Natural Disaster Preparedness in North Korea or Lack Thereof
By Kim Myong
Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK Executive Director
In recent years, our planet has been witnessing extreme natural phenomena. The identified causes of recent natural disasters include climate change, air pollution, and the destruction of ecosystems. Earthquakes, typhoons, droughts and floods are happening at every hour somewhere on the globe, causing enormous losses to individuals and communities worldwide.
According to estimates by the United Nations, losses caused by natural disasters in Asia and the Pacific alone amount to US$ 148.9 billion every year, accounting for 54 per cent of the global losses. The scope and extent of these losses varies by type of disaster (see Fig.1).
Figure 1: Scope of global losses by type of disaster (Unit: percentage)
Source: United Nations, Asia-Pacific Disaster Report 2019, Bangkok.
I escaped from North Korea a few years ago to be resettled in the Free World. Whenever I hear news of natural disasters in North Korea, I vividly remember what I experienced myself while living in my country of birth.
My earliest memories involve a flood I experienced at a young age for the first time in my life, in a summer of the late 1960s. This flood almost swept away our house in Pyongyang, where both the Daedong and the Botong rivers had overflowed their banks.
The Kim regime, which has driven North Korean’s population into starvation and absolute poverty, has been using the four-syllabled word “Ja-yeon Jae-hae” (“natural disaster”) as a shield to rationalize its politics and policies for decades.
Then, I ask myself: “Is the North Korean regime doing enough to protect its citizens from natural disasters?”
Yet, due to the lack of pre-disaster preparedness, an inadequate early warning system and response as well as the insufficient economic resilience, the country is highly vulnerable to natural disasters.
Therefore, the international community has classified North Korea as the 39th most vulnerable country in terms of disaster risk management among the world’s 191 countries. North Korea's INFORM index for risk management, averaging trends over the past three years for the period 2018–2020, is 5.2 out of 10 full points (very high risk). This index is calculated on the basis of each country's exposure to natural disasters and the government's risk management capabilities (see Tab.1).
Table 1: Grouping of 191 countries by risk level (from highest to lowest as measured by the INFORM Risk Index): North Korea belongs to the High Risk Group
Risk level | Number of countries | Country names (ISO3 Country Codes) |
Very High (6.5-10.0) | 15 | SOM, CAF, YEM, SSD, AFG, SYR, TCD, IRQ, COD, SDN NGA, ETH, NER, HTI, UGA |
High (5.0-6.4) | 38 | MLI, PAK, MMR, MOZ, LBY, BDI, KEN, CIV, CMR, BGD PNG, MRT, GTM, TZA, COG, SLE, NPL, IND, COL, PHL LBR, HND, BFA, PRK, MDG, LBN, NIC, IRN, ERI, DJI AGO, ZWE, PSE, MEX, GIN, EGY, TUR, SEN |
Medium (3.5-4.9) | 51 | MWI, ZAF, KHM, UKR, SLB, RWA, IDN, VEN, TGO, PER JOR, GNB, AZE, TLS, TJK, LAO, BEN, ZMB, CHN, BRA BOL, LSO, GMB, GAB, VUT, THA, MAR, GNQ, RUS, SLV ECU, COM, DZA, TON, FSM, KGZ, GEO, SWZ, VNM, NAM GHA, DOM, LKA, MHL, BLZ, KIR, BIH, ARM, PAN, DMA CUB |
Low (2.0-3.4) | 51 | USA, GUY, PRY, NRU, MYS, TUN, BWA, UZB, TUV, SUR SRB, JAM, GRC, BTN, MDA, CYP, CRI, CHL, ALB, WSM FJI, ROU, MNG, TTO, ISR, ARG, TKM, MKD, ITA, CPV SAU, STP, PLW, OMN, MDV, CAN, BGR, JPN, FRA, AUS ATG, ESP, LCA, MNE, BHS, KOR, HRV, SYC, VCT, MUS DEU |
Very Low (0.0-1.9) | 36 | ARE, KNA, MLT, KAZ, HUN, BEL, BLR, BRB, URY, GBR KWT, GRD, POL, SVK, PRT, NZL, BRN, AUT, SWE, LVA CHE, NLD, LTU, IRL, QAT, BHR, SVN, ISL, CZE, DNK NOR, LUX, LIE, EST, FIN, SGP |
Source: Inter-Agency Standing Committee and the European Commission, INFORM report 2020: Shared evidence for managing crisis and disaster, Publication Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2020.
Large and small-scale natural disasters, which occur almost every year in the country, threaten the precious lives and homes of North Korean families and victimize them with tremendous human and material losses.
Recently this year, due to consecutive typhoons and heavy rain, thousands or tens of thousands of homes and large areas of farmland were flooded or completely destroyed in most parts of the country, including both South and North Hwanghae provinces, North Korea's “breadbasket” high-yield grain areas.
Due to rather blunt measures to address the new coronavirus pandemic that broke out earlier this year, the food shortages in North Korea had already reached a serious level, and people’s lives had been significantly affected. On top of that, natural disasters further aggravated the human insecurity of North Koreans. Some claim that the UN sanctions have also taken a toll on the livelihoods of ordinary North Koreans. However, the only way to confirm or refute that claim would be to conduct rapid assessments and other surveys inside the country. So far, the North Korean authorities have been reluctant to allow transparent monitoring by the UN or international NGOs.
The North Korean authorities, as if they recognized the seriousness of the situation, decided to postpone, and possibly cancel, the implementation of the ongoing national economic development plan to focus on repairing the damage caused by natural disasters. New houses are being built in disaster-affected villages, and broken infrastructure is being fixed.
They even go further to brag about the building of new housing units, as if they were meant to provide assistance to people in the disaster-affected areas. However, these are not real post-disaster humanitarian interventions, but just just propaganda aimed to boost the leader’s cult of personality.
These statements by the North Korean government are meaningless. As Koreans would put it, what North Korean authorities are doing is just to “repair the cowshed after losing the cow.” Or, as Anglophones would say, “close the barn door after the horse has bolted.” Disaster preparedness was lacking. Post-disaster interventions were lackluster and meaningless. And regardless of how buoyant they are when they appraise their own work, nobody in North Korea will believe the distorted facts put forth by the North Korean authorities.
2. Natural disasters in North Korea are also Kim regime-made disasters
The government’s primary responsibilities in any part of the world is to protect the lives and safety of its people. Needless to say that each government should play a leading and coordinating role in preparations for mitigating the risks and effects of natural disasters that arise all of sudden, without notice. It is the government’s responsibility to mitigate risk and minimize the damage caused by natural disasters.
The North Korean regime has always adhered to the anachronistic political slogan of “self-sufficiency”, and opted for isolationism to keep itself away from the mainstream international society. The regime has also been prioritizing the “safeguarding of its system” over improving the living standards of the population.
Because of the regime’s wrong way of thinking and erroneous policies, natural disasters in North Korea have had a multiplier effect, inflicting serious blows to the staggering national economy, augmenting chronic economic hardship, and leading to the failure of public welfare and the worsening of the humanitarian crisis.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the economic crisis and food shortages dramatically worsened. Many North Koreans were forced to cut down trees in the mountains and destroy forests to expand farmland and obtain food and fuel necessary for cooking or house heating.
As a result, many forests were devastated and mountains became bare. Eventually, due to massive deforestation, the water storage capacity of the mountains and the soil declined sharply. Deforestation-induced soil erosion turned into soil depletion. Now, even when only a little rain falls, the soil slides down mountain and hill slopes, and the bottom of rivers and reservoirs rises, causing them to easily overflow.
Although the North Korean authorities have made forest rehabilitation as one of their top priorities, reforestation has not been that successful.
According to UN data, the total forest resources in North Korea have been continuously decreasing since 1990, from 6.91 million ha at that time to 6.03 million ha in 2020, representing an average loss of 30,000 ha per year (see Fig.2).
Figure 2: North Korea: Annual net change in area of naturally regenerating and planted forest, by decade, 1990–2020 (Unit: 000s ha)
Source: FAO Global Forest Resources Assessment 2020 Main Report, Rome.
On the other hand, North Korea's rivers and reservoirs have lost their storage capacity and the water resources management system has become so weak that the country is not adequately prepared for floods or droughts.
In addition, due to the outdated technical equipment available, the lack of cooperation with foreign meteorological agencies, and the inconsistency of weather observation data with the international standards, North Korea’s weather forecasting capacity notoriously falls short of predicting any significant weather event. Thus, it is impossible to issue flood warnings in time to conduct evacuations or initiate natural disaster mitigation.
Despite the fact that up to fifty per cent of North Koreans live in rural areas and are engaged in agricultural work, there still exists a large gap in living standards between urban and rural dwellers. Many farmhouses are easily exposed to typhoons as they were built decades ago with low-quality and unstable building materials.
In a centralized society such as North Korea, where the state takes possession of all available resources and controls the supply and use of such resources, disaster risk management can be successful only if that is the will of the leader and the regime.
However, this is not the case in North Korea where a significant share of the national budget is spent for strengthening national defense capabilities. The overall economic structure of the country is organized around the military industry rather than the civilian industry, and enormous human and material resources are devoted to enhancing the military buildup.
North Korea's annual military expenditure as its share of the national GDP goes up and down around the 24 percentage line, which is 8 to 24 times higher than in neighboring countries or countries with a vested interest and presence in the region (see Fig.3).
Figure 3: Military expenditure in North Korea vs. in its neighboring countries, as percentage of Gross Domestic Product, 2007–2017 (Unit: percentage)
In addition, due to the outdated technical equipment available, the lack of cooperation with foreign meteorological agencies, and the inconsistency of weather observation data with the international standards, North Korea’s weather forecasting capacity notoriously falls short of predicting any significant weather event. Thus, it is impossible to issue flood warnings in time to conduct evacuations or initiate natural disaster mitigation.
Despite the fact that up to fifty per cent of North Koreans live in rural areas and are engaged in agricultural work, there still exists a large gap in living standards between urban and rural dwellers. Many farmhouses are easily exposed to typhoons as they were built decades ago with low-quality and unstable building materials.
In a centralized society such as North Korea, where the state takes possession of all available resources and controls the supply and use of such resources, disaster risk management can be successful only if that is the will of the leader and the regime.
However, this is not the case in North Korea where a significant share of the national budget is spent for strengthening national defense capabilities. The overall economic structure of the country is organized around the military industry rather than the civilian industry, and enormous human and material resources are devoted to enhancing the military buildup.
North Korea's annual military expenditure as its share of the national GDP goes up and down around the 24 percentage line, which is 8 to 24 times higher than in neighboring countries or countries with a vested interest and presence in the region (see Fig.3).
Figure 3: Military expenditure in North Korea vs. in its neighboring countries, as percentage of Gross Domestic Product, 2007–2017 (Unit: percentage)
Source: US State Department’s online database on military expenditure, armed forces, GDP, population, labor force, and their ratios, 2007–2017.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un declared publicly in 2012, soon after assuming leadership, that "I will not let my people tighten their belts again”. However, the first nine years of his rule have proved that statement to be an empty promise.
North Korea offers an excellent potential for economic growth with abundant natural resources and a quality labor force. Nevertheless, due to the wrong policy direction dictated by policymakers, the economy has cratered into a deep and chronic crisis. Over ten million people, i.e. 40 per cent of the total population, suffer from chronic malnutrition and famine. A quarter century after the “Arduous March,” the great and tragic famine of the mid-1990s, the country remains a recipient of international humanitarian assistance. (see Fig.4).
Figure 4: Humanitarian assistance provided to North Korea by the international community, 2010–2020 (Unit: million US$)
Source: Financial Tracking Service of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
In fact, the underlying concept of Byung-jin is founded upon the long-standing selfishness of the Kim family and North Korea’s elite groups who are only concerned about forever maintaining their ruling system regardless of what happens to the people, whether they starve or eat, whether they live or die.
While claiming to be to be a political and military power, North Korea has never claimed to be an economic power. Nor has the country ever published any decent statistics on its economic development. This is implicit proof that their policy direction is wrong and that their policies have failed. Unless the regime fundamentally changes course, North Korea will never accomplish the kind of economic prosperity that its neighbors including South Korea have already accomplished over the past few decades.
The North Korean authorities have issued harsh prescriptions for an “80-Day Campaign” to mobilize the entire population in overcoming the triple crises allegedly caused by the economic sanctions, the COVID-19 pandemic and natural disasters.
The North Korean authorities should not place the blame on any abstract factors such as challenges posed by outside forces but on themselves. The regime must assume responsibility for repeatedly failing in disaster risk management and in state affairs. Responsibility for any failure falls on the North Korean leadership. That is the same leadership that failed to choose the right policy direction to repay the people for decades-long unconditional confidence and support.
To help the North Korean authorities in making the right decision, I am suggesting below a few recommendations.
First, the North Korean authorities must boldly choose denuclearization as required by the international community, stop the reckless arms race, and engage in a path for truly safeguarding their regime through taking care of their citizens’ lives, safety and welfare.
Second, the North Korean authorities should increase the transparency of government budgets and policies, reduce military expenditure and increase investments aimed at improving the welfare of their people.
Third, the North Korean authorities should develop strategies that integrate poverty reduction, livelihoods, education, health, regional development, and human security including climate change adaptation and disaster mitigation, with the aim of reducing disaster risk and exposure and increasing the resilience of local communities.
Fourth, the North Korean authorities should establish national development strategies and policies by defining the protection of their citizens’ lives and safety from natural disasters as a main objective of these strategies.
Fifth, the North Korean authorities should incorporate a human-rights-based approach in disaster risk reduction and management and focus on marginalized populations, the elderly, persons with disabilities, women and children, the poor, IDPs, and people in detention, political prisoners in particular.
Sixth, the North Korean authorities should improve the quality and quantity of information available on disaster risk, increase access to such information, improve the early warning system, and involve the broad-based participation of local communities and vulnerable populations in all phases of disaster risk reduction and management, including preparedness, response, prolonged displacement, relocation, recovery and reconstruction.
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