterrence using an integrated approach.
Continued State of Readiness:
The Armistice Agreement signed between opposing military commanders on July 27, 1953, created ceasefire conditions to allow for higher level political negotiations for a final peace settlement. However, the 1954 peace talks held in Geneva broke down and terms for a peaceful end to the Korean War have never been settled.[6] Thus, the military ceasefire agreement, intended merely as a temporary measure, is the only formal safeguard against the resumption of full-blown hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. A cornerstone of the Alliance, Article IV of the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty is the basis for the stationing and movement of U.S. Forces operating in South Korea.[7] The U.S.-ROK Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), signed July 9, 1966, implements Article IV by delineating in detail facilities and areas used by, and the status of, U.S. forces in Korea.[8]
U.S. Forces have been stationed on the Peninsula since the Korean War, and today roughly 28,500 U.S. military remain, a baseline augmented by rotational forces. While U.S. Forces serve under a unique structure made up of three commands—U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), the Combined Forces Command (CFC), and the United Nations Command (UNC)— the CFC, established on November 7, 1978, is considered the “heart of the U.S.-ROK Alliance.” As the warfighting command for the U.S.-ROK Alliance, the CFC demonstrates, through combined exercises, the preparedness of the Alliance to credibly deter or rapidly respond if challenged.[9]
Over the decades, to counter North Korean military adventurism, maintain preparedness, and signal resolve to defend South Korea and protect the Alliance, the United States and the ROK have consistently conducted combined exercises, at times ramping them up or scaling them down, depending on factors such as the threat environment or political climate (e.g., during nuclear negotiations with North Korea during the Clinton and Trump administrations, exercises were scaled back). From the November 1955 combined Chugi exercise, to the massive Team Spirit field exercises held from 1976 through the early 1990s, all the way to Ulchi Freedom Shield 2025 held this past August, combined ROK-U.S. drills have been key to demonstrating the commitment and resolve of the Alliance.[10]
Ensuring Readiness Through Training:
As outlined by General Xavier T. Brunson, the tri-hatted commander of the Combined Forces Command (CFC), U.S. Forces Korea, and the United Nations Command, before the House Armed Services Committee this past April, CFC’s dual missions of deterrence and defense require unparalleled readiness. CFC accomplishes this through combined live and virtual training during exercises such as FREEDOM SHIELD (FS), ULCHI FREEDOM SHIELD (UFS), and FREEDOM EDGE. General Brunson described the FS 25 training conducted this past March, where CFC achieved over 50 combined field training activities covering tactical to strategic scenarios. In addition to these scheduled exercises, strategic asset deployments to the Korean Peninsula not only support extended deterrence operations but also provide multinational training opportunities. The USINDOPACOM trilateral FREEDOM EDGE exercise enhances strategic coordination among the U.S., Japan, and South Korea.
Constraints to Training:
In his testimony given before the House Armed Services Committee in 2023, General Paul J. LaCamera, outlined an ongoing limitation—“Our ability to provide forward deterrence is dependent upon conducting regular, robust, and challenging training. Due to space constraints, collective live-fire training opportunities are limited.” Just two years before, the previous commander, General Robert B. Abrams stated in his testimony that the CFC had continued experiencing limitations vis-Ã -vis training range access and airspace, impacting the ability to train effectively on the Korean Peninsula and maintain readiness—in some cases, requiring units to train off-Peninsula to maintain their effectiveness. The problem of access to reliable training ranges and airspace, as General Abrams noted, had been simmering since 2006 and was especially pertinent to live-fire scenarios and air crew training, requiring USFK to rotate forces off-Peninsula to sustain proficiency.
Fortunately, many of these deficiencies began getting attention during the Biden-Yoon period. In June 2023, the Yoon administration approved the permanent stationing of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in Seongju, North Gyeongsang Province. Following THAAD “normalization” in August 2023, the ROK, US and Japan later formalized a multi-year trilateral exercise plan. Together, these moves essentially reversed Moon Jae-in’s “Three No’s” vow to China made in 2017, which promised (1) no additional THAAD deployment, (2) no South Korean integration into a US-led regional missile defense system and (3) no trilateral alliance with the United States and Japan. It was reassuring to later see continued momentum reflected at the 24th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue between the ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) and the U.S. DoD in April 2024. The joint press statement showed the two sides agreeing that it was “imperative for the Alliance to conduct practical combined exercises and training,” and that there was acknowledgement over “...the need to improve realistic training conditions for U.S. and South Korean troops, including through the joint use of ROK facilities and airspace for mutually agreed training.” The extent to which the Trump-Lee era will see to these improvements is unknown, but the groundwork for continued improvement has been laid.
As the U.S.–ROK Alliance marks more than seven decades of partnership, its longevity rests not only on shared history but on continuous adaptation to shifting security dynamics. The alliance’s resilience—expressed through sustained deterrence, equitable cost-sharing, and combined readiness under the Combined Forces Command—remains its defining strength. Yet maintaining that strength will require renewed commitment to practical challenges: ensuring access to training ranges and airspace, refining extended deterrence frameworks, and aligning political will on both sides of the Pacific. As long as both nations remain united in purpose and prepared in practice, the alliance will continue to serve as a bulwark for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula in the Indo-Pacific.
Discussion on North Korea:
Both President Lee and President Trump agreed that strengthening political ties with Pyongyang would be beneficial for both nations. President Lee specifically framed negotiations with North Korea as a partnership with the United States, calling himself the ‘pacemaker’ and President Trump the ‘peacemaker’[11]. President Trump in turn had an interesting personal relationship with Chairman Kim Jong-Un during his first presidency in 2018 and expressed a desire to meet with him again. The President also went on to describe his relationship with Kim as strong due to these past negotiations.
Kim Jong-un has since given no statement on these comments or prospects for future talks. This is most likely due to North Korea’s strengthening military and trade alliances with Russia and Iran. North Korea’s alliance with Russia and Iran distinctly positions it as a perennial adversary of the United States and runs counter to American trade and security interests.
As reported by the United Nations, North Korea has a long history of trading weapons with Iran, whereas South Korea in turn has stayed neutral regarding the conflict between the two countries, advocating instead for peace between them. South Korea’s Israeli embassy expressed this in a statement in June:
“1. The government of the Republic of Korea welcomes the announcement of a ceasefire between Israel and Iran on June 24 and appreciates the diplomatic efforts of the United States and other relevant countries that played key roles in the process.
2. The government of the Republic of Korea hopes that all parties concerned will faithfully implement the agreement, thereby contributing to the de-escalation of tensions in the region.
3. As a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, the government of the Republic of Korea will continue to engage in international efforts to promote peace and stability in the Middle East.” - MOFA Spokesperson's Statement on Announcement of Ceasefire between Israel and Iran (6.26.25)
North Korea has sent millions of artillery shells, KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles as well as approximately 30,000 troops, primarily special forces from the Korean People’s Army 11th Corps, to aid Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine. South Korea instead condemned Russia’s actions in Ukraine and continues to do so to this day, their embassy in Ukraine giving this statement:
”1. The Korean government strongly condemns Russia’s armed invasion against Ukraine as a violation of the principles of the UN Charter. The use of force that causes innocent casualties cannot be justified under any circumstances.
2. Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence should be respected.
3. As a responsible member of the international community, the Korean government will support and join the international community’s efforts, including economic sanctions, to curb armed invasion and resolve the situation peacefully.” - MOFA Spokesperson's Statement on Situation Regarding Ukraine (2.25.2022).
North Korea and South Korea stand militarily opposed, their allies even more so. As such it is no surprise that South Korea wishes to strengthen its most important alliance with the United States whilst still maintaining its neutral stance on global conflicts.
Defense Budget and Concerns:
During the summit, President Lee announced an increase in South Korea’s defense budget, a proposal which was received positively by both parties. This increase would seek to invest $47.6 billion dollars and is meant to counter the ever-growing number of North Korean missile tests. This would be the greatest increase in the defense budget South Korea has seen in seven years.
During talks regarding defense, President Trump expressed a desire to purchase land in South Korea for military purposes. Currently South Korea leases land for American military sites. Most likely a purely rhetorical statement, this is likely to receive future political backlash.
This comment could also be in reference to the land which the Chinese government has purchased in Itaewon, Seoul, South Korea, much of it in the immediate vicinity of U.S. diplomatic residential facilities. In the summer of 2024, following Japanese and the American growing concerns for this land acquisition, the US proposed new rules to strengthen national security reviews of real estate transactions near military sites. Japan has since followed these suggestions within its own national borders.
Shipbuilding and Trade:
On June 30th, before the August 25th summit took place, President Lee succeeded in reaching a trade agreement which decreased American tariffs on auto exports to the United States. During this meeting, South Korea also promised to invest $350 billion in the United States and purchase $150 billion in U.S. fossil fuels[12]. Though investment was a significant topic during the summit, President Lee instead centered on shipbuilding as the primary industry of future trade with the United States. President Lee named this trade alliance by the slogan, ‘Make American Shipbuilding Great Again’, which is referred to as ‘MASGA’ by South Korean officials.
Included in the summit was an industry roundtable between American and South Korean companies to discuss a deal that would allow for greater South Korean participation in American shipbuilding. In the end, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was agreed upon among HD Hyundai, the American private equity firm Cerberus Capital, and the state-run Korea Development Bank (KDB). This agreement was meant to attract and focus billions of dollars on reinvigorating the American shipbuilding industry and MASGA[13].
On August 26th, right after the summit with President Trump, President Lee also visited a Philadelphia shipyard which the South Korean Hanwha Ocean company purchased. This visit, purchase and shipbuilding negotiation also followed an August 19th meeting in South Korea involving US Senators Tammy Duckworth of Illinois, Andy Kim of New Jersey and South Korean companies HD Hyundai, Hanwha Ocean, and Samsung Heavy Industries regarding shipbuilding. Due to these companies' investment, specifically HD Hyundai and Hanwha Ocean in South Korean and American shipbuilding relations, they will most likely continue to play the biggest economic role in this alliance.
Post-Summit Relations:
Due to the success of the summit, the economic and military alliance has strengthened both President Lee’s initial objectives and President Trump’s confidence in the South Korean president. Under growing North Korean exportation of instability and violence to both the Middle East and Eastern Europe, international influence and militaristic ambitions, South Korea has remained focused on neutrality and alliance management with the United States and other like-minded countries.
Hyundai ICE Raids and President Trump’s Immigration Policies:
In early September, following the August summit, it was reported that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrests had taken place at the site of a Hyundai company building in the state of Georgia[14]. It was reported that 475 workers had been arrested with over 300 of that number being Korean nationals themselves. Following the arrests, South Korean officials sent diplomats to Georgia calling for the protection of the Korean nationals’ civil rights after backlash from the South Korean media.
Hyundai has released a statement reaffirming its intention to invest in the American market and comply with American immigration laws. As President Trump continues to expand his international economic endeavors, the question will fall onto how these companies and their workers will be treated under President Trump’s immigration policies. Due to the Trump Administration’s platform of immigration legislation, this may come at a cost to the relatively new South Korean trade and investment deals. How this will affect the process of investment in the United States by other South Korean companies is yet to be determined. Below is a copy of the statement Hyundai made following the arrests.
“Hyundai Motor Company is aware of the immigration enforcement action that took place at the construction site of its supplier, the HL-GA Battery Company in Bryan County, Georgia. We are closely monitoring the situation while working to understand the specific circumstances. Based on our current understanding, none of those detained is directly employed by Hyundai Motor Company.
Hyundai is committed to full compliance with all laws and regulations in every market where we operate. This includes employment verification requirements and immigration laws. We expect the same commitment from all our partners, suppliers, contractors, and subcontractors.
The safety and well-being of everyone working at our sites, whether directly employed by us or working for our suppliers, is a top priority. We take our responsibility as a corporate citizen seriously, and incidents like this remind us of the importance of robust oversight throughout our entire supply chain and contractor network.
We are reviewing our processes to ensure that all parties working on our projects maintain the same high standards of legal compliance that we demand of ourselves. This includes thorough vetting of employment practices by contractors and subcontractors.
North America Chief Manufacturing Officer Chris Susock will now assume governance of the entire mega site in Georgia and we will conduct an investigation to ensure all suppliers and their subcontractors comply with all laws and regulations.
Hyundai has zero tolerance for those who don't follow the law.
As we continue to invest in American manufacturing and create thousands of jobs, we will do so in full accordance with U.S. law and in a manner that reflects our values of treating all people with dignity and respect.” -Hyundai Motor Company[15]
Beijing Meeting Between Presidents Xi, Putin, and Kim:
On September 2nd, 2025, following President Trump’s summit with the president of South Korea, leaders from Russia, China, and North Korea met in Beijing to celebrate the 80th anniversary of Japan’s surrender at the end of World War II. The celebration included a parade showcasing China’s military and the announcement of further economic agreements among the three nations.
All three leaders have a long history of working with one another, with Kim and Putin sharing revamped military ties due to North Korea’s armed support of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Russia, which has been economically isolated from much of the western world due to the international sanctions imposed on it following the war, has been very open to advancing their relationship with North Korea. To further avoid such sanctions, President Putin has also met with many other non-western leaders to help create a Russian economy centered distinctly outside of western influence. These meetings include the one in Beijing, a meeting with the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and a meeting with the Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. The economic and military support of Russian interests were the primary goals of Putin's meeting in Beijing, with Kim reflecting much of this objective.
North Korea, which has been militarily supporting Russia for almost two years now, has by far the most to gain from this emerging alliance among the three countries. Unlike Russia and China, it is a heavily isolated, comparatively smaller nation of only 25 million. If Russia were to succeed in creating an international economic trade system among non-western powers, North Korea would become exponentially more powerful, both economically and militarily on the global stage. As the country has also received widespread criticism by the international community for its testing of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and human rights issues, such international influence would also help Kim Jong-un to earn further legitimacy within the international community.
President Xi, unlike Putin or Kim, has not openly expressed any public support or declaredly sustained Russia’s war in Ukraine[16]. Though expressing support for Russia verbally in public reports, President Xi’s actions and written international agreements suggest a strong desire for China and Russia’s alliance to remain purely economic. The military parade which all three leaders attended was specifically a show of Chinese military prowess, with no statement of formal military collaboration with China from any party. Regarding economics, China has mirrored Russia, meeting with a large number of non-western nations to form strong economic ties and future policies. For example, just two days before the Beijing meeting, President Xi and President Putin met with the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. India, unlike China, Russia, and North Korea, has seemingly decided to work both with the United States and its allies as well as its adversaries. The question now is if revisionist powers such as Russia and North Korea will pressure their economic allies to pick between western and non-western interests.
As expressed by both American officials and news outlets, this ceremonial meeting was perceived as a show of strength against western American military and economic policy with President Trump responding on the platform Truth Social,
“Give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un, as you conspire against The United States of America.” - President Donald J. Trump
This ceremony and the summit between President Trump and President Lee in August marks a growing economic divide between the west and its allies. The Korean peninsula rests specifically at the heart of this rift, with both the North and South, as usual, on opposing sides.
H1-B Visas:
As of September 21st, President Trump issued an executive order that will add a $100,000 fee for applicants for H1-B visa, a visa for highly skilled foreign workers[17]. The president stated in an explanation of the order, “The company needs to decide... is the person valuable enough to have a $100,000-a-year payment to the government, or they should head home, and they should go hire an American. All of the big companies are on board.”
Though meant to enroll ‘higher value’ employees, this added cost to such a common workers’ visa will inevitably affect foreign companies working in the United States. This includes the South Korean companies that have made deals with President Trump and the United States following the August summit. How foreign companies plan to pay these fees and if they will stop leasing workers from their home countries is yet to be determined. What can be assured through this added cost of foreign visa workers is that the number of foreign workers will dramatically decrease for the vast majority of foreign companies if other visa alternatives are not found.
Work Cited
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Gregory A. Wald, S.M. (2025b) Understanding the new $100,000 H-1B fee and its effect on U.S. employers, Employment Law Worldview. Available at: https://www.employmentlawworldview.com/understanding-the-new-100000-h-1b-fee-and-its-effect-on-u-s-employers/ (Accessed: 12 October 2025).
Haggard, H. Analysis of the first Trump-Lee Summit, CSIS. Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/analysis-first-trump-lee-summit (Accessed: 06 October 2025).
HD Hyundai announces joint multibillion-dollar U.S. Shipbuilding Investment Program (2025) Korea JoongAng Daily. Available at: https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-08-26/business/industry/HD-Hyundai-announces-joint-multibilliondollar-US-shipbuilding-investment-program/2384259 (Accessed: 06 October 2025).
Isidore, C. (2025) Hyundai raid shows Trump’s policies are getting in the way of his economic ambitions | CNN business, CNN. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2025/09/10/business/hyundai-raid-trump-policies-immigration-manufacturing (Accessed: 08 October 2025).
Kim, Sarah. After 18 Months of Tough Talks, SMA is Signed with U.S., Korea JoongAng Daily, April 8, 2021: https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2021/04/08/national/defense/defense-costsharing-SMA-Special-Measures-Agreement/20210408181500393.html, accessed September 5, 2025
Lee, D.C. and Y., Choi, D. and Lee, Y. (2025) South Korea seeks $47.6 billion defense budget, biggest increase in 7 years, Stars and Stripes. Available at: https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2025-09-04/south-korea-record-defense-budget-18970959.html (Accessed: 06 October 2025).
Matza, M. (2025) Ice raid on Hyundai plant in Georgia swept up workers on visitor visas, BBC News. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy50yge052xo (Accessed: 06 October 2025).
Senate. “Statement Of General Robert B. Abrams Commander, United Nations Command; Commander, United States-Republic Of Korea Combined Forces Command; And Commander, United States Forces Korea Before The Senate Armed Services Committee,” 12 February 2019, pp. 11-13, Available at: https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Abrams_02-12-19.pdf (Accessed: 12 October 2025).
Song, Sang-ho, “U.S. Forces Korea Opens New Headquarters in Pyeongtaek,” Yonhap News Agency, June 29, 2018, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20180629000352315 (Accessed: 05 October 2025).
“The Korean War Armistice Agreement Panmunjom, Korea”, July 27, 1953. Available at: https://www.usfk.mil/Portals/105/Documents/SOFA/G_Armistice_Agreement.pdf (Accessed: 12 October 2025).
Three commands, “United States Forces Korea”. Available at: https://www.usfk.mil/About/Combined-Forces-Command/ (Accessed: 05 September 2025).
US-ROK Status of Forces Agreement _1966-67. Available at: https://www.usfk.mil/Portals/105/Documents/411%20CSB/1%20U.S.-ROK%20SOFA.PDF (Accessed: 12 October 2025).
“U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service IF11388, Updated March 14, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11388; accessed September 5, 2022.
“U.S.-South Korea Relations,” Updated February 24, 2022, Congressional Research Service Report R41481, p. 24, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41481 (Accessed: 05 October 2025).
Walsh, N.P. (2025) China tells EU it can’t accept Russia losing its war against Ukraine, official says, CNN. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2025/07/04/europe/china-ukraine-eu-war-intl (Accessed: 08 October 2025).
Xi, Putin, Kim and the optics of a new world order (2025) The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/news/ng-interactive/2025/sep/06/xi-jinping-vladimir-putin-kim-jong-un-optics-new-world-order (Accessed: 06 October 2025).
Yeo, A., Lev Nachman, H.J.K. and Evans J.R. Revere, K.C. (2025a) The art of the alliance: 3 takeaways from the trump-lee summit, Brookings. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-art-of-the-alliance-3-takeaways-from-the-trump-lee-summit/ (Accessed: 08 October 2025).
Yeo, A., Lev Nachman, H.J.K. and Evans J.R. Revere, K.C. (2025b) The art of the alliance: 3 takeaways from the trump-lee summit, Brookings. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-art-of-the-alliance-3-takeaways-from-the-trump-lee-summit/ (Accessed: 06 October 2025).
Interviews:
Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., Angelo State University. October 8, 2025.
Dr. George Hutchinson, editor-in-chief, International Journal of Korean Studies. October 9, 2025.
[1] Craig, B.E. (2025) Korea’s Lee Jae Myung reflects on summit with Donald Trump, UPI. Available at: https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2025/08/25/south-korea-president-forum/5891756174444/ (Accessed: 06 October 2025).
[2] Interview with Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., Angelo State University. October 8, 2025.
[3] Interview with Dr. George Hutchinson, editor-in-chief, International Journal of Korean Studies. October 9, 2025.
[4] Dohee Kim, “Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing through Theoretical Approaches to the Evolution of an Asymmetric Alliance,” Korea Observer, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Spring 2020), pp. 37, 45-46; for text of the 2021 SMA, see, “Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, Signed at Seoul April 8, 2021,” https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/21-901-Korea-Defense-SMA.pdf; Sarah Kim, “After 18 Months of Tough Talks, SMA is Signed with U.S.,” Korea JoongAng Daily, April 8, 2021; https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2021/04/08/national/defense/defense-costsharing-SMA-Special-Measures-Agreement/20210408181500393.html, accessed September 5, 2022
[5] Song Sang-ho, “U.S. Forces Korea Opens New Headquarters in Pyeongtaek,” Yonhap News Agency, June 29, 2018, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20180629000352315; “U.S.-South Korea Relations,” Updated February 24, 2022, Congressional Research Service Report R41481, p. 24, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41481; “U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service IF11388, Updated March 14, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11388; accessed September 5, 2022
[6] For the text in the Armistice Agreement that discusses the peace settlement question, see Articles IV and V, “The Korean War Armistice Agreement, Panmunjom, Korea, July 27, 1953,” https://www.usfk.mil/Portals/105/Documents/SOFA/G_Armistice_Agreement.pdf; for a good historical summary, see “Armistice Negotiations,” United Nations Command, https://www.unc.mil/History/1951-1953-Armistice-Negotiations/, accessed September 5, 2022
[7] Article IV states, “The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.” See, “United States of America-Republic of Korea Treaty,” p. 148
[8] For text of the original agreement, see, “Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Korea: Agreement Between the United States of America And the Republic of Korea,” https://www.usfk.mil/Portals/105/Documents/411%20CSB/1%20U.S.-ROK%20SOFA.PDF, accessed September 5, 2022
[9] For a “command perspective” of the command structure and the alliance, see “Statement Of General Robert B. Abrams Commander, United Nations Command; Commander, United States-Republic Of Korea Combined Forces Command; And Commander, United States Forces Korea Before The Senate Armed Services Committee,”
12 February 2019, pp. 11-13, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Abrams_02-12-19.pdf; for information on the commands, see, “Three Commands,” https://www.usfk.mil/About/Combined-Forces-Command/, accessed September 5, 2022
[10] For a historical accounting of the combined ROK-U.S. exercises, see Robert Collins, “A Brief History of the US-ROK Combined Military Exercises,” 38 North, February 26, 2014, https://www.38north.org/2014/02/rcollins022714/#_ftn1
[11] Haggard, H. (no date) Analysis of the first Trump-Lee Summit, CSIS. Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/analysis-first-trump-lee-summit (Accessed: 06 October 2025).
[12] Cha, V. and Lim, A. South Korea gets its trade deal with the United States, CSIS. Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-korea-gets-its-trade-deal-united-states (Accessed: 06 October 2025).
[13] HD Hyundai announces joint multibillion-dollar U.S. Shipbuilding Investment Program (2025) Korea JoongAng Daily. Available at: https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-08-26/business/industry/HD-Hyundai-announces-joint-multibilliondollar-US-shipbuilding-investment-program/2384259 (Accessed: 06 October 2025).
[14] Isidore, C. (2025) Hyundai raid shows Trump’s policies are getting in the way of his economic ambitions | CNN business, CNN. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2025/09/10/business/hyundai-raid-trump-policies-immigration-manufacturing (Accessed: 08 October 2025).
[15] Hyundai official statement on Georgia plant closure following ICE raid, September 10, 2025: Esposito, J. (2025) Unpacking claims Hyundai is closing Georgia plant following Ice Raid, Snopes. Available at: https://www.snopes.com/news/2025/09/10/ice-hyundai-plant-georgia/ (Accessed: 08 October 2025).
[16] Walsh, N.P. (2025) China tells EU it can’t accept Russia losing its war against Ukraine, official says, CNN. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2025/07/04/europe/china-ukraine-eu-war-intl (Accessed: 08 October 2025).
[17] Gregory A. Wald, S.M. (2025b) Understanding the new $100,000 H-1B fee and its effect on U.S. employers, Employment Law Worldview. Available at: https://www.employmentlawworldview.com/understanding-the-new-100000-h-1b-fee-and-its-effect-on-u-s-employers/ (Accessed: 12 October 2025).
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