The Inaugural Fred Iklé Lecture Featuring Justice Michael Kirby and Roberta Cohen
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
WASHINGTON D.C.
FEBRUARY 19, 2016
NORTH KOREA: THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY NEXUS
INAUGURAL FRED IKLÉ MEMORIAL LECTURE
INTRODUCTION TO THE INAUGURAL FRED IKLÉ LECTURE
By Roberta Cohen, Co-Chair Emeritus, HRNK
It gives me great pleasure to introduce the first Fred Iklé Lecture sponsored by the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). This lecture is to become an annual HRNK event to honor Fred Iklé as principal founder and intellectual architect of our organization and its first chair. When HRNK was established in 2001, Dr. Iklé was well known as a defense and foreign policy specialist and a nuclear strategist. But what was not so well known was his passionate interest in promoting democracy and human rights in countries where people were closed off from their basic freedoms–in particular North Korea. He was one of the first to recognize that because North Korea was so isolated, a research and advocacy organization was needed to document the human rights situation and draw international attention to it. As Chair, he kept HRNK focused and steered a tight ship. HRNK went on to produce groundbreaking reports on North Korea’s prison camps, the plight of refugees, and the devastating famine. He saw the linkage between human rights deprivation and peace and security, which was recalled in a eulogy by NED President Carl Gershman, another distinguished co-founder of HRNK.
Further, Dr. Iklé recognized the importance of broad based bi-partisan support to strengthen undertakings on human rights in North Korea. In founding HRNK, he initially joined hands with Stephen Solarz, a well-known former Democratic Congressman who had visited North Korea and later became Co-chair of our committee. The cultivation of a broad spectrum of political support has contributed immensely to HRNK’s effectiveness.
There could be no better fit for HRNK’s first Fred Iklé Lecture than the HONORABLE MICHAEL KIRBY, who has mobilized world attention to a situation that shocks all our consciences but has gone on for more than 50 years. When Michael Kirby was chosen in 2013 to chair the United Nations Commission of Inquiry (COI) on the human rights situation in North Korea, we knew that he had been a justice of the High Court of Australia for thirteen years with a distinguished legal career. We also learned that he was nicknamed “the Great Dissenter” because he had the character and integrity to give a record number of dissenting opinions before the High Court. And he served as chancellor of Macquarie University for nine years.
Nonetheless, we were not prepared for the incredibly bold and outspoken role he played internationally and the readiness to debate the North Korean delegates at the UN, who for the first time felt challenged to come forward in response. And he took on China’s illegal and cruel practice of forced repatriation of North Korean refugees. The influence of his personality reinforced by the COI’s formidable 400-page report–produced in less than a year–led to strong General Assembly resolutions, changes in policies on the part of a number of governments, Security Council action, and an energizing of the NGO and think tank communities. Remember that the UN has many commissions, rapporteurs, and committees that monitor human rights. Justice Kirby’s powerful eloquence on behalf of the people of North Korea, his insistence on public hearings so that survivors could speak, and the vigorousness of the legal research leading to the finding of crimes against humanity made him and the COI on North Korea stand out in an unparalleled way.
A final word which allows me to end on a lighter note. Michael Kirby has a wise and wonderful sense of humor. A few years ago, I was handling his schedule in Washington which was ever changing with appointments being juggled around among government offices, think tanks, and universities. So I must have expressed some frustration because Michael wrote me that everything done so far was good. But he advised, and I quote, “Roberta, Stay calm. Think of Churchill in the Whitehall bunker during the Battle of Britain when Britain stood (almost) alone (except for the Dominions and FDR!).” Michael, your email is pasted on my desk. So without further ado, let us now turn to the man of the hour, The Honorable Michael Kirby.
SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA – AND
THE POWER OF PARADOXICAL THINKING*
The Hon. Michael Kirby AC CMG**
I. WORLDS APART
Until
recently, the dangers for international peace and security occasioned by the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) (North Korea) were generally
regarded as a topic separate from the grave abuses of the human rights,
occasioned to the people of that country.
The
institutions of the international community that tended to address each topic
were different. International
peace and security was substantially the concern of the United Nations Security
Council.[1] Attention to questions of human rights
rarely troubled the Security Council; although this was beginning to change.[2] Concerns about human rights, either
globally by reference to specified topics or as occurring in individual member
countries of the United Nations, tended to be addressed, if at all, in the
General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, and specialised agencies such as
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).
Although
there was an obvious overlap, because affronts to human rights can sometimes be
a cause of challenges to security and because dangers to peace and security
(particularly in the use of nuclear weapons) can profoundly affect fundamental
human rights, it was normally the practice to keep the topics apart. Debates over the human rights situation
in nation states were often highly emotional and controversial–creating an
atmosphere considered unconducive to the peaceful resolution of international
disputes.
The
expertise in strategic and military studies was also commonly seen as distinct
from expertise about universal human rights. Security analysts were prone to look at human rights advocates
as idealistic, unrealistic, and resistant to the compromises considered
essential to prevent or settle major disputes between nations. Talk about human rights tended to get
in the way of the cool analysis essential to reduce the dangers of war and to
uphold the fragile security of nations and regions. On the other hand, human rights experts commonly regarded
those with expertise on security and strategic studies as unacceptably indifferent
to the shocking burdens imposed on human lives and suffering by oppressive
states. They reminded experts in
military and strategic studies of the fact that the Charter of the United Nations itself grew out of the experience of
the great wars, which shared in common the breakdown of international peace and
security; but also the revelation of grave crimes against humanity, genocide,
war crimes, and humanitarian crises.[3]
Fred
Iklé, whom we honour in this memorial lecture, was a notable expert in
strategic studies, military deployment, and security decisions at a high level
in his adopted country, the United States of America. Yet, from his early days, he was highly sensitive to the
relevance of decisions made in those fields for the human rights of the people
affected, and vice versa. He
displayed a capacity to think paradoxically: retaining in his mind at the same
time ideas that many would have seen as contradictory and mutually
incompatible.
My
thesis is that we need the power of paradoxical thinking to confront
effectively the new and enlarged security dangers presented by the DPRK to its
neighbours and the planet, if we are safely and justly to navigate our way
through the new and increased dangers to the human rights challenges presented
by the DPRK. Like Cesar’s Gaul, my
lecture will be divided into three parts.
First, I will describe the distinguished career of Fred Iklé for it is
relevant to my thesis. Secondly, I
will explain the background to the new and enlarged dangers presented to the
world by the DPRK’s recent military and human rights postures. Thirdly, I will seek to bring out from
these materials ten propositions to guide us as we grapple with the present
challenges. Some of these
propositions will undoubtedly appear to be paradoxical and mutually inconsistent. However, learning from Fred Iklé, we
should be unconcerned that this might be so. We should open our minds to the power of the paradox.
I.
FRED IKLÉ: A PARADOX
The life of Fred Iklé was covered in many
places when the news of his death on November 10, 2001 became known.[4]
He was born on August 21, 1924 in Engadin,
Switzerland and named Fritz Karl Iklé.
He trained to be an academic sociologist. The dangers of neighbouring countries and the remarkable
developments in the weapons of war were kept at bay from his childhood by Swiss
neutrality. However, his own experience
and circumstances inculcated a fascination with the technology of war and with
the difficulties thereby presented of controlling its outcomes. Those outcomes
were increasingly linked to scientific developments rather than rational
considerations or issues of justice.
This reality was brought home to him in the ultimate way in which the
Second World War ended abruptly, following the explosion of nuclear weapons
over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan.
That phenomenon posed the question: what would have happened if the Axis
powers had won the race to develop nuclear weapons? What, if anything, could be done to safeguard humanity
against such possiblitiles? What, if anything, would ensure that good in
international affairs necessarily triumphed over evil?
In 1946, at the age of 22, Iklé came to the
United States to undertake his Masters and PhD degrees at the University of
Chicago. His doctoral thesis
examined an issue that was already highly controversial, namely the ‘social
impact of bomb destruction.’ Specifically,
he studied and assessed the impact of carpet bombing by the Allies over
Dresden, Germany and the impact of the use of the final atomic bomb in Nagasaki
in August 1946. As someone who
lived through those immediate post-war years, when the world was exhausted from
war, I can aver how two great themes were burned into human consciousness even
amongst children at that time. These were the discovery of the destructiveness
of modern wars for human life with the grave human rights violations that
coincided with the war’s termination; and the fear of atomic weapons: symbolised
in the unforgettable mushroom cloud.
These considerations profoundly affected
the design on the new United Nations Organisation. They revealed the astonishing cruelty to which human beings
were prone. They also disclosed
the grave dangers to peace and security presented by technology, armaments, and
bombing–especially the use of nuclear weapons. Iklé was profoundly affected by all of these dominant ideas.
By the 1960s, he had been appointed a
professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Drawing here on his doctoral thesis, he
was highly critical of the huge accumulation of nuclear weapons by the combatants
in the Cold War. Specifically, he criticised
the principle of ‘mutually assured destruction,’ advanced by many at the time
as the only sure way to ensure that nuclear weapons would never be used. For Iklé, that strategy posited the
possibility of potential crimes against civilian populations that were contrary
to old and established principles of international law. They also made no allowance for the
risks of error, mistake and accident that could trigger a nuclear catastrophe.
In 1970 Iklé moved to Harvard University
where he met Henry Kissinger, then National Security Advisor to President
Nixon. At Kissinger’s instigation,
Iklé moved again to Washington to join the Nixon (later Ford) Administrations
as Director of Arms Control of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The
very title of that agency captured the paradoxical opinions that were
formulating in Iklé’s mind: the vital necessity of arms. But the equal importance of controlling
them and working towards practical moves for their elimination by disarmament.
During this period Iklé also came to know
Governor Ronald Reagan, already an aspirant for the presidency. In the 1980s he became an advisor to
the Reagan Administration. Specifically,
he addressed the Russian-led war against the Taliban and other rebels in
Afghanistan. He urged the provision
of sophisticated United States armaments to the rebels. This was at first vetoed by the Central
Intelligence Agency. However, eventually
that veto was lifted. The weapons
contributed to the Russian defeat and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Still they left a resurgent force of
well-armed religious fundamentalists who would later prove a large menace to
the United States and to the peace and security of the world.
In 1987, Iklé reflected his generally
conservative stance on political questions by being one of the early
signatories to the Project for a New American Century: a document viewed by
many as the Neocon charter. When
George W. Bush became President of the United States in 2000, Iklé was invited
back into government as a member of the Defense Policy Board under Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Soon
after, he became Commissioner of the National Commission on Terrorism and a
director of the National Endowment for Democracy. In 2003, he supported President George W. Bush’s decision to
invade Iraq. However, he was later
to recant that support, concluding that, in some ways, the conditions in Iraq,
and their dangers to the United States and the West, were even greater than the
dangers that had been presented by Saddam Hussein.
In 2006, Iklé wrote a book that signalled the
turn-around in his thinking. It
was Annihilation From Within. It was a text critical of the U.S.-led ‘war
on terror.’[5] His incisive expression; his
willingness to change his mind and to admit error; and his attention to
practical details constituted the hallmarks of his writing.[6] His book on international negotiation
became a standard text for training diplomats, not only in the United States.
In 2006, he joined, as a distinguished
scholar, the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. By this time, he had also taken part as
a co-founder of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), a civil
society organisation that was explicitly concerned about the reports of grave
human rights offences seeping out of that highly secretive country. He never ceased to re-examine his own assumptions,
even basic assumptions. As another co-founder of HRNK, Carl Gershman, remarked
at the time of Iklé’s death:[7]
"[Fred] brought his prestige as a defense strategist to this effort
[the founding of HRNK], declaring when the new group was announced [in
2001] that the security and disarmament problems that had topped the US
agenda in dealing with North Korea could not be solved as long as North Korea
remained 'such a tightly closed totalitarian state.' In the end, Fred said,
'democracy and the rule of law, desirable in and of themselves, are also a
guarantee of peace and security.' This statement, of course, summed up Fred's
thinking more generally on international security."
Thus, Iklé was not an uncritical Cold War
warrior or apologist for the Right.
From the choice of his doctoral thesis to the end of his life, he
understood that there were two sides to the coin of a stable new world order. Peace and security reinforced by universal
human rights and the rule of law: both at home and in the international sphere.[8] Without these reinforcements of
stability, predictability, and mutual respect, security would be an illusory
pipedream. The human mind had to struggle to retain paradoxical thoughts
together at the one time.[9]
It was because of his capacity to embrace
new thinking, outside the limits of the stereotypes, that Fred Iklé won many
friends and many laurels. He was
awarded the Distinguished Public Service Medal of the U.S. Department of
Defense in 1975. To this, the
Bronze Palm was added in 1985. The National Endowment for Democracy awarded him
its Democratic Service Medal. On
his death, he was survived by his widow and two daughters. His widow has since died but his daughter
Miriam has joined in this occasion to witness the respect felt for her father
in those circles concerned with the human rights record of North Korea. For Iklé, that record underpinned and helped
to explain the security dangers.
They could not be resolved without attention to both sides of the coin.
II.
HUMAN
RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA IN CONTEXT
Fred Iklé brought with him to the United
States a European’s understanding that the international dangers to peace and
security are not ordinarily to be found only in the interstices of the
contemporary 24-hour news cycle.
They are to be found in a deep reflection upon history, including
ancient history. It is there that
the causes of conflict and danger can often be found. When, in faraway Australia, in high school, I undertook
studies on the causes of the Second World War, my teacher directed our minds to
a poem from Ancient Greece describing the causes of one of the Peloponnesian
wars.[10] It shows how, basically, little has
changed in human conflict and motivation.
But the weapons of cruelty have certainly changed.
Of
revolutions and intrigues,
The war its causes cause and crime,
The ups and downs of pacts and leagues,
And wounds as yet unhealed by time,
These are the themes you treat, who dare,
A course which many a heart dismays,
To turn hot ashes which may flare,
At any moment to a blaze.
In March 2013, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC)
established a Commission of Inquiry (COI) on human rights in the DPRK.[11] Unusually, the COI was established without
a call for a vote. The HRC resolution mandated the COI to investigate the
systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights in the DPRK, with a
view to ensuring full accountability, in particular for violations that might
amount to crimes against humanity.[12]
In May 2013, the President of the HRC
appointed Sonja Biserko of Serbia and me to the COI, joining Marzuki Darusman, a
member ex-officio. He already held
office as Special Rapporteur on human rights in the DPRK. I was designated to chair the COI on
the DPRK. The resulting report was
released in February 2014.[13] It addressed the nine point mandate
received by the COI. The report
was delivered on time, within budget, and unanimously. In doing so, the COI embraced many
innovations in its methodology: most especially the use of public hearings,
with testimony, transcript, and other materials placed online and shared with the
international community and media.[14]
To understand the divided Korean peninsula
today, the COI considered it was essential to give a historical background.[15] For more than a thousand years, history
records organised human societies in Korea. Because of its geographic position, the peninsula was
frequently the subject of interventions, sweeping its exposed territory from
the respective directions of China and Japan. This provided a source both for the cultural roots of the
Korean land and people, but also the origin for local attitudes, hostility,
fears, and perceived security risks.
The invasions from China brought industrialisation, but also a deep
wellspring of Confucian social values and attitudes. The invasions from Japan
brought deep animosities, cultural memories, and some autocratic habits,
including in the forms of torture of suspected enemies and the worship of the
designated leader.
In 1876, the resurgent Meiji Empire of Japan
imposed, by force, an unequal treaty on the Korean Empire. In 1910, fresh from its defeat of
Russia, Japan invaded Korea and imposed a harsh colonial regime. Independence movements were ruthlessly
suppressed. In the centre of Seoul
is a former Japanese prison for Korean dissidents. Displayed there are the continuing means of torture that
were recounted in evidence given by several witnesses from the DPRK.[16]
In 1943, as the tide of the Second World
War turned in favour of the Allies, their leaders met in Cairo to consider the
likely post-war situation. The
United States toyed with the idea of mandate-like arrangements for Korea, once
released from Japanese rule. This
was subsequently changed to specification of ‘spheres of influence.’ The Soviet Union, which did not enter
the war against Japan until just before its conclusion, was assigned the
northern section of the peninsula.
The southern section was assigned to the United States, below an
artificial line drawn close to the median point. In every way, the division was artificial. It was not self-determination by the
Korean people of their post-colonial political future. It severed the unity of the governance
of the Korean people. The actual
division was drawn on a map by a middle ranking U.S. official, Dean Rusk, later
to be Secretary of State. He had
no actual familiarity with Korea, its geography, or people.
Each of the successor states, the DPRK in
the north and the Republic of Korea (ROK) (South Korea) in the south, began
with autocratic regimes that reflected the animosities of the Cold War. Militaristic autocracy was to be a
feature of the peninsula for most of the supervening years. By 1949, Kim Il-sung had emerged as the
uncontested Supreme Leader in the north.
He yearned for a fight to ‘liberate’ the south. On 25 June 1950, the Korean War was
initiated by the DPRK. However,
seizing advantage of the temporary absence of the Soviet Union from the
Security Council,[17] the United
Nations resolved to authorise a defence of the ROK. The UN Force repelled the invading force from the DPRK. But this attracted a huge intrusion of
Chinese ‘volunteers.’ They
ultimately drove the UN Forces back, effectively to the original demarcation
line.
The sufferings on both sides of the Korean
War were enormous.[18] Most Korean families had experience of
lost or severely injured family members.
The memories of the suffering have proved indelible on both sides. There has never been a peace settlement;
merely an armistice. Technically,
the two Korean states are still at war.
The hostility between them, and the animosity of attitudes and
propaganda, have been poisonous on both sides.
An attempt to begin afresh the
relationships between the two Korean states followed the election of a great
liberal leader as President of the ROK: Kim Dae-Jung. He espoused a ‘Sunshine’ policy. He sought to tap the deep desires of ordinary people on both
sides of the demilitarised zone, for restored relationships and eventual
reunification of the Korean peninsula.
He visited Pyongyang in 2000.
In 2005, Six-Party Talks were initiated on the basis of a pledge that
the DPRK would abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. It agreed to do this in return for
support in establishing stable energy supplies for the North. There are differences of view about
what next happened. However, the
objective fact is that the DPRK reneged on its non-nuclear pledge; recommenced
a nuclear energy program incidental to developing atomic weapons; and created a
dangerous and destabilising military potential that triggered deep anxiety and
military responses on the part of the ROK and its military ally, the United States.
There followed three (underground) atomic
weapons tests: in 2006, 2009 and 2013.
By the time of the third test, in December 2013, the second dynastic
ruler of the DPRK, Kim Jong-il, had died.
His son, Kim Jong-un, aged about 30, succeeded to the military, party,
and effective state leadership of the DPRK. However, his rule introduced features of greater danger. Not only did he retain the huge army,
constituting the fifth largest standing military force in the world. He immediately authorised the third
atomic test in 2013. And he
introduced a series of executions of high-level leaders of the DPRK, including,
in December 2013, Jang Song-thaek, his uncle by marriage. Until his sudden
humiliation, removal, military trial, and execution, Jang had been described as
the ‘control tower,’ accepted to guide Kim Jong-un.[19]
This and other violent acts indicated potential elements of instability in the DPRK.
These were the more concerning
because of the youth and inexperience of the new leader; his rejection of the prudent
voices that had gathered around his father; and his willingness to explore
still newer weapons. These
included the testing of missile systems, potentially to carry nuclear devices;
the conduct of a fourth underground test, allegedly of a hydrogen weapon; and the
reported testing of a submarine launch of a missile that could enlarge still
further the risks presented by the enhanced weaponry of the DPRK.
As these dangerous developments unfolded,
the COI played out its role in the Korean drama, but with its focus fixed
always on the principles of universal human rights as required by its
mandate. The commissioners met for
the first time in July 2013. In
accordance with the distinctive methodology that they had agreed, they
conducted public hearings in Seoul, Tokyo, London, and Washington in September
and October 2013. They had no
difficulty in gathering substantial testimony of grave human rights
abuses. Available for both public
and private hearings was a huge number of refugees who had fled the DPRK:
particularly during the grave famine (“arduous march”) of the mid-1990s. These witnesses told stories of
enormous suffering, cruel brutality, shocking discrimination against women and
suspected political or religious opponents, severe restrictions on basic civil
rights, and the beginnings of a reaction to these horrors on the part of the
people of the DPRK. Those reactions
included the establishment of rudimentary markets in some towns; the protest
against an attempted currency ‘reform;’ and the exodus of thousands of DPRK
citizens to China, searching for a better life, promised stability, and
predictability.
Although access to the internet was
prohibited to ordinary citizens in the DPRK, availability of an intranet
gradually opened up potential access to global media, including television
dramas from the ROK that confirmed the widespread rumours that life in South
Korea was prosperous and infinitely freer than in the north. These were the circumstances in the
DPRK by the time the United Nations’ COI delivered its report on 17 February
2014.
A month later, on 17 March 2014 the report
was formally presented by my colleagues and me to the Human Rights Council in
Geneva. Because virtually every
page of the report contained extracts from the testimony of witnesses, speaking
directly to the international community, it caused a sensation. It attracted very high votes in favour
of the report and its recommendations both in the HRC and in the General
Assembly, to which the report was duly referred. On 17 April 2014, on the initiative of France, an Arria briefing
was given on the content of the report to those members of the Security Council
who chose to attend. Only China
and the Russian Federation absented themselves from this briefing. The latter called on the COI, in
advance of the Arria briefing, to explain that its absence was not a reflection
on the actual findings of the COI but because of the objection of Russia to
country specific mandates from the HRC.
Informed by the Arria briefing, steps were
then taken to assemble a procedural motion in the Security Council. Exceptionally, this brought the
situation of human rights in the DPRK before a meeting of the Security Council
held on 22 December 2014. Under
the Charter of the United Nations,
procedural votes are not subject to the veto of permanent members, but they
still require the support of at least 10 members of the Council.[20] The opposition of China and the Russian
Federation caused the Security Council to delay its consideration of a central
recommendation of the COI that the human rights situation in the DPRK should be
referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC). A year after the first
procedural resolution was adopted, on 10 December 2015 (Human Rights Day),
despite the election of new non-permanent members in the interim, the Security
Council once again agreed to place the human rights situation in the DPRK on
its agenda. It thereby accepted
and endorsed the interconnection of human rights and international peace and
security.
Speaking in her capacity as the representative
of the United States, the President of the Council in December 2015, Ambassador
Samantha Power, said:[21]
“The
situation in the DPRK is now an item on the Security Council’s seizure
list. Given that the DPRK
continues to carry out these widespread and systematic human rights violations,
inflicting immeasurable suffering on the North Korea people, and given the
ongoing threat posed by DPRK to international peace and security, the reasons
for the Council meeting on the situation in the DPRK persist. For as long as this situation in the
DPRK remains unchanged, this Council should continue to hear briefings about,
and engage in debates on, the human rights situation in the DPRK in this
chamber.
The adoption by the Security Council of the procedural resolutions reaffirms the ongoing superintendence of the human rights situation in the DPRK by the Council. However, the UN Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, in his remarks in 2015, stressed the need for “efforts to engage the Government of the DPRK to improve the human rights situation in the country [which] must go hand in hand with efforts to hold perpetrators of crimes accountable.” He also acknowledged:[22]
“The
international community is yet to find and agree on an effective way to address
the serious rights concerns raised by the report of the Commission of Inquiry,
and how to bring about positive and lasting change for the North Korean people. Particular challenges have been posed
on how to balance calls for accountability and focus on security matters and
the need for engagement and dialogue.”
Far from the DPRK responding to the concerns
and admonishment of the international community, by engagement with its
institutions and compliance with previous Security Council resolutions on sanctions,
the DPRK proceeded to an escalation of the grave dangers involved in the
maintenance of its huge standing army; the conduct of a fourth underground
nuclear weapon test (allegedly a hydrogen bomb); the conduct of a submarine to
air missile test; and the undertaking of a long-range missile test of military
potential. Obviously, these were
deliberate and provocative actions, pursued intentionally and in violation of
earlier Security Council resolutions.
What can the international community do to
assert its will, to protect itself and the people of North Korea, whose
government fails to do so? How can the global community uphold international
peace and security in such a dangerous environment?
III. TEN PARADOXICAL STRATEGIES
III. TEN PARADOXICAL STRATEGIES
These are times for principled thinking, but also
fresh thinking, on how to handle the dual challenges to peace and security and
human rights presented to the world by the DPRK. My skills are narrower than those of Fred Iklé, being in the
fields of law and international human rights. Those skills can sometimes be an impediment to major
breakthroughs for peace and security but that does not make them illegitimate.
An earlier such fresh approach was the initiative of
the ROK, thirty years ago, to embrace the broad features of parliamentary
democracy, the rule of law, and economic liberalism. This challenge helped to build a society in South Korea
which is far more attractive to knowledgeable Korean citizens than the
threadbare absolute monarchy of the DPRK, with its grinding poverty, recurring
famines, obsessive secrecy, totalitarian rule, and detention camps. Another effort at fresh thinking was
that offered by Kim Dae-Jung’s ‘Sunshine Policy.’ In the result, it did not succeed, as most observers hoped
it would. But at least the attempt
was made. As several participants have
explained, there are no ‘quick fixes’ to the challenge of the DPRK. That challenge is no longer a ‘fringe
issue.’ It lies at the heart of
contemporary global security concerns. ‘Business as usual’ is no longer a
viable option so far as the DPRK is concerned. The risks of mistakes, accidents, and unpredictable chance
events are too great. The dangers
to nations, peoples, and the entire biosphere are real. They cannot be ignored.
Three recent images bring the current realities to
our minds:
* In
the DPRK, the signs of rejoicing on the streets are vividly recalled, as the
emotional television presenter announced the fourth bomb test and the subsequent
missile launch;
* In
the United States, the somber faces of the legislators who came together,
across party lines, to adopt the North
Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (U.S.) reflected the
unanimous or near unanimous support in both Houses of the Congress. With one voice the senators and
representatives set out to tighten the web of sanctions, designed to achieve
“an overall policy to denuclearize North Korea and promote human rights within
the country.”[23] At a time of very deep political
divisions in the United States, President Barack Obama endorsed this signal of
unified resolve by signing the measure into law. It is now operating to impose new and stronger sanctions and
strategies in respect of the DPRK, its leaders, and people; and
* In
the ROK, the government abruptly cancelled cooperation with the DPRK in the
Kaesong Industrial Zone. It declared
that the income from the zone had been used by the DPRK to finance its nuclear
and missile programs. A day later,
the DPRK froze all Kaesong assets, expelled all nationals of the ROK from the
zone, and declared the zone a military security area. Inevitably, this action dismantled the effective Trojan horse
that the efficient, clean, and prosperous factories in Kaesong had presented to
the 50,000 Kaesong workers, to be spread as an idea throughout the DPRK.[24] Whatever the competing arguments, the ROK
had clearly concluded that its exposure to increased risks from the DPRK
required resolute action. Inaction
or turning the other cheek was not a sufficient response. A signal had to be sent, including a
signal to the DPRK’s protector, China.
Given that China is the only country with
major trading and economic relations with the DPRK, and potential influence
over its actions, it remains a key to achieving progress on the human rights
and security issues. But given the
recent history of China, and its own current regional strategies, is there any
hope for change? What can the
international community do to promote new initiatives? What strategies or combination of
strategies present any possibility of promoting change? Given the
unacceptability and dangers of military intervention, what can be done specifically
to improve the human rights of the people of the DPRK at this present juncture? Is hope of change unrealistic? Or, paradoxically, is the present time
propitious for change in the DPRK?
1.
UN
Initiatives
The
mandate of the COI has been discharged. The COI has no continuing existence. The members of the COI rejected
suggestions that they should continue in office. They wanted to make the point that, the report being
provided to the United Nations, it was up to the nation states to respond as
their legal duty demanded.[25]
The
term of the second Special Rapporteur, Marzuki Darusman, will shortly
expire. It will be important to
fill the vacancy caused by his retirement without delay. I pay tribute to the outgoing SR for
the excellence, persistence, and creative imagination of his reports. He and his predecessor (Professor Vitit
Muntarbhorn of Thailand) have demonstrated the qualities of mind and courage
that are essential to this frustrating task. Despite so many discouragements, the HRC must persist with a
SR. In his last report, SR
Darusman proposed that a “committee of experts” should be established to
explore, beyond the efforts of the COI, the present state of international law
and the prevailing state practices on accountability.[26]
He recommended that “creative and practical mechanisms of accountability that
are most effective in securing truth and justice for the victims of crimes
against humanity in the [DPRK],” should constitute the mandate of the new
expert committee. Some concern has
been expressed that the COI has already fully explored the remedies available.
[27] However, it did so under a tight
deadline. A new committee might
produce fresh options. It would maintain
the commitment of the United Nations, to mobilise the international community
to protect the human rights of DPRK nationals. It would signal an unwavering
determination to that end. Given
appropriate timing, it need not cut across the mandate and responsibilities of
the new SR when appointed.
2.
Publicity
for the COI Report
Preparing a report is not the end of the
mission of a UN COI. It is only the
beginning for follow-up action.
Much international news media on the DPRK seems content to emphasise the
peculiar or humorous features seen in the DPRK and its society. However, as the COI report discloses, the
DPRK is no joke for the people vulnerable to its rule. An antidote to the isolation, and to
the denial of access to modern communications in the DPRK, would be the
widespread distribution of the DPRK report, including in the Korean
language. Top priority should be
given to this objective. Likewise,
distribution of the full report, in hardback and in an attractive format,
should be a priority UN initiative.
The UN is successful in organising COIs. It is less successful in promoting awareness of their
findings. The present impediments
placed in the way of translations of the report into the Korean and Chinese
languages should be immediately removed by the OHCHR. As much attention should be addressed to publicity for the
COI report as to the enforcement of policies on archiving immaterial documents
which the OHCHR certainly enforces. The new attitude to transparency,
demonstrated by the COI on the DPRK during its operations, should spill over
into the approach of the OHCHR to promoting worldwide awareness of the COI findings
and recommendations. Awareness of
these assists in maintaining and increasing the direct perception of the DPRK
as a “rogue state.”[28] This enhances continuously strong votes,
at all levels of the United Nations, in support of the passage of resolutions
on human rights in the DPRK. This
sends the clearest signals to the DPRK that it must change its ways if it is to
engage with the world community.
It was not obliged to join the United Nations. Having done so (and having ratified several human rights
treaties), it is obliged to conform to the requirements of the treaties and
answer for compliance to the organs of the United Nations.
3.
Engagement
with China
In the discharge of its mandate, the COI
took great pains to engage with China.
The COI’s actions and correspondence with representatives of the PRC are
described in the COI report.[29] China itself must necessarily have
concerns about the nuclear weapons and missile developments of the DPRK, with
which it shares geographic contiguity, ecological connection, and shared
dangers. National responses, in
the organs of the United Nations, suggest the potential for finding common
ground in the shared concerns over the DPRK’s weapons developments. China is a great nation. Its recent economic and other progress
has been astonishing. It is also a
permanent member of the Security Council, with the special responsibilities that
go with that position and with its privileges. During the debate on December 10, 2015 in the Security
Council, the Chinese Ambassador stated that the DPRK was no danger to peace and
security. Subsequent events
constitute an affront by the DPRK to China by making the latter’s assertions and
judgment appear naive and foolish.
China shares with other countries common responsibilities to apply
pressure on the DPRK, both to change its armaments policies and to reduce its
human rights defiance.[30] The existence of the shared interests
of humanity and concern over the dangers inherent in the present situation may,
paradoxically, bring about a degree of consensus which includes China. Propinquity, including in the chamber
of the Security Council, is sometimes an encouragement to exploring and finding
common ground.
4.
Outreach
to Koreans: ROK
The
OHCHR should explore outreach to the individuals and community groups concerned
about the state of human rights in the DPRK. The establishment of the UN field office in Seoul, ROK,
provides an opportunity to open and extend that conversation. To the extent that sedition or other
laws in the ROK impede frank dialogue within the ROK community, consideration
should be given to the reform and amendment of such laws and their enforcement.
The legislature in the ROK should consider draft legislation designed to
promote accountability in the DPRK for its most serious human rights crimes. A
Bill intended to protect and improve human rights of the people of North Korea was
first proposed to the legislature in ROK in 2005. However, progress has been slow. It may be hoped that after the conclusion of pending
elections in the ROK, the passage of legislation of this kind will prove
possible.[31] The United Nations must explain how the
pursuit of humanitarian aid to the DPRK can proceed in conjunction with
providing redress for grave human rights crimes, including crimes against humanity. Human rights conferences held in the ROK
should no longer present the spectacle of the virtually total absence of opposition
parliamentarians. In addressing an existential question, such as the future of
the Korean peninsula, all democratic elements in the ROK should actively engage
in the issues raised by the report of the COI. That report cannot be ignored.
5.
Outreach
to Korean People: DPRK
It is essential to step up communication to
people of the DPRK so that they are informed (as their government attempts to deny
to them) on the findings and recommendations of the United Nations COI on their
country. COI members have
repeatedly offered to visit Pyongyang to explain their report and answer
questions and criticisms. The COI
members are still prepared to do this.
In default of such invitations, the ROK should support and encourage new
and enlarged efforts to broadcast news on the findings of the COI and later and
other investigations of human rights in the DPRK. Although there are more than 28,000 refugees from the DPRK
in the ROK, their voices are strangely silent. Whether this is for cultural reasons or for fear of legal
breaches, is unclear. It is
remarkable that no large scale and general representation of refugees in ROK
has yet been formed. Providing for
the voices of DPRK refugees to speak directly to the people of the DPRK and the
ROK should be encouraged by every technological means. These include the provision of URL and
other technologies to bring the advantages of freedom, prosperity, and
diversity in the ROK to the notice of the citizens of the DPRK.
6.
Person
to Person Contacts
The
COI placed emphasis on the pursuit of person to person contacts between
organisations, civil society bodies, and other groups on both sides of the
demilitarised border.[32] Although approaches of this kind may at
first be rebuffed, they should be persisted in. The delays in providing adequate communication between
divided families in the DPRK and the ROK are a humanitarian disgrace. Private
consultations should be held, if necessary supported by new international funding,
to explore what is required to facilitate such contacts. At the present rate of annual meetings,
it will take 300 years to process all of the available applicants. This is barbarous. Once such meetings
are agreed, the modalities constitute no more than technical impediments. It is
also shocking that the precise fate of Japanese abductees in the DPRK has not
yet been determined. This
unfinished business remains to be addressed. Contacts between professional bodies should also be explored,
including by initiatives from outside the DPRK. With my encouragement and the
knowledge of the Korean Bar Association in the ROK, contacts have been
established between LawAsia, a regional legal professional organisation, and lawyers’
bodies in the DPRK. Initiatives for sharing specialised knowledge should be
explored. The DPRK is proud of its technological institutions. The ROK should
permit professional contacts to begin the process of building up dialogue at
the individual and grassroots level.
7.
OHCHR
Initiatives
One
consequence of the COI report on the DPRK was the initiation, for the first
time, of at least some meaningful dialogue in the Universal Periodic Review
(UPR) before the HRC in Geneva. The acknowledgement by the DPRK of areas where
improvement in its human rights record could be secured gives rise to the
possibility of technical assistance.
This should be explored.
Likewise, the possibility of a visit to the DPRK by the soon-to-be-appointed
new SR should be proposed. The
possibility of a first visit to the DPRK by the High Commissioner for Human
Rights should also be investigated, so as to establish appropriate
circumstances for such a visit.
None of these initiatives is inconsistent with the closure by the ROK of
the Kaesong Complex. None of them presents risks of hard currency accumulation,
which was the ultimate reason for the termination by the ROK of the Kaesong Zone. The DPRK is a member of the United
Nations. The disclosure and
acknowledgment of serious defects in the DPRK’s human rights posture imposes on
members of the United Nations obligations to provide help and support.
8.
Establish
Contact Group
The
COI report also urged the creation of a “contact group,” including countries
that have historically maintained friendly ties with the DPRK.[33] Finding a venue in which the DPRK might
feel comfortable to explore an improvement of contacts, where improvement is
possible, should be a top priority of the United Nations. Similarly, the means of promoting dialogue
over a peace treaty and eventual reunification should be explored. The DPRK Ambassador to the United Kingdom
recently pointed out that Kim Jong-un had declared that the slogan that should
be endorsed by the people of the DPRK in 2016 should be: “Let us frustrate the
final challenges by the anti-reunification forces within and without, and usher
in a new era of independent reunification!”[34] The leaders of the ROK have asserted
their commitment to reunification. Such common aspirations should be unpacked
patiently to find possible ways of achieving real progress beyond mere slogans.
9.
Accountability
Messaging
It
is necessary to insist that crimes against humanity cannot be waved away as a
price that must be paid for international peace and security. The definition of crimes against
humanity restricts such crimes to those that shock the conscience of human
beings.[35] This does not mean that every minor
criminal offender must be tried on that account or that all officials in the
DPRK will be at risk of prosecution.
That outcome would not be practically possible or sensible. However, justice to victims of the
crimes recounted in the COI report cannot be swept under the carpet. As in the case of Anne Frank, hiding in
an attic in Amsterdam, the message should be sent to victims in the DPRK to
keep diaries. This was the message
Anne Frank heard on the BBC. It
led her to write her famous book. One
hopes that a renewed BBC service to Korea (and other news outlets) will bring
the same message to current victims of abuses in the DPRK. Such diaries would need to be kept
prudently and with circumspection.
However, in due course, their contemporaneity and detail would support
reliable evidence to be used in the prosecution of serious offenses against
international law. In the meantime,
as the current SR has insisted in his most recent report,[36]
the principle of command and superior responsibility may render high personages
in the DPRK responsible for crimes against humanity. There is some evidence that, towards the end of the Second
World War, Nazi perpetrators began to modify their conduct out of fear of being
placed on trial, after the war, for their crimes.[37] One of the most vivid images of the
twentieth century, alongside the mushroom cloud but more hopeful, was of the
Nazi and other Axis leaders on trial: collected in a dock full of prisoners who
once held great power over the life and death of others. Accountability for great international
crimes is one of the signal recent achievements of international law. It is a work still in progress. But it does not apply to every wrongdoer.
10.
Special
Nuclear Danger
Allowing fully for the foregoing urgencies in
securing responses to the human rights offenses reported in the COI report, the
fact remains that the development of a significant nuclear arsenal, missile and
submarine facilities, and the maintenance of a huge standing army are abiding
dangers to the very survival of humanity, certainly in and near the Korean peninsula. The dangers extend beyond deliberate
actions on the part of the DPRK.
They include accidents, misunderstandings, mistakes, or random acts of
violence by a person facing acts of violence targeted in themselves. The
increasing number of military and other leaders in the DPRK who have been
reportedly executed in recent years underlines the risks. It is those risks that make it
obligatory to continue dialogue with the DPRK. That dialogue must extend beyond the special dangers of
nuclear weapons and missiles. It
must extend to proper responses to the “systematic, widespread and gross human
rights violations [that] have been, and are being, committed by [DPRK], its
institutions and officials,” as found in the COI report.[38]
This
is where decision makers need to embrace the paradoxes of the situation in
Korea. They need to remember that
the Korean people themselves, in the north and the south, are innocent of the
division of the country. They
inherited the division from others, who then influenced the governmental
systems of the two hostile states.
The Korean people, in huge numbers, in the north and south, suffered
grievously in the Korean War. So
did the Chinese people, including even Mao Zedong who lost his son. Famine, prolonged hardship, and
detention camps proved, with pinpoint accuracy, by satellites peering into the
dark space of the DPRK, demonstrate the suffering that is continuing. Likewise, the voices of the victims
collected in the report of the UN COI.
When
doubts arise as to the utility of promoting dialogue with the DPRK, the risks
of failing to do so must also be remembered. Pride or even a sense of deserved retaliation, can get in
the way of reducing the intolerable risks inherent in isolation and total non-engagement.
When
the possibility of improvement of the situation in the DPRK seems at its bleakest,
we must remember that the division of Korea is but 70 years of history. That is short in comparison to the
millennia in which the Korean people lived together and the centuries in which
they were governed as one nation and people.
IV.
WE ARE ONE
If
contemporary observers are tempted to lose their patience with the DPRK, they
must be cautioned to stay the course of dialogue and exploration: remembering
the commonalities that the people of all nations share with one other, with the
Korean people, and with all of them. The Korean people themselves know of these
commonalities. They enjoy the same
language, literary classics, musical traditions, cuisine, and great poets. They also share still more humble
pursuits.
Things
in common sometimes emerge unexpectedly from the deep silence when the Korean
people from north and south meet, however rarely. Slogans of reconciliation may
be shouted at each other from both sides of the DMZ. However, the sense of mutuality in a recent football
match is a metaphor for the paradoxical possibilities.
Whilst
the work of the COI was concluding and being considered by the international
community, the Asian Games were held in Incheon, ROK. To those games, the DPRK proudly sent a member of sporting
champions, including its football team. That team won through to the final,
only to discover that its competitor for the winner’s medals was the ROK, its
neighbour.
The
football game began before a packed stadium in Incheon. Yet the apparent rivalry was muted by
the recognition, on the part of the players and spectators, of the historical
nature of the contest. Each team
played with sportsmanlike attitudes.
When a player of the ROK team was accidently bumped and fell over, he
was helped to his feet by DPRK players.
When a DPRK player fell, he was helped to his feet by the ROK team. In
the end, the ROK team won the medals. But the players exchanged
acknowledgements of each other. And all the while the spectators repeatedly
cried out, throughout the game: “We are one!”[39]
This
is a story of the essential paradox of Korea. One day, the riddle will be solved. The paradox will be fully understood. Until that day comes, humanity, and the United Nations on its behalf, must retain minds
open to advancing the changes that arise. We must be ready for them to come at once with peace and
security for all and upholding the human rights of the Korean people and all of
them on both sides of the DMZ. “We
are one!” they cried out to us in that stadium in Incheon. If Fred Iklé were here, he would be
urging us to remember that cry. To
accommodate the paradox that it expresses. And to embrace the paradoxical
thinking that it demands.
* Delivered as the inaugural Fred Iklé Memorial Lecture, February 19,
2016, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington D.C., United
States.
** Chair of the United Nations Human Rights Council’s Commission of
Inquiry on human rights in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) (2013-14); Member of the Secretary-General’s
High Level Panel on Access to Essential Medicines (2015-16).
[1] Charter of the United Nations (June 26, 1945);
59 Stat. 1031, TS 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force October 24, 1945, Arts
23, 24, 25, 26.
[2] United Nations, Security Council Report, ‘Human Rights and the
Security Council – an Evolving Role’, research report, 2016, no. 1 (25 January
2016) 1, 2.
[3] Charter of the United Nations,
above n. 1, Preamble, clauses i and ii.
[4] See e.g. T.R. Shapiro, “Fred Charles Iklé, Reagan Administration
Defense Official, dies at 87”, The
Washington Post, November 16, 2011; “Fred Iklé (1924-2004),” Institute of
Policy Studies, Right Web, last
updated September 24, 2012; Andrew Schwartz, Center for Strategic &
International Studies (CSIS), November 11, 2011. The biographical details were taken from these and other
sources.
[5] F.C. Iklé, Annihilation From
Within, Columbia University Press, New York, 2006.
[6] He was author of two other important monographs: How Nations Negotiate, Harper & Row,
New York, 1964; and Every War Must End,
Columbia University Press, New York, 1970.
[7] Eulogy for Fred Ikle, by Carl Gershman (President, National
Endowment for Democracy), December 10, 2011, reprinted in Life & Human Rights in North Korea,
Vol. 62, Winter 2011, pp. 87-89.
[8] The rule of law is expressly mentioned in the third preamble to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted 10 December 1948; GA Res 217A(111), UN doc A/810, at 71 (1948).
[9] Paradoxes are common in international affairs, including in legal
responses. The “AIDS Paradox”,
attributed to Jonathan Mann, taught that some of the most effective laws to
respond to the HIV/AIDS epidemic included offering protection and legal support
to persons at risk of having and passing the virus. Paradoxically, winning trust was seen as essential to
conveying messages that would reduce the risk of transmission and protect
against infections. See United Nations Development Programme, Global Commission
on HIV and the Law, Risks, Rights and
Health, New York, July 2012, 9.
[10] Quoted in G.A. Gathorne Hardy, A
Short History of International Affairs (1920-1939), Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1960, frontis piece.
[11] A/HRC/Res/22/13 (21 March 2013).
[12] HRC, Res 19/13 and GA Res 67/151.
[13] A/HRC/25/CRP.1 (“COI report”).
[14] The report of the COI is available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIDPRK/Pages/CommissionInquiryonHRinDPRK.aspx. A discussion of the methodology adopted
by the COI may be found in M.D. Kirby, “The UN Report on North Korea: How the
United Nations Met the Common Law”, Judicial
Officers’ Bulletin, September 2015 (NSW), vol. 27, number 8 at pp
72-24. See also P. Alston and S.
Knuckey (Eds.), The Transformation of
Human Rights Fact-Finding, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016.
[15] This was Part III of the COI report (at pp 19ff, para [85] ff). Historical materials appear in Victor
Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea,
Past and Future, ECC, Harper Collins, 2011; Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea – Life and Politics in
the Failed Stalinist Utopia, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013.
[16] COI report, pp21-22 [95].
[17] It was absent as a
protest against the continued occupancy of the China seat in the United Nations
by the Republic of China and the failure to recognise the credentials of the
People’s Republic of China. After
the UN vote, the Soviet Union hastily returned to the Security Council; but the
vote had been adopted. Questions
persist as to the legality of the vote in the absence of the “concurring votes
of the permanent members” in accordance with the United Nations Charter, Art 27.3.
[18] The total Korean casualties were approximately 2 million; Chinese,
600,000; United States, 36,000; and United Kingdom and others (including
Australia) 1,000.
[19] COI report, p43 [157].
[20] Charter of the United Nations
above n.1, Art 27.2, requiring 10 affirmative votes. In fact, in December 2014 there were 11 affirmative votes, 2
abstentions and 2 against.
[21] Remarks on the adoption of the provisional agenda of the UN
Security Council on the situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
UN Security Council, New York, December 10, 2015.
[22] Remarks to the Security Council Briefing on the situation in the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey
Feltman, December 10, 2015.
[23] Announcement of the U.S. Senators Bob Corker (R-Tenn), Ben Cardin
(D-Md) and Cory Cardner (R-Colorado) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) announcing that
the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee had passed the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act, January 28, 2016.
[24] R. Frank, “The Kaesong Closure, Punishment or Shot in the Foot”,
published in 38 North, February 12,
2016.
[25] The reference was to the “R2P” principle. The origins and implications of this principle in
international law are described in Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For
All,” Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2008, according to this
exposition “the primary responsibility for protecting its own people from mass
atrocity crimes lies with the state itself. State sovereignty implies responsibility, not a license to
kill. But when a state is
unwilling or unable to halt or avert such crimes, the wider international
community then has a collective responsibility to take whatever action is necessary”.
[26] United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation
of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. A/HRC/31/70 (19
January 2016), p10 [39(a)].
[27] COI report, pp361-365 [1201]-[1208].
[28] M.D. Kirby and Sandeep Gopalan, ‘Recalcitrant’ States and
International Law: The Role of The UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights
Violations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, 37 University of Pennsylvania Journal of
International Law, 229 at 279-294.
[29] COI report, Appendix
II. See also report summary, 27 –
36 and recommendations in report, p369 [1221].
[30] After the lecture on which this article was based was delivered, it
was announced that the United States and China had agreed on a resolution
addressed to North Korea’s nuclear “provocations” and that the new resolution
would go to a Security Council vote shortly. New York Times,
February 25, 2016, 1; The Australian,
February 26, 2016, 9.
[31] Human Rights Watch
Asia, (February 2, 2016) “South Korea’s Act to Promote Rights in North Korea”. Since
this lecture was given, ROK adopted on March 2, 2016 the North Korean Human
Right Act.
[32] COI report, p370
[1222].
[33] COI report, p371
[1225] (h).
[34] Kamila Kingstone,
“North Korea’s UK Ambassador: ‘We want peace but we’ve been victimised?” The Guardian, London, January 14, 2016.
[35] COI report, p319 [1022]-[1065].
[36] Report of the Special
Rapporteur, above n.26, p6 [E2].
[37] The reference is to
the belated agreements by H. Himmler in late 1943 to permit a delegation of the
International Committee of the Red Cross to inspect the Theresienstadt
Concentration Camp and the release of a small number of Danish Jewish
prisoners. See e.g. Vojtěch
Blodig, Terezĭn In the “Final Solution of
the Jewish Question 1941-1945”,
Oswald, 2003, 34-37.
[38] COI report, p365
[1211].
[39] Agence France-Presse, http://sport.ndtv.com/asian-games-2014/news/230881-asian-games-top-north-korean-leaders-to-attend-closing-ceremony.
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