March 23, 2016

The Inaugural Fred Iklé Lecture Featuring Justice Michael Kirby and Roberta Cohen

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

WASHINGTON D.C.

FEBRUARY 19, 2016

NORTH KOREA: THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY NEXUS

INAUGURAL FRED IKLÉ MEMORIAL LECTURE


INTRODUCTION TO THE INAUGURAL FRED IKLÉ LECTURE
By Roberta Cohen, Co-Chair Emeritus, HRNK

It gives me great pleasure to introduce the first Fred Iklé Lecture sponsored by the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). This lecture is to become an annual HRNK event to honor Fred Iklé as principal founder and intellectual architect of our organization and its first chair. When HRNK was established in 2001, Dr. Iklé was well known as a defense and foreign policy specialist and a nuclear strategist. But what was not so well known was his passionate interest in promoting democracy and human rights in countries where people were closed off from their basic freedoms–in particular North Korea. He was one of the first to recognize that because North Korea was so isolated, a research and advocacy organization was needed to document the human rights situation and draw international attention to it. As Chair, he kept HRNK focused and steered a tight ship. HRNK went on to produce groundbreaking reports on North Korea’s prison camps, the plight of refugees, and the devastating famine. He saw the linkage between human rights deprivation and peace and security, which was recalled in a eulogy by NED President Carl Gershman, another distinguished co-founder of HRNK. 

March 21, 2016

English Translation of South Korea's North Korean Human Rights Act


North Korean Human Rights Act
Law No. 14070
Enacted: Mar. 3, 2016, Entry into force: Sept. 4, 2016

Article 1 (Purpose)
The purpose of this Act is to contribute to the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights by pursuing the rights to life and liberty as defined in international human rights treaties, including the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Article 2 (Basic Principles and Responsibilities of the State)
(1) The State shall acknowledge that the North Korean people have the right to human dignity and to pursue happiness, and shall endeavor to promote the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights.
(2) The State, while promoting the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights, shall also endeavor to develop inter-Korean relations and work towards peace on the Korean Peninsula.
(3) The State shall consistently provide sufficient financial resources to promote the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights.

Article 3 (Definitions)
The term “North Korean,” as used in this Act, means persons who reside in the area north of the Military Demarcation Line, and have formed the basis of their livelihood—including immediate family members, spouses, or workplace—in that area.

Article 4 (Relationships with other Acts)
In endeavoring to promote the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights, this Act shall apply except in cases where there are special provisions in the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act, Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund Act, and Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act.

Article 5 (North Korean Human Rights Advisory Committee)
(1) The North Korean Human Rights Advisory Committee (hereafter “the Committee”) shall be established under the Ministry of Unification for the purpose of deliberating on policies to promote North Koreans’ human rights.
(2) The Committee shall be composed of ten or fewer members recommended by the National Assembly, and the chairperson shall be elected by and from the members. In selecting the Committee members, the negotiating body of the current or former party of the incumbent President shall recommend one half of the members, and the negotiating bodies of other parties shall recommend one half of the members. Committee members shall be commissioned by the Minister of Unification.
(3) Necessary matters concerning the composition and management of the Committee shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree.

Article 6 (Basic Plan for the Promotion of North Koreans’ Human Rights and Implementation Plan)
(1) The Minister of Unification shall formulate a basic plan to promote the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights (hereafter “basic plan”) every three years in consultation with the head of relevant central administrative agencies and the Committee. A basic plan shall include the following matters.
  1. Research on human rights conditions in North Korea 
  2. Measures to protect and improve North Koreans’ human rights, including, but not limited to, inter-Korean human rights dialogue and humanitarian assistance 
  3. Other matters deemed necessary for protecting and improving North Koreans’ human rights, as determined by Presidential Decree 
(2) In accordance with the basic plan, the Minister of Unification shall formulate every year an implementation plan (hereafter referred to as “implementation plan”) in consultation with the Committee.
(3) Once the basic plan and implementation plan have been formulated, the Minister of Unification shall inform the National Assembly without delay.

Article 7 (Promoting Inter-Korean Human Rights Dialogue)
(1) The Government shall pursue inter-Korean human rights dialogue regarding important matters in promoting the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights.
(2) Necessary matters regarding the appointment of the representatives participating in inter-Korean human rights dialogue shall be governed by Article 15 of the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act, with the necessary modifications.
(3) Other necessary matters in pursuing inter-Korean human rights dialogue shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree.

Article 8 (Humanitarian Assistance)
(1) The State shall observe the following matters when providing humanitarian assistance to the North Korean authorities and North Korean agencies for the purpose of promoting the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights.
  1. The distribution of assistance shall be conducted transparently and in compliance with internationally recognized standards. 
  2. The most vulnerable groups, including children and pregnant women, shall be prioritized in the provision of assistance. 
(2) The State shall endeavor to ensure that humanitarian assistance delivered by private organizations observes the conditions stated in the sub-clauses of clause (1).

Article 9 (International Cooperation to Promote North Korean Human Rights)
(1) The State shall cooperate with foreign governments, international institutions, international organizations, and other entities with regards to people-to-people exchanges and information sharing in promoting the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights, and shall endeavor to raise international attention towards promoting human rights in North Korea.
(2) In accordance with clause (1), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may appoint an Ambassador-at-large for Human Rights in North Korea (hereafter “Ambassador for International Cooperation on North Korean Human Rights”) to promote international cooperation for promoting human rights in North Korea.
(3) Necessary matters concerning the Ambassador for International Cooperation on North Korean Human Rights, including duties and qualifications, shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree.

Article 10 (Establishment of North Korean Human Rights Foundation)
(1) The Government shall establish the North Korean Human Rights Foundation (hereafter “the Foundation”) to investigate human rights conditions in North Korea, and to conduct research and develop policies on matters related to promoting the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights, including inter-Korean human rights dialogue and humanitarian assistance.
(2) The Foundation shall be an incorporated body, and it shall be duly formed once it is registered at the physical location of its main office.
(3) The Foundation shall conduct the following projects, and each project may be managed by a specialized body.

1. Projects to promote the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights, including inter-Korean human rights dialogue:
A. Investigation and research on human rights conditions in North Korea
B. Formulating and recommending policy options for the Government on issues including inter-Korean human rights dialogue
C. Other projects reviewed by the Committee and assigned by the Minister of Unification
D. Providing support to civic society organizations necessary for conducting the above projects

2. Projects to promote the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights, including humanitarian assistance:
A. Investigation and research on the need for humanitarian assistance in North Korea
B. Formulating and recommending policy options for the Government regarding humanitarian assistance to North Korea
C. Other projects reviewed by the Committee and assigned by the Minister of Unification
D. Providing support to civic society organizations necessary for conducting the above projects

(4) Other necessary matters concerning the establishment of the Foundation shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree.

Article 11 (Operation of the Foundation)
(1) Funds for the Foundation’s operation shall be drawn from the following.
  1. Contributions by the government
  2. Other income
(2) The Foundation may accept voluntarily donations with the approval of the Minister of Unification, provided that such donations are used for purposes within the scope of the Foundation’s activities, notwithstanding the provisions under Article 5.2 of the Act on the Collection and Use of Donations.
(3) The Minister of Unification shall manage and supervise the Foundation.
(4) If deemed necessary for the Foundation to achieve its objectives, the Minister of Unification may request the heads of relevant agencies to send to the Foundation public officials belonging to such agencies.
(5) Unless otherwise prescribed by this Act, the provisions of the Civil Code concerning incorporated foundations shall apply in regard to the Foundation, with the necessary modifications.
(6) Other necessary matters concerning the management and supervision of the Foundation and the process for accepting donations shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree.

Article 12 (Composition of Foundation Board Members)
(1) The Foundation shall have not more than twelve board members, including a president. The board shall be composed of individuals recommended by the National Assembly, including two board members recommended by the Minister of Unification. In recommending the board members, the negotiating body of the current or former party of the incumbent President shall recommend one half of the members, and the negotiating bodies of other parties shall recommend one half of the members. The board members shall be appointed by the Minister of Unification.
(2) With the exception of the president and other full-time members as designated by the articles of association, the board members will serve in a part-time capacity.
(3) The president shall be elected from among the board members. The term for the president and the executives shall be three years, and all board members may be re-appointed once. The term of ex officio board members shall be the term of their office.
(4) Other necessary matters concerning the selection of board members for the Foundation shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree.

Article 13 (Database Archive for North Korean Human Rights)
(1) The Ministry of Unification shall establish the Database Archive (hereafter “the Archive”) for North Korean Human Rights to collect and record information related to human rights conditions in North Korea and promoting the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights.
(2) The Archive shall conduct the following activities and collect, research, document, and publish information and other materials.
  1. Matters related to investigating and researching the human rights situation of the North Korean people
  2. Matters related to South Korean prisoners of war, abducted South Korean citizens, , and separated families
  3. Other matters as reviewed by the Committee and deemed necessary by the Minister of Unification
(3) The activities listed under clause (2) may be entrusted to external institutions. For this purpose, financial support may be provided within the scope of the budget.
(4) The Archive shall have a director appointed or commissioned by the Minister of Unification. The director shall be chosen from among senior government officials or civilian experts who have extensive knowledge and experience in the area of human rights in North Korea.
(5) The materials collected and documented by the Archive shall be transferred every three months to the Ministry of Justice, under which a specialized body shall be established for the purpose of preserving and managing such records.
(6) Other necessary matters concerning the composition and management of the Archive shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree.

Article 14 (Cooperation with Relevant Institutions)
(1) In conducting tasks that aim to promote the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights, the Minister of Unification may, as deemed necessary, request administrative agencies, public institutions, and relevant individuals to submit information, provide testimony, and provide other forms of cooperation necessary to policy implementation.
(2) The heads of administrative agencies or public institutions and relevant individuals shall, upon receiving requests under clause (1), comply with such requests in the absence of any specific reasons to the contrary.
(3) The heads of relevant central administrative agencies and local governments who seek to enact or amend an Act or ordinance related to the activities proscribed under this Act shall notify the Minister of Unification thereof.

Article 15 (National Assembly Report)
(1) In addition to the basic plan and implementation plan, the Minister of Unification shall give an annual report to the National Assembly before the beginning of the regular session regarding the following matters.
  1. Human rights conditions in North Korea
  2. Degree of progress and results pertaining to efforts to promote the protection and improvement of North Koreans’ human rights
  3. Formulation of plans regarding South Korean prisoners of war, abducted South Korean citizens, and separated families, and degree of progress in the implementation of such plans
  4. Evaluation of projects referred to in sub-clauses 1 to 3, as conducted by the government, central administrative agencies, and local governments
  5. Other matters as deemed relevant by the Minister of Unification
(2) In relation to reports referred to in clause (1), the National Assembly may, when deemed necessary, request rectification or improvement.

Article 16 (Application of Penal Provisions relating to Public Officials)
In the performance of their duties, the executives and staff members of the Foundation may be considered public officials subject to Article 127 and Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Code.

Article 17 (Penalty Provisions)
Any person who receives financial support under this Act by fraudulent or other illegal means shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than three years or by a fine not exceeding thirty million won.


Addenda (No. 14070, March 3, 2016)


Article 1 (Entry into force)
This Act shall enter into force six months after the date of its promulgation.

Article 2 (Preparation for Establishment of the Foundation)
(1) The Ministry of Unification shall appoint a founding committee of not more than seven individuals within thirty days of the promulgation of this Act, so that they may execute tasks related to the establishment of the Foundation.
(2) The founding committee shall prepare the articles of association of the Foundation and obtain authorization from the Minister of Unification. Once this authorization has been received, the founding committee shall complete without delay the registration of the Foundation through joint signatures.
(3) As soon as the registration has been completed, the founding committee shall hand over its affairs without delay to the president of the Foundation, and thereafter, the members of the founding committee shall be deemed to have been released from commission.
(4) Expenses incurred in relation to establishing the Foundation shall be borne by the State.


Translated by Hyebin Jeon, HRNK Research Intern

Edited by Raymond Ha, HRNK Office Manager and Outreach Coordinator

March 18, 2016

The Special Rapporteur on DPRK Ends his Term with Calls for Group of Experts on Accountability


By Christine Chung

Christine Chung is a Senior Advisor to the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the former Political Advisor to the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. As a human rights officer for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, she managed the Office's technical cooperation program with China, supported the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, and served desk functions for Northeast and Southeast Asia. Before joining the UN, Ms. Chung established and headed the China field office for the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. She is currently advising the Leiden Asia Centre on its investigation of forced labor practices involving North Koreans in the European Union.


On Monday, Marzuki Darusman, the current Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), participated in his final interactive dialogue with the Human Rights Council in Geneva. Approaching the limit of two terms, the former Indonesian Attorney General looked back on achievements during his incumbency of the mandate in a 10-minute opening statement. At the start of his first term six years ago, he noted, there was skepticism that the international community could go any further than passing annual resolutions on the human rights situation in North Korea. However, the previous mandate-holder, Thai law professor Vitit Muntarbhorn, had suggested at the end of his term that there was a need for a commission of inquiry for a deeper investigation into the subject. While it took four more years for its establishment through the consensus of the Human Rights Council, the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the DPRK (COI) in 2014 delivered definitive findings to focus “unprecedented concern” on the dire situation of human rights. Mr. Darusman argued that the COI, by establishing that crimes against humanity had taken place and were currently being committed, had helped to “re-profile” North Korea within the United Nations system raising its human rights problems to the highest political level and aligning them with concerns about peace and security.

The Special Rapporteur emphasized that the human rights situation in North Korea has not changed at all in the past two years: political prison camps still operate; authorities still carry out torture with impunity; religious believers are still subject to persecution; food insecurity remains rife despite the emergence of markets; slave-like organizing of labor continues while workers are sent abroad to have their earnings confiscated by the state; and victims of kidnapping have not yet been accounted for.

Alluding to recent North Korean ballistic and nuclear provocations, he characterized the country’s external aggression as the flip side of the same coin that expresses itself internally in brutal suppression of human rights. He also noted that workers sent abroad to earn foreign exchange for the regime were subject to “severe labor conditions.” While there has been increasing talk of the need for a peace treaty to resolve the situation on the peninsula, the Special Rapporteur emphasized that accountability must be part of any discussion on unification. The question is not whether there should be accountability, he said, but when and how this will be done. And it is both a Korean and international challenge.

Given North Korea’s highly hierarchical structure, the principle of command and superior responsibility under international criminal law points to the individual culpability of Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un. The Special Rapporteur explicitly named the North Korean leader twice in this context. Mr. Darusman said Kim Jong-un should be tried in a court of law while recalling that the COI had made the recommendation that the Security Council refer the North Korean situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC). He also noted the possibility for universal jurisdiction whereby a third country could undertake judicial proceedings regardless of the nationality of the perpetrators or victims or whether the alleged crimes occurred within its territory. The Special Rapporteur concluded his statement by repeating his recommendation that a three-member group of experts be established to investigate plausible measures to ensure accountability in North Korea.

Following procedure, Vice-President of the Human Rights Council H.E. Mr. Ramón Alberto Morales Quijano (from the Republic of Panama), who was chairing the session, gave the floor to the delegation of the concerned state. As the North Korean delegation was not present, he proceeded to call on the representatives of member states in order of their inscription—activated electronically for one minute at the start of the session. The first to speak was Deputy Head of the European Union (EU) Delegation to the UN in Geneva Dominic Porter who, noting that the COI had presented a major turning point, supported Security Council referral of the North Korean human rights situation to the ICC, encouraged the DPRK to engage with the Special Rapporteur and the field-based structure of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Seoul, and explained that the DPRK resolution would call for extending the mandate of the Special Rapporteur. Other EU states aligned themselves with the EU statement, including the Republic of Estonia, Ireland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Portuguese Republic, the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Lithuania, the Kingdom of Spain, and the French Republic.

The Russian Federation condemned the Special Rapporteur in a particularly harsh statement. Russian representative Dmitry Vorobyev said the usual thanks to the mandate holder are not warranted as he had politicized the process in a non-professional way instead of seeking a normal respectful dialogue. He accused the Special Rapporteur of flagrantly violating the code of conduct for Special Procedures mandate holders by openly calling for regime change. Vorobyev questioned the Special Rapporteur’s suitability for holding the post alleging that he had undermined the whole system. Nevertheless, the representative conceded that Pyongyang has problems with its human rights, but “whipping up confrontation” would not help. In contrast, the United States of America, represented by Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues Ambassador Robert King, commended the Special Rapporteur’s outstanding accomplishments, expressed disappointment over North Korea’s lack of cooperation with the Special Rapporteur, and noted that the United States is committed to working closely with the international community on improving human rights in North Korea. Other supportive states included the Commonwealth of Australia, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Botswana, New Zealand, and the Republic of Albania.

Given its own history with country-specific mandates, the Republic of Cuba (Cuba) objected to what it described as the “selective and politically motivated” mandate of the Special Rapporteur. Cuba’s representative noted there was no genuine intent to contribute to dialogue and disparaged the establishment of new monitoring mechanisms outside the work of the Human Rights Council. Highlighting the punishment and sanctions imposed on North Korea which deny it the right to peace and development, Cuba’s representative said her country would never support actions to bring about regime change. She said that the best support could be provided through mechanisms of cooperation such as the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) that provide a venue for non-politicized debate. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s representative echoed Cuba’s position calling for dialogue and cooperation while noting that human rights should not be used for political ends and that unilateral coercive measures have negative effects on the civilian population. The Republic of Sudan’s representative emphasized that cooperation with the country was essential, recalling that the DPRK’s second UPR was encouraging as the country had accepted a number of recommendations. The Republic of Belarus’s representative expressed doubts about the establishment of another group of experts above other mechanisms without the consent of the DPRK. The Lao People's Democratic Republic’s representative stated his firm belief in the UPR as the most constructive dialogue forum for any country and took note of the DPRK’s participation in the UPR and high-level segments. The Syrian Arab Republic’s representative claimed that dual standards are in play and that the selective approach to North Korea undermines the Human Rights Council. He said that calling for the dismantling of the power structure violates the principles of the UN and that those who wish to see a change in government are dictating the extension of the mandate. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela called for reconsideration of country-specific mandates.

Of the three states most directly impacted by North Korea, Japan, represented by Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the International Organizations in Geneva Junichi Ihara, noting the escalation of provocative actions by North Korea, said that Security Council Resolution 2270 reflects strong international concerns about human rights and the humanitarian situation in the DPRK. He expressed support for the group of three experts idea proposed by the Special Rapporteur and noted its inclusion in the draft resolution co-sponsored by Japan and the EU. The People’s Republic of China’s representative Wang Yi reiterated that equality and mutual respect should be the grounds for engagement with the DPRK. She said that the root cause of the problems was the lack of political trust, a lingering effect of the Cold War, which necessitated negotiating a pathway away from the armistice through dialogue and cooperation. Furthermore, she regretted what she called “inaccuracies” about China in the Special Rapporteur’s report noting that China’s goal has been denuclearization of the peninsula and safeguarding its legitimate security concerns. Representative Wang Yi repeated the Chinese official position that North Koreans in China are not refugees but illegal aliens. She further stated that China has always adhered to Chinese, international, and refugee laws. The Republic of Korea (ROK) expressed full support for the Special Rapporteur and the OHCHR field office in Seoul. ROK Ambassador for Human Rights Jung-Hoon Lee regretted that the DPRK is boycotting Human Rights Council sessions and remarked that if conditions in North Korea are what the government claims, there would be no reason not to unconditionally invite the Special Rapporteur to visit. He also called on all states to respect the principle of non-refoulement.

After interventions by member states, national human rights institutions and nongovernmental organizations got their turn to speak. Human Rights Watch noted the importance of pursuing justice not just for past human rights violations (or “atrocities”) but for sending a message to officials that further abuses now would subject them to prosecution in the future. UN Watch was represented by Gayoung Kim of NK Watch, who detailed ongoing human rights violations of women, including sexual harassment by agents, particularly targeting victims in their 20s. Amnesty International focused on violations of freedom of expression, tightening of border security, and an increase in surveillance. People for Successful Corean Reunification highlighted the situation of North Korean workers overseas whose earnings get confiscated, thus forcing them to engage in illegal activities to survive.

Vice-President Quijano noted the country concerned had the right of reply. However, as its representative was not in the room, he proceeded to give the floor to the Special Rapporteur for his closing remarks. Mr. Darusman noted that the work of the past six years was a collective effort and that it was conducted on behalf of the 30,000 citizens of North Korea who have escaped and for those who remain. We are at the tail end of 15 years of work started by the international community, he said. The COI merely compiled available information, while it was entirely up to the DPRK government to present its side of the story. The Special Rapporteur argued that the international community has always adopted a two-track approach to engage and pursue accountability at the same time. Two years since the COI presented its report nothing has happened in the DPRK, he repeated. As the international community cannot allow an open-ended process, he urged that an accountability mechanism be put in place. A group of experts should not duplicate the work of the COI or the OHCHR field office in Seoul but would be a fundamental next step for accountability. He closed by saying he trusted the Human Rights Council to “see this matter through.”

Discussions on the North Korea resolution are currently going forward. According to Ambassador Ihara, Japan and the EU intend to include support for the Special Rapporteur’s recommendation for a group of experts on accountability in the draft resolution. A new human rights investigation body, coupled with the renewal of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the DPRK, would keep up institutional pressure on Pyongyang.

Side events that followed the interactive dialogue focused on forced labor by North Koreans both inside and outside the country and human rights violations against women and persons with disabilities. These two informal panels reflected increasing interest in these specific areas of concern. Certainly, North Korean women experience many additional levels of vulnerability and abuse ranging from pervasive discrimination to severe gender-based violence. In many respects, there has not been sufficient attention to the gender dimensions of the human rights situation in North Korea. It is symptomatic that trafficking of North Korean women in China, given its likely scale and scope, has not received the level of scrutiny the situation warrants. On persons with disabilities, the COI desperately sought to find one glimmer of hope in an otherwise grim portrait of human rights inside North Korea and found it in the DPRK’s signing of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Nevertheless, regardless of whether Pyongyang takes the next step of ratifying the treaty, North Korea’s lack of compliance with the other four human rights treaties that it is already a state party to indicates that this may not be real progress in the intentions of North Korean authorities. After all, Pyongyang is unlikely to suddenly respect and promote the rights of persons with disabilities. Meanwhile, several organizations have started examining North Korea’s practice of dispatching labor abroad under what appears to be conditions of forced labor. This approach has the advantage of overcoming some barriers of accessibility and of dealing with states that are more serious about implementing applicable labor and human rights laws. In these and various other ways, civil society promises to continue to do its part in advocating for improving the lives of North Koreans.

_________________________________________________________________________________

Draft resolution

A/HRC/31/L.25
Received from (main sponsors): Japan and EU
Date and Time: 16/03/2016 1259-1

Human Rights Council
Thirty-first session
Agenda item 4
Human rights situations that require the Council's attention


Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The Human Rights Council,

Guided by the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights and other human rights instruments,

Recalling all previous resolutions adopted by the Commission on Human Rights, the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including Council resolution 28/22 of 27 March 2015 and Assembly resolution 70/172 of 17 December 2015, and urging the implementation of those resolutions,

Bearing in mind paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006,
Recalling its resolutions 5/1, on institution-building of the Human Rights Council, and 5/2, on the Code of Conduct for Special Procedures Mandate Holders of the Council, of 18 June 2007, and stressing that the mandate holder shall discharge his/her duties in accordance with those resolutions and annexes thereto,

Stressing the importance of following up on the recommendations contained in the report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,[1] which was welcomed by both the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly, and transmitted to the relevant bodies of the United Nations, including the Security Council,

Deeply concerned at the systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that, in many instances, constitute crimes against humanity, as well as at the impunity of perpetrators, as described in the report of the commission of inquiry,

Concerned that the precarious humanitarian situation in the country is exacerbated by the failure of the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to provide humanitarian agencies with free and unimpeded access to all populations in need and by its national policy priorities that, among others, prioritize military spending over citizens’ access to food,

Reaffirming that it is the responsibility of the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to ensure the full enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms of its entire population, including by ensuring equal access to adequate food, as well as, among others, freedom of religion or belief, freedom of expression and freedom of association and assembly,

Recognizing that particular risk factors affect women, children, persons with disabilities and the elderly, and the need to ensure the full enjoyment of all their human rights and fundamental freedoms by them against neglect, abuse, exploitation and violence,

Acknowledging the participation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the second universal periodic review process, noting the acceptance by the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of 113 out of the 268 recommendations contained in the outcome of the review and its stated commitment to implement them and to look into the possibility of implementing a further 58 recommendations, and emphasizing the importance that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea accept and implement the recommendations in order to address the grave human rights violations in the country,

Recognizing the important work of the treaty bodies in monitoring the implementation of international human rights obligations, and emphasizing the need for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to comply with its human rights obligations and to ensure regular and timely reporting to the treaty bodies,

Noting the importance of the issue of international abductions and of the immediate return of all abductees, taking note of the outcome of the government-level consultation between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Japan in May 2014, on the basis of which the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea commenced investigations on all the Japanese nationals, and expecting the resolution of all issues related to the Japanese, in particular the return of all abductees, to be achieved at the earliest possible date,

         Welcoming the panel discussion on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including the issue of international abductions, enforced disappearances and related matters, held during the thirtieth session of the Human Right Council,

Noting the importance of inter-Korean dialogue, which could contribute to the improvement of the human rights and humanitarian situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,

Welcoming the resumption  of the reunions of separated families across the border in October 2015, and, given that this is an urgent humanitarian concern of the entire Korean people, owing, in particular, to the advanced age of many members of the separated families, hoping that necessary arrangements for confirming the fate of family members, exchanging letters, visiting their hometowns and holding  further reunions on a larger scale and a regular basis will be made by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea and members of the Korean diaspora,

Reaffirming the importance of States engaging fully and constructively with the Human Rights Council, including with the universal periodic review process and other mechanisms of the Council, for the improvement of their situation of human rights,

1. Condemns in the strongest terms the long-standing and ongoing systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations and other human rights abuses committed in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and expresses its grave concern at the detailed findings made by the commission of inquiry in its report, including:

(a) The denial of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as well as of the rights to freedom of opinion, expression and association, which is enforced through an absolute monopoly on information and total control over organized social life, and arbitrary and unlawful State surveillance that permeates the private lives of all citizens;
(b) Discrimination based on the songbun system, which classifies people on the basis of State-assigned social class and birth, and also includes consideration of political opinions and religion, discrimination against women, including unequal access to employment, discriminatory laws and regulations, and violence against women;
(c) Violations of all aspects of the right to freedom of movement, including forced assignment to State-designated places of residence and employment, often based on the songbun system, and denial of the right to leave one’s own country;
(d) Systematic, widespread and grave violations of the right to food and related aspects of the right to life, exacerbated by widespread hunger and malnutrition;
(e) Violations of the right to life and acts of extermination, murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape and other grave forms of sexual violence and persecution on political, religious and gender grounds in political prison camps and ordinary prisons, and the widespread practice of collective punishment with harsh sentences imposed on innocent individuals;
(f) Systematic abduction, denial of repatriation and subsequent enforced disappearance of persons, including those from other countries, on a large scale and as a matter of State policy;

2. Urges the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to acknowledge the human rights violations in the country and to take immediate steps to end all such violations and abuses through, inter alia, the implementation of relevant recommendations in the report of the commission of inquiry, including, but not limited to, the following steps:

(a) To ensure the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as well as the rights to freedom of opinion, expression and association, including by permitting the establishment of independent newspapers and other media;
(b) To end discrimination against citizens, including State-sponsored discrimination based on the songbun system, and to take immediate steps to ensure gender equality and to protect women from gender-based violence;
(c) To ensure the right to freedom of movement, including the freedom to choose one’s place of residence and employment;
(d) To promote equal access to food, including through full transparency regarding the provision of humanitarian assistance so that such assistance is genuinely provided to vulnerable persons;
(e) To immediately halt all human right violations relating to prison camps, including the practice of forced labour, to dismantle all political prison camps and to release all political prisoners, to immediately cease the practice of the arbitrary execution of persons in custody, and to ensure that justice sector reforms provide protections for a fair trial and due process;
(f) To resolve the issue of all persons who have been abducted or otherwise forcibly disappeared, as well as their descendants, in a transparent manner, including by ensuring their immediate return;

3. Reiterates its deep concern at the commission’s findings concerning the situation of refugees and asylum seekers returned to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and other citizens of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who have been repatriated from abroad and made subject to sanctions, including internment, torture, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment, sexual violence, enforced disappearance or the death penalty, and in this regard strongly urges all States to respect the fundamental principle of non-refoulement, to treat humanely those who seek refuge and to ensure unhindered access to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Office of the High Commissioner, with a view to protecting the human rights of those who seek refuge, and once again urges State parties to comply with their obligations under international human rights law as well as the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the Protocol thereto in relation to persons from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who are covered by those instruments;

4. Stresses and restates its grave concern about the commission’s finding that the body of testimony gathered and the information received provided reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity have been committed in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, pursuant to policies established at the highest level of the State for decades; these crimes against humanity entail extermination, murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions and other sexual violence, persecution on political, religious, racial and gender grounds, the forcible transfer of populations, the enforced disappearance of persons and the inhumane act of knowingly causing prolonged starvation;

5. Stresses that the authorities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have failed to prosecute those responsible for crimes against humanity and other human rights violations, and encourages the members of the international community to cooperate with accountability efforts and to ensure that these crimes do not remain unpunished;

6. Welcomes General Assembly resolution 70/172, in which the Assembly  encouraged the Security Council to continue its consideration of the relevant conclusions and recommendations of the commission of inquiry and  take appropriate action to ensure accountability, including through consideration of referral of the situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the International Criminal Court and consideration of the scope for effective targeted sanctions against those who appear to be most responsible for acts that the commission has said may constitute crimes against humanity;

7. Also welcomes the decision of the Security Council to hold a second  Council meeting on 10 December 2015, following the one in December 2014 during which the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was discussed, and looks forward to the continued and active engagement of the Council on this matter;

8. Commends the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for the activities undertaken to date and his continued efforts in the conduct of his mandate despite the lack of access to the country;

9. Welcomes the report of the Special Rapporteur submitted to the Human Rights Council at its thirty-first session, in which the Special Rapporteur calls upon the Human Rights Council to establish a group of independent experts on accountability;

10. Recalling the findings and recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, requests the High Commissioner for Human Rights to designate for a period of six months, a maximum of two existing independent experts in support of the work of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to focus on issues of accountability for human rights violations in the country, in particular where such violations amount to crimes against humanity as found by the commission of inquiry;

11. Also requests this group of independent experts on accountability, taking into account existing international law and prevailing State practices with regard to accountability to

a) explore appropriate approaches to seek accountability for human rights violations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in particular where such violations amount to crimes against humanity as found by the commission of inquiry;
b) recommend practical mechanisms of accountability to secure truth and justice for the victims of possible crimes against humanity in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including the International Criminal Court ;

12. Further decides to extend the mandate of the Special Rapporteur of the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in accordance with Human Rights Council resolution 28/22 for a period of one year;

13. Calls again upon all parties concerned, including United Nations bodies, to consider implementation of the recommendations made by the commission of inquiry in its report in order to address the dire situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;

14. Welcomes the establishment by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights of a field-based structure in Seoul to strengthen the monitoring and documentation of the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, to ensure accountability, to provide the Special Rapporteur with increased support, to enhance the engagement and capacity-building of the Governments of all States concerned, civil society and other stakeholders and to maintain the visibility of the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including through sustained communications, advocacy and outreach initiatives;

15.  Welcomes the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the role and achievements of the Office with regard to the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, submitted to the Human Rights Council at its thirty-first session, and invites the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to provide regular updates on the topic to the Human Rights Council ;

16. Calls upon all States to undertake to ensure that the field-based structure of the Office of the High Commissioner can function with independence, that it has sufficient resources and that it is not subjected to any reprisals or threats;

17. Requests the Office of the High Commissioner to report on its follow-up efforts in the regular annual report of the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;

18. Requests the Special Rapporteur to submit regular reports to the Human Rights Council and to the General Assembly on the implementation of his mandate, including on the follow-up efforts made in the implementation of the recommendations of the commission of inquiry;

19. Request the Special Rapporteur to include the report of the group of independent experts on accountability as an annex to his/her report to the Council at its thirty-forth session;

20. Acknowledges that the Special Rapporteur held a dialogue with the representatives of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in New York on 27 October 2014, and urges the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, through continuous dialogues, to invite and to cooperate fully with the Special Rapporteur, to give the Special Rapporteur and supporting staff unrestricted access to visit the country, and to provide them with all information necessary to enable them to fulfil such a mandate, and also to promote technical cooperation with the Office of the High Commissioner;

21. Encourages the United Nations system, including its specialized agencies, States, regional intergovernmental organizations, interested institutions, independent experts and non-governmental organizations to develop constructive dialogue and cooperation with special procedures mandate holders, including the Special Rapporteur, and the field-based structure of the Office of the High Commissioner;

22. Encourages all States, the United Nations Secretariat, including relevant specialized agencies, regional intergovernmental organizations and fora, civil society organizations, foundations and engaged  business enterprises and other stakeholders towards which the commission of inquiry has directed recommendations to take forward those recommendations;

23. Encourages all States that have relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to use their influence to encourage it to take immediate steps to end all human rights violations, including by closing political prison camps and undertaking profound institutional reforms;

24. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Special Rapporteur and the Office of the High Commissioner with regard to the field-based structure with all the assistance and adequate staffing necessary to carry out the mandate effectively, and to ensure that the mandate holder receives the support of the Office of the High Commissioner;

25. Decides to transmit all reports of the Special Rapporteur to all relevant bodies of the United Nations and to the Secretary-General for appropriate action.



[1] A/HRC/25/63.

March 10, 2016

An HRNK Interview with Justice Michael Kirby, Former Chair of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the DPRK

Please click here to view the video.

Q1: In regards to an improvement in North Korean human rights, what was your original expectation of the impact of the Commission of Inquiry and how has it either been met or fallen short?

Justice Kirby: The situation in North Korea has been going on, as the Commission of Inquiry found, for a very longtime—decades. Therefore, we didn’t expect things would change overnight. We did not expect that the Commission of Inquiry would be permitted to come into North Korea and we, therefore, prepared our methodology on the assumption that we would not be given access to the country, but that didn’t stop us doing our job because there were 26,000 people from North Korea who had fled from that country, living in South Korea and many others living in other countries. So we had plenty of testimony. To what extent were things different from what we expected? Well, I think the value of the inquiry was that it connected a great deal of information from people, who in many cases quite recently, had recently been in North Korea and they could give their testimony and indicate what they went through, what their experiences as human beings were. And they demonstrated that very serious offenses to human rights had occurred and some of those were crimes again humanity, which the international community has promised to react to and respond to. So, that is where the Commission of Inquiry led us. It led us to fact-finding and to reaching conclusions on a high level of standard of proof and making recommendations for the improvement of the human rights situation in North Korea.

Q2: What role does China play as a member of the P5 (US, UK, France, Russia, and China) in the UN Security Council in regards to North Korean human rights?

Justice Kirby: Well, the Commission of Inquiry understood right from the start that the cooperation of the People’s Republic of China was really a key to getting progress in respect of human rights in North Korea. That is because, in part, of the economic links between the DPRK and China, also the historical and fraternal party links between the two countries, the geographical contiguity—China has a border with the DPRK—and the large Korean minority, many of them themselves descended from, or in person, refugees from North Korea who live on the border on China.

Q3: The Commission met with roughly 300 witnesses during its investigation. What struck you as the most compelling and significant issue that victims of the Kim regime face today?

Justice Kirby: The situation in respect to their testimony was graphic. I think the aspect of the testimony that I will never forget was the sheer necessity of food in the human being. Human beings can last for so long without literature, without art, and without the accoutrements of ordinary life, but food is absolutely essential. In our report, there is a very important chapter—very well written if I can say so—explaining how the daily grind of getting food is, for most people in North Korea or outside of the elite, a continuing grave burden on the people. We heard testimony, which was extremely graphic, of the situation of the lack of food in the detention centers. One person, who gave testimony, had the job of leading a wheelbarrow around the encampment to pick up the emaciated bodies of the people who had died overnight and put them in a vat, where they were burned. Their ashes and the body parts were then scattered on the nearby fields in order to help grow the rudimentary needs of food for the detention centers. I am of such an age that I remember seeing vivid images of emaciated bodies at the end of the Second World War, when the Allied soldiers opened up parts of the Nazi-occupied Germany. Sitting there, listening to this testimony, brought home to me that here was I, decades later, listening to testimony of a somewhat similar kind. Therefore, that was the most vivid testimony that I heard. The testimony of women and the suffering they had undergone; the testimony of disadvantaged groups; of disabled people; the testimony of people who could not practice their religion without very grave punishments—all of this was horrific in this day and age that this goes on, and in a country that is a member of the United Nations and has signed up to the United Nations treaties. So there is a job to be done here and it is the obligation of the whole world to make sure that those who are responsible for the crimes against humanity are rendered accountable before the bar of humanity for their crimes.

Q4: What were some of the findings of the Commission of Inquiry regarding North Korean detention camps?

Justice Kirby: The forms of torture that were inflicted on people in the detention camps in North Korea were all horrible: the motorbike torture, the airline torture, but the most horrible of all was the pigeon torture—when people were manacled and held above the floor so they couldn’t stand; they couldn’t rest; they couldn’t sleep; they vomited; they defecated; and they didn’t want to continue to live.

Q5: Do you foresee the public release of the names of the alleged perpetrators as part of an accountability or transitional justice measure?

Justice Kirby: We recommended that the matter should be referred by the Security Council to the International Criminal Court, where there is a prosecutor, who could have access to the material of the Commission of Inquiry and that prosecutor’s own investigations. That was the correct way to go about it. This is yet another instance of the fact that the Commission of Inquiry on North Korea acted with great propriety and care. We were prudent and we were careful. We thought that the step of launching a prosecution was a step that should be taken by a prosecutor, not by the Commission of Inquiry. Our job was to find facts, and that is what we did and all that we did.

Q6: What do you believe HRNK and other NGOs can do to ensure accountability for crimes against humanity in North Korea as an international goal?

Justice Kirby: Make sure that the world hears your voices. The voices of the people of North Korea cannot be heard. They cannot have access to the Internet. They cannot speak to us, but we can speak out for them and to them. It’s important that the United Nations should make our voices heard in North Korea and that is an important message that we should bring. Civil society should bring it and they should remember the motto: never give up; never give up; never give up. That is the motto they should accept for the voices of North Korea and they should become the voice of North Korea today, tomorrow, and until the human rights situation in North Korea is radically changed for the better.

Q7: What message would you like to send to HRNK’s board of directors, staff members, interns, volunteers, and supporters?

Justice Kirby: I have completed by duties in respect to North Korea, but your duties continue. Your duties involve lifting your voices, not being satisfied with inaction on the report. Getting a report is a good thing. It has put this matter on the agenda of the international community, but a report of itself does not change things in North Korea. It’s important that the change agents should be you. The change agents within North Korea are difficult to organize because of the totalitarian regime that exists there. Therefore, they need friends. They need friends outside North Korea. They need people who will lift their voices and pursue their actions peacefully in order to promote the changes that the Commission of Inquiry recommended. My recommendations and my words to those in HRNK would be to:

Stay the course, continue your efforts, and never give up in your efforts to bring human rights to North Korea. Be absolutely sure that in the end, human rights will come to North Korea. We humans are genetically programmed to search for rationality and to love one another and because of that fact, we will ultimately see an end to the oppression of human rights in North Korea. When that happens, HRNK will have an honored place in those who have worked for human rights for the people of North Korea.


Edited by Rosa Park, HRNK Director of Programs and Editor

Original transcription by Caitlin Lenzner-White, HRNK Research Intern

March 08, 2016

An HRNK Interview with Robert Collins, Author of "Pyongyang Republic: North Korea's Capital of Human Rights Denial"


Q1: What was your motivation to be a leader on North Korean human rights?

Robert Collins: When I decided to retire from the army six years ago, I felt that my knowledge could be useful in writing materials that would contribute to an overall understanding of how North Korea makes its decision and to how they carry out their policies. And so, since retirement, I’ve just continued with what the army taught me to do over those decades at the end of the 20th century and doing it unilaterally. And now I’m doing it in support of HRNK.

Q2: What do you think is the relationship between human rights issues and security concerns for the U.S. – R.O.K. relationship regarding North Korea?

Robert Collins: The deplorable human rights condition of North Korea has a direct impact on their military. They have a million man army that can’t be composed of everybody in the country that is on the positive side of the political classification system—songbun. Many, if not close to half, are recruits—those that receive a denial of human rights through their entire life because they have been classified, socially and politically, as enemies of the state. Therefore, they have grown up with inadequate food, poor education, poor housing, and the opportunities that they receive in the military are very, very limited. Those in the lower songbun classifications can’t become officers. The few that do can’t go past the company grade. And even up until a few years ago, many of the individuals in the North Korean military that were regarded as low songbun—low trust on the political scale—weren’t even allowed to carry weapons because they didn’t trust them.

March 01, 2016

The Korea Society Featuring HRNK Executive Director Greg Scarlatoiu

The Korea Society
"North Korean Human Rights: Two Years beyond the COI Report"
February 18, 2016


Stephen Noerper: Welcome to the Korea Society. We’re delighted to have you here this afternoon on a very important anniversary—that of the second year since the release of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry (UNCOI) on Human Rights Abuses in North Korea. This is an area that we know many of you in our studio audience here feel very strongly about and we welcome all of our viewers online as well as those listening via podcast or watching the video. We are delighted to have with us Greg Scarlatoiu, who is the Executive Director of HRNK, the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. And we are absolutely delighted to welcome a member of his Board, Ambassador Winston Lord, who is in our audience today as well.

Before we begin in our discussion with Greg, we wanted to offer a few minutes of commentary from Seoul with a frequent guest to the Korea Society, Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon, who is the South Korean Ambassador for Human Rights. He was unable to join us physically here today, but is very much with us in spirit and wanted to offer a few comments to kick us off. So, this will be about seven minutes of his thoughts on where we are at two years since the release of the UNCOI. Peter? Thank you.

Peter Stuehmke: Welcome Ambassador Lee. What do you make of the COI anniversary and current state of play?

Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon: February is a very important month because it commemorates the second anniversary of the Commission of Inquiry report, which really stands as a landmark event. It really changed not only the way the international community views the North Korean human rights issues in a comprehensive way, but also, I would say that it really changed how the North Korean regime also deals and handles the human rights issue. It really, I think, was a game changer and it remains so. I think it’s very good that we’re addressing this second anniversary and really looking at so many things that were addressed by the COI report.

What has been done? And what still needs to be done? It is a very important gauge as to where we stand and what we still need to do as we move forward. We all know that crimes against humanity is one of the four major violations of international law. But the United Nations, after one year of very intensive investigation, has concluded that in North Korea, crimes against humanity are being committed and that this is something that needs to be referred by the Security Council to the International Criminal Court (ICC) so that those people who are responsible and who are committing these crimes against humanity ought to be prosecuted. It is on the agenda of the Security Council. It has been discussed in the most recent Security Council as well. So, we still need to get to the ICC, but I believe that the foundations are still there. And I think it is very important for the international community, whether it’s individuals, NGOS, churches, or whoever it may be, to keep raising these issues so that a lot of the points that have been raised by the COI can be followed up with.

Peter Stuehmke: What of the North Korean response?

Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon: North Korea is responding to this issue as it’s never done so before—even at the Security Council level. For example, Ri Su-yong, who is the North Korean Foreign Minister who never came to the UN General Assembly for 15 years, all of a sudden shows up at the General Assembly and addresses the General Assembly by giving a speech. And he did that again in 2015. So, two years in a row. We see high ranking North Korean diplomats making rounds in Europe, meeting with, for example, the EU head of human rights, Mr. Lambrinidis. We have incidents of North Korea inviting Special Rapporteur Darusman to North Korea on the condition that he help to take out those conditions of referral to the ICC. This is hitting the core of the North Korean leadership because they know that now the international community is watching over them. For three years, the North Korean human rights issue will remain as an agenda item so that at any time it can be discussed. But just the fact that a North Korean human rights issue sits as an agenda item at the Security Council is a source of very significant pressure on North Korea. It's fully aware now that the UN, not only the General Assembly, but also the Security Council and the wide spectrum of the international community are scrutinizing the human rights conditions in North Korea. Increased pressure on North Korea is making North Korean violators of human rights think twice. And I think that’s a very important first step towards actual improvement in the human rights condition.

Peter Stuehmke: What of the new Seoul UN office on human rights?

Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon: Just the fact that the field office was set up is a very significant development. The most important function of this office, number one, would be to continue to get testimonies and collection of data of human rights violations so that it can be kept as records for future reference. Just in case that, let’s just say, the issue does get referred to the ICC or if there is finally reunification on the Korean peninsula. There have to be measures to deal with what has happened in the past. It also serves the purpose of gathering people as a venue for discussions and trying to come up with better policies: improvement of relations so that we can actually begin to see improvements in human rights conditions in the North; just the advertisement factor; or just keeping the issue on the radar so that there’s a greater amount of media coverage. It’s very important, I think, to keep sending the message that the world is looking out.

Peter Stuehmke: What of new US sanction legislation?

Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon: Once this Sanctions Enforcement Act of the US is in place, I think that it will just add to the pressure that North Korea will feel because it is about a secondary boycott. So it’s not just North Korean individuals and companies, but whoever else deals with North Korea will also be subject to sanctions.

Peter Stuehmke: And [South] Korea's human rights legislation?

Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon: We remain hopeful that it will pass in the next general election. If it does, it will only add to, for example, the funding of a lot of the NGOs that do great work to deal with human rights problems.

Peter Stuehmke: And in closing, international efforts?

Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon: I believe that there has to be a comprehensive global campaign. For example, what we have seen against South Africa’s apartheid system, where there was really a concerted effort made by the international community to really target South Africa to get rid of this system of constitutional segregation. And the sanctions, of course, applied to sports, culture, financial investments, and so on. I believe that it will take that kind of concerted effort by the international community to make a dent.

Peter Stuehmke: Thank you, Ambassador Lee.

Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon: I hope you continue with this effort and I thank the Korea Society for all that you do. Thank you.

Stephen Noerper: And we really do thank Ambassador Lee for taking the time for that. And I’d like to thank Nikita Desai and Peter Stuehmke, part of our staff, for putting all of that together. Thank all of you for your attention.

Greg, we are honored to have you here. You are both a nationally and internationally recognized expert in this area. Your service with HRNK is remarkable as Executive Director and we’re so very pleased to have you on the stage of the Korea Society. Welcome.


What in this very eloquent and concise summary that Ambassador Lee has shared with us grabbed you the most?

Greg Scarlatoiu: Steve, first and foremost, the honor is all mine. Delighted to be here with you today and delighted that Ambassador Winston Lord is in the audience. Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon visited all of the key points pertaining to the UNCOI and implementation of the UNCOI recommendations. I was extraordinarily impressed with his remarks about the need for a campaign on par with what was done to do away with South Africa’s apartheid. Many of us may have been under the wrong impression that North Korea was one of the most sanctioned countries in the world. It is not. And the sanctions regime as it stands today only addresses counter-proliferation—efforts to counter the proliferation of North Korean nuclear and missile technology. It has nothing—absolutely nothing—to do with North Korea’s crimes against humanity or egregious human rights violations. Now, HR 757, the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act, will be most likely—surely I would say—signed by President Barack Obama. This is a piece of legislation that factors in human rights concerns. This is going to be a first. This is a very important part of the story if implementation is adequate and if others participate in implementing these sanctions.

A second point that I would like to make is that yes, a campaign on par with what was done to do away with South Africa’s apartheid is important and if we are to see that, we really need the grassroots organizations. The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea does not have that capacity. We are a research organization. Of course, there is an embedded advocacy element in everything that we do since we deal with North Korean human rights, but we need the large international grassroots human rights organizations to engage in a global campaign to end crimes against humanity and bring improvement to the North Korean human rights situation.

Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon was right on the mark in his comments on accountability and the need for accountability in North Korea. The UN Commission of Inquiry recommended that the North Korean case be referred by the UN Security Council to the International Criminal Court. As Ambassador Lee said, we’ve had good progress in 2014 and 2015. Both the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva and the UN General Assembly here in New York City had two very strong resolutions on North Korean human rights, addressing both accountability and the ICC referral. Indeed, the Security Council held two meetings on North Korean human rights. North Korean human rights was placed on the agenda. Just a couple of months ago in December 2015, our own Ambassador to the United Nation, Ambassador Samantha Power, gave, I would say, one of the most powerful speeches ever given by U.S. a government official on North Korean human rights. We begin to understand that North Korean human rights violations and crimes against humanity in North Korea pose a threat to regional and international peace and stability. Yes, we are fully aware that merely including an issue in the agenda of the UN Security Council is a procedural issue that requires 9 out of 15 votes of permanent and nonpermanent members. Now, taking up the issue is a different matter. It becomes a substantive matter subject to a veto by a P5 member (a permanent member): potentially China or even Russia. We are fully aware of that difficulty. However, one has to remember that every time China attempts to block an initiative to address the egregious human rights situation in North Korea, China places itself in a position where it’s aiding and abetting a regime that’s committing crimes against humanity. Moreover, I think we have to remember, Steve, that the North Korean Kim regime has been a master of playing one super power against another: the Soviets against the Chinese during the Cold War and arguably, after the end of the Cold War, possibly the United States against the European Union and China regarding humanitarian assistance and other issues on a smaller scale. The point that I would like to make is that this is not a comfortable position for the Kim regime. The Kim regime cannot be comfortable knowing that China is the only one standing between Kim Jong-un and referral to the International Criminal Court.

In addition to the UN Security Council referral, in his most recent report to the UN Human Rights Council submitted just a few days ago, the UN Special Rapporteur, Mr. Marzuki Darusman, reminded us that the UN General Assembly can also rely on its residual powers to establish a tribunal dealing with crimes against humanity in North Korea. If this is done in response to the Security Council’s incapacity, an inability to address a situation that poses a threat to international peace and security, this would go to the precedent of Resolution 377 uniting for peace, which we all recall in relation to the Korean War.

Speaking of Special Rapporteur Darusman’s report, another point that he makes is that one of the recommendations of the UN Security Council was to establish a panel of experts, which would examine the applicable legal standard—a panel of experts that would prepare the ground for accountability in North Korea. The point that the Special Rapporteur makes in his most recent report is that there is no amnesty for crimes against humanity. Moreover, we cannot prepare overnight. We must be prepared when faced with a contingency—with a situation that most likely will require immediate procedures pertaining to accountability. And thus, once again, the Special Rapporteur has called for the establishment of a panel of experts. An international NGO consortium or several international NGOs are sure to push in this direction. This could be another step that we could see in the near future. And of course, as emphasized by Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon, one very important recommendation of the UNCOI report was implemented: the establishment of a field office of the Office of the High Commission of Human Rights in Seoul. That office has been there just a few months. They’re already doing an extraordinary job collaborating with NGOs in South Korea and beyond, and also continuing to document human rights violations happening in North Korea.

Stephen Noerper: Thank you, Greg. That’s a very comprehensive and bold overview, and we appreciate your eloquence on that. You’ve given us a lot to work with here and I’m sure a lot will come out in the Q&A as well with those in the studio. I’d like to focus in on a few points and ask you for a bit more. One is this issue of China, where South Korea has put a tremendous amount of effort into its diplomacy and where you do have to ask the question about whether China gets to a point where there are trade-offs and whether its defense of the North Korean regime is really worth it. What are the practicalities of where you see China in terms of opposing further movement on this front? Where do you think there might be flexibility? And how does this relate to the broader security dynamic we see now given the January 6 nuclear test, the February 7 missile test, and the movement for stronger sanctions?

Greg Scarlatoiu: Now certainly, fundamentally, China is opposed at the UN to the so called “country-specific mechanisms”: UN Commissions of Inquiry and UN Special Rapporteurs. It’s not only China. It’s the Russian Federation, Venezuela, and others. Of course, the reason is simple: this establishes a precedent. Some other countries might be next. So, the point that China has made, time and time again, is that it opposes this type of country-specific mechanism, but it’s going beyond that. Of course, we could surely have a discussion about the traditional ties between the DRPK and China. We know that this has not always been a love story. There have been great times in this relationship. There have been terrible times in this relationship and in particular, during the days of the Cultural Revolution in China. China continues to be a fairly pragmatic actor. Its approach to North Korea is that it wants stability on its borders and unfortunately, under the current circumstances, China still believes that the only arrangement that can maintain stability on its border is the Kim Jong-un regime—as terrible as it might be. And I hope that China would see how terrible this regime is and what a liability it is. Secondly, China does not want to see any massive refugee inflows. Thirdly, if China can create a couple of business opportunities in the process, so be it.

Doing business in North Korea, of course, is not easy for China either and I’m speaking of those investors who go there for business reasons, for economic reasons. It’s a tough environment: bad infrastructure; the investment has to be front loaded; once you’ve front loaded it, they take you prisoner; informal taxation is a big problem; and North Korea is highly corrupt. So it’s not easy from China’s viewpoint either. Every time North Korea conducts another provocation—a missile launch or a nuclear detonation—China cannot be too happy to see U.S. B-52s, F-22s conducting nuclear bombing exercises so close to Chinese airspace. So China is not happy with North Korea, but at the same time, China has not reached a point where it’s ready to change its fundamental strategic stance on North Korea.

On human rights in particular, China could be tremendously helpful. This is a point made by the UNCOI. China forcibly repatriates North Korean refugees. Of course, China does not repatriate all North Koreans. There are North Korean workers officially dispatched to China by the North Korean government as part of their moneymaking operations. They work under terrible working conditions. This is pretty much bonded labor or forced labor; many organizations see it as slave labor. I’m speaking about those refugees who try to escape those dire circumstances in North Korea. If apprehended, they are forcibly repatriated to the North. China does this because it claims they are "illegal economic migrants" and not political refugees. It claims that many of them are in China because they are hungry and in search of economic opportunity. Are many of them in China in search of economic opportunity? Possibly, but what matters is that China is a party to the 1951 UN Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees, which stipulates that if a person has crossed an international border and upon repatriation faces a credible fear of persecution based on a political rational, then that person clearly qualifies to gain access to the process leading to acquiring political refugee status. As you know, leaving the country without the government’s approval is a criminal act in North Korea. Those returned to North Korea, in particular if they came across South Korean nationals and in particular if they came across Christian missionaries, are subjected to very aggressive interrogation and if it turns out that they did come across South Koreans or Christian missionaries, the punishment is extraordinarily harsh: imprisonment in the political prison camps or re-education camps and in some instances, even death. We’ve had terrible terrible reports, fully confirmed, of women who became pregnant with Chinese men along the road of defection. They were subjected to forced abortions and we’ve had reports of infanticide.

"...what matters is that China is a party to the 1951 UN Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees, which stipulates that if a person has crossed an international border and upon repatriation faces a credible fear of persecution based on a political rational, then that person clearly qualifies to gain access to the process leading to acquiring political refugee status."

So once again, there is a very simple step that China can take by protecting these refugees: allowing them access to the process leading to acquiring political refugee status. If China is afraid of increased numbers of ethnic Koreans in its border areas, the best way to ensure that they leave is to allow them access to this process because if they can approach the High Commission for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross, they won’t stay. They’ll leave. Probably, China’s fear here is a process similar to the “European Picnic” of 1989, when the Hungarians opened their border to East Germany and East Germans were flowing out of West Germany and this is what eventually brought about the fall of the Berlin Wall. Possibly, China might see this as opening the door to a process similar to what happened in Europe in 1989. Thus, bringing about the collapse of the Kim regime in North Korea.

Stephen Noerper: It seems, Greg, there have been two things in recent memory that have elicited a strong response from the North Koreans. One has been the restrictions around Banco Delta Asia and the other has been this and the frequent mention of ICC referral. The regime seems to be taking it very strongly and very personally. Do you have any sense or any intelligence that the behavior of the regime has at all altered in the last two years? Or that there has been any movement within North Korea relative to the camps? Has there been any easing of the gulags as far as you and the community are aware?

Greg Scarlatoiu: Unfortunately, as far as we are aware, there hasn’t been an easing on the gulags. What we have seen is a transformation of the gulag that may be related to international efforts to focus attention on North Korea’s political prison camps. As you know, there are at least four fully functional political prison camps in North Korea where anywhere between 80,000 and 120,000 people are imprisoned. A couple of years ago, one of the camps, located close to the border with China, Camp No. 22 in Hoeryong North Hamgyong Province, was shut down. It ceased to function as a political prison camp. Why? We can speculate that this happened because of international efforts to focus attention on North Korea’s gulag and also because it was so close to the border with China. It was bad PR. There were Chinese businesses in the area. There were Chinese tourists visiting the area. And also, the last thing North Korea wants is another escapee from a political prison camp managing to cross the border into China to tell his or her story about the horrors witnessed in the prison camps: the forced labor, the induced malnutrition, the torture, the rapes, the public executions, and the secret executions happening at the camps.

Most unfortunately, what we also know is that a few thousand inmates, a few thousand prisoners, went unaccounted for. We had reports from sources inside the country that they were put on trains and taken away in the middle of the night. We had reports that many of them were starved to death. They simply went unaccounted for. What we know is that other detention facilities—and this is based on satellite imagery research that we’re conducting corroborated with testimony by witnesses, former prisoners, former guards, former officials in charge of running the camps—have expanded. For example, Camp No. 25 in Chongjin, North Hamgyong province expanded pretty much twofold. These are reports by our organization, the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, in collaboration with AllSource Analysis in Colorado; this is a satellite imagery company. Amnesty International and others also focused attention on Camp No. 14, for example. That facility has also expanded. It has actually expanded into the adjacent village. So, we have seen a transformation of the political prison camp system in North Korea. It may be in response to international efforts to address North Korea’s human rights situation.

Unfortunately, as pointed out in the UNCOI report itself, the Kim regime still sees these human rights violations as part of its modus operandi. These are not unfortunate side effects. These are at the very core of how the Kim regime operates.

Stephen Noerper: I know tomorrow in Washington you’re participating in a larger event. I was wondering if you could say a few words about that. And also, tell us here and to those viewing and listening, within the field, who do you consider to be the most effective actors right now? And I’m thinking primarily of suggestions in terms of the NGO world. How are they helping to move the agenda along?

Greg Scarlatoiu: Tomorrow we’ll be having an event in Washington DC hosted by CSIS, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, our second anniversary of observation of the UNCOI report. It’s a large conference and very well attended. We still have room for more attendees I hope. Basically, this is a collaborative effort. It’s us, the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea; CSIS; the National Endowment for Democracy; our good and dear friend Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon and the Human Liberty Center at Yonsei University; and the George W. Bush Institute in Dallas, Texas. This event will feature experts; witnesses; Justice Michael Kirby, the former Chief Commissioner of the UNCOI; and Mrs. Sonja Berserko, another member of the UNCOI. Unfortunately, Mr. Darusman will be unable to join us this time. He was there last year. So this conference will not only focus on the celebration of the UNCOI, but we will also discuss all of these key issues, which are part of the process of moving forward. Anything from the panel of experts to possible future efforts at the General Assembly and to the “rights up front” approach put forth by the UN Commission of Inquiry as a recommendation to those UN agencies involved on the ground in humanitarian operations in North Korea.

This main conference will be followed by our first ever celebration of the memory and legacy of one of our founding board members, Dr. Fred Iklé, who is well known for having been a great American who kept America safe and developed the nuclear deterrence strategy during the years of the Reagan administration in particular. We remember Dr. Iklé as one of the founding board members of our organization and as a board member who was extraordinarily dedicated to North Korean human rights. The stars aligned and our first keynote speaker at the Fred Iklé Lecture is going to be none other than Justice Michael Kirby. This will also happen at CSIS from 4:30 to 6:00 p.m. tomorrow in Washington, DC.

Stephen Noerper: And that’s open to the public?

Greg Scarlatoiu: That is also open to the public.

Stephen Noerper: And so, other than HRNK, other bright lights in the NGO community and other people and organizations we should be paying attention to?

Greg Scarlatoiu: There are different organizations playing critical roles. What HRNK does, primarily, is to investigate and to publish on the North Korean human rights situation based on interviews with witnesses, based on satellite imagery, based on interviews with experts, and based on work out in the field. This is a very important role because this is what those engaged in advocacy need in order to move forward with their advocacy. Of course, there is an advocacy element embedded in what we do because, after all, what we deal with is North Korean human rights. But there are organizations tasked exclusively with advocacy. Their role is extraordinarily important. These are organizations that brought us the UNCOI. This was an effort, I want to say, spurred by NGOs. NGOs were also involved in efforts to push for the passage of HR 757 here in the United States, the North Korea Sanction Enforcement Act. NGOs have been fully engaged in efforts to persuade the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea to pass the North Korean Human Rights Act. This has been going on for more than 10 years now as Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon said. All we can do is hope to see this act pass.

There are NGOs that have performed, I would say, the most important role of all. These are the NGOs that have been engaged in rescuing North Korean refugees or North Korean escapees. Remember that prior to the great famine that decimated North Koreans in the mid- to late-1990s, we had just seen a handful of refugees or a handful of defectors in South Korea. The numbers have increased sharply during and after the famine, and there are now 29,000 North Koreans, or former North Koreans, living in South Korea. Without their testimony and without their courage, we would not have had the UNCOI, we wouldn’t be seeing all of these efforts going on at the UN and elsewhere. I would say that organizations tasked with rescuing, protecting North Korean refugees, and enabling them to adapt to their new life—in South Korea, in Europe, in the United States, or Canada—perform an extraordinarily important role. And I would also say that NGOs that endeavor to provide training to former North Koreans—in particular, to young former North Koreans in their teens, twenties, and thirties—perform an extremely important role. I’m not trying to say that they should all become political leaders of a reunified Korea, but they need all the help they can get to become leaders and experts in their chosen areas of expertise. This is a mosaic of organizations performing very important roles that are complementary, I want to say, at the end of the day.

Stephen Noerper: Very important. Thank you. And before I turn to the audience, let me just ask quickly if you can say a few words about your work with Radio Free Asia in that I know that support for broadcast into North Korea has been one of the primary emphases both with the new legislation and in terms of some of the debate on how to move things forward.

Greg Scarlatoiu: I want to say that my work with Radio Free Asia is a labor of love just like my work with HRNK. I have had a weekly Korean language column for the past 13 years since 2003. Initially, I was building on my own personal experiences as one who was born and raised in Nicolae Ceausescu’s Romania, and this was the one country most similar to Kim Il-Sung’s North Korea, as you recall, and also as one who had lived for 10 years on a divided Korean peninsula while living, studying, and working in South Korea. I think that broadcasting is extraordinarily important. What we all want to see on the Korean peninsula is change. And change in North Korea can only come from the people of North Korea themselves. What we can do in order to enable them to see that there are alternatives to the current political arrangement in North Korea is to tell them three basic stories.

First and foremost, to tell them the story of their own human rights situation. They don’t know it. They don’t understand it living under such an oppressive regime. Religious freedom and freedom of speech and association have all been embedded in the constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, but North Koreans never read their own constitution. That’s the story we need to tell them. We need to tell them about international obligations North Korea has assumed by being a UN member state and thus, bound by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by being a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic and Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention of Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; and the International Convention of Rights of a Child.

Secondly we must tell them the story of the corruption of their leadership, in particular, the corruption of the Kim family regime.

Thirdly, we need to continue to tell them the story of the outside world, in particular, the story of South Korea, which is, as we all know, a miraculous success story. Once one of the poorest countries in the world just a few decades ago, [South Korea is] now the world’s 12th largest economy and moreover, a liberal democracy that’s a model for others in the region and beyond. Yes, a noisy liberal democracy, but that’s how we like liberal democracies—noisy. It’s very important to keep telling these stories to North Koreans and what we know based on surveys conducted by InterMedia and other companies tasked to monitor radio broadcasts into North Korea, former North Koreans interviewed state that about one third of them did listen to foreign broadcasting while they were in North Korea. South Korean broadcasting is also classified as foreign broadcasting. So here we’re talking Radio Free Asia, Voice of America, stations based in South Korea staffed with North Korean defectors, Kookmin TV (Korea TV), KBS, and so on and so forth. So, some North Koreans are listening, but probably not one third of all North Koreans. After all, these were the North Koreans who actively sought out information from the outside world. These are the North Koreans who had the courage to escape. But, nevertheless, we’ve seen the percentage of those who state that they listened to foreign broadcasting on the increase. We have to remember that there are new media storage devices. We know that USBs, DVDs, memory chips—in particular, memory chips and USBs—are very popular in North Korea today. We know that some North Koreans are familiar with the Hallyu (with the South Korean wave), the South Korean pop culture, and soap operas. Extraordinarily important.

Stephen Noerper: Greg, thank you for this very rich hour. Before we close, I wanted to give you an opportunity to share a few thoughts on Ambassador Steven Bosworth, who passed away earlier in January. Those of you who have been with us for programs over January and February know that we have tried to make frequent mention of Ambassador Bosworth’s very deep commitment to and effort for Korea-U.S. relations. We have on our website on koreasociety.org a tribute to Ambassador Bosworth. But I know that he was a mentor and friend to you, and was wondering if you would offer a few thoughts on his guidance and contributions in your life.

Greg Scarlatoiu: Ambassador Bosworth will always be remembered as an extraordinary diplomat. To us, those who graduated from the Fletcher School, he will always be remembered as the Dean who brought the Fletcher School into the 21st century. This has always been an extraordinary school, but he has added new programs, he has brought a true sense of strategic vision, I would say into the next century as well. For that we are all grateful to him. Personally, I am extraordinarily grateful to Stephen Bosworth. It so happened that we arrived at Fletcher at about the same time—both of us from Korea. I also happened to sit on the student council and I got to meet him regularly, at least a couple times a week, and work with him very closely. He was extraordinarily supportive. He was a friend; he was a mentor; he was a role model; and his personal support went to the extent that years after my graduation from Fletcher as I was applying for a position, he picked up the phone and called my employer to provide a recommendation that was tremendously helpful. I will dearly miss Stephen Bosworth. I was deeply saddened to hear the news of his passing. And I think that the best way for all of us to honor the extraordinary legacy of Steven Bosworth is to continue performing our mission. In our case, addressing this extraordinarily difficult situation in North Korea. I’m certain that Stephen Bosworth would be extraordinarily happy to see all of us here today. And what you have done here today, Steve, is an extraordinary way of honoring the legacy of Stephen Bosworth.

Stephen Noerper: Well, thank you very much. Please join me in thanking Greg for his keen insights. We do hope that you join us at koreasociety.org to become a member or to find out about future events. We would also note that this is our twelfth program on North Korean human rights leading up to and since the UN COI, so please feel free to consult and share any of those programs, which are available online, free of charge, in both audio and video form. And we would welcome you back next Thursday for a very interesting discussion on political forecasting: Korea and regional relations that will feature Ralph Casa, the President of Pacific Forums CSIS; Victor Cha who is the Korea Chair at CSIS and Korea Foundation Professor at Georgetown University—Victor will be hosting you tomorrow in Washington; and Scott Snyder of the Council on Foreign Relations. And so, really, three of our nation’s top analysts on political and security issues. Again, 12:30 next Thursday and we look forward to seeing you then. Thank you again for your attention today. Thank you, Ambassador Lord, for sharing your time with us and we’re delighted to have you here.

Greg Scarlatoiu: Thank you.


Edited by Rosa Park, HRNK Director of Programs and Editor

Original transcription by Liz Cheek, HRNK Research Intern