The Human Rights Factor: Changes Under Kim Jong-un
By Amanda Mortwedt Oh, HRNK Project Officer
Introduction
North Korea’s human rights landscape is changing since Kim
Jong-un came to power at the end of 2011, as evidenced by: 1) decreased refugee
flows to South Korea; 2) increased information infiltration into North Korea;
3) increased international pressure concerning human rights violations; 4)
North Korea’s responses to international criticism for its human rights
policies and practices; and 5) the growing nexus between security and human
rights.
In February 2014, three UN commissioners—Michael Donald Kirby of
Australia, Sonja Biserko of Serbia, and Marzuki Darusman, the former Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea—released a report finding, based on a “reasonable
grounds” standard, that “systematic, widespread and gross human rights
violations have been and are being committed by the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, its institutions and officials.” The commissioners collected
evidence and heard witness testimony of crimes committed by North Korean
officials that “shocked the conscience of humanity.” They stated that
based on the body of testimony—almost 300 victims and expert witnesses were
interviewed publicly and privately—and other information, “crimes against
humanity have been committed in [North Korea], pursuant to policies established
at the highest levels of the State.” The commissioners called on North Korea to
undertake profound reforms to provide its citizens with basic human rights,
including the recommendation that North Korea first “acknowledge the existence
of human rights violations, including the political prison camps.”
Despite this historical undertaking, the current state of
human rights in North Korea is bleak. Nevertheless, there are some changes on
the human rights landscape that should be considered by the North Korea “community
of interest”—including policymakers, UN member states, advocates, researchers,
and intelligence and security officials—because of the potential presented by
the human rights factor.
Current State of
Human Rights Under Kim Jong-un
North Korea is a dynastic, totalitarian state ruled by the
Kim family for over 60 years. Marshal Kim Jong-un has been the “Suryong” (Supreme
Leader) since just after his father’s death in December 2011. Although many
people hoped Kim Jong-un would be more tolerant and reasonable than his father
and grandfather before him, he has, by some accounts, been far more
“aggressive, arrogant and impulsive.”[1]
As the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea’s (HRNK’s) Executive Director Greg
Scarlatoiu puts it:
After all, he was likely chosen to be leader of North Korea
despite being the youngest of three sons not because he was seen as a potential
reformer, but because he was the one son most likely to follow in his father’s
footsteps. …[D]uring his first four and a half years at the helm, Kim Jong-un
purged all four fundamental building blocks of the regime: the Korean People’s
Army; the Workers’ Party (in particular, the Administrative Department); the
internal security agencies; and the inner core of the Kim family (to an
unprecedented extent, through the execution of Jang Sung-taek, his own uncle…).[2]
Five Trends
Based on research conducted by HRNK, five trends have
defined the human rights situation under the Kim Jong-un regime:
1) An
aggressive purge of senior officials, aimed to consolidate the leader’s grip on
power. According to South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-Se, at least
70 senior officials had been executed in North Korea as of July 2015.
2) A
“restructuring” of the political prison camp system, with some facilities,
closer to the border with China, being shut down, while inland facilities have
been expanded. An example of this is Camp 22 in Hoeryong, North Hamgyong
Province, which has been closed. In the process of closing Camp 22 and
transferring prisoners to other detention facilities, 23,000 inmates went
unaccounted for.[3]
3) Disproportionate
oppression of women, who have assumed primary responsibility for the survival
of their families; thus, women represent the majority of those arrested for
perceived wrongdoing at the “jangmadang” (markets) or for “illegally” crossing
the border;
4) The
sustained, if not increased, economic importance of the political prison camps.
For example, many prisoners are forced to mine in or around the camps, which
provides the regime with income from iron ore, coal, and various minerals; and
5)
An
intensive crackdown on attempted defections.
Decreased Refugee
Flows to South Korea
North Korean Refugees in South Korea[4]
|
||||||||||||||||||
Year/
|
’98
|
’01
|
’02
|
’03
|
’04
|
’05
|
’06
|
’07
|
’08
|
’09
|
’10
|
’11
|
’12
|
’13
|
’14
|
’15
|
’16.6
|
합계/
Total
|
Classification
|
||||||||||||||||||
Male
|
831
|
565
|
510
|
474
|
626
|
424
|
515
|
573
|
608
|
662
|
591
|
795
|
404
|
369
|
305
|
251
|
||
Female
|
116
|
478
|
632
|
811
|
1,272
|
960
|
1,513
|
1,981
|
2,195
|
2,252
|
1,811
|
1,911
|
1,098
|
1,145
|
1,092
|
1,025
|
||
Total
|
947
|
1,043
|
1,142
|
1,285
|
1,898
|
1,384
|
2,028
|
2,554
|
2,803
|
2,914
|
2,402
|
2,706
|
1,502
|
1,514
|
1,397
|
1,276
|
749
|
29,544
|
*Yellow boxes indicate numbers of North Korean Refugees in
South Korea under Kim Jong-un (as of June 2016).
Under Kim Jong-un, fewer North Koreans have escaped to South
Korea, as compared to the preceding five years under Kim Jong-il. The Ministry
of Unification (MoU) accounts for all North Koreans who arrive in South Korea
each year, and beginning in 2012, there was a significant decline in the number
of people who escaped to South Korea. In fact, over the last five years, the
numbers have reverted back to what they were in the early 2000s, just around
1500 people or less. Even with Kim Jong-un’s reported purging of officials—of
which there are reports that more high-level officials defected as a result—the
numbers are still low, especially among men. Since 2002, females outnumber male
defectors and now generally account for about 70% of North Korean refugees[5]
in South Korea.
So what reasons are there for this decline in number of defections
and escapes? Many reports have pointed to increased surveillance and tighter
border security along the Sino-North Korean border, thus making it more
difficult for people to leave North Korea by way of China and then eventually
travel to South Korea where the MoU can count them. Reports have shown extended
fencing along the border areas by both the North Koreans and the Chinese.[6]
The Chinese have continued to violate their legal obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (1951 Refugee Convention) and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and persist in the
refoulement of North Koreans, who are then persecuted by their own government
upon return.
Additionally, there may have been policy changes made by Kim
Jong-un’s regime, to include rumored “shoot to kill” instructions for border
security, designated times for people to use the Tumen River—for example, to
wash their clothes—and harsher punishments for families left behind by those
escaping the country.
An alternative analysis of the decline in defections to
South Korea is that the economy has improved, thus encouraging fewer people to
escape North Korea. As some evidence shows, the North Korean economy has
improved, and perhaps more people are allowed to participate in the markets,
such as the “jangmadang” generation. But such improvements have surely not been
the result of deliberate, top-down government policy. It is also possible that
more North Koreans are staying in China, either by choice or because securing
brokers or traveling alone or with the help of ministries has become more dangerous
and more expensive.
Here, it is worth noting that even amongst the North Koreans
who escape to China across the Tumen River, not all are able or willing to
travel the various escape routes through Southeast Asia to South Korea. Others,
but relatively very few, decide to come to the United States under our North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 and
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
Today, there are still fewer than 200 former North Koreans living in the United
States, while there are about 30,000 former North Koreans in South Korea
according to the MoU.
Interestingly, the number of escapees this year is on the
rise. According to data from the MoU, the number of escapees grew 22 percent in
the first half of the year compared to a year earlier in the January to June
period (749 v. 614). It is still too early to make conclusions or speculate,
but it may be worth analyzing the impact international scrutiny has had on overseas
workers, particularly restaurant workers.[7]
Instability
A key topic of consideration when discussing refugee flow is
instability. While the converse is not necessarily true, an increase in the
flow of refugees may point to instability inside North Korea. Prior to signs of
instability and refugee changes, plans to provide humanitarian aid and
assistance to refugees and the most vulnerable populations inside North Korea, its
prisoners, should exist. Right now, there is an estimated 80,000 to 120,000
people inside North Korea’s political prison camps, or kwan-li-so. Its forced labor camps, kyo-hwa-so, are also believed to hold prisoners for what the regime
deems political crimes. In both types of detention, there are reportedly high rates
of death due to forced labor, malnutrition, disease, and even torture and killings.
The UN COI also found that human rights violations are most severe inside North
Korea’s political prison and forced labor camps. Many violations constitute crimes
against humanity.[8]
Roberta Cohen, HRNK Co-Chair Emeritus, has also written
about another important consideration in these detention facilities:
In the event of an
armed conflict or revolution, camp authorities “have received orders to kill
all prisoners,” according to former prison guard Ahn Myong-chol, in order “‘to
eliminate any evidence’ about the existence of the camps.”[9] The initial order appears to originate with
Kim Il-sung, later reaffirmed by Kim Jong-il. “Drills” also have been held “on
how to kill large numbers of prisoners in a short period of time.”[10] Guards from other camps, as well as former
prison officials, confirm this account. Rescuing prisoners should be given a
high priority, even at a time of chaos. The camps and their brutality now symbolize
a principal way in which the Kim regime has maintained its power.[11]
Whether or not this order is still in place is unknown, but
it is an important knowledge gap because it could point to just how far the
regime may go to eliminate evidence of its abuses in the event of instability.
Furthermore, North Korea may go to lengths to hide evidence
of wrongdoing. As Joseph Bermudez, Jr. frequently points out: “North
Korean officials, especially those within the Korean People’s Army and the
internal security organizations, clearly understand the importance of
implementing camouflage, concealment and deception (CCD) procedures.”[12] As a result, it is also
imperative to continue documenting these human rights abuses and come up with
ways to provide aid to the prisoners, hopefully learning both the good and the
bad lessons from the previous release of prisoners from Nazi Germany’s
concentration camps.
Increased Information
Infiltration into North Korea
A second indicator of the changing human rights landscape
under Kim Jong-un has been that of information infiltration. Over the last five
years, more information is seemingly seeping into North Korea. This is forcing
the Kim regime to adapt in order to survive and maintain its grip on power.
First, new technology constantly challenges North Korea.
Today, there are drones from China, tablets, mobile phones, micro SD cards made
to look like they are unopened—when in reality, they have Korean dramas and
American movies on them in hard-to-detect files—and USB drives, not to mention
DVDs. International civil society organizations continue to send radio
broadcasts into North Korea detailing a more prosperous life in South Korea,
and there has even been an uptick in the ROK government’s use of loudspeaker
messaging.[13]
Second, with the advent of new technology that is harder to
clamp down on, more North Koreans are receiving information. A widely-used
resource detailing media consumption among North Korean escapees is InterMedia’s
“A Quiet Opening” from 2012.[14]
It found that access to outside media is rising steadily, and, for example,
DVDs at the time had become the most common mode of accessing foreign media. Today,
there is growth in the use of USBs and mobile phones, particularly mobile
phones as media devices.
Of course, the technological changes and increased media
consumption have not gone unnoticed. North Korea is the most adept state in the
world at controlling information flow inside its borders. Likely due to new
technology and an increased perception of threat, the regime has stepped up
internal monitoring of its people and its networks. For example, IT
professionals released information stating that North Korea’s operating system “Red
Star” has a watermarking function that enables the regime to keep track of where a document hits Red
Star OS for the first time and who opened it (as long as the computer is
connected at least to the intranet).
Earlier
this month, Radio Free Asia reported that “North Korean authorities have
significantly stepped up crackdowns on illegal footage, they are also spreading
a politics of fear [fearpolitik].”
The 109 Combined Command (State Security Department or SSD) conducted a raid of
a university student’s home and found a memory chip with several South Korean films.
Unfortunately, the student reportedly killed herself during interrogations to
protect her friends.[15]
Increased International Pressure
on North Korea for its Human Rights Abuses
United Nations
A third
and significant way in which the human rights landscape has changed since Kim
Jong-un took power is the unprecedented pressure North Korea has received from
the international community, including the United States. The UN COI was in and
of itself a historic step—there are only a few other commissions of inquiry,
including one for Syria currently—and deserves great credit for serving as a
catalyst to promote awareness and international pressure.
Other
UN actions besides the UN COI, though, have helped keep human rights at the
forefront of the dialogue on North Korea. From a human rights organization
perspective, this is incredibly important yet also difficult to sustain. It is
understandably necessary to discuss the security threats regarding North Korea,
but it is also incumbent upon the international community to investigate and
hold leaders accountable for international crimes—in this case, crimes against
humanity.
© U.S. Mission to the United
Nations
In the
last five years, the UN Human Rights Council and General Assembly have issued
strong resolutions condemning the Kim regime’s abuses. In 2014, however, the
issue of North Korea was put on the agenda of the Security Council for the
first time by way of a procedural vote. Again, in 2015, it was kept on the
agenda. This signifies that the international community recognizes that North
Korea’s human rights situation is important and has a direct impact on
international peace and security. Time and time again, we have heard that human
rights violations ultimately breed regional and international instability.
U.S. Government
For its
part, the U.S. Government has also made remarkable strides towards
accountability for the Kim regime’s human rights abuses. Recently, the North Korea Sanctions and Policy
Enhancement Act of 2016 became law.
On July 6, 2016, the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights and Labor published a report for Congress pursuant to the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 entitled, Human Rights Abuses and Censorship in North Korea. This report focuses on highlighting and deterring human rights
abuses committed by the North Korean regime. HRNK’s recent publication, Pyongyang Republic: North Korea's
Capital of Human Rights Denial, by Robert Collins, informs the report on the Kim regime's policy of human
rights denial within the now disbanded National Defense Commission, the
Organization and Guidance Department, and the Reconnaissance General Bureau:
"numerous and brutal
executions of members of the power elite since Kim Jong-un took power are
apparently being used by the regime to maximize the power elite’s fear of
the young supreme leader.”
Furthermore, this report details aspects of the human rights situation in
North Korea and the conduct of relevant persons, including those responsible
for the commission of serious human rights abuses and censorship in North
Korea. Drawing on both the work of the UN Commission of Inquiry and HRNK, the
State Department identified individuals and entities as "subject to
designation for sanctions" by the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
On the
same day and in coordination with the U.S. Department of State, the Department
of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 11
individuals, including Kim Jong-un, and five entities, all identified in
State's report. The sanctions are pursuant to Executive Order 13722 and
Executive Order 13687 and are meant to "to pressure North Korea to cease
engaging in destabilizing behavior and inflicting grave human rights
abuses."[16]
North Korea’s Changing
Responses to Human Rights Criticisms
North Korea has certainly responded to the criticisms of its
human rights policies by the international community. While varied, the
responses typically denounce the United States in an attempt to deflect blame,
but these reactions are interesting because they have elicited changes in North
Korea’s behavior under Kim Jong-un.
Reactions to the UN
After
the adoption of HRC resolution 22/13, establishing the UN COI, North Korea
publicly stated that it would “totally reject and disregard” the resolution,
which it considered to be a “product of political confrontation and conspiracy.” Immediately after the Commission was
created, the North Korean Ambassador to the UN, So Se-pyong, denounced the
Commission as “an instrument that serves the political purposes of the hostile
forces in their attempt to discredit the image” of North Korea, while denying
that any human rights abuses existed in his country.
Throughout
the UN COI investigation, North Korea repeatedly dismissed the Commission and
failed to cooperate with the commissioners by denying them access to the
country. For its part, China also denied the commissioners access to its border
region with North Korea. North Korean officials said that it did not have
prison camps, but that there were “detention centres where people are improved
through their mentality and look on their wrongdoings.”[17]
North
Korea also submitted its own report on its human rights record after the UN COI
released its findings, claiming that North Koreans enjoy robust human rights.
It failed to mention the prison camps, despite the evidence gathered by the
Commission of the existence of these unlawful detention facilities. Then, North
Korea responded further with its own criticisms of the human rights situation
in the United States and South Korea.
Interestingly,
North Korea did something it had not done in over 15 years due to mounting
pressure for its human rights abuses: its Foreign Minister attended the General
Assembly and announced his country’s readiness to hold a “human rights dialogue
with countries not hostile to it.”
Furthermore,
North Korea changed its behavior in response to human rights by taking a
greater part in another human rights mechanism, something known as the
Universal Periodic Review (UPR). Previously, North Korea had rejected
recommendations made to it by other member states on ways to improve certain
human rights issues. Following the publication of the UN COI findings, though,
North Korea changed its tune and said it would implement certain
recommendations. For North Korea, this was a new reaction to human rights
pressure. During its last UPR cycle, North Korea again changed its prior stance
and accepted some of the 268 recommendations. Unfortunately, the Special
Rapporteur at the time, Marzuki Darusman, found that North Korea had done
nothing to implement any of these recommendations, as of June 2014. Still,
North Korea had never before said it would accept any of the UPR
recommendations, so this was an interesting change in behavior by the regime.
After
the UN General Assembly in December 2014 referred the Commission's findings to
the Security Council, North Korea renounced any further cooperation with UN
human rights mechanisms.
Reactions to the U.S.
Most recently, North Korea reportedly conducted a submarine-launched
ballistic missile (SLBM) test after the State Department’s human rights report
and OFAC’s sanctions were published. In addition, it said that there were no
longer any diplomatic ties to the United States—so no longer would North Korea
communicate through its Mission in New York and the U.S. Mission to the UN—and
it will operate with the United States under its “wartime law.”
North Korea’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement on July 7,
2016, responding to Kim Jong-un’s sanctions designation by the U.S. Treasury
“for having engaged in, facilitated, or been responsible for an abuse or
violation of human rights.” The full speech issued by its Foreign Ministry is enclosed
here:
Several points worth highlighting in the speech include: 1)
North Korea said the U.S. has crossed a “red line” by issuing the human rights
report and sanctioning its leader; 2) North Korea said the U.S. has now declared
war on the DPRK; 3) that North Korea will operate with the U.S. now under its
“wartime law;” and 4) that North Korea will take the “toughest countermeasures”
against the U.S.
A
recent and interesting analysis of this speech was that done by NK News using its KCNA
Watch data
tool. NK News looked at that declaration of war language and found that for
English media output since 1997, North Korea has felt other countries are
declaring war over 200 times.
The phrase “wartime law,” also used in the Foreign Ministry statement, was analyzed and found to have been used much less frequently. In total, it has come up just 20 times over the same period.[19]
Various experts have commented on North Korea’s latest
responses to the Treasury sanctions, including Victor Cha, who said that North
Korea's threat to shut down its New York channel of communication should
invite caution.
“The loss of the channel could
be risky as ‘we head into the fall with U.S.-[South Korea] military exercises
in August and U.S. presidential elections in November,’ Cha said.”[20]
Ken Gause, at CNA, also said
that the upcoming US-ROK military exercises could serve as a justification for
North Korea to act out. He said, "[t]he question is whether North Korea
will stick with demonstrations and tests or will it try something more
aggressive. If North Korea tries something aggressive, it most likely will be a
covert—versus an overt—attack."[21]
The Human Rights and
Security Nexus
Finally, international pressure for North Korea’s human
rights violations has evoked responses from Kim Jong-un, aiding in a stronger
nexus between security and human rights issues. Previously, human rights issues
were on the backburner, and security issues, especially the nuclear one, were
at the forefront. With increased international awareness and pressure today, coupled
with Kim’s own actions—including that of executing officials, continuing to
pursue nuclear weapons, and more obvious measures of effectiveness in terms of
diplomatic responses to human rights pressure—the issue of human rights violations
has been elevated. In most cases, the policy dialogue now includes human rights
at the same time as security.
From HRNK’s perspective, this is certainly a positive
development. It not only recognizes the shocking atrocities committed against
fellow human beings, but there is also an interplay, an interconnectedness between
human rights and security issues. It also buttresses up against an issue that James
R. Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), noted previously, that
“[t]he risk of waning support for universal human rights norms is increasing as
authoritarian regimes push back against human rights in practice and in
principle.”[22]
Nevertheless, the Kim Jong-un regime’s commission of serious
human rights abuses constitutes a continuing threat to the national security of
the United States. As General Vincent Brooks said in an April 2016 statement to
the Senate Armed Services Committee, Kim Jong-un “appears to be more
risk-tolerant, arrogant, and impulsive than his father, raising the prospect of
miscalculation.”
Because of the interplay between human rights and security,
there is also room to improve cooperation among NGOs and the security community
in ways that are mutually beneficial. Human rights organizations have knowledge
gaps that the security community may be able to help with, and security
officials may benefit from unclassified reports, policy recommendations, and
civil society perspectives.
An example of this relationship can be seen with the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2015. The law states that “[t]he Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives a report on political prison camps in North Korea.”[23]
This report was to be unclassified with an optional classified annex. HRNK
prepares reports on North Korea’s political prison camps using commercial
satellite imagery. Our reports are publically available, but they could potentially
be improved with access to more declassified information on the prison camps,
including more recent satellite imagery. In turn, we have done assessments of
the camps, monitored developments, and interviewed former prisoners and guards.
Another example of this mutually beneficial relationship
also involves the prison camps. Camp 16, or Kwan-li-so
No. 16 Hwasong’s western perimeter is about two kilometers away from North
Korea’s only known nuclear test facility, Punggye-ri. As an organization that focuses
on human rights abuses that may be occurring in the camp, we have been looking
for any signs that these political prisoners are used for labor at Punggye-ri. There
have been reports that prisoners were taken to Mt. Mantap for biological and/or
chemical testing, and there are one or two reports indicating that prisoners
have been used to dig the tunnels for testing nuclear weapons.[24]
However, although HRNK has closely followed these reports, our organization has
not been able to independently confirm them.
©
AllSource Analysis and the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2016
North Korea’s
human rights landscape is changing since Kim Jong-un came to power at the end
of 2011. International focus is transitioning from security to security and human rights. Kim Jong-un has
cracked down on defections, yet more information is getting into North Korea. This
changing human rights environment with elevated tensions over human rights
criticism continues to beg the question: Does this mean Kim Jong-un is
consolidating or losing his power?[25]
For now, this continues to be an open question, but human rights is certainly an
integral part of this changing landscape under Kim Jong-un.
[1] General
Vincent K. Brooks, Advance Questions for
General Vincent K. Brooks, USA, Nominee to be Commander, United Nations
Command, Commander, Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command,
and Commander, United States Forces Korea, April 19,
2016, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Brooks_02-19-16.pdf.
[2] Scarlatoiu, Greg. “Romanian Perspectives on Korean
Unification: The Romanian Regime Change Precedent.” International Journal of Korean Studies XX: 1 (2016), p. 4. (Not yet published.)
[3] Hawk, David. North Korea’s Hidden Gulag: Interpreting
Reports of Changes in the Prison Camps, 22. Washington, D.C.: Committee for
Human Rights in North Korea, 2013. https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/NKHiddenGulag_DavidHawk(2).pdf.
[4] Statistics from ROK Ministry of Unification,
http://www.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=1440.
[5] Some U.S. human rights groups have indicated that defector may have some negative
connotations, but the North Korea community of interest has not reached
consensus regarding the use of the terms defector,
refugee, former North Korean, or escapee.
The term refugee, though, has a legal
connotation, as it is defined under international law in the 1951 Refugee
Convention and under U.S. domestic
law in the INA.
[6] Jung Min Noh, “China Extends
North Korean Border Fences to Bolster Security,” Radio Free Asia, August 5, 2013,
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/fences-08052013162858.html.
[7] For current analysis on this topic, see
http://m.koreatimes.co.kr/phone/news/view.jsp?req_newsidx=210966 and
https://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk03600&num=14024.
[8] “In the 21st century, North Korea is the only country in the
world that is still running a vast system of political prison camps
incarcerating 120,000 men, women and children under gruesome conditions. They
are persecuted behind the barbed wire fences of North Korea’s political prison
camps, subjected to induced malnutrition, forced labor, torture, and sexual
violence, as well as public and secret executions. In 2016, pursuant to Songbun—a system of social
discrimination established in the 1950s—access to food, jobs, and any type of
opportunity continues to depend on one’s perceived loyalty-based social
classification.
Although, as a UN member state since
1991, North Korea is bound by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
also by other international human rights instruments it has ratified, such as
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, each and every conceivable human right is violated in
North Korea.” Scarlatoiu, “Romanian Perspectives,” 3.
[9] UN General Assembly, Report of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, A/HRC/25/CRP.1, 7 February 2014, para. 732.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Cohen, Roberta. “Post-Reunification Human Rights and
Humanitarian Concerns.” International
Journal of Korean Studies XIX: 2 (2015),
p. 4.
[12] Bermudez Jr., Joseph S. and Opperman, Amy, North Korea’s Camp No. 22, 4.
Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012.
https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/HRNK%20CAMP%2022%20REPORT%20FINAL%20(1).pdf.
[13]For instance, see S. Korea to introduce more
loudspeakers to step up anti-NK broadcasting, Yonhap News Agency, April
12, 2016, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2016/04/12/0200000000AEN20160412009000315.html.
[14] See, generally, Kim, Jane and Kretchun, Nat, A Quiet Opening: North Koreans in a Changing
Media Environment. Washington, D.C.: InterMedia, 2012. http://www.intermedia.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/A_Quiet_Opening_FINAL_InterMedia.pdf.
[15] Elizabeth Shim, “North Korean Woman Commits Suicide
After Arrest,” UPI, July 8, 2016,
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/07/08/Report-North-Korean-woman-commits-suicide-after-arrest/7951467990957/?or=tn&spt=sec.
[16] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights and Labor, Report on
Human Rights Abuses and Censorship in North Korea, July 6,
2016, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/259366.htm. The following is Annex
A of the report, which is “a list of
individuals associated with the below entities who are subject to designation
for sanctions:”
National Defense Commission: Kim Jong-un, First Chairman; Ri Yong-mu, Vice
Chairman; O Kuk-ryol, Vice Chairman; Hwang Pyong-so, Vice Chairman (1st Vice
Director of the Organization and Guidance Department); Choe Pu-il, Member
(Minister of Public Security); Pak Yong-sik, Member (former Ministry of Public
Security Bureau Director and current Minister of the People’s Armed Forces)
Organization and Guidance Department: Jo
Yon-jun, 1st Vice Director; Kim Kyong-ok, 1st Vice Director
Ministry of State Security: Kang Song-nam, Bureau Director, Prisons Bureau (in Ministry of State
Security)
Ministry of People’s Security: Choe Chang-pong, Bureau Director; Ri Song-chol,
Counselor, Correctional Bureau (in
Ministry of People’s Security)
Propaganda and Agitation Department: Kim Ki Nam, Director; Ri
Jae-il, 1st Vice Director
Reconnaissance General Bureau: Cho Il-u; O Chong-kuk.
[17] Choe Myong-nam, as quoted in, “North Korea Defends Human Rights
Record in Report to UN,” BBC News,
October 8, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29531969.
[18] See Michael Madden, “Foreign Ministry Issues
Statement on Kim Jong Un’s Sanctions Designation,” North Korea Leadership Watch, July 8, 2016,
https://nkleadershipwatch.wordpress.com/2016/07/08/foreign-ministry-issues-statement-on-kim-jong-uns-sanctions-designation/.
[19] Leo Byrne, “China, North Korea Criticize New U.S.
Sanctions,” NK News, July 8, 2016,
https://www.nknews.org/2016/07/china-north-korea-criticize-new-u-s-sanctions/.
[20] Elizabeth Shim, “North Korea May Soon Stir Up
Provocations, U.S. Experts Say,” UPI, July 12, 2016, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/07/12/North-Korea-may-soon-stir-up-provocations-US-experts-say/5861468374691/?spt=mps&or=1&sn=tn_us.
[22] James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat
Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Senate Armed Services
Committee, February 9, 2016,
http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Clapper_02-09-16.pdf.
[23] See https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr4681.
[24] We also wonder if these prisoners are used to
decontaminate the site after the tests; perhaps they are buried alive. All
speculation at this point, but the proximity of these two facilities may be
more than coincidental.
[25] “Despite new sanctions, North Korea continues to
develop its weapons programs, including nuclear weapons and submarine-launched
ballistic missiles—diverting precious resources away from the humanitarian
needs of its people—and deny citizens their basic human rights. In the weeks
leading up to the first Workers’ Party Congress in 36 years, Kim Jong-un seemed
more unrelenting than ever in his current policies of “byeongjin” (simultaneous
nuclear and economic development) and human rights denial.” Scarlatoiu,
“Romanian Perspectives,” 5.
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